Port Security in the context of the Naval Reserves has always been a confused issue, and suffers heavily from high turnover rates, and what seems to be a lack of vision beyond defending naval assets within the context of Halifax or Esquimalt. In my own opinion, I believe that to change Port Security we must refine or change the following elements (My PSS theory is based on serving with POESB-PSS Esquimalt, and limited engagements with PSU-Halifax).
1) Port Security Section, Port Security Unit and Formation Guard Force must establish a common operations doctrine. An effective and coherent Port Security policy is a must in an era where we face threats from both home and abroad. A solid and well executed/funded Port Security strategy is the only way to guarantee the safety of our naval assets and insure that Canada can continue to effectively wage a global war against terrorism.
2) To elevate the status of Naval Reserve based Port Security, one of the first and most important steps is for access control/security patrols to be handed over to Port Security personnel. The continued usage of unarmed civil security guards (the Corps of Commissionaires) is an outdated practice which no longer fits with the current world situation. In my own personal experience, I found the Commissionaires to be less that suited to the job of access control, and often times making mistakes which could in theory cost of lives of countless Canadian Servicemen. With that being said, in consultation with the Naval Provost Marshal’s (of their respective regions), Port Security Personnel should take over all security functions aboard both CFB Esquimalt & CFB Halifax.
3) Port Security as a whole must transition from an any trade required function, to an actual rating with established doctrine, and leadership. Now obviously some may complain that the Navy’s primary function is not combat related and that would therefore be stepping on the toes of Army, but in a historical context many services across the world(especially in the context of the world’s Air Force’s have had to create force protection units to defend air assets, a good example being the Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Defense Guards, who were created out of necessity during Vietnam when it became impossible for the United States Air Force Security Police(now USAF Security Forces) to provide coherent and effective protection to both USAF and RAAF assets). Now with respect to a Port Security Rating, it would not have to be a direct entry and instead could operate as a re-muster rating which would then bring a wealth of experience from across the NAVRES community to the rating. The other option, would be a direct entry rating, in which personnel from the time they have completed BMQ will become adept in the all the functions and duties required of a PS Sentry/Boats Crew. Now obviously, the other question remains as to whether the rating would have its own officers, or if instead officers would be seconded to the rating to simply fulfill a logistical/leadership function. The other option, would be the creation of an PS Classification for Officers, with a focus on tactics and doctrine.
4) Now obviously in the modern CF the idea of a “fighting sailor” is considered something of a relic from the days of Nelson and the RCN, but in actuality pre-unification at least among certain elements of the RCN/RCN(R) & RCNR there seemed to be some impetus on teaching naval landing training (references to this can be found in articles in the Crowsnest Magazine). For the modern Port Security Sailor, the concept of naval landing training should be revised, since after all a well rounded fighting sailor, should be able to defend his fleet along with being able to engage the enemy without having to rely on the army, or wait for the air force to bomb the aggressor force out of existence. After all, if Port Security personnel were able to receive offensive training, as well as defensive training they could realistically be employed in combat zones (as it has sometimes been stated in the past, that the future of NAVRES PSS lies in external operations).
5) Finally, there must be a change in the security posture of NAVRES Port Security in general. Rather than simply acting as a visual deterrent/tripwire, PSU (and its sister units) should instead adopt a more aggressive policy. After all, when dealing with any aggressor it is better to be ready to fire and be on the offensive, then to stand fast and potentially loose servicemen because of vaguely instituted policies. After all, force protection should not be viewed through a litigious lens of whether or not we are justified to use force, but instead should be based around, are our sailors ready to kill a potential aggressor, and protect his fellow shipmates from harm. Now this may seem like a rather harsh view on both policy and procedure, but if we are to look at the situation in a fair and balanced manner, how many times have we seen our US Allies loose personnel in overseas operations due to rules of engagement/policies which were either too strict, or far too vague. Simply put, a sailor must be able to make a snap decision on every call, and he must feel competent to be able to back that call, if he is made to account for his actions, in front of a jury of his peers.