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A U.S. report casts a pall over conditions in Kandahar
JEFFREY SIMPSON
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080624.wwcosimp24/BNStory/Afghanistan/home
jsimpson@globeandmail.com
E-mail Jeffrey Simpson | Read Bio | Latest Columns
June 24, 2008 at 7:43 AM EDT
Canadians are in Afghanistan, yes, but, more important, they are in Kandahar city and province.
Kandahar was and, to some extent remains, the heartland of the Taliban and its allies. It was there that the Taliban movement began, politically and intellectually; it is to there the Taliban wishes to return. It was to there that the Taliban invited al-Qaeda and other "foreign fighters"; it is there that "foreign fighters" were discovered in the battle north of the city last week.
Saturday, another roadside bomb struck a convoy west of Kandahar, killing four unidentified soldiers and wounding two others. In Kandahar city last week, militants successfully stormed a prison, freeing all who had been incarcerated there. Taliban from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and "foreign fighters," were then pushed from villages north of the city. Perhaps a hundred or so were killed; the rest melted away.
Canada and its NATO allies hope the Afghan National Army can do more of the fighting. Certainly, this has been the strategy propounded by the Canadian government.
The task force chaired by former deputy prime minister John Manley supported this strategy. Said the task force members: "The Afghan National Army has shown measurable improvements." The army had reached 47,000 troops and planned to deploy at least 70,000 by 2010.
Alas, that optimism was not reflected by the General Accountability Office of the U.S. Congress. It reported last week that, despite a U.S. investment of more than $10-billion since 2002, only two of 105 ANA units are capable of operating effectively.
The report says the ANA lacks equipment, leaders, recruits, trainers and weapons. Part of the shortfall in trainers and weapons is tied to U.S. deployments in Iraq, the conflict that still dominates U.S. spending, strategy and deployment of personnel.
The ANA, despite this assessment, remains far ahead of the Afghan National Police that is undermanned, underpaid, deeply corrupt and generally ineffective. The GAO found that none of the ANP's 433 units were "fully capable," and 12 per cent were "capable" only with coalition support. Put another way, of the 433 units, 381 were "not capable."
From weekly reports of ANP detachments, the GAO found that 94 per cent reported problems with pay and 87 per cent with corruption, and that 85 per cent were attacked or working in dangerous places that led to high rates of desertion.
It would be reassuring to believe that the conflict has turned a corner, but it has not in Kandahar and other troubled provinces of the country's south and east. The Taliban indigenous to Afghanistan and the Taliban in Pakistan have changed tactics, relying much more on suicide bombings and ambushes than pitched battles.
They are using an asymmetrical military strategy that they believe, if sustained, will exceed the willingness of foreigners to remain. The best antidote to their strategy would be a robust Afghan military and police, but as last week's GAO report demonstrated, Afghanistan is a long way from having either.
In Pakistan, an entire structure of institutions produces young men (and women) ready to blow themselves up, with payments paid to families of the bombers from profits extorted or made from the opium trade NATO has been incapable of halting. As long as the Pakistani government is powerless or unwilling to combat these institutions, a constant stream of recruits will cross the border into Kandahar.
The result has been that in the first three months of 2008, there were 704 Taliban attacks from suicide bombings, ambushes and other kinds of assaults, compared to 424 in a similar period last year. The incidence of violence is increasing, especially in and around the epicentre of the Afghanistan fighting: Kandahar.
This year, there has been an average of 18 suicide attacks a month, twice the average in 2006 and 2007. Remember that in the entire Afghan war against the Soviets, there is no record of a suicide bombing. Suicide attacks have arrived courtesy of imported but now ingrained al-Qaeda ideology, the example of Iraq and the teachings of various religious communities.
Conventional military deployments are next to useless against suicide bombings, which cannot win a war but can terrorize indigenous populations and demoralize others whose troops have been sent to faraway places.
JEFFREY SIMPSON
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080624.wwcosimp24/BNStory/Afghanistan/home
jsimpson@globeandmail.com
E-mail Jeffrey Simpson | Read Bio | Latest Columns
June 24, 2008 at 7:43 AM EDT
Canadians are in Afghanistan, yes, but, more important, they are in Kandahar city and province.
Kandahar was and, to some extent remains, the heartland of the Taliban and its allies. It was there that the Taliban movement began, politically and intellectually; it is to there the Taliban wishes to return. It was to there that the Taliban invited al-Qaeda and other "foreign fighters"; it is there that "foreign fighters" were discovered in the battle north of the city last week.
Saturday, another roadside bomb struck a convoy west of Kandahar, killing four unidentified soldiers and wounding two others. In Kandahar city last week, militants successfully stormed a prison, freeing all who had been incarcerated there. Taliban from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and "foreign fighters," were then pushed from villages north of the city. Perhaps a hundred or so were killed; the rest melted away.
Canada and its NATO allies hope the Afghan National Army can do more of the fighting. Certainly, this has been the strategy propounded by the Canadian government.
The task force chaired by former deputy prime minister John Manley supported this strategy. Said the task force members: "The Afghan National Army has shown measurable improvements." The army had reached 47,000 troops and planned to deploy at least 70,000 by 2010.
Alas, that optimism was not reflected by the General Accountability Office of the U.S. Congress. It reported last week that, despite a U.S. investment of more than $10-billion since 2002, only two of 105 ANA units are capable of operating effectively.
The report says the ANA lacks equipment, leaders, recruits, trainers and weapons. Part of the shortfall in trainers and weapons is tied to U.S. deployments in Iraq, the conflict that still dominates U.S. spending, strategy and deployment of personnel.
The ANA, despite this assessment, remains far ahead of the Afghan National Police that is undermanned, underpaid, deeply corrupt and generally ineffective. The GAO found that none of the ANP's 433 units were "fully capable," and 12 per cent were "capable" only with coalition support. Put another way, of the 433 units, 381 were "not capable."
From weekly reports of ANP detachments, the GAO found that 94 per cent reported problems with pay and 87 per cent with corruption, and that 85 per cent were attacked or working in dangerous places that led to high rates of desertion.
It would be reassuring to believe that the conflict has turned a corner, but it has not in Kandahar and other troubled provinces of the country's south and east. The Taliban indigenous to Afghanistan and the Taliban in Pakistan have changed tactics, relying much more on suicide bombings and ambushes than pitched battles.
They are using an asymmetrical military strategy that they believe, if sustained, will exceed the willingness of foreigners to remain. The best antidote to their strategy would be a robust Afghan military and police, but as last week's GAO report demonstrated, Afghanistan is a long way from having either.
In Pakistan, an entire structure of institutions produces young men (and women) ready to blow themselves up, with payments paid to families of the bombers from profits extorted or made from the opium trade NATO has been incapable of halting. As long as the Pakistani government is powerless or unwilling to combat these institutions, a constant stream of recruits will cross the border into Kandahar.
The result has been that in the first three months of 2008, there were 704 Taliban attacks from suicide bombings, ambushes and other kinds of assaults, compared to 424 in a similar period last year. The incidence of violence is increasing, especially in and around the epicentre of the Afghanistan fighting: Kandahar.
This year, there has been an average of 18 suicide attacks a month, twice the average in 2006 and 2007. Remember that in the entire Afghan war against the Soviets, there is no record of a suicide bombing. Suicide attacks have arrived courtesy of imported but now ingrained al-Qaeda ideology, the example of Iraq and the teachings of various religious communities.
Conventional military deployments are next to useless against suicide bombings, which cannot win a war but can terrorize indigenous populations and demoralize others whose troops have been sent to faraway places.