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Neighbors by Day, Soldiers by Night in Afghanistan
BARAKI BARAK, Afghanistan — As the Obama administration sends thousands
of additional troops into Afghanistan, the future of the American strategy for
securing the country is already playing out in this verdant triangle of wheat
fields and fruit orchards 40 miles south of Kabul.
For the last five months, a troop of American soldiers has ensconced itself in
the heart of the district’s largest town, living alongside its police officers and
public officials, trying to win friends as it struggles to root out enemies.
By day, the soldiers patrol the bazaar just outside their barbed-wire gates,
chatting with merchants and buying their wares. They have hired three dozen
local men as day laborers and security guards and committed more than $2
million to improving local roads, schools and government buildings.
But by night, the troop resumes the work of war, conducting armed patrols
and raids on homes in search of insurgent fighters and bomb makers. As
surgically as possible, the soldiers are trying to separate fighters from the
villagers who provide them shelter, whether by choice or at gunpoint. As the
soldiers of Able Troop are finding, their two missions can sometimes clash.
On one recent night, American soldiers and Afghan security forces raided four
homes in the village of Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani, detaining seven men. But they
released the men a day later after determining none were insurgents. Several
of the men worked in the bazaar where the soldiers sometimes shop, their
wives said.
“People are not happy with these night raids,” said Yasin Ludin, the district chief
of Baraki Barak. But he added that villagers would tolerate intrusions provided
security improves — and so far, he and others said, it has.
Establishing small beachheads in population centers like Baraki Barak is central
to the new Afghan policy recently outlined by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the
commander of allied forces in Afghanistan. Building off counterinsurgency lessons
learned in Iraq, the strategy calls for clearing enemy fighters from towns, then
remaining behind to train the police, stimulate economic growth and strengthen
local government. The trade-off, senior military officers acknowledge, is that the
Taliban may gain influence in sparsely populated rural and mountainous regions.
With about 130,000 residents, Baraki Barak was a hotspot of insurgent activity a
year ago, when rocket attacks on the police station occurred almost nightly. Today
such attacks are rare, residents say. Merchants now stay open after dark, and a
district chief who had fled to Kabul has returned. The Americans are building new
government offices adjacent to their outpost.
“Last year, we could not sit here this late,” said Malaam Zahir, 55, as he sipped
tea one evening outside his bakery in the town. “We can work now.”
Southeast Logar Province was also a haven from which insurgents organized missions
against Kabul, the Afghan capital. Those attacks have declined since the United States
stationed about 2,700 soldiers from the Third Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain
Division, into Logar and adjacent Wardak Provinces at the beginning of the year,
American and Afghan officials say.
Still, things are far from safe in Baraki Barak. Improvised explosive devices are
discovered almost daily in the district’s dirt roads. American patrols still come under
ambush. Posters threatening villagers who work for the Americans appear regularly
in the bazaar. A girls’ school was recently set ablaze. And insurgent fighters float in
and out of outlying villages with near impunity.
In some cases, villagers help insurgents because they support their cause, while
others give shelter only under threat. But many, perhaps most, villagers who assist
the insurgents do so simply for money, American officials say. For that reason, the
American soldiers are pumping money as fast as they can into the local economy.
“They are carrying an R.P.G. for $150,” said Col. David B. Haight, commander of
Task Force Spartan, the American force in Wardak and Logar, referring to a rocket-
propelled grenade. “I’m trying to get them to carry a shovel for $150. There may be
a guy working for us now that two weeks ago was the enemy.”
As the night raid in Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani underscores, separating insurgents from
the villages is no simple task. American officers called their target “an intimidator”
who has financed roadside bomb attacks and threatened villagers who cooperated
with the Americans. But they had no photograph of him and had to track his
movements using sophisticated surveillance equipment.
Their plan called for a “soft knock” approach different from the door-bashing raids
that American officials acknowledge have alienated many people in Iraq and Afghanistan.
After creeping along irrigation ditches by the light of the stars to reach a walled compound,
Afghan national police officers pounded on the metal gate until a man in a white nightshirt
emerged. Behind the police officers was a squad of Able Troop soldiers whose commanding
officer, a first lieutenant, shouted orders through an interpreter.
The Afghan and American forces searched four homes before sending the detainees to an
American base for questioning, just as a muezzin began his call to the dawn prayer. Later
the American investigators would learn that their target had slipped away just hours before
the police and soldiers arrived. Though no doors were kicked in and no one was injured,
some of the American soldiers later questioned whether the raid had alienated more villagers
than it had secured.
The detainees, many barefoot, had been forced to sit or kneel on a dirt path during the room-
to-room searches, and after several hours in the cold, some were shivering so vigorously that
their teeth chattered. Frightened women and children were awakened and moved into courtyards
alongside their cows and goats. Still, several women questioned by an interpreter said that they
were glad the Americans had accompanied the Afghan police officers. Alone, those officers would
steal from them, the women said.
Maj. Todd Polk, commander of Able Troop, part of the Third Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, said
that he would meet with villager elders if they had complaints about the raid, but that he had not
heard of any. Major Polk said he thought villagers were willing to accept some intrusions if they
thought it meant greater security. The night after the Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani mission, he said,
American and Afghan forces raided a sprawling compound in a nearby village and captured a man
thought to be a senior operative of Al Qaeda.
“If they don’t see people getting stopped for weapons checks, they aren’t going to feel as secure,”
Major Polk said. “We could sit here in our outpost and just do patrols and never get anywhere
except have people shoot at us and blow us up.”
Ruhullah Khapalwak contributed reporting from Kabul.
BARAKI BARAK, Afghanistan — As the Obama administration sends thousands
of additional troops into Afghanistan, the future of the American strategy for
securing the country is already playing out in this verdant triangle of wheat
fields and fruit orchards 40 miles south of Kabul.
For the last five months, a troop of American soldiers has ensconced itself in
the heart of the district’s largest town, living alongside its police officers and
public officials, trying to win friends as it struggles to root out enemies.
By day, the soldiers patrol the bazaar just outside their barbed-wire gates,
chatting with merchants and buying their wares. They have hired three dozen
local men as day laborers and security guards and committed more than $2
million to improving local roads, schools and government buildings.
But by night, the troop resumes the work of war, conducting armed patrols
and raids on homes in search of insurgent fighters and bomb makers. As
surgically as possible, the soldiers are trying to separate fighters from the
villagers who provide them shelter, whether by choice or at gunpoint. As the
soldiers of Able Troop are finding, their two missions can sometimes clash.
On one recent night, American soldiers and Afghan security forces raided four
homes in the village of Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani, detaining seven men. But they
released the men a day later after determining none were insurgents. Several
of the men worked in the bazaar where the soldiers sometimes shop, their
wives said.
“People are not happy with these night raids,” said Yasin Ludin, the district chief
of Baraki Barak. But he added that villagers would tolerate intrusions provided
security improves — and so far, he and others said, it has.
Establishing small beachheads in population centers like Baraki Barak is central
to the new Afghan policy recently outlined by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the
commander of allied forces in Afghanistan. Building off counterinsurgency lessons
learned in Iraq, the strategy calls for clearing enemy fighters from towns, then
remaining behind to train the police, stimulate economic growth and strengthen
local government. The trade-off, senior military officers acknowledge, is that the
Taliban may gain influence in sparsely populated rural and mountainous regions.
With about 130,000 residents, Baraki Barak was a hotspot of insurgent activity a
year ago, when rocket attacks on the police station occurred almost nightly. Today
such attacks are rare, residents say. Merchants now stay open after dark, and a
district chief who had fled to Kabul has returned. The Americans are building new
government offices adjacent to their outpost.
“Last year, we could not sit here this late,” said Malaam Zahir, 55, as he sipped
tea one evening outside his bakery in the town. “We can work now.”
Southeast Logar Province was also a haven from which insurgents organized missions
against Kabul, the Afghan capital. Those attacks have declined since the United States
stationed about 2,700 soldiers from the Third Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain
Division, into Logar and adjacent Wardak Provinces at the beginning of the year,
American and Afghan officials say.
Still, things are far from safe in Baraki Barak. Improvised explosive devices are
discovered almost daily in the district’s dirt roads. American patrols still come under
ambush. Posters threatening villagers who work for the Americans appear regularly
in the bazaar. A girls’ school was recently set ablaze. And insurgent fighters float in
and out of outlying villages with near impunity.
In some cases, villagers help insurgents because they support their cause, while
others give shelter only under threat. But many, perhaps most, villagers who assist
the insurgents do so simply for money, American officials say. For that reason, the
American soldiers are pumping money as fast as they can into the local economy.
“They are carrying an R.P.G. for $150,” said Col. David B. Haight, commander of
Task Force Spartan, the American force in Wardak and Logar, referring to a rocket-
propelled grenade. “I’m trying to get them to carry a shovel for $150. There may be
a guy working for us now that two weeks ago was the enemy.”
As the night raid in Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani underscores, separating insurgents from
the villages is no simple task. American officers called their target “an intimidator”
who has financed roadside bomb attacks and threatened villagers who cooperated
with the Americans. But they had no photograph of him and had to track his
movements using sophisticated surveillance equipment.
Their plan called for a “soft knock” approach different from the door-bashing raids
that American officials acknowledge have alienated many people in Iraq and Afghanistan.
After creeping along irrigation ditches by the light of the stars to reach a walled compound,
Afghan national police officers pounded on the metal gate until a man in a white nightshirt
emerged. Behind the police officers was a squad of Able Troop soldiers whose commanding
officer, a first lieutenant, shouted orders through an interpreter.
The Afghan and American forces searched four homes before sending the detainees to an
American base for questioning, just as a muezzin began his call to the dawn prayer. Later
the American investigators would learn that their target had slipped away just hours before
the police and soldiers arrived. Though no doors were kicked in and no one was injured,
some of the American soldiers later questioned whether the raid had alienated more villagers
than it had secured.
The detainees, many barefoot, had been forced to sit or kneel on a dirt path during the room-
to-room searches, and after several hours in the cold, some were shivering so vigorously that
their teeth chattered. Frightened women and children were awakened and moved into courtyards
alongside their cows and goats. Still, several women questioned by an interpreter said that they
were glad the Americans had accompanied the Afghan police officers. Alone, those officers would
steal from them, the women said.
Maj. Todd Polk, commander of Able Troop, part of the Third Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, said
that he would meet with villager elders if they had complaints about the raid, but that he had not
heard of any. Major Polk said he thought villagers were willing to accept some intrusions if they
thought it meant greater security. The night after the Pabkhuab-e-Rowghani mission, he said,
American and Afghan forces raided a sprawling compound in a nearby village and captured a man
thought to be a senior operative of Al Qaeda.
“If they don’t see people getting stopped for weapons checks, they aren’t going to feel as secure,”
Major Polk said. “We could sit here in our outpost and just do patrols and never get anywhere
except have people shoot at us and blow us up.”
Ruhullah Khapalwak contributed reporting from Kabul.
