Unfortunately, not having had the benefit of military experience myself, I thought I would post some pertinent a few documents recently released under ATI and resultant puzzling questions, and some interesting tidbits, about the MGS.
This lets the subject-matter experts provide their comments/advice.
A 19 Jan 2004
'Presentation to JCRB' re:
MOBILE GUN SYSTEM [MGS] Statement of Operational Requirement' notes:
"The MGS is not a replacement or substitute for a main battle tank.
Equipped with M68A1
"105mm gun, stabilized (fire on the move);
Can Defeat T-72M at 2000m;
Operational mobility C-130 (1000 naut miles @ 38,000 lbs);
Leopard Tank Transitional Distribution - Asst CLS Approved: Total Fleet = 66,
CMTC BlueFOR - 14; CMTC OPFOR - 4; LdSH (Live) - 14;
CTC (Gagetown) - 8; CFSEME (not yet approved) - 2;
Operational Depl Stock (prob Montreal) - 14; Log Stock (prob Montreal) - 10."
What is CFSEME??
Although, during the slide presentation the PD notes:
"It has been clear to all involved with the project, including the former minister's staff, that movement by C-130 is not the normal mode of transport and would only be done in an emergency with limitations.
The vehicle can be prepared for a transport weight of 38,000 pounds. The limitations will probably include a reduced ammo load and removal of the 14.5mm heavy machine gun armour.
You can see that the primary weapon will be the NATO standard 105mm gun. It is still a very capable weapon able to defeat a T-72M tank."
:tank: The point that MGS
"Can Defeat T-72M at 2000m" seems to directly contradict other DND Briefings that MGS only capable of defeating a level II armoured threat (up to T-62).
An 8 May 2003
'BRIEFING NOTE FOR ADM(Mat) - MGS' states
"The main gun, a stabilized 105mm with autoloader, will defeat hardened bunkers and armoured vehicles up to T-62 Tank [roughly equiv to Leo I ??]."
While, a 2003 BN (Briefing Note)
'CONCEPT FOR PROCUREMENT OF THE US MOBILE GUN SYSTEM [MGS]' affirms
"The MGS does not have the capabilities of a modern main battle tank in terms of firepower and protection, however, it is capable of fire support tasks short of tank on tank engagements against modern MBTs. The logic in delaying ACV (MGS predecessor) was that it did not offer a significant capability improvement over that provided by Leopard I. This logic is still valid." :tank:
Meanwhile, MGS
'Backgrounder' notes:
"The MGS can be deployed aboard CF air assets, a major step forward in providing protection for Canadian soldiers quickly when they deploy."
Regarding MGS deployability, a public domain answer provided by DAR 2, the LCol in charge of Directorate of Air Requirements tactical transport business, noted:
"Typical Maximum Payloads [MPL] for an eastern crossing to Europe are 28,000 lbs for an E-model and H30, and 30,000 lbs MPL for a regular H. Western crossing are limited to 25,000 lbs MPL for an E or H30 and 27,000 lbs MPL for a regular H."
Therefore a 'stipped-down' 38,000 lb MGS is only tactically deployable via C-130H (of which the CF only has 11) over short distances of a couple hundred nautical miles at most, compared to over 3,000nm to cross Atlantic Ocean - 1,000nm via C-130J only.
As noted in Air Force's 2003
'Aerospace Capability Framework' released 31 May 2004, the
"Airlift Capability Project [ACP] aims to acquire a replacement capability for the current CC-130 E and H [-73 model] aircraft. To determine 'best value', the ACP will examine options that range from the status quo, replacement of the CC-130 with like capability, or replacement of the Hercules with an aircraft with the capacity to carry outsized cargo. Outsized cargo is defined as cargo that, because of length, width, height and/or weight, cannot fit into a Hercules-sized aircraft. Such cargo includes equipment such as the HLVW used by the Disaster Assistance Response Team [DART]; the Beaver Tail Trailer; 6K and 5K forklifts; and the 6x4 Dump Truck. Other equipment, such as the Army's LAV-III must be disassembled to enable transport by Hercules. Three Hercules flights are required to transport two LAV-III vehicles."
A high-level Jan 2004
'Project Brief For a Major Capital Project - MGS', to PMB for Preliminary Project Approval, had some interesting, SOR Highlights, assertions:
"2.3.5 - Risk of buying long lead items. Long lead-time items (specifiically the gun tube and breech) will have to be procured prior to finalizing the main production contract to meet the delivery schedule. It is, however, known that the contractor will have to place an order for these same items for the US Army program after the Canadian long lead item order. Negotiating a buy back clause with the contractor could mitigate this risk.
3.4 Project Constraints 3.4.1.2 - There is no intent for the project to buy additional stocks of existing configurations of ammunition." Which seemingly implies no additional AMMO is required. :bullet::bullet:
:tank:
Interestingly, a Oct 2003 report
'Stryker Brigades Versus the Reality of War' by Mr. Victor O'Reilly (article pdf link available on Army.ca) - an author and counterterrorism authority with an obvious bias for the MTVL upgrade, has some damning contradictions and revealing information:
"Bought to be C-130 deployable but too heavy."
MOST INTERESTINGLY on pg47 -
"Stryker MGS problems with the 105mm cannon get worse. . . . (numerous issues listed)
. . . Why are the contractors trying to use the wrong cannon, on the wrong chassis - at the taxpayers' expense?
The short answer to this question is that the Army has a large number of surplus M68A1 cannons which are being made available to the contractor virtually for free. [The M68 105mm cannon was the standard weapon for the M60 tank and the early Abrams.] Accordingly, it is very tempting indeed to try and use that free cannon in the Stryker Mobile Gun system because it increases profit per vehicle by about US$250,000."
This provides GDLS with a major profit incentive to make an unsuitable gun such as the high-velocity M68A1, that requires a muzzle brake and heavy recoil mechanism to reduce gun recoil impulse - with has the side-effect of adding to the weight problem, work on the MGS vs a LRF 105mm gun (Low Recoil Force). As problems are being fixed at taxpayer expense, x204 MGS for Interim Styker Brigade Combat Teams = US$51M profit, plus x66 MGS for DND = US$16.5M additional profit, or US$67.5M Overall additional profit from just the M68A1 cannon alone.
:fifty: This seems to blow a major hole in
'2.3.5' "Long lead-time items (specifiically the gun tube and breech) will have to be procured" ?? While
"Negotiating a buy back clause" adds yet more unnecessary cost to the MGS project - seemingly more profit for GDLS. :tank:
:tank: While a DND
'MGS UPDATE 12 AUG 03' seems to implicitly confirm O'Reilly's assertions about
"Stryker MGS problems with the 105mm cannon get worse." as other than listing MGS decision, order, and delivery timelines, plus
"Proposed Project Timelines", the remainder of the briefing is
"WITHHELD - per s.13.1 & s.20.1.b" of ATI. Highly probable that only major integration problems, with LRIP already delayed until Feb 04, would require such severe pruning of an Update Brief?? :tank:
:tank: Meanwhile, a
'21 Oct 02 Info Brief to CLS' on 'MGS' sheds interesting new light on '3.4.1.2' as section on
'AMMO' affirms:
"MGS must provide direct, supporting fires . . . in order to destroy hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun, and sniper positions. To accomplish this the MGS primary armament must defeat a standard infantry bunker and create an opening in a double reinforced concrete wall, through which infantry can pass. Primary armament must engage and defeat a dismounted Infantry squad in the open from a minimum of 50m to a maximum of 500m. Primary armament must have the capability to deliver high explosive munitions in an anti-personnel mode.
New buy/development" AMMO required:
"- M393A2 HE-T [based on a HEP rd);
- XM1028 AP Canister [based on 120mm rd];
- M467A1 TP-T." :tank: :bullet: :bullet: :bullet: :tank:
:tank: Meanwhile, besides the Type Classified tracked M8 Armoured Gun System (light tank) mounting a Watervliet Arsenal M35 LRF 105mm gun in a well-armoured turret, that is air deployable via C-130 (including via parachute), in the mid-90s an 8x8 LAV-based MGS predecessor successfully completed development and testing. This was the Textron Marine & Land Systems (Cadillac Gage) Light Armoured Vehicle - Assault Gun [LAV-AG]. The LAV-AG is based on the LAV-I as supplied to the Marine Corps (3 prototype LAV-AG completed using chassis supplied by USMC) and mounts M35 LRF 105mm in a two-man reduced profile turret similar to that used on the Cadillac Gage 'Stingray' light tank (which also mounts the more suitable M35 LRF 105mm). Even though the LAV-AG was completed on time and within the fixed price budget,
'Jane's Armour and Artillery 1996-97' notes it was cancelled
"due to lack of production funding between FY93 and FY96 as Pentagon acquisition policy did not allow continued development of a program unless there was assured production money." Unlike the MGS
"Trials have shown that the LAV-AG can engage stationary and moving targets with a high first round hit probability while the vehicle itself is stationary or moving." :soldier:
Interesting, that GDLS (General Dynamics Land Systems) does not use a proven solution, the Cadillac Gage LAV-AG turret on the LAV-III chassis (easily transferable from earlier LAV-I), in favour of saving company money (by not having to pay a license fee or subcontract to TM&LS for the 90s technology LAV-AG turret) by using 'no-charge' high-velocity M68A1 cannons -
US$67.5M Overall additional profit - on the cramped GDLS Low Profile Turret [LPT] just to try to save a few pounds in weight due to use of the heavier M68A1. Also noteworthy that the GDLS LPT is 80s technology as it was originally designed by Teledyne Vehicle Systems (taken over by GDLS in early-1996) for the mid-80s private-venture tracked Expeditionary light Tank (which compared to the 10 round replenisher for the MGS had a 22 round replenisher) with the more stable chasis able to accomodate the M68A1 or the M35 LRF 105mm gun. Jane's notes
"The company envisaged it could be fitted to such chassis as the M48/M60 and Leopard 1 series MBTs, the old M47 medium tank and the M41 light tank, and the Marine Corps AAV7A1 armoured amphibious assault vehicle." No mention of a LAV type chassis - Interesting! :tank:
Curiously, DND seems to have bought into the notion of padding GDLS's profit margin as, besides the noted
'2.3.5', the December 2003
'Project Profile and Risk Assessment Project 00000731 MGS' notes:
"The Industrial and Regional Benefit strategy would be to seek an IRB commitment of 100% of the contract value. This would be achieved though both direct and indirect benefits, with a target of 50% direct Canadian value-added, with a view to improving General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada viability." By implication, the 2,131 Stryker LAV-III.5s for the Interim SBCTs, the 651 LAV-III; 203 Coyote LAV-II; 199 Bison LAV-II, and numerous foreign sales of thousands of LAVs (USMC, Australia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia) must not have done much to improve GDLS-Canada's viabillity??
I sincerely hope the above provides/provokes some thoughtfull discussion amongst all the regular/reserve/retired Armour types out there as this directly affects the livelihood of the current RCAC members. I look forward to reviewing the responses after a few days.
[I do ask that those with No subject matter experience stay out of the discussion. :
]
