Infantry Tactics

[markppcli]

The reality is we are pretty shitty at planning for anything.

Primary lesson of Afghanistan - No one predicted that we be engaged in a intense conflict in Central Asia for a decade and taking causalities during it. Had you announced this prediction in 2000, you be laughed out of the room by the "Experts".

Primary lesson of Ukraine - Many of the "Experts" claimed that large scale peer to peer conflicts where a thing of the past and would not take place again.

Primary lesson from the above - The "Experts" are generally wrong more often than right, you don't get to pick the wars we learn from or the ones you are thrust into. Canada is likley to be an expeditionary army for at least the rest of this century and faces the possibility of being engaged anywhere in the world, at any level of engagement, from humanitarian to peer to peer operations, so prepare, plan, train and equip for all of them.

I was more commenting on the previously posted notions that you don’t need to train drone operators, as an example.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The reality is we are pretty shitty at planning for anything.

Primary lesson of Afghanistan - No one predicted that we be engaged in a intense conflict in Central Asia for a decade and taking causalities during it. Had you announced this prediction in 2000, you be laughed out of the room by the "Experts".

Primary lesson of Ukraine - Many of the "Experts" claimed that large scale peer to peer conflicts where a thing of the past and would not take place again.

Primary lesson from the above - The "Experts" are generally wrong more often than right, you don't get to pick the wars we learn from or the ones you are thrust into. Canada is likley to be an expeditionary army for at least the rest of this century and faces the possibility of being engaged anywhere in the world, at any level of engagement, from humanitarian to peer to peer operations, so prepare, plan, train and equip for all of them.

Well.... I think the training and other aspects of our tactical skills development were just fine in terns of preparing us for lower intensity conflicts like FRY and AFG deployments.

With a modicum of specific to theatre preparation, we mostly did OK and built a good reputaiton for the CAF.

IMHO the issues with us preparing for a General War type scenario are largely strategic e.g., not enough of the right weapons and equipment, a CAF that is under assault from internal to Canada threats, as well as weak alliances on the foreign affairs scene amongst a few dozen other deficiencies.

 

[Kirkhill]

I was more commenting on the previously posted notions that you don’t need to train drone operators, as an example.

Some place between here and there.....

What can be done without training vs how much training is needed?

All new technologies were introduced by people without training. Tactics and Procedures evolved.


How can you train to use something that is not available? And once it is available shouldn't imagination be given free run?


Load of bias confirming bumf follows.

In 1908, the British Government recognised the military potential of aircraft. The Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, approved the formation of an "Advisory Committee for Aeronautics" and an "Aerial Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence". Both committees were composed of politicians, army officers and Royal Navy officers. On 21 July 1908 Captain Reginald Bacon, who was a member of the Aerial Navigation sub-committee, submitted to the First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher that a rigid airship based on the German Zeppelin be designed and constructed by the firm of Vickers. After much discussion on the Committee of Imperial Defence the suggestion was approved on 7 May 1909. The airship, named Mayfly, never flew and broke in half on 24 September 1911. The then First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson, recommended that rigid airship construction be abandoned.[2]

On 21 June 1910, Lt. George Cyril Colmore became the first qualified pilot in the Royal Navy. After completing training, which Colmore paid for out of his own pocket, he was issued with Royal Aero Club Certificate Number 15.[3]

In November 1910, the Royal Aero Club, thanks to one of its members, Francis McClean, offered the Royal Navy two aircraft with which to train its first pilots. The club also offered its members as instructors and the use of its airfield at Eastchurch on the Isle of Sheppey. The Admiralty accepted and on 6 December the Commander-in-Chief, The Nore promulgated the scheme to the officers under his jurisdiction and requested that applicants be unmarried and able to pay the membership fees of the Royal Aero Club. The airfield became the Naval Flying School, Eastchurch.[4] Two hundred applications were received, and four were accepted: Lieutenant C. R. Samson, Lieutenant A. M. Longmore, Lieutenant A. Gregory and Captain E. L. Gerrard, RMLI.[5]

History[edit]​

Commander C. Samson of the RNAS takes off from HMS Hibernia in his modified Shorts S.38 “hydro-aeroplane” to be the first pilot to take off from a ship underway at sea.

After prolonged discussion on the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Royal Flying Corps was constituted by Royal Warrant on 13 April 1912. It absorbed the nascent naval air detachment and also the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers.

The Air Battalion Royal Engineers (ABRE) was the first flying unit of the British Armed Forces to make use of heavier-than-air craft. Founded in 1911, the battalion in 1912 became part of the Royal Flying Corps, which in turn evolved into the Royal Air Force.

In 1911, following the growth in early aviation activity, the War Office issued instructions for the School of Ballooning, which had originally been formed in 1888, to be expanded into a battalion. An order was issued on 28 February 1911 for the formation of the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers effective 1 April the same year. The initial establishment was 14 officers and 150 other ranks. Officers could be selected from any branch of the service whereas other ranks were selected from the Corps of Royal Engineers.

Pilots had to already have earned a Royal Aero Club certificate from a private flying school. The GBP 75 charge for flight training was reimbursed only if the student passed the course.

I would offer Mills bombs, Stokes mortars, Lewis guns, Vickers Guns, the Machine Gun Corps, the Tank as additional examples.

Doctrine followed technology and experimentation.

Even the Trench Raid had its pre-doctrinal antecedents - cf Capt Frame of the HLI and the Mad Point raid of 27/28 June 1916 - conducted by Territorials.

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/5133259-courage-past

British Proud Heritage Highland Light Infantry Vol 3 Hardcover Reference Book

This is a used hardcover British HLI Proud Heritage Highland Light Infantry Vol 3 Hardcover Reference Book. Total of 404 pages with lots of picture and information.

militaryantiquestoronto.com

The trench raid referred to was carried out by a company of the
Glasgow Highlanders led by Captain A. C. Frame during the night
of 27—28 June 1916, and was directed against Mad Point, a bulge
in the German front line a little to the north of the Hohenzollern
Redoubt facing the Cuinchy Right Sector of the British line. Captain
Frame’s orders were to advance to the German Second line behind
Mad Point, and hold this for 60 minutes, to enable old and new
craters to be examined and any mines destroyed. Also to get as
many live prisoners as possible, and any other articles, and to do
damage to defences and dug-outs.’

The preparations for this affair were of the utmost thoroughness,
as indeed they required to be, in the case of so formidable a
proposition. Each man was individually instructed and carefully rehearsed in his particular
role, with the aid of air photographs, maps and lantern slides. A full-scale plan of the
enemy trench system was marked out, upon which the selected company carried out
rehearsals by day and night. Co-operation by artillery - machine-guns and trench mortars
was planned to the last detail. The password was the nostalgic-sounding one of’
Sauchiehall.’

The battalion went into the line on the night of 26 June, and shortly before midnight the
guns put down a heavy bombardment on Mad Point for the purpose of cutting the wire.
The resultant gaps in the wire were carefully observed during the following morning, and
Lewis guns trained on them to prevent repairs being made. The raiding party, consisting
of 4 Officers and 148 rank and file crept out of their trenches at 11 p.m. and formed up in
three parties, each of which was organised into three similar groups of 2 bombers, 2
bayonet-men, 2 bomb-carriers and 8 bayonet-men, and was led by an officer. Captain
Frame’s headquarters party consisted of 2 buglers, 2 signalers and 3 runners, and a
small demolition party was attached to deal with enemy mines and mine-shafts, and there
was also a Gunner Major as forward observation officer.
....

The enemy was completely surprised and was apparently unable to grasp, in the
general turmoil, exactly what was happening. His only reaction was to put down a ragged
defensive fire which did no damage. The raiding party was accordingly able to hold the
positions gained for the required sixty minutes, during which the enemy mines were
demolished and his shafts and a bomb store blown up, 47 prisoners collected and sent
back, and a large quantity of arms and material, including two machine-guns secured. An
officer, whose papers were secured, and ten other Germans had been killed in the
trenches, and an unknown number in the dugouts; while of his wounded 16 were counted
of whom 9 were taken prisoner. At the end of the hour the buglers sounded the recall and
the raiding party returned, its sole casualties being 11 men wounded, all but one slightly.
This very remarkable exploit, in which important results had been achieved at trifling
cost by a combination of skill, gallantry and resolution, attracted the attention of the whole
army. A spate of congratulatory signals including many from individual units, and from
each commander in the chain of command up to Sir Douglas Haig himself whose
telegram read:

‘Commander-in-Chief wishes his congratulations conveyed to 9th H.L.I. on the
creditable achievement night of 27.6.16.’

In forwarding your report on the raid carried out by the 9th Highland Light
Infantry the Corps Commander has written as follows to the First Army:
‘This is the most successful of the 40 raids carried out by the Corps since we came
into this part of the line in November last. It was carried out by a Territorial Battalion that
had only just joined the Division and in my opinion reflects the greatest credit on all
concerned. Both the G.O.C., 33rd Division and the G.O.C. 100th Infantry brigade took the
greatest pains to ensure that every detail was thought out and provided for beforehand,
and the gallant and determined manner in which the operation was carried out by the 9th
Bn. Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Highlanders) will be a great encouragement to other
units. Col, Darling who commanded the Battalion & Captain Frame who commanded the
raid deserve great credit for inspiring their officers and men with a fine offensive spirit.’
(Sgd.) W.H. Anderson,
XICorps. B.G.G.S.
30th June l916.

 

[FJAG]

How can you train to use something that is not available? And once it is available shouldn't imagination be given free run?

I think that you misconceive how thing s work and ought to work in an Army.

When a new system is being considered, it is usually bought for a specific and accepted purpose - in other words to fill a specific capability gap. It is then studied and experimented with by SMEs, with the advice of the developers, and which SMEs then develop TTPs which can be taught at the training establishments so that a large number of people can learn to use it in the appropriate manner. Feed-back comes back from the field so that SMEs can refine TTPs so that courses are improved and so that technical/tactical directions are sent to the field to update people who are already using the systems.

What we're seeing in Ukraine are reactive processes where thousands of untrained people are developing their own TTPs to augment those that can be centrally developed and disseminated to the field.

Doctrine followed technology and experimentation.

Doctrine also directs technology. Much of the development of technology comes from funding provided by the military to come up with a technological solution to a specific doctrinal problem that needs solving. Pluto and Mulberry are two of my favourite examples of that.

Fielding a mature technology throughout a force requires effort and planning. Sometimes the circumstances require short cuts but ad hoc procedures being developed in the field without some guidance end up with as many failures and disasters as successes.

The difference is really down to turning out a large force that can use a system efficiently and just turning something loose and hoping enough people serendipitously find an optimum solution before they die.

 

[Kirkhill]

What we're seeing in Ukraine are reactive processes where thousands of untrained people are developing their own TTPs to augment those that can be centrally developed and disseminated to the field.

Agreed.

Has anybody looked at why innovation occurs during wartime and stagnates during peace time?

Serendipity plays its role.

Occupational Health and Safety types are few and far between in Ukraine.

 

[KevinB]

Has anybody looked at why innovation occurs during wartime and stagnates during peace time?

Money flows and more capabilities are looked at.

Serendipity plays its role.

Occupational Health and Safety types are few and far between in Ukraine.

Honestly I get the dissatisfaction with the status quo, but you’re missing the forest from the trees in a number of situations.

 

[GR66]

Agreed.

Has anybody looked at why innovation occurs during wartime and stagnates during peace time?

Serendipity plays its role.

Occupational Health and Safety types are few and far between in Ukraine.

Part of the problem is that every war is different and requires different solutions. Unfortunately you don't know what specific solutions you need until you're in the war. That's what's happening in Ukraine right now.

There is no point looking at what's happening there and trying to create the ideal force to fight that war. Our next war might be totally different.

That's certainly not to say that there aren't lessons to be learned (and re-learned). A lot of what we are seeing in Ukraine is simply re-affirming what we learned in our previous wars...and chose to forget. Logistics...war stocks...casualty and equipment replacement...redundancy...artillery is king...dispersion in movement and concentration in attack...air defence...camouflage...communications security...recce...digging in...etc.

Of course there are new tricks like UAVs, USVs, loitering munitions, 3D printing, etc., but really if you build a solid force around the basic principles that have been known (or should have been remembered) for decades then you'll be in a good spot for the start of the next war and you can focus on the rapid prototyping, experimenting and innovating that is required to overcome the unique problems of that particular war.

 

[Kirkhill]

Part of the problem is that every war is different and requires different solutions. Unfortunately you don't know what specific solutions you need until you're in the war. That's what's happening in Ukraine right now.

There is no point looking at what's happening there and trying to create the ideal force to fight that war. Our next war might be totally different.

That's certainly not to say that there aren't lessons to be learned (and re-learned). A lot of what we are seeing in Ukraine is simply re-affirming what we learned in our previous wars...and chose to forget. Logistics...war stocks...casualty and equipment replacement...redundancy...artillery is king...dispersion in movement and concentration in attack...air defence...camouflage...communications security...recce...digging in...etc.

Of course there are new tricks like UAVs, USVs, loitering munitions, 3D printing, etc., but really if you build a solid force around the basic principles that have been known (or should have been remembered) for decades then you'll be in a good spot for the start of the next war and you can focus on the rapid prototyping, experimenting and innovating that is required to overcome the unique problems of that particular war.

Sorry but I can't agree. I've posted this before.

Wars change things - every war changes things.

 

[Kirkhill]

Money flows and more capabilities are looked at.

That is certainly a major factor but there is a lot more bottom up activity - experimentation in the field at the lowest levels.

Honestly I get the dissatisfaction with the status quo, but you’re missing the forest from the trees in a number of situations.

And my dissatisfaction is not with the status quo. It is with the acceptance of the status quo. A different thing entirely.

Are any of the solutions that I bring to the fore worthwhile? I have no idea. And I humbly suggest most folks here don't either.

My fascination is with the continuing expansion of alternate solutions to ancient problems. That expansion continues to open new opportunities, and new ways of "outflanking" the enemy. Or new ways for the enemy to "outflank" us.

 

[GR66]

Sorry but I can't agree. I've posted this before.

Wars change things - every war changes things.

I totally agree with you...it's just that you don't know what the next war is going to change until it happens.

All I'm saying is that priority one should be to (re)master the basics. Ukraine has proven that most of the lessons we've learned in the past have again been shown to be true. Unfortunately we keep forgetting these things during every interwar period.

Absolutely embrace those new technologies that have shown themselves to be impactful in Ukraine. Small flying things are now ubiquitous in the battle space so obviously we need our own as well as ways to eliminate the enemy's, etc.

Where I think we differ is that you seem to want to take the next step and optimize the CAF to be exactly the force that would be most effective in Ukraine, but our next conflict might not look like Ukraine. It might be more like Mosul, or Desert Storm, Kursk, or ???.

Where I think we would strongly agree is that the CAF needs to embrace a culture of innovation and experimentation so that when the next conflict comes we can quickly adapt to the necessities of that particular conflict.

Ideally it would be nice to have a combined arms Battle Group that is focused on experimenting with new ideas and equipment and works directly with industry so that the military knows what new ideas/technologies are out there and can experiment with them to see what works and what doesn't and at the same time industry could see where the challenges/opportunities are for new products/systems.

 

[FJAG]

That is certainly a major factor but there is a lot more bottom up activity - experimentation in the field at the lowest levels.

And my dissatisfaction is not with the status quo. It is with the acceptance of the status quo. A different thing entirely.

Are any of the solutions that I bring to the fore worthwhile? I have no idea. And I humbly suggest most folks here don't either.

My fascination is with the continuing expansion of alternate solutions to ancient problems. That expansion continues to open new opportunities, and new ways of "outflanking" the enemy. Or new ways for the enemy to "outflank" us.

It's not that we disagree on the idea of challenging the status quo. Nor do we disagree that there are numerous technical solutions that are of value. It's just that your approaches frequently sound like "let chaos reign". That might work briefly within a small group setting but it does not translate very well to large group capability development which requires more structure. The key is to ensure that the structure itself doesn't stifle innovation.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I totally agree with you...it's just that you don't know what the next war is going to change until it happens.

All I'm saying is that priority one should be to (re)master the basics. Ukraine has proven that most of the lessons we've learned in the past have again been shown to be true. Unfortunately we keep forgetting these things during every interwar period.

Absolutely embrace those new technologies that have shown themselves to be impactful in Ukraine. Small flying things are now ubiquitous in the battle space so obviously we need our own as well as ways to eliminate the enemy's, etc.

Where I think we differ is that you seem to want to take the next step and optimize the CAF to be exactly the force that would be most effective in Ukraine, but our next conflict might not look like Ukraine. It might be more like Mosul, or Desert Storm, Kursk, or ???.

Where I think we would strongly agree is that the CAF needs to embrace a culture of innovation and experimentation so that when the next conflict comes we can quickly adapt to the necessities of that particular conflict.

Ideally it would be nice to have a combined arms Battle Group that is focused on experimenting with new ideas and equipment and works directly with industry so that the military knows what new ideas/technologies are out there and can experiment with them to see what works and what doesn't and at the same time industry could see where the challenges/opportunities are for new products/systems.

Historically most new ideas have been pushed by innovators within the military/reserve. A lot of the outside solutions pushed on the militaries often didn't work out so well.

 

[Kirkhill]

It's not that we disagree on the idea of challenging the status quo. Nor do we disagree that there are numerous technical solutions that are of value. It's just that your approaches frequently sound like "let chaos reign". That might work briefly within a small group setting but it does not translate very well to large group capability development which requires more structure. The key is to ensure that the structure itself doesn't stifle innovation.

I like the idea of "let chaos reign".

I'd be ecstatic if a portion of the budget were allocated to that end - perhaps to fund an experimental OPFOR made up of a rotating cast of characters from all branches and services including the reserves and DND civilians.

Based on how comfortable TB seems to be with pre-clearing 500 MCAD tranches for donation to Ukraine I suggest an annual budget (costed on Ukrainian terms) over and above the sunk costs of the personnel, their infrastructure and issue materiel.

I think a free range Opfor would both test new technologies and also assist the regular force in training to manage in a chaotic environment where the answers may not necessarily be doctrinal.


Consider it "Next Level Training" - training conducted at all levels once the doctrinal basics have been demonstrated as mastered.
Training that is conducted by the Opfor with their chaotic rules of play.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

CCG had a fund you could apply for monies up to $25,000 for new and innovative ways to do your job. This allowed us to purchase a ROV and drone, which allowed us to experiment on ways to make doing our job better. Generally the grant was aimed at the field/ship level people and was a very good idea.

 

[Kirkhill]

Machine guns are a basic. At least in the infantry.

This one has been niggling at me since you wrote it. I didn't want to disrupt the train of thought at the time but will now.

Machine guns are a basic for infantry.

I'll start by saying that I have seen the machine gun employed in two separate roles

• essentially hand held or on a bipod and used at short range with line of sight
• tripod mounted with offset sights for predicted fire

The first role is without doubt an extension of infantry practice. It is a rapid fire rifle.
The second role, in my opinion, conforms more to artillery practice. It is a rapid fire cannon.

Now, with the introduction of ballistic computer sights for rifles, MGs, grenade launchers and ATGMs (like the N-LAW and the Carl G rather than the missiles that are flown to their targets like Javelin and Spike) would it be more appropriate to have the infantry focus on their sights?

Rather than the weapon that is attached to the sights?

2 and 3 are Aimpoints on a Carl Gustaf M4 and on a GMG. It can also work on an M2. Is it worth mounting on a C6 in the Sustained Fire Role?

The first image is of similar type of predictive sight that can be attached to a rifle making it more effective against fleeting targets like drones. Add it to the C9?

 

[markppcli]

This one has been niggling at me since you wrote it. I didn't want to disrupt the train of thought at the time but will now.

Machine guns are a basic for infantry.

I'll start by saying that I have seen the machine gun employed in two separate roles

• essentially hand held or on a bipod and used at short range with line of sight
• tripod mounted with offset sights for predicted fire

The first role is without doubt an extension of infantry practice. It is a rapid fire rifle.
The second role, in my opinion, conforms more to artillery practice. It is a rapid fire cannon.

No both are essential infantry tasks.

An MG ina tripod is not a rapid fire cannon, this is a hunt for a comparison that doesn’t mean or achieve anything useful.

Now, with the introduction of ballistic computer sights for rifles, MGs, grenade launchers and ATGMs (like the N-LAW and the Carl G rather than the missiles that are flown to their targets like Javelin and Spike) would it be more appropriate to have the infantry focus on their sights?

Rather than the weapon that is attached to the sights?

What does focus on the sight va focus on the weapon mean? The weapon and the sight are both the weapon system and to employ it you need to be intimately familiar with both. How would you “focus on the sight” without using the weapon?

None of these loaded

2 and 3 are Aimpoints on a Carl Gustaf M4 and on a GMG. It can also work on an M2. Is it worth mounting on a C6 in the Sustained Fire Role?

Probably not, you’re going to substantially increase the battery load which limits the ability to employ the sights, which is already an issue in the C16.

The first image is of similar type of predictive sight that can be attached to a rifle making it more effective against fleeting targets like drones. Add it to the C9?

Without seeing the sight it’s impossible to comment.

 

[Kirkhill]

No both are essential infantry tasks.

An MG ina tripod is not a rapid fire cannon, this is a hunt for a comparison that doesn’t mean or achieve anything useful.


What does focus on the sight va focus on the weapon mean? The weapon and the sight are both the weapon system and to employ it you need to be intimately familiar with both. How would you “focus on the sight” without using the weapon?


None of these loaded


Probably not, you’re going to substantially increase the battery load which limits the ability to employ the sights, which is already an issue in the C16.


Without seeing the sight it’s impossible to comment.

So you have opinions?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Speaking of Infantry tactics from the depths of my armchair...

Just what the MacGyver is going on here?

Northern Provisions on Instagram: ": Footage from the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade shows Ukrainian soldiers in the Bakhmut Direction taking casualties from incoming Russian ordnance. The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has been locked in intense fighting for months now as it tries to push against Russian forces, taking back small footholds as part of a counter offensive in the Bakhmut Region."

 

[markppcli]

Speaking of Infantry tactics from the depths of my armchair...

Just what the MacGyver is going on here?

Northern Provisions on Instagram: ": Footage from the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade shows Ukrainian soldiers in the Bakhmut Direction taking casualties from incoming Russian ordnance. The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has been locked in intense fighting for months now as it tries to push against Russian forces, taking back small footholds as part of a counter offensive in the Bakhmut Region."

Which part? Looks like the dismounted, took indirect fire, got a casualty into a roll up stretcher and started to get him to cover.