• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Informing the Army’s Future Structure

Interesting little article found yesterday.

Short form: Technology changes. Warfare is.


The argument is summarized here:

A clear-eyed assessment of the battlefield realities in Ukraine demonstrates that drones are largely in continuity with the development of military capabilities coherently understood since the late 19th century. Their use in Ukraine is notable, simply because they carry to maturation concepts under long-term historical development. By generating a widespread reconnaissance-strike complex, drones in Ukraine allow both Ukraine and Russia to fight in a truly systemic manner, bringing to fruition the logic of the modern battlefield. There is much to learn from the Ukrainian case—and those that learn its lessons are likely to gain military power. But its lessons are primarily intellectual, not technical or material.

Modern military history demonstrates that, barring a decisive initial victory, most wars settle into a long-term positional rhythm, broken only by societal collapse or a well-designed, well-executed series of offensives over months or years.

The necessity of the breakthrough battle stems from changes in the character of war that began in the mid-19th century. Indirect fire artillery combined with rail-based long-range transportation and telegraphy to expand the battlespace in width and depth. This necessitated a new military logic that progressed beyond the linear tactical model that dominated early modern warfare, and which Napoleon ultimately perfected.

Moreover, the development of the modern bureaucratic state depersonalized military leadership. It is no coincidence that the final personalized battles of the 19th century occurred at the creation of the German Empire, which marked the final ascendance of bureaucratic governance and the destruction of the chivalric model that dominated from the 10th century. Campaigns had to be won over time in a series of engagements, individually disconnected, but made whole through a coherent strategic scheme.

The technology changes but the game remains the same.

....

I'm not sure how you see having Javelin in an AA platoon or company results in "deny the Javelin to the FEBA troops".

Perhaps because I didn't say that. What I was responding to was the suggestion that there be no Javelins in the section and that they should be in specialist elements. My response was why not both?

I like UAVs and missiles as much as the next guy but for some reason you seem to see a need to replace existing artillery systems.

I don't see a need to replace existing artillery systems. But those who lack existing artillery systems are looking for alternative means to deliver the same effects. And if they can't afford, or find guns, they can't afford or find aircraft either. That lack doesn't change their need or want to win wars and for that they need something that will do the same job as artillery.

 
I doubt the rifle section can function well if it's overloaded with capabilities. It might be workable in peacetime with the advantages of long training, but everything has to also work under wartime conditions, which I predict would result in foreshortened training times.
Add the fact that Infantry Bn's, Coy, Pl, and Sect are never going to be at full strength due to casualties and possibly LOB's.
Your dedicated, experienced anti armour specialist may be one of them .
 
Add the fact that Infantry Bn's, Coy, Pl, and Sect are never going to be at full strength due to casualties and possibly LOB's.
Your dedicated, experienced anti armour specialist may be one of them .

If there was a coherent strategy, and operational plan with the right resourcing, for the Reserves they might be... one of these days.

Meanwhile:

Michel Maisonneuve: Neglected reserves highlight the dire state of our military​


Recent comments by the Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair, as well as several articles in the National Post and other media have highlighted the dire state of the Canadian Armed Forces. Not one of those comments or articles however has focused solely on the state of Canada’s reserves: the sailors, soldiers and air personnel who serve our country part-time, all while holding down civilian jobs. Things are especially grave in that sector.

Today, there is not much the regular-force CAF can do without reserve support. Our reserve ships are being used in operations because of a lack of naval crews. Our army reserves are essential to fulfilling our international tasks such as the enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia, and they are always at the ready for domestic operations. Our reserve RCAF squadrons employ former regular force airmen and women on many tasks including as pilots. As is the situation with the regular forces, the recruitment crisis in the reserves is crippling Canada’s capabilities and our reputation abroad. It is time for the Canadian government to give our indispensable reserves stable funding and respect.

 
Back
Top