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Purge the Generals - US Army LTC calls for sweeping changes from the top down

dapaterson

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Provocative article in the Armed Forces Journal, suggesting that there's a need for a comprehensive housecleaning.

http://armedforcesjournal.com/article/2013/08/14067080



Of interest: the author states there are 900 GOFOs for 1.4 million active duty service personnel.  That's 20x the size of Canada's Reg F, suggesting Canada should have ~45 GOFOs - but the author thinks the US needs to cut their numbers...
 
Both LTC Davis and I recognize that there are economies of scale, as he says, "In 1945, about 2,000 general and flag officers led a total of about 12 million citizens in uniform. Today, we have about 900 generals and admirals and 1.4 million troops, and the ratio of leader-to-led has accelerated upward in the two decades since the end of the Cold War." The simple fact is that even in a small (or in the US case smaller) military there need to be some GOFOs.

He is also correct, in the same paragraph, when he says, "Many general officer billets ... can effectively be filled by colonels or even lieutenant colonels." This is especially true in the CF where there is an "executive imbalance:" our rank for major command ~ commander and lieutenant colonel ~ is not, but should be, the first level "executive" rank for HQ - the "director" level in Ottawa. Formation commanders ~ RCN captains commanding MOGs and army colonels commanding brigades ~ have, at the very least, authority equivalent to directors general or even assistant deputy ministers. Our HQs are not only bloated they are over ranked. (Which leads us towards this thread.)
 
E.R. Campbell said:
Our HQs are not only bloated they are over ranked. (Which leads us towards this thread.)

Agree.  I worked on this with my graduate degree - staff sizes (in the Army at least) remained fairly constant to the 1980s - they even made it through unification with only cosmetic changes.  It was the 1984 institution of the Continental System that led to an amazing amount of growth.  This, I believe, is due to two reasons.  First, the bureau structure of the continental system promotes "equality" - so, the Int guy, the CIMIC guy, and the Fin guy all occupy branches and are this equal to the Ops guy and the Admin Guy (who really drive the ship).  So that means more guys at higher ranks.  When something new is developed, it can be given it's own branch (along with rank and staff responsibility) instead of being subordinated to Ops or Admin as in our old model.  Some staffs have J1 through 14.

The second is the "keeping up with the Jones" factor - NATO adopted a U.S. staff model which came with U.S. rank conventions.  The Americans have always had staff out rank command.  Majors were staff and Captains were commanders (as opposed to the opposite at the lowest levels of the Commonwealth system).  When we graft it onto our system, it doesn't fit right, because now we have Majors in staff and Majors in Command and a bunch of Captains to work for them all.  Apply that at every level, and the growth occurs.
 
here is an article that may be helpful http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/08/overthrow-the-generals/

It expands and adds two other sources as Tom Ricks from Best Defence and LCOL  Yingling

snippets under the fair use policy of the copyright act

"In May 2007, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, comparing the prospect of U.S. defeat in the cases of Vietnam and Iraq,  wrote that the debacles in the Iraq war “are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps,” who have “failed to prepare our armed forces for war.

...

And Thomas Ricks wrote in The Atlantic in November 2012 (“General Failure”) that, “To a shocking degree, the Army’s leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a risk-averse middle where they are more likely to find a stalemate than a victory.”

He added: “Ironically, our generals have grown worse as they have been lionized more and more by a society now reflexively deferential to the military… No one is pushing those leaders to step back and examine the shortcomings of their institution. These are dangerous developments. Unaddressed, they could lead to further failures in future wars.”

But how to fix such an ingrained, systemic problem?"
 
Infanteer said:
Agree.  I worked on this with my graduate degree - staff sizes (in the Army at least) remained fairly constant to the 1980s - they even made it through unification with only cosmetic changes.  It was the 1984 institution of the Continental System that led to an amazing amount of growth.  This, I believe, is due to two reasons.  First, the bureau structure of the continental system promotes "equality" - so, the Int guy, the CIMIC guy, and the Fin guy all occupy branches and are this equal to the Ops guy and the Admin Guy (who really drive the ship).  So that means more guys at higher ranks.  When something new is developed, it can be given it's own branch (along with rank and staff responsibility) instead of being subordinated to Ops or Admin as in our old model.  Some staffs have J1 through 14.

The second is the "keeping up with the Jones" factor - NATO adopted a U.S. staff model which came with U.S. rank conventions.  The Americans have always had staff out rank command.  Majors were staff and Captains were commanders (as opposed to the opposite at the lowest levels of the Commonwealth system).  When we graft it onto our system, it doesn't fit right, because now we have Majors in staff and Majors in Command and a bunch of Captains to work for them all.  Apply that at every level, and the growth occurs.


I should go on search and find an old post of mine where I explain this in some detail but our "old" system was:

    At unit level, the sub-unit commanders were majors and the principal staff officers (Adjutant, Ops O and QM) were captains;

    At brigade level, the unit COs were lieutenant colonels while the principal staff officers (BM and DAA&QMG) were majors;

    At division level, the brigade commanders were brigadiers while the principal staff officers were lieutenant colonels, later colonels;

    At corps, the main subordinate commanders were major generals while the principal staff officers were brigadiers.

Do you see the pattern? The principal subordinate commanders always outrank the principal staff officers. This accomplishes two things:

    1. It simplifies and clarifies the chain of command; no one can doubt that a brigadier outranks the lieutenant colonel GSO1 Ops at Div HQ; but

    2. It strengthens the staff ~ the staff must, always and clearly, understand their commander's intentions, the staff must be on top of the situation, it must have a firm grasp of all the details and exercise sound military judgement.

In our "old" system the brigade major for example, was able to control the brigade, hour by hour and day by day on the brigade commander's behalf because the COs knew he had the brigadier's confidence ~ that was clear because he hadn't been fired ~ and the COs knew that he was a smart, hard working officer. It was a good sound, economical system.

We need reform of the C2 superstructure as a matter of urgency, in my opinion.
 
The US Army is taking this seriously: they've given subordinate commands two weeks to find ways to reduce their HQ burden.

http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130819/NEWS/308190035?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter
 
Too bad across the board reductions rarely work - they look at people but miss out on process and product.  The UK tried this in the 1970s and quietly re-manned all the positions 6 months later.
 
I do like the 2 week turn-around - less time for folks to dig in and prepare their rearguard defences.

Though I suspect you're right about the "Wait a few months and they'll all be back" situation.
 
The surest way to reduce staffs is to eliminate headquarters.During Clinton's hollow Army to counteract,the manpower shortages at the tactical level,manpower slots were taken from training and headquarters to fill the combat units.Title X is the core of the problem.Congress mandated that officers of all services spend part of their career on a joint staff.Like many acts of congress the idea was good,but the execution has been poor.Time spent in a series of staff jobs takes an officer away from the tactical level.This is most important for mid grade officers.Would a MAJ serving as a brigade XO be more beneficial to the Army or that same officer sitting in a cube at the Pentagon ?

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10
 
While the topic is to reduce flag officers,there is a trend for allied general officers to serve in US Army division and or Corps as deputy CG.Here is one such announcement that I wasnt aware of. Canada has BG Eyre at 18 Abn Corps and BG Milner at III Corps. I would bet that Eyre,Milner and Brig Gedney will be Major General's in the near future.

http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130821/CAREERS03/308210005/British-general-leaving-Fort-Riley-command

FORT RILEY, KAN. — A British military officer is leaving his position with the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley to return to the United Kingdom for duty.

Brig. Felix G. Gedney has been serving as the 1st Infantry’s deputy commanding general for training since November 2011. A farewell ceremony was scheduled Wednesday at the northeast Kansas Army post.

Gedney deployed from April 2012 to March 2013 with the division to Afghanistan. He oversaw the support that Regional Command-East provided to NATO and U.S. forces handing off security duties to Afghan forces.

His previous tours of duty include serving at the United Nations in 2000 and leading British forces in Iraq in 2008.









 
We also have BGen Turenne at I Corps.

BGen Juneau returned from 18 AB Corps to command 3 Div here in Edmonton.
 
Thats a new twist on foreigners taking American jobs. ;D
Lest someone get the wrong idea,they aren't taking american jobs.The roles they fill have been added to the organization to add international experience.It doesnt hurt that they also gain experience working as part of a major combat unit.
 
I agree, I'm sure there is a degree of perspective gained by working in the US Army higher formations that cannot be gained anywhere else.  I hope this trend continues.
 
In recent years a tour at Ft Hood seems to be preparation for the top job in the CF.
 
tomahawk6 said:
I would bet that Eyre,Milner and Brig Gedney will be Major General's in the near future.
III Corps is in Afghanistan.  Milner is currently wearing MGen as part of NTM-A.

http://nouvelles.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=744809
 
related:

Military.com link

Navy Joins Army in Plan to Cut Brass

WASHINGTON — With a warning that "the money is gone," military leaders driven by falling defense spending are moving to cut top brass positions and slash headquarters spending.

The Navy announced late Tuesday that Navy Secretary Ray Mabus had approved a plan to “reduce, eliminate or consolidate a net of 35 Navy flag officer positions” at the one-, two- and three-star ranks. The Navy said it also plans to eliminate 6 more top officer positions in the 2015 budget.

And last week, a memo from Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno and Army Secretary John McHugh declared that a plan to cut Army headquarters at the two-star level and above by 25 percent was priority No. 1 for headquarters staff.

The Navy said flag officer end strength is being reduced using a “phased approach” and will be complete by 2017, resulting in 151 Navy-specific billets and 61 flag officers to fill joint billets.

“We had to make tough choices but it was the right thing to do -- the plan is in line with Congressional mandates, OSD guidance and our changing fiscal environment,” said Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Mark E. Ferguson.
 
tomahawk6 said:
In recent years a tour at Ft Hood seems to be preparation for the top job in the CF.

Yes, pretty high correlation, what with two past DCGs of III Corps being CHoDs...  :nod:
 
tomahawk6 said:
Title X is the core of the problem.  Congress mandated that officers of all services spend part of their career on a joint staff. Like many acts of congress the idea was good,but the execution has been poor.  Time spent in a series of staff jobs takes an officer away from the tactical level.
I have noticed that maintaining the separate service stovepipes in the US consumes a lot of effort and manpower.  Maybe the next step in reducing the number of generals is consideration of some sort of unification.
 
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