The party's over for Europe: The bear is back
EDWARD LUTTWAK
From Wednesday's Globe and Mail
August 20, 2008 at 8:38 AM EDT
South Ossetia may be very small, but it has become the scene of an event of colossal proportions: the return of Great Power politics, in which tanks are the deciding factor, not "soft power," let alone international legitimacy.
This huge change follows inevitably from Russia's regression to its own historic version of empire, which existed under the czars and was revived by Stalin. It is based on a tacit bargain: The Russians accept authoritarian rule and the loss of personal freedom in exchange for an imperial role on the global scene, starting with the "near abroad" - countries such as Georgia that used to belong to the Soviet Union.
For all its weaknesses, the Russian Federation has all it needs to function as a Great Power, from a determined ruling elite to a vast nuclear arsenal, adequate military forces now being modernized, and a revitalized intelligence service. Hence, the reversion of Russia to the dangerous rules of Great Power politics compels all others to change their behaviour as well - it is not a game, and participation is not voluntary.
Understandably, the Poles were the first to react. After bargaining with the Americans for months to extract more rewards for accepting a small anti-ballistic missile base on their territory, within hours of the Russian advance into Georgian territory, they dropped all their demands to sign on the dotted line. Other reactions may be much less obvious but could be much more important. Japan, for example, is likely to draw even closer to the United States, while China's rulers might be influenced in a most unfortunate way. After leaning this way and that, they had seemingly decided that maximum economic success was more valuable than a fast buildup of military strength; they may now revise their priorities.
The most direct impact, however, will be on Europe and the North Atlantic alliance. All through the Cold War, it was a truly operational organization, in which every member had to be ready to fight in defence of every other member. There were serious defence plans for vulnerable borders that were realistically exercised by hundreds of thousands of troops, and periodic airlifts to bring reinforcements to exposed frontiers as a reminder of what would happen in war.
Once the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO was not abolished, as some would have wanted. It never really worked for expeditions elsewhere, and mostly became something of a social club for European armed forces. That is why Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were allowed to become members, even though nothing was done to prepare for their defence in the event of a Russian threat to their borders. The same was true of Poland, less indefensible with its much deeper territory and significant armed forces but also the prime focus of Russian hostility. When it comes to Poland, the Russians just can't help themselves.
It was in that other world of "soft power" that has just ended that the admission of both Georgia and Ukraine to NATO was being rapidly prepared. Indeed, that was the strategic setting of Vladimir Putin's attack on Georgia's independence. Under Mr. Putin, Russian influence has been restored over the Central Asian republics and Moldova, but Ukraine is the big prize. Its territorial integrity is also threatened by a claim over the Crimea, in which Russia retains a fleet at Sevastopol, whose city authorities side with Russia and are subsidized out of the Moscow city budget. There is a large Russian minority, and also Ukrainians would like to join today's newly prosperous Russia.
There is also a new threat: Last Wednesday, the Russian news agency Interfax relayed the accusation that Russian warplanes flying in the "peace enforcement operation" in Georgia were shot down by S-200 and Tor anti-aircraft missiles supplied by Ukraine.
If Ukraine is allowed to enter NATO, all other members must be ready to send their troops to defend its borders - an outlandish notion for most of them. Would German troops go back to the Ukrainian front? Would the Italians? Or the British, for that matter? Yet, to refuse Ukraine's admission now would surely hand it over to Russian hegemony.
One way or the other, Europe's holiday from serious geopolitics is over.
Edward Luttwak is senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies
