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Infantry Tactics

Kat Stevens

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Blah blah.

Ever ben a 2Lt with 10-40 weeks training in charge of dangerous people on a mission that cannot fail?

As I get older, I find I have less patience for this rote denegation of people who are doing their jobs....because of their designation.
No idea what that feels like, sorry. Message received. Out.
 

daftandbarmy

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Maybe we need to recruit Incels for this. They'll already come with a good level of aggression and have no significant attachments to worry about. Might be some Op Honour issues there but if we keep them deployed away from everyone else ...

🤔

It's pretty clear that part of this re-entry into former 'outposts of Empire', in a long term physical presence kind of way, is a message to China that their Belt and Road initiative will have a few Sleeping Policeman along the way. Similar messages are likely aimed at Russia and Iran.

The downside will be sustaining this effort, financially and otherwise. The retreat from Empire since WW2 was been largely driven by an effort to save costs. One of the reasons the British kept the Gurkha regiments around for so long was that they were a cheap and reliable method of securing key colonial terrian, like Hong Kong. I assume they're planning on training and standing up local forces (as they did with the Gurkhas), using the Ranger units, to act as force multipliers outside of the UK.

Concurrently, I'm guessing that we'll see a new Golden Age for mercenaries and contractors of various types, of course. A good example is the Loan Service arrangement the UK has with Oman, where British officers and NCOs lead Omani units, and provide other support.
 

FJAG

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It's pretty clear that part of this re-entry into former 'outposts of Empire', in a long term physical presence kind of way, is a message to China that their Belt and Road initiative will have a few Sleeping Policeman along the way. Similar messages are likely aimed at Russia and Iran.

The downside will be sustaining this effort, financially and otherwise. The retreat from Empire since WW2 was been largely driven by an effort to save costs. One of the reasons the British kept the Gurkha regiments around for so long was that they were a cheap and reliable method of securing key colonial terrian, like Hong Kong. I assume they're planning on training and standing up local forces (as they did with the Gurkhas), using the Ranger units, to act as force multipliers outside of the UK.

Concurrently, I'm guessing that we'll see a new Golden Age for mercenaries and contractors of various types, of course. A good example is the Loan Service arrangement the UK has with Oman, where British officers and NCOs lead Omani units, and provide other support.

One thing about those types of clandestine and semi-clandestine deployments is that make convenient targets for local malcontents as well as opfor clandestine actors. That said, pairing SAS with MI6 sends a powerful message. One wonders what the RoE will be like. Are we back to 1950s/1960s Europe?

🤔
 

daftandbarmy

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One thing about those types of clandestine and semi-clandestine deployments is that make convenient targets for local malcontents as well as opfor clandestine actors. That said, pairing SAS with MI6 sends a powerful message. One wonders what the RoE will be like. Are we back to 1950s/1960s Europe?

🤔

UKSF and MI5/6 have been working together for years. I have no idea why they think it's important to make an announcement about it right now, unless they're just trying to send a warning of some kind.
 

FJAG

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UKSF and MI5/6 have been working together for years. I have no idea why they think it's important to make an announcement about it right now, unless they're just trying to send a warning of some kind.

It strikes me a bit like when US Tier 1 HQs and folks were starting to get worn out during mid Iraq and Afghanistan and they started dialing up what the Ranger Regt and SF Groups and even Marine SF (not to mention non-Team 6 SEALs) were starting to be tasked with simply to spread the work load around and to leave the true Tier 1 guys set aside for the trickiest jobs.

I've thought for a long time that 2 CMBG should become a light brigade (perhaps somewhat restructured) and together with CANSOFCOM deal with almost all (except for Latvia which is heavy metal) of our international deployments involving military advisor/training. That would leave 5 brigade mechanized for peacekeeping etc stuff and 1 brigade armoured for Europe/Latvia. (But then we'd have to change the whole way we do MRPs)

🍻
 

daftandbarmy

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It strikes me a bit like when US Tier 1 HQs and folks were starting to get worn out during mid Iraq and Afghanistan and they started dialing up what the Ranger Regt and SF Groups and even Marine SF (not to mention non-Team 6 SEALs) were starting to be tasked with simply to spread the work load around and to leave the true Tier 1 guys set aside for the trickiest jobs.

I've thought for a long time that 2 CMBG should become a light brigade (perhaps somewhat restructured) and together with CANSOFCOM deal with almost all (except for Latvia which is heavy metal) of our international deployments involving military advisor/training. That would leave 5 brigade mechanized for peacekeeping etc stuff and 1 brigade armoured for Europe/Latvia. (But then we'd have to change the whole way we do MRPs)

🍻

Which further suggests that the theoretical and strategic underpinnings of Special Forces, and their 'helpers', are not yet well developed:

"Identifying the “theory” gap​

The rise to military prominence of SF in recent years has been unprecedented, but it is a phenomenon that has unfolded with relatively little mainstream scholarly attention in the great debates about modern strategy. Looking closely at the core strategy conversations and discussions of the last two decades, from fourth-generation warfare,9 risk-transfer warfare/spectator-sport war,10 and most recently, hybrid warfare,11 reveals little sustained interest. The paradox of SF is that while popular social fascination has never been higher and increases annually, the theoretical foundations have remained relatively stagnant. Put simply, it has not moved much further from early thinking when these units were first created nearly 80 years ago.12 SF may have become the preferred military “first responders” for advanced powers into international affairs in the twenty-first century, yet they are perhaps the most underexplored aspect of military studies from a theoretical perspective, with barely a scrap of weighty strategic thought13 to guide their employment. There is no Clausewitz14 or Galula15 (to take just two examples) of special forces and they are barely visible in the staples of contemporary military theory. This state of affairs begs large and pressing theoretical questions as to whether this relatively new dimension of warfare merely supplements, supports, and sustains traditional approaches or if it has the potential to transform the use of force between powerful nation-states. Without substantial theoretical exploration, the latter will always remain a largely undiscovered country with the odd accidental incursion (the Afghan Model in 2001), with little recognition of its significance."

 

FJAG

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Which further suggests that the theoretical and strategic underpinnings of Special Forces, and their 'helpers', are not yet well developed:

"Identifying the “theory” gap​

Interesting when you think about it. Most of the advances do seem to have more to do with advances in technology and the integration of multi-disciplinary agencies breaking down silos. I guess that's a "theoretical foundation" advance in it's own right. The Russians seem to have advanced the concept of incorporating a blended, escalating continuum of special to conventional forces quite well. Is it the theory that is missing or is it that we question the morality of using it to its potential? Special Forces have a limited role in peacetime, defensive warfare.

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