I am sorry to sound like a Johnny-one-note but it is a note that I have been sounding for many years now, long before Ferguson rediscovered/made fashionable Empire. The Brits succeeded for as long as they did because they did more things right than wrong
One of the things they did right was figure out how to govern/control-reward millions of people with thousands of "overlords".
"Between 1858 and 1947 there were seldom more than 1,000 members of the covenanted (qualified, authorized and British) Civil Service, compared with a total population which, by the end of British rule, exceeded 400 million."
Ferguson, Empire p.184
"....much larger tier of bureaucracy below them. This was the uncovenanted civil service, composed of Indians, and it was they who took responsibility for the day-to-day administration of each District's local talukas and tahsils (chiefs?). There were 4,000 Indians in the uncovenanted service by 1868, and below them was a veritable army of lesser public employees: the telegraph clerks and ticket collectors......In 1867 there were around 13,000 public sector jobs paying 75 or more rupees a month, of which around half were held by Indians.?
Ferguson, Empire p.189
"(In) 1881 the Indian Army numbered 69,647 British Troops and 125,000 Native..."
Ferguson, Empire p.174
Leaving aside the discussion about a public sector of 13,000 in a nation of 400,000,000
I wish to make the point about how Canada can best utilize its resources to achieve the desired level of stability in Afghanistan.
Those "Coppers" in Afghanistan today are no different than the Indians of the Raj. And the Brits managed to secure the Raj with 1,000 British Civil Servants, 13-17,000 Indian Civil Servants, 69,647 British soldiers and 125,000 Indian soldiers - and the soldiers were the police.
Assuming a direct correlation of forces and a population of 32,000,000 Afghans then the current staffing levels for Afghanistan would be (in the ratio or 32:400 or 2:25):
80 "International" Civil Servants;
1,040-1,360 Afghan Civil Servants;
5,572 British soldiers and:
10,000 Afghan soldiers.
Total Governance: Approximately 17,000!!!!!
Allowing for things being different now and the fact that there is an active war going on (Strength in India went up during the Indian Mutiny/First War of Independence) at that rate Canada could fund the entire exercise herself.
Commitment:
80 Civil Servant administrators
5,572 soldiers/police
One thing that they did was raise regiments as Private Security Contractors. Initially the Colonels were contracted by the East India Company to provide security. This was done by having the Colonels (with or without military experience) hire a few experienced ex-soldiers from the British and other armies and then hire locals to fill out the ranks. The Colonel got paid if the East India Company was happy with his performance and his performance was predicated on the performance of his troops. His troops wouldn't perform well if they were grumbling.
Even after the regiments and the Colonels became direct hires of the East India Company, and then the British Crown, like all other British regiments that sense of "ownership" existed well into the 20th century (maybe the 21st in Britain via the senates). The troops were the Colonel's troops. He fed them, clothed them, equipped them and led them. And he paid them.
So one solution to the problem is, perhaps, to put a bit of the entrepreneurial spirit into the system and figure out how to resurrect the "Guides" and the "Scouts" and the "Legions" and the "Field Forces" that policed the British Empire for so long - and whose successors are still well represented in the Indian and Pakistani armies and organizations like Jordan's Arab Legion. You need to find Canadian versions of Glubb Pasha.
The second thing they did was partner/mentor Indian officers.
In addition to the cadre of European officers the "native" regiments had a full complement of Indian subalterns and junior field grade officers up to the rank of Major with independent command of Company/Squadron sub-units, as well as an entirely native corps or NCOs.
I include the Wiki article on these for the rank structure but disagree with the note that Viceroy Commissioned Officers were Warrant Officers. They weren't. They were commissioned officers as much as I was in that my commission was granted by the local Viceroy here in Canada - the Governor-General. They weren't treated the same socially (another matter and irrelevant here) but they were treated the same as any other officer on the parade square.
So what is my point?
This notion of paying the locals directly makes excellent sense to me.
Couple that with the observation that the ANA seems to be making some strides towards competence and respectability.
Couple that with the observation that historically (and the bias of modern western soldiers notwithstanding) soldiers have been indistinguishable from police.
Couple that with a revision of the old hierarchy of the Raj and create local "Regiments" with a local "Colonel" with Canadian advisors working for him - A modification of the OMLTs I guess, and a modification of the concept of Honourary Colonel.
We have the team of Advisors in place to the Government in Kabul (80 Civil Servants? Check)
We have the structure for forming "Regiments" out of the ANA/ANP (OMLTs - right idea, not enough of them)
We have the potential recruits (ANA seems to be more sound than not. ANP exists. The general populace can't be less amenable to military life than your average 19th century Indian.)
Perhaps this is the final link in putting the system together.
And none of this need undermine the Karzai government. The ANA/ANP units still would operate under the authority of the Government in Kabul.
And the CF would be there to do what the "Europeans" did for the Raj: provide BOTH a Quick Reaction Force to deal with trouble spots AND to keep wayward units of the ANA/ANP in line.
Final point to Ferguson:
"....the unspoken truth about British India; and that was why, as Machonochie (a Devon born Magistrate of the Raj in the 1880s) himself put it, it did not really feel like 'a conquered country'. Only the Indian rulers had been supplanted or subjugated by the British; most Indians carried on much as before - indeed, for an important class of them British rule was an opportunity for self-advancement."
Ferguson, Empire p.189
Relations with the local rulers and how they react to self-advancing juniors is another discussion.
Viceroy's Commissioned Officer
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A Viceroy's Commissioned Officer (VCO) was a senior Indian member of the British Indian Army. VCOs held appointments approximately equivalent to Warrant Officers in the British Army, but held a commission issued by the Viceroy. Also known as Indian Officers or Native Officers, they were treated in almost all respects as commissioned officers, but only had authority over Indian troops and were subordinate to all British King's (and Queen's) Commissioned Officers and King's Commissioned Indian Officers.
These ranks were created to facilitate effective liaison between the British officers and their native troops. The soldiers who were promoted to VCO rank had long service and good service records, spoke reasonably fluent English, and could act as a common liaison point between officers and men and as advisers to the British officers on Indian affairs.
VCOs were always treated and addressed with respect. Even a British officer would address a VCO as, for instance, "Subedar Sahib" or <name> "Sahib".
Ranks held by VCOs were:
Cavalry regiments
Jemadar
Risaldar (or Ressaidar)
Risaldar-Major (also called Ressaidar-Major or Wordi-Major)
Infantry regiments and other arms
Jemadar
Subedar
Subedar-Major
Similar ranks are retained in the Indian Army and Pakistan Army, where they are known as Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs).
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viceroy%27s_Commissioned_Officer"
