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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

We'll skip the points of agreement.


I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity. If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.

As to managing threats -

there are threats.

Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.

The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required. The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training. My sense is that security should be their primary focus. That means small arms, light vehicles and comms. It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds. Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap.

My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences. All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations. With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.





The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat. At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.

Oka on a large scale.

Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.



Yes.



No. Only if you plan on demolishing the cities. If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.

It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?



I don't question the capability of Canada. It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.

I think it has the skeleton of a Division. And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence. I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary Division. I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity. It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.


And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.
What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars?

There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat.

For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada, but has no intention. Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US. Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps. But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation. What other threats are driving your strident demands?

Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats. Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations. Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely. There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season. Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation, love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves. Good things are also happening.

The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.
 
What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars?

There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat.

For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada, but has no intention. Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US. Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps. But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation. What other threats are driving your strident demands?

Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats. Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations. Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely. There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season. Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation, love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves. Good things are also happening.

The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.
As a former Forester, BIG no thanks to the air defence role. Big no.
 
There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat.

Heh. There's a chuckle. You and my wife. Between the pair of you I'm well aware that I am no position to demand anything.

What I want and what I expect are worlds apart. So I learned a minute ago not to demand anything.

I'll propose a modification to your formula.

Threat at time = t is a function of capability at time = t and intention at time = t.

Capability, intention and time are all variables. Therefore the threat will vary over time. As will capability and intention.

What will the nature of the threat be at time = t? When will it arise? How fast will it appear?

How long does it take to prepare for a revised threat?

Should you prepare for the perceived immediate threat? Or should you prepare for the generic threat?

What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars?

As I noted Canadian ports face aerial nuisances that require constant surveillance of the skies and recourse to a variety of effectors. Most nuisance threats don't require effectors that will kill people. But because the scale of response is less it doesn't mean that the sense or command requirement is any less. Civil airports surveilling their grounds and skies to track everything from birds and runway intruders to windshear events so that they are in a position to react. Even if the reaction is just a broadcast warning. On occasion they might want a more lively response. A klaxon, a popper, an acoustic beam, a microwave or even, potentially a laser to discretely knock down some kid's quadcopter that has strayed onto the airfield. Nuisance management.

That does not require a military response. But conveniently the architecture for nuisance management is not a million miles away from managing a military response.

Most of the system I am envisaging is under civilian control, NAVCan control and/or NORAD control. What I am proposing is that the military provide the means to plug military effectors into civilian controlled system when the threat warrants, and if necessary, NORAD or other military command takes control.

Not necessarily when, but perhaps if.

They might come in handy some day.

In the meantime those effectors, if not required at home might be welcome in places like Taipei, Riga, Lviv or Bucharest. Or even Svalbard or Attu.

The military air defence then might find itself carrying a version of the civil system into the field with its own sensors and command system - but using the same effectors.

For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada,
Agreed. Today.

but has no intention.
Agreed. Today.

Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US.
Is that still true in 40 years? Even 20?

Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps.
Agreed. Today.

But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation.
Agreed. Today. Although I understand we are pretty much on our own if Russia decided to launch on Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal. Not sure why they would do that but forever is a long time.

What other threats are driving your strident demands?
Am I making demands? Stridently?
I thought I was making an argument. Strenuously.

Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats.
I accept that you are managing the current threat level adequately.

Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations.
Thank you for confirming my understanding.

Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely.
Agreed.

There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season.
And that is a good thing as far as I am concerned. Although I sense that a number of people on this site are not thrilled at effort spent in that regard.

Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation,
That would include me.
love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves.
That would not include me. I don't hate any of the organizations. I have distinct reservations about the way they are manned, equipped, trained and organized.

Good things are also happening.
I'm glad.

My primary concern, gleaned from this site, is that there is a distinct lack of manpower and a shallow recruiting pool. My belief is that by focusing on the expeditionary army the army in particular and the CAF in general is not moving in sync with the general population and that is making it harder to find recruits. To put it another way, I am suggesting that the CAF open itself up to recruiting more Zombies. And perhaps, out of that herd of Zombies you might find those willing and able to take on a more aggressive posture with the expeditionary forces.

Why machine guns and mortars? Beyond the fact that they are useful in a variety of scenarios, they, along with rifles, grenades and M72s supply a suite of weapons useful in all levels of warfare and provide a training base for section, platoon and company training.

The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.

I'm glad the Foresters are gainfully employed but you misunderstand me if you think I meant that they should be turned into anti-aircraft gunners. I was suggesting that they be prepared to provide security to anti-aircraft gunners.

Anti-aircraft gunners that could be employed tying their guns into Owen Sound, or North Bay, or Toronto, Vancouver, Darlington, Halifax or Alert..... of Riga. In all of those places I would expect that an infantry company would be attached to a deployed air defence troop, or battery, to supply local security.

Those security troops could be adjuncts to the Manoeuver Brigade. They might even supply recruits for the Brigade. They would certainly count towards NATO tripwire forces and solidarity... and they might even contribute to protecting the tripwire.
 
PS

What domestic threats do you expect to counter with Leos and M777s?

I'll stipulate that the LAVs, ACSVs and TAPVs have domestic utility in support of the RCMP.
 
The CAF does not want PRes crewed LAV doing anything ALEA. It doesn’t even want to see LAV doing anything ALEA with Reg F crews.
 
Heh. There's a chuckle. You and my wife. Between the pair of you I'm well aware that I am no position to demand anything.

What I want and what I expect are worlds apart. So I learned a minute ago not to demand anything.

I'll propose a modification to your formula.

Threat at time = t is a function of capability at time = t and intention at time = t.

Capability, intention and time are all variables. Therefore the threat will vary over time. As will capability and intention.

What will the nature of the threat be at time = t? When will it arise? How fast will it appear?

How long does it take to prepare for a revised threat?

Should you prepare for the perceived immediate threat? Or should you prepare for the generic threat?



As I noted Canadian ports face aerial nuisances that require constant surveillance of the skies and recourse to a variety of effectors. Most nuisance threats don't require effectors that will kill people. But because the scale of response is less it doesn't mean that the sense or command requirement is any less. Civil airports surveilling their grounds and skies to track everything from birds and runway intruders to windshear events so that they are in a position to react. Even if the reaction is just a broadcast warning. On occasion they might want a more lively response. A klaxon, a popper, an acoustic beam, a microwave or even, potentially a laser to discretely knock down some kid's quadcopter that has strayed onto the airfield. Nuisance management.

That does not require a military response. But conveniently the architecture for nuisance management is not a million miles away from managing a military response.

Most of the system I am envisaging is under civilian control, NAVCan control and/or NORAD control. What I am proposing is that the military provide the means to plug military effectors into civilian controlled system when the threat warrants, and if necessary, NORAD or other military command takes control.

Not necessarily when, but perhaps if.

They might come in handy some day.

In the meantime those effectors, if not required at home might be welcome in places like Taipei, Riga, Lviv or Bucharest. Or even Svalbard or Attu.

The military air defence then might find itself carrying a version of the civil system into the field with its own sensors and command system - but using the same effectors.


Agreed. Today.


Agreed. Today.


Is that still true in 40 years? Even 20?


Agreed. Today.


Agreed. Today. Although I understand we are pretty much on our own if Russia decided to launch on Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal. Not sure why they would do that but forever is a long time.


Am I making demands? Stridently?
I thought I was making an argument. Strenuously.


I accept that you are managing the current threat level adequately.


Thank you for confirming my understanding.


Agreed.


And that is a good thing as far as I am concerned. Although I sense that a number of people on this site are not thrilled at effort spent in that regard.


That would include me.

That would not include me. I don't hate any of the organizations. I have distinct reservations about the way they are manned, equipped, trained and organized.


I'm glad.

My primary concern, gleaned from this site, is that there is a distinct lack of manpower and a shallow recruiting pool. My belief is that by focusing on the expeditionary army the army in particular and the CAF in general is not moving in sync with the general population and that is making it harder to find recruits. To put it another way, I am suggesting that the CAF open itself up to recruiting more Zombies. And perhaps, out of that herd of Zombies you might find those willing and able to take on a more aggressive posture with the expeditionary forces.

Why machine guns and mortars? Beyond the fact that they are useful in a variety of scenarios, they, along with rifles, grenades and M72s supply a suite of weapons useful in all levels of warfare and provide a training base for section, platoon and company training.



I'm glad the Foresters are gainfully employed but you misunderstand me if you think I meant that they should be turned into anti-aircraft gunners. I was suggesting that they be prepared to provide security to anti-aircraft gunners.

Anti-aircraft gunners that could be employed tying their guns into Owen Sound, or North Bay, or Toronto, Vancouver, Darlington, Halifax or Alert..... of Riga. In all of those places I would expect that an infantry company would be attached to a deployed air defence troop, or battery, to supply local security.

Those security troops could be adjuncts to the Manoeuver Brigade. They might even supply recruits for the Brigade. They would certainly count towards NATO tripwire forces and solidarity... and they might even contribute to protecting the tripwire.
You'll have to forgive me for not engaging in a line by line post-dissection fest with you.

I will say, though, that domestic operations are not the only task of the Reserves and I apologize if my post gave that impression. All components of the CAF have the task of domestic operations. We have immediate response units across the country that may have been on expeditionary operations the year before.

Our expenditure on defence must be to counter credible threats and to prepare to engage in likely operations.
 
You'll have to forgive me for not engaging in a line by line post-dissection fest with you.

I will say, though, that domestic operations are not the only task of the Reserves and I apologize if my post gave that impression. All components of the CAF have the task of domestic operations. We have immediate response units across the country that may have been on expeditionary operations the year before.

Our expenditure on defence must be to counter credible threats and to prepare to engage in likely operations.
Cheers.
 
The CAF does not want PRes crewed LAV doing anything ALEA. It doesn’t even want to see LAV doing anything ALEA with Reg F crews.

I understand that. I am saying that despite that I personally find the LAV and TAPV vehicles well suited to operating in the Canadian urban and rural environment. That does not include the bush, muskeg, the tundra, mountains or high arctic.
 
I understand that. I am saying that despite that I personally find the LAV and TAPV vehicles well suited to operating in the Canadian urban and rural environment. That does not include the bush, muskeg, the tundra, mountains or high arctic.
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In other words the other 75% of the country.
Ah well in the entire history of warfare no one has ever fought in such terrain so I suspect we're pretty safe.
 
Canada's Priorities.


1662395890174.png

Total uniformed employees - ~230,000

The governments of Canada hire as many police officers as they do military personnel. And they hire a similar number of firefighters and paramedics combined.





1662396461385.png

80,000 firefighter volunteers
18,000 SAR volunteers
30,000 Reserves.

128,000 Civilian Volunteers.

3 to 4 times as many Canadians willing to put themselves at risk to help other Canadians for free as are willing to join the Reserves for pay.

What the CAF and the Reserves are selling, Canadians are not buying.
 

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Taking the reorganization of the Reserves a step further the balance of the Reserve Regiments work pretty well for creating 2 x 10/90 Reserve Light Brigades with 4 x Territorial Battalions each. This could be your mobilization force if ever required, doubling the size of the light forces to a four Brigade Light Division worth of Infantry.

For non-mobilization situations these Territorial Battalions can be used for any variety of domestic operations required. Coincidentally, it just happened to work out to be the case that for each of the groupings of 3 x Companies (Reserve Regiments) in the proposed Territorial Battalions just one of the three units have an existing StAR "Mission Task" assigned. This same Mission Task could be extended to the other two Regiments in each Territorial Battalion giving each the ability to force generate a full Company-sized specialty unit.

2022.09.05 - 4 x Light Brigades.png
 
Further to the task of finding Reserves to organize.

  • In 2018, over 24 million people volunteered, accounting for 79% of Canadians aged 15 and older.
  • Volunteers dedicated approximately 5 billion hours to their volunteer activities, a number of hours equivalent to over 2.5 million full-time year-round jobs.

That suggests that the majority of Canadians are heavily invested in their communities and want to help/assist/serve.
They are willing to spend, on average 200 hours of their own time, beyond the typical 2000 hours of the typical work year in that service.

200 hours is
50 4 hour Wednesday nights, or
25 8 hour shifts (12 weekend days) or
5 48 hour weekend exercises or
5 40 hour work weeks or
8 24 hour days.

Ukrainians are being trained in 3 to 5 weeks - 500 to 800 hours.

The Danes training opportunities (it is in English)




Curiously although 24,000,000 Canadians volunteer domestically every year on 65,000 youngsters have volunteered for overseas assignments in the past 60 years since the era of Lotta Hitschmanova.

Since the 1960s, over 65,000 young Canadians have participated in volunteer abroad
programs; this number continues to expand each year as young people travel to
developing countries for a variety of reasons that range from self-discovery and
adventure to the desire to make a difference (Tiessen, 2008).


Another indication, perhaps, that emphasising foreign service deployments is not attracting young Canadians to the Forces?
 
Danish Home Guard Training

Basic

As a new volunteer, you must complete our statutory basic training of a minimum of 250 hours , unless you have previously been conscripted . It is a basic military training with four modules that you must complete within the first three years . (See figure below).

During the course you will learn , among other things, on weapons, first aid, combat and tactics as well as guard duty. Each module lasts 4-9 days, but you can also choose to complete the entire course over three weeks at the Home Guard's bootcamp.

The training is divided into three different tracks: the Marine Home Guard, the Air Force Home Guard and the Army Home Guard (including the Police and Business Home Guard). For all three tracks, it is possible to complete modules 1 and 4 in all the Home Guard's local subdivisions .


Specialised

When you have completed the basic training, or if you have previously been conscripted, you have the opportunity to continue your development with our specialized training and courses. We have many different ones, so there are good chances that you can build on your training and education with something that matches both your interests and your level of ambition .

For example, you can train as :

  • Shipmaster
  • Navigator
  • Security guard specialist
  • Dog handler
  • Medical assistant
  • IT commander
  • Press and recruitment officer

Leadership

If you would like to continue your development further, you can take one of our leadership courses, which give you a deeper understanding of the dynamics of group collaboration . The goal is to develop your leadership skills through a focus on stronger group cooperation and relationship building .


The result of the training is a number of tools that are useful in the Home Guard , but which are also of great value in the business world.

On our management courses, you learn about:

  • Decision-making processes
  • Systematic problem solving
  • The conditions of man
  • See, listen and understand
  • Influence and co-determination
  • Assumption about people
  • Communication options
  • Communication problems
 
Another indication, perhaps, that emphasizing foreign service deployments is not attracting young Canadians to the Forces?
I think you are missing the likelihood that maybe it’s just the CAF in general that doesn’t appeal to those demographics.
 
I think you are missing the likelihood that maybe it’s just the CAF in general that doesn’t appeal to those demographics.

That's possible. But why?

There are apparently a lot of people, including young people, that are willing to volunteer (for free) their time in service of the community. A couple of hundred hours a year. That corresponds to a Danish Homeguard Basic Training Course of 3 weeks and an Anglo Ukrainian Basic Defence Course of 3 weeks.

What is wrong with the CAF's terms of service that youngsters would rather volunteer for SAR or Firefighting or a multitude of other activities?

And I don't think it is just about tattoos, piercings, hair-colour or gender issues.
 
That's possible. But why?

There are apparently a lot of people, including young people, that are willing to volunteer (for free) their time in service of the community. A couple of hundred hours a year. That corresponds to a Danish Homeguard Basic Training Course of 3 weeks and an Anglo Ukrainian Basic Defence Course of 3 weeks.

What is wrong with the CAF's terms of service that youngsters would rather volunteer for SAR or Firefighting or a multitude of other activities?

And I don't think it is just about tattoos, piercings, hair-colour or gender issues.
Military, weapons, and war…
 
There should still be a quarter to half of the population available as a recruiting pool.

Or 6 to 12 million volunteers.

Canadians are split, however, on whether they would go to war with Russia over Ukraine. Thirty-two per cent of respondents oppose entering the conflict, and 13 per cent somewhat oppose joining the fray. Twenty-one per cent would support fighting Russia over Ukraine, and another 26 per cent would somewhat support this course of action.

But support for war rises if Moscow were to invade another country, the poll found. Two-thirds of Canadians would support or somewhat support war with Russia in that scenario, with 41 per cent supportive and 25 per cent somewhat supportive. Sixteen per cent of Canadians would still oppose war, and 11 per cent would somewhat oppose it.

The Nanos poll found significant differences between older and younger adults on this question. Only 31 per cent of Canadians 18 to 34 would support war with Russia under this scenario, with another 25 per cent somewhat supporting it.

 
Assuming no increase in Reg Force Infantry PYs the proposed structure for the Light Brigades uses around 3502 of the 5238 PYs currently allocated. That would leave 1736 PYs for the Mech Forces.

With that you could do something like the following to create a single Mechanized Brigade with 3 x Combined Arms Battalions (at 100% Reg Force manning).

These 3 x Battalions would rotate readiness to provide the eFP Latvia Mechanized Company. The reduced overall number of LAV Battalions would allow you to pre-position the tank Squadron and the additional LAV Company to allow us to fly-over the balance of the high-readiness Battalion to increase our Latvia deployment to a full combined arms Battalion.

We could also have a LAV Training Company at each of Shilo, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown to allow the Light Infantry troops stationed there to cross-train on the LAVs to provide additional mechanized troops if required.

Lastly, there would be enough LAVs left over to allow a Battalion's worth to be re-configured to provide a SHORAD Regiment and another Battalion's worth to be converted to specialty vehicles (120mm Mortars, ATGMs, UAV/Loitering Munition launchers, etc.) to equip the Weapon Detachments/CS Company for the Mechanized Brigade.

2022.09.05 - Mech Brigade.png
 
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