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British Army Surgeon Blasts Delay In Treating Troops

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Top medic blasts delay in treating troops
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/17/ntroops117.xml
By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent, Sunday Telegraph Last Updated: 1:09am BST 18/06/2007

Wounded British troops are being evacuated from the battlefield more slowly than the Americans managed in Vietnam 40 years ago, one of the Army's most senior surgeons has revealed.

In a withering attack on defence medical policy, Lt Col Paul Parker condemned the treatment of injured troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as being "excessively slow". He blamed the delays on "too much middle management".

Several soldiers have died in Afghanistan following delays in deploying a helicopter and medical crew, The Sunday Telegraph has learnt.

Col Parker, an orthopaedic surgeon who has served on operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and Sierra Leone, said a fundamental failing of British defence policy was that the military still lacked a "dedicated all-weather medical helicopter fleet", specifically designed to rescue battlefield casualties.

He also said that British hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan could not cope with mass casualty emergencies and could run out of blood, oxygen and drugs if more than two seriously wounded troops arrived at the same time.

Col Parker, 45, who is parachute-trained and has served on numerous special forces operations, is the first British officer publicly to voice his concerns over the treatment of casualties.

Writing in the Royal Army Medical Corps Journal, he said: "In Vietnam, wounded soldiers arrived in hospital within 25 minutes of injury. In Iraq in 2005, that figure is 110 minutes, on Operation Herrick IV, (Afghanistan 2006 ) the average pre-hospital time was seven hours. A casevac [casualty evacuation] request has to go through too many layers of command. There seems little point in providing high-technology in-hospital care when our patients still take several hours to travel a few miles to us.

"We use support or anti-tank helicopters that are re-roled on an ad hoc basis for the critical care and transport of our sickest patients. We still do not have a dedicated all-weather military helicopter evacuation fleet. Should we not be asking why? We have gone backwards in terms of our evacuation time-lines."

Col Parker said that the limitations of the medical facilities available in Afghanistan were such that just two seriously injured casualties could "exhaust" the available blood, drugs and oxygen kept at the main medical centre in Camp Bastion in only "17 hours".

He described the British ambulances as "antediluvian" and revealed that the laboratory at Camp Bastion, which is used to match blood and test samples, had to close between 11.30am and 3.30pm because the air-conditioning system could not keep the temperature below 97F (36C).

He also revealed that there had been no CT scanner, which is used in the diagnosis of brain injury, in the field hospital in Afghanistan for more than a year. A unit finally arrived in Helmand province this month.

Last year, Tony Blair promised that commanders in Afghanistan could have whatever equipment they needed to achieve their mission. He said in a radio interview: "Whatever package they want, we will do."

A senior colleague of Col Parker said that his report had the support of every member of the defence medical services and that it was regarded by the Ministry of Defence as an "inconvenient truth".

Last year, Cpl Mark Wright and six other soldiers spent six hours in a minefield in Afghanistan because no suitable helicopter was available to rescue them. Cpl Wright died of his injuries and three survivors had legs amputated.

In a statement, Lt Gen Louis Lillywhite, the Surgeon General and the head of the Defence Medical Service, said: "The care that we provide is equal to that which would be expected in any major trauma centre in Europe and the USA.

Helicopters are always available when required and are manned by highly qualified medical teams. It is damaging to the morale of our troops to falsely suggest that the care is otherwise than excellent."
 
+1

Most armies tend to underestimate the huge demands for medical support that operational deployments create until the real bullets fly...
 
Switch "commanders" for "armies" in your statement, and you would be absolutely correct.
 
The UK Surgeon General responded to the above article with a letter (to The Telegraph)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/06/24/nosplit/dt2401.xml
When Lt Col Paul Parker expressed the fear that "British hospitals in Iraq and Afghanistan could run out of blood, oxygen and drugs if more than two seriously wounded troops arrived at the same time" he was describing a type of medical unit not currently deployed (News, June 17). There are detailed plans to make sure we do not run out of supplies.

Col Parker also criticised the lack of a dedicated medical helicopter fleet. I have not asked for dedicated helicopters, nor do I want them, as our military personnel have priority access to a range of helicopters 24 hours a day. It takes longer to helicopter people to hospital in Afghanistan than it did in Vietnam simply because the distances that we fly are much greater. We take specialist medical teams and equipment in a helicopter to the patient in the battlefield, rather than wait for them to get to hospital, and many lives are saved when they would have been lost in the "Vietnam era".

Defence ministers have told me that should more resources be required, I need only to ask.

(Lt Gen) Louis Lillywhite, Surgeon General, Ministry of Defence, London SW1


But all he may have done was open himself up to further criticism.

Hero Falklands medic criticises military care
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/07/01/nmedic101.xml
By Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent, Sunday Telegraph Last Updated: 2:00am BST 02/07/2007

A celebrated war hero has accused the head of Britain's Defence Medical Services of "complacency" over the treatment of wounded soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Surgeon Capt Rick Jolly, the only serviceman to be decorated by both sides in the Falklands War, questioned claims made by Lt Gen Louis Lillywhite, the Surgeon General, that there is no need to deploy extra helicopters to lift injured troops from the battlefield in Afghanistan.

Dr Jolly, who was in charge of the Field Hospital at Ajax Bay during the Falklands War, where the lives of 580 British and Argentinian troops were saved, says that the time taken to rescue injured troops from the battlefield is as critical today as it was during the South Atlantic campaign 25 years ago.

In an article for this newspaper, Dr Jolly, 61, writes: "If we are going to be in Afghanistan for the long run, then the Surgeon General's apparent complacency over his lack of helicopters is baffling.

"He needs more 'lift and shift' capability to cope with the potential loads. He is on record as saying that the politicians have promised the resources required. If he takes his responsibilities seriously, then he should be asking them for more dedicated helicopters - now."

Dr Jolly, who was awarded an OBE in the South Atlantic Honours List and later given the equivalent Order of May (Orden de Majo) by the Argentine Government, also argues that medical teams based at Camp Bastion in Helmand, Afghanistan, where the British Army's field hospital is based, would struggle to cope with a large number of casualties. He warns that in war, unexpected casualties can quickly overwhelm small field hospitals that are not properly equipped and manned.

Citing his own experiences, Dr Jolly, who spent 25 years in the Royal Marines and the Fleet Air Arm, said that the field hospital at Ajax Bay had to deal with 160 casualties, many with appalling burns after the disaster at Fitzroy, a settlement on East Falkland, when the two Royal Navy ships were bombed by the Argentine air force.

Dr Jolly's comments follow the publication of a letter by Lt Gen Lillywhite in last week's Sunday Telegraph in which he wrote: "I have not asked for dedicated helicopters, nor do I want them, as our military personnel have priority access to a range of helicopters 24 hours a day ... Defence ministers have told me that should more resources be required, I need only to ask".

That letter was written in an effort to rebut claims made by a senior Army surgeon that British troops are being evacuated from the battlefield more slowly than the Americans managed in Vietnam 40 years ago.

The Army Surgeon, Lt Col Paul Parker, described the treatment of injured troops in Iraq and Afghanistan as "excessively slow", blaming the delays on "too much middle management". Col Parker made his outspoken comments in an article published in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps after serving in Afghanistan, where several soldiers have died after delays in deploying a helicopter and medical crew.

Last year, in one of the most controversial incidents of the war in Afghanistan, Cpl Mark Wright and six other soldiers spent six hours in a minefield in Afghanistan because no suitable helicopter was available to rescue them. Cpl Wright died and three survivors were forced to have legs amputated.

Lt Gen Lillywhite's comments prompted a flood of letters from readers who were aghast to learn that the Army's most senior medical officer had not asked for extra helicopters for use in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Among them was retired Army Major Peter Lenthall who wrote: "The complacent letter by the Surgeon General defending the current disarray of the Army medical Services is breathtaking."


This is Dr. Jolly's article.

This complacency will cost us lives in battle
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2007/07/01/do0107.xml
By Rick Jolly  Last Updated: 12:01am BST 01/07/2007

'I have not asked for dedicated helicopters, nor do I want them," says the Surgeon General, Lt Gen Louis Lillywhite. In 1974, like the Surgeon General, I was serving as a regimental medical officer in Belfast. His red-bereted medics and my "green-lidded" boys co-operated to good effect. Eight years later, while he was at Army Staff College, I commanded the field hospital at Ajax Bay, during the land battles of the Falklands campaign. Part of my team came from the Airborne medics of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

We soon became known as the "Red and Green Life Machine" because word spread that every wounded soldier who reached us alive, despite often terrible injuries, made it out alive to the hospital ship Uganda. Only three of our 580 WIA (Wounded in Action) casualties subsequently became DOW (Died of Wounds). The newest generation of medics can call us "old dinosaurs" if they like, but the 580-to-3 ratio is the standard they must beat first.

My boys and I had but a single purpose: to make sure no wounded marine, paratrooper, guardsman or Gurkha succumbed to his injuries. Nearly 200 enemy wounded were also treated with the same considerations, inspired by the "humanity in victory" that Nelson had prayed for on the morning of his death off Cape Trafalgar. The primitive conditions of dirt and poor lighting, and the danger from two unexploded bombs, were our constant companions, but these were of little importance to us. We were there for our friends in the front line, chums who all had a real chance of surviving if they became battlefield casualties. That wasn't solely down to us, of course. The unstinting efforts of our support helicopter force and the hospital ship were also critically important. It was a team effort.

While I don't believe that the superb personal qualities of our combat medics have changed at all since then, I'm delighted to see the way that their professional knowledge and expertise have increased. A recent 25th anniversary visit to my old unit revealed all sorts of minaturised diagnostic and specialist monitoring kit - but still in a tent.

While it was a thrill to meet these confident young men and women and hear about their experiences in Afghanistan, I could not help worrying about one unchanging problem: getting the casualty from the point of wounding and back to definitive surgical care. The story of Corporal Mark Wright GC, as reported in this newspaper, filled me with dismay. To hear that when the casevac helicopter eventually arrived, it lacked the winching gear to lift the terribly wounded Para from the minefield he was lying in, was heartbreaking. My anguish is personal. I have looked down from a helicopter at two of HMS Ardent's crew who would have drowned had they not been winched up, as if by the Archangel Gabriel as one of them put it, in a rescue so movingly described at the Falklands commemoration on Horseguards a fortnight ago.

At the end of the Second World War, the four key factors in battlefield casualty treatment were: surgeons close to the front line; blood transfusion; rapid rearward evacuation by air; and (with absolutely no apologies to the PC polizei) female nurses. Just one of those factors has changed significantly.

In Korea, light helicopters became available in sufficient numbers to make a difference to extraction times over difficult terrain. Who can forget the haunting images that opened all those brilliant M*A*S*H episodes? Vietnam then brought the dedicated Hueys that saved countless lives. Today's battlefield medical support helicopters have improved further, but only in quality, not quantity. My Army friends tell me that there are two "medical" CH-47 Chinooks allocated to the main hospital at Camp Bastion, but that they are not under direct command as mine were. In theatre, delay can be significant. The two Chinooks are at immediate notice to launch, but an authorisation request must first be passed up, and then returned down a variety of command chains.

Both aircraft then deploy, in mutual support, with a varied equipment and skill mix embarked. This is all splendidly tailored stuff, but only when casualty numbers are as small as they have been so far, thank goodness. What would happen if the present system was suddenly faced with the consequences of a full-on firefight like 2 Para's battle for Goose Green: 48 wounded "Toms", some almost ex-sanguinated? Could mass casualties like those from the disaster at Fitzroy on June 8, 1982 be coped with? Then, 160 mainly burns cases arrived in Ajax Bay over the space of two hours, and had to be transported out to the hospital ship the following morning. Officially, no helicopters were available, but my Fleet Air Arm friends managed to achieve the task for me without compromising their other duties.

Who knows what lies around the corner? If we really are going to be in Afghanistan for the long run, then the Surgeon General's apparent complacency over his lack of helicopters is baffling. He needs more "lift and shift" capability to cope with the potential loads. He is on record as saying that the politicians have promised the resources required. If he takes his responsibilities seriously, then he should be asking for more dedicated helicopters - now.

• Dr Rick Jolly is a retired Royal Navy medical officer. His diary of the Falklands field hospital, The Red and Green Life Machine, has just been expanded and republished and is available through www.redandgreen.co.uk






 
Interesting discussion. I have worked with both Lillywhite and Jolly in my dim and distant past. Lillywhite was the Fd Amb Comd for 5 AB Bde, Jolly was with 3 Cdo Bde. They both know what they're talking about, and they each seem to have a completely different take on the problem that could be described as an extension of the 'PARA vs. Royal Marine' ideological tussle....
 
Yes they do have different perspectives.  But not having met Gen Lillywhite and only having met (then) Surgeon Commander Jolly at one of the many presentations he gave following the Falklands War I am unable to compare the qualities of these two men.  At least Jolly didn't defend the somewhat (IMO) odd protocol (supposedly championed by the Para RMO in the Falklands) of infusing fluids rectally if unable to establish an IV. 

But I did get an impression from reading Jolly's article that he holds Lillywhite in low esteem because of his career path.
Eight years later, while he was at Army Staff College, I commanded the field hospital at Ajax Bay, during the land battles of the Falklands campaign.
But I also formed the impression (those many years ago when I heard him speak) that while he undoubtedly did a very good job during the Falklands campaign and was an entertaining and knowledgeable speaker,  he was a bit full of himself when he spoke of it.
 
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