The Light Battalions.

[Ex-Dragoon]

I have been reading about the jump company subject with a lot of interest and realized that I don't know what the other company does. One Coy is Para, another Coy is Mountain ops. Do I hazard a guess and say that the last Coy is Air Assault? *Waiting for the back of the hand*

 

[Bartok5]

Dragoon,

Aside from the para role assigned to a single rifle company (and selected combat support attachments if the unit is creative with its allocation of para positions), there are no doctrinally-formalized "sub-specialties" for the other 2 rifle coys within a light battalion.   To the best of my knowledge, the assignment of such "specialist roles" is confined to 3 PPCLI at the present time.  

The idea is to give the non-para rifle coys a similarly specialized light infantry role which fosters a sense of sub-unit identity while offering capability benefits the battalion as a whole.   When I served in 3 PPCLI a couple of years ago, A Coy was para, B Coy was Mountain, and C Coy was Amphibious and Airmobile.   These mobility-related SME tasks give each sub-unit a focus above and beyond their core light infantry skills.   "Core" battalion-wide skills within 3 PPCLI include operations in complex terrain (urban, forested, etc), so there is no requirement for sub-unit specialization in those "bread and butter" areas.

What the coy "specialites" amount to is the assignment of suitably-qualified soldiers to that particular sub-unit, combined with a coy-wide focus on researching, training for, and performing the assigned secondary role in support of battalion operations.  To use the B Coy "Mountain Ops" example which I alluded to in the Para thread, when I was with the Coy we had the majority of the unit's Mountain Operations Instructors (MOIs) employed within the coy ORBAT.   We did all of the "common-to-all" light infantry training that the other coys did, but above and beyond that we:

- conducted the annual Basic Mountain Operations School for the remainder of the unit (90% of 3 PPCLI personnel are B Mtn Ops qualified.  Everyone joining the battalion attends the course as a "welcome to the battalion".   This program served us VERY well in the mountains of Afghanistan),

- provided SME MOI support to the other 3 VP sub-units for their internal training,

- provided SME MOI support to other 1 CMBG units,

- provided SME field-force representation to the CPC Mountain Ops Cell,

- were the obvious choice to conduct a SOVEX in the moutainous terrain of the Yukon adjacent to Kluane National Park,

- conducted pre-course training for 3 PPCLI MOI candidates,

- facilitated the movement of other 3 VP sub-units over mountainous terrain during tactical exercises by day and night.   B Coy did this by constructing, operating and securing the applicable installations (scramble lines, single/double/3-rope bridges, vertical hauling lines, suspension-traverses, rappel sites, etc).

C Coy performed similar functions in regards to amphibious and airmobile operations.   They also picked up the additional task of being the battalion Non-Combattant Evacuation (NEO) SMEs while 3 VP had the Army's NEO task.   This was based on the fact that such operations would most likely occur in an airmobile or joint amphibious context.

Since I left 3 VP in late 2002, my understanding is that C Coy re-roled a year ago to a "Long-Range Patrol" focus.   The idea being that with the NEO task passed to another unit and the majority of 3 VP personnel VERY familiar with airmobile ops from Afghanistan, C Coy could focus on a new area of light infantry expertise.   It made good sense.   Now that C Coy is adopting the Para role, it remains to be seen whether A Coy will rejeuvenate the amphibious/airmobile specialty, or continue the LRP focus started by C Coy.   It is entirely the CO's call, since none of those secondary sub-unit tasks are mandated by higher HQ.

I can't speak to what 3 RCR or 3 R22eR do internally WRT sub-unit "specialties", but I can say that the approach works exceptionally well within 3 PPCLI.   It is a "good thing" for a whole host of reasons, not the least of which is the sub-unit focus/cohesion that such an assignment fosters.   Add to that the specialized light infantry skill-sets and concentrated subject-matter expertise that the sub-unit roles generate, and you have a win-win situation.

I hope this answers your question.

Cheers,

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

D'oh!!!
I am surprised that the organization does not seem standard across the board. Isn't this a major shortcoming then.

Thank you for your reply as well Mark.

 

[Jungle]

There was a similar system in place in 3R22R before I left 3 years ago, and it was also working well.
Actually I made a similar proposal in 1995 when we first formed the Para coy. Since the coy was on it's own, without any combat support, I had proposed to give each Rifle section a secondary task, on which they would train one day a week. Examples of tasks: mortars (60mm with C2 sight), tank-hunting teams, MG (SF role), assault pionneer, Pathfinder etc... This gave the OC the flexibility of having sections trained and current on specific tasks, and use them as he wished, like Support PLs at the Battalion level.
Then we joined the new Light Battalion, received a new CO and OC and the plan fell through the cracks. Some time later it was revived, with mobility-related tasks going to the coys.

 

[rw4th]

I have it from an acquaintance that pre-deployment to Afghanistan, one of the coys in 3R22R was specialized in urban operations. I don't know if this specialization will be maintained post deployment, or if it's a trend that has spread to other battalions.

 

[Mortar guy]

Not totally related but here goes anyway. My Platoon formed a Pioneer Section and a 60mm Mortar Section out of two of our rifle sections before deploying to Kosovo. We had enough Pioneer and Mortar qualified guys in the Pl to make it work. The Pioneer Sect was especially useful. I don't always agree with specialization but in this case it was more like a secondary task for those sections.

Alex

 

[pbi]

One of the reasons that we don't have a completely standardized approach to the roles and tasks for our light battalion is that the Army has not yet made some of the key decisions that will point us in the final direction. (This can be at least partly attributed to the genesis of these three battalions, which was not really the result of an operational needs analysis but rather from other causes)

There has been alot of debate in the Infantry community over the last two years on this subject, but my impression before I deployed was that we were moving somewhat toward a "Ranger"-like orientation, with an inherent ability to cooperate with SF or to conduct some types of "SF"  missions. This is as opposed to the school of thought that sees a Light bn as a veh-deficient Mech bn. That line of thinking has, I believe, died a natural death.

The problem with a more specialized stream such as this in our small Army is that it would make personnel  movement between LAV and Lt battalions difficult, and at the moment the Inf is still standing firm on the idea of mobility between battalions.  If we decide to drop that approach, then things may move further in that direction. The result, however, might be the further subdivision of an already small branch.  Cheers.

 

[Jungle]

The problem with a more specialized stream such as this in our small Army is that it would make personnel   movement between LAV and Lt battalions difficult, and at the moment the Inf is still standing firm on the idea of mobility between battalions.   If we decide to drop that approach, then things may move further in that direction. The result, however, might be the further subdivision of an already small branch.   Cheers.

It is inevitable that the Corps will come to that. Actually, I think it is desirable... There was an interesting discussion on the subject here: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17022.30.html

 

[pbi]

Yes- I agree with you. I think that while the Infantry has to preserve a core set of skills, we are fooling ourselves if we think that we will be able to move people easily between Light battalions that have gone "Ranger" or "MEU-SOC" (to use a USMC parallel) with SF type skill sets, and LAV battalions in which, as far as I can see, it is a severe challenge to maintain individual, crew and collective skills (maybe a LV guy can put me straight on this one...).

In my opinion, if we really do each of those roles right (as opposed to just half-assing both of them...), the training and mindset delta that will open between the two types of units will make crossover difficult. I clearly recall in the days of the CAR, when guys returned to the "leg" battalions, there was a psychological adjustment required (but not always made). I'm sure it was the same going in the other direction. At least there was still some commonality of skills, because in hte mech bns we were just using our APCs and AVGPs as taxis: we did not have an IFV like we do now. And, if we are truly to honour the potential of the LAVIII, we need to focus our training in LAV bns on being proficient mech warriors.

This, in my opinion, is confrontingl us with a serious dilemma because we are so small. A concept that I have heard and that I agree with, would be to regard our Corps as a tree. The trunk of the tree is just called "Infantry" and is best represented by the  core skill sets that are currently taught in DP1 Inf (more or less). The units that reside here are our Reserve Infantry. Before you laugh, I can assure you that they are quite capable of functioning there: in some areas such as basic winter warfare they are probably better than most Regular Army inf because their winter training is not disrupted by endless Rotos.

The next branch of the tree would be Mech (LAV) Inf. LAV soldiers begin with a common Inf skill set base, but train to fight in a way that maximizes the power and potential of the LAV. Mech Inf might become a sub-MOC (but not, I think, an MOC on its own...)

The second branch of the tree is formed by the Light battalions, with a focus on being SOC, or as I suggested above, "Ranger". This might also represent a sub-MOC, in particularly because the training required to field truly capable units in this field would work against crossover.

The final branch of the Infantry tree is, in my opinion, the JTFII. While I know that this unit is recruited from across all MOCs, it is in my opinion firmly based in skill sets we would associate most closely with Infantry. This branch, I think, has the strongest case to make in being a sub MOC.

If we follow the tree model and ensure a common core of skills, we may be able to preserve some mobility between the branches of the tree. But, I am still increasingly skeptical that we will be able to do our usual good old Canadian "jack of all trades" approach. I freely admit that I have not thought this out in depth, and I await the flogging. Cheers.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

The LAV (turret esp) is very technical and there is a requirement to stay on top of things (not like its done though).  do to budget contraints I think we are leaning to simulation trainers.

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

That said the mech guys still need to cover patrols, hasty/deliberate attacks etc.  Also with the loss of some of our army cars we are now 2 coy mech and one light.  So what does that mean in the grand scheme of things?

 

[Bartok5]

CFL,

I'd say that it leaves a Mech Battalion with "2 mech" and one "dismounted" coy.   With the latter simply awaiting its rotation through a mech skills maintenance rotation based on the limited availability of unit-held LAV IIIs.   The "dismounted" coy could be spending its time in the "dismounted skills cycle" honing those very same "LAV-less" core-competency skills that you mentioned - recce and fighting patrols, urban operations/interior combat, etc.

I my view, we need to begin collectively distinguishing between "light" and "dismounted" forces.   I say this despite the current absence of formalized Canadian "Light Forces" doctrine which will presumably define the two distinct roles.   I am of the opinion that "Dismounted" does not equal "Light" in a whole range of regards.   Some of these considerations have already been touched on earlier in this thread, but there are more.   Whether the two infantry roles are sufficiently different or "specialized" to warrant sub-MOCs and separate "Mech" and Light" career-streams remains to be seen.   But I would suggest that there can be little dispute about the fact that "Dismounted" and "Light" are no longer interchangable terms within the Canadian Army lexicon.  

This is precisely why I have taken the time to explain in detail on other discussion boards why our Infantry Reserves should not consider themselves "Light Infantry".   Like our "Mech" sub-units, the Reserves simply do not have the available time nor training resources to establish a full range of comprehensive "Light" skill-sets on par with the 3 Light Battalions.   We have reached a point where the skill-sets are diverging to the point of uniqueness (in terms of both the natures and LEVELS of skills), whether people are willing to admit it or not.   The fact that "Mech" or "Dismounted" soldiers are not "Light" (and vice-versa) is not indicative of lesser soldier skills.   It simply reflects the divergence of specialized skill-sets.   Fighting and exploiting the inherenet firepower, manoeuvre and protection of the LAV, while mastering the increased technology and training demands of the vehicle is the purview of the Mechanized soldier.   Maintaining basic core competency in the full range of Dismounted infantry skills within the acknowledged limitations of reduced time and resources is the responsibility of Reserve Infantry units.   Optimizing for "Unique Operations" (airborne, airmobile, amphibious, long-range patrol) in "Specific Environments" (urban, mountain, forest, desert) is the emerging role of the Light Battalions.   They are complimentary roles, with considerable overlap (eg.   the tree branches).   But at the end of the day, they are also quite distinct and different roles.   And I would suggest that they will become even more so in the future.
       
It is safe to say that the 3rd Battalions have already moved well beyond the basic "dismounted" infantry core competencies to varying degrees.   If we use 3 PPCLI as an example, even in the absence of formalized direction and doctrine we are already seeing elements of specialization which go well beyond the basic range of dismounted operations.   The focus on Airborne, Mountain, Amphibious and Long-Range Patrol capabilities are just a few of the more obvious "specialized" aspects of that unit.   The continual development (through routine practice) of enhanced urban interior combat skills as a "common-to-all" capability within 3 PPCLI is yet another.   As is the unit's focus on developing an exceptional level of "across-the-board" physical fitness.

This ongoing developmental and training focus within all 3 Light Battalions is entirely consistent with the guidance pertaining to Light Forces contained in the Army Force Employment Concept.   It also directly supports the CLS's Guidance issued on 12 Jul 04, which specifically directs the "who's who" of Canadian Army development and implementation to significantly increase the pace of formalized Light Force development.   Doctrine, TO&Es, Training Directives - you name it.   If the CLS's recent direction is actioned with the same vigour that it suggests, then we should be seeing the formal development of our Light Force capability take substantive leaps forward within the next couple of years.   Of interest is the fact that the CLS's guidance is not confined to soley to the 3 Light Infantry Battalions.   It also directs the Combat Engineers, Artillery and Armour Corps to examine their respective requirements in terms of forming "Light (Infantry-Heavy) Combined-Arms Battlegroups".  

These are interesting and promising times to be a "Light Fighter".   But I would argue that the same holds true for the "Mech Warriors".   It is all a matter of perspective and your areas of interest as a soldier.

Anyhow, just some thoughts on the subject of "Light", versus "Mech", verus "Dismounted".   Getting the distinctive terminology correct from the outset will allow us all to speak from a commonly-understood frame of reference.  

Cheers,



   

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Interesting times is an understatement.  A tad OT here but do the senior leadership in the 3rd Bn's need to take the LAV crew commander course even though they are in a non-mech BN?

 

[pbi]

With respect to the issues of the correct designation for Reserve Infantry, I am in complete agreement with Mark C. My recommendation (I have also put this forward within the Infantry planning community) is simply to call the Reserve battalions "Infantry", plain and simple. To my way of thinking, this is because their competency area lies squarely within the core skill area, or the "trunk" of the tree if you will. They are quite capable of maintaining a respectable skill level in this area, and this designator is in NO way meant to belittle or degrade our Reserve soldiers.

I do NOT agree with calling them "dismounted "(nor, I hasten to add, do the five Res Inf Bns in our Bde...) because this term is both redundant and incorrect. It is redundant because we have no "mounted" Res Inf bns. It is incorrect because most (in fact almost all) of our Res Inf Bns were never "mounted" in the first place and so cannot be "dismounted". Scrap it, I say. Readers might be interested to note that in our Bde(38 CBG), during the Reserve Roles and Missions Town Hall meetings series last year, our Infantrymen stoutly and universally rejected having anything to do with being designated "Mech" or "Dismounted LAV" at all. They experienced the AVGP farce and they know they do not have the time to master this additional skill package. They are also familiar with the USARNG Bradley battalion south of our Bde, whose Infantry soldier kills are weak when compared to our Res Inf. Our guys want to be good basic Inf, which they can be.

I agree fully with Mark that we must protect and respect the "Light" designator as it evolves into its 21st century meaning. Just as "Cavalry" no longer means what it once did, neither will "Light Infantry" and we must IMHO be careful not to spread the term around like peanut butter. When I look around the AOO here (OK-when I look at the maps in the JOC...) I see a countryside that cries out for the kind of Light capability Mark is describing. Given the kind of flexibiliy, lethality and mobility that modern technology can offer, I believe we can field Light battalions in the SOC role that will be second to none. Cheers.

 

[Bartok5]

CFL,

In my experience, serving officers who have not been employed in a Mech Battalion since adoption of the LAV have not been required to take the LAV Crew Comd's course.  Those (such as numerous serving Capts) who did not receive the qualification as part of the revamped Infantry Officer Phase 4 course within the past 2 years will receive the course if/when they are posted to a Mech Battalion.  There are several officers who served their first tour with 3 PPCLI who must now do so upon returning to Regimental duty with either the 1st or 2nd Battalions.  

If you think about it, there is only a small minority of officers who were "caught out" and missed the LAV qualification because they either weren't in a Mech Battalion during LAV implementation, or completed Phase 4 prior to the course being added into the basic Mech Platoon Comd qualification.  It makes the most sense to load those officers on the course as they join a LAV-equipped unit for the first time, as that way the training is fresh and they do not have to overcome the inevitably skill-fade that would have ensued had they received the training without ever reinforcing it through subsequent service with the vehicle.

There is also a group of officers who for whatever reason, will likely never serve in a LAV battalion because they missed LAV implementation while Extra-Regimentally Employed, and then completed their company command tour in the pre-LAV days or with a Light Battalion.  Unless such officers are slated for Battalion Command or the DCO slot in a LAV Battalion, there is no need for the Crew Comd Qualification.  I would be a typcial example of such an officer.    

Having said that, the officer who does not receive the LAV Crew Comd qualification is not necessarily disenfranchised.  The Infantry School runs an "Executive Course For LAV Dummies" that essentially teaches you vehicle and turret safety, the turret power-up and power-down procedures, and everything else you need to know in order to safely crew-command the vehicle (but not operate the cannon).  This allows people like me to crew command a vehicle in my role as Directing Staff, if necessary.  I know enough to "keep my hands and feet inside the ride", as it were.

As far as the vehicle capabilities and tactical employment are concerned, that is the "Bread and Butter" of what we teach at the Tactics and Infantry Schools.  The physical procedures for operating the cannon are irrelevant to the level at which I instruct, and I do not feel the least bit less qualified to discuss and assess the tactical employment of LAVs at the sub-unit (or sub-sub-unit) level simply because I have not been taught to function as a vehicle gunner.  I have spent enough time in LAVs over the past 2 years to have a very good working knowledge of the vehicle and its capabilities - including the ammo natures, effective ranges, rates of fire, ammo capacities, STA capabilities, turret traverse rate, max cannon elevation angle, cross-country mobility in all types of terrain and weather, etc.  

Not everything is best taught on a formal course, and there is much experience-based knowledge that can only be accrued through experience with the vehicle in the field.  Although I will grant you, if I were to be employed in role which places me in the turret within an operational unit, I would certainly insist on having the formal Crew Comd's course.  I am simply noting that it is not a necessity for all officers.  Think of it more as employment-based training for those who aren't already qualified.  Those who need the qualification will certainly get it, but there is little point in wasting the time and ammo on training someone who will does not require the technical gunnery skills.

I hope that this answers your question.

Cheers,

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

To a point but by senior leadership I was also referring to "soon to be" Sgt's, and WO's.
A little fun story.  When I was EN force for the PH 4 there was a LAV command and gunned (is that a proper word?) by 2 female R22R that forget to align the barrel with the hull prior to crossing a bridge during withdrawl drills.  What a sight seeing half a barrel stuck in the turret.

 

[Bartok5]

PBI,

I fully concur with your remarks regarding the basic "Infantry" descriptor for Reserve units.  Logic dictates that one cannot be "dismounted" if one were never "mounted" in the first place.  Semantics are important to clarity of thought and discussion, so no argument from me.    

One would presume however, that if/when our Reserve Infantry Sections, Platoons and Companies "fall in" on crewed LAVs, the "mechanized" and "dismounted" descriptors suddenly apply - even if only on a temporary "misson-tasked" basis.  I have heard recent tell of this occurring during summer  concentrations.  

As further food for thought, Reserve Infantry Officers currently attend the exact same ATOC course and receive the identical qualification as their Regular counterparts.  This is done at the insistence of the Reserve Senior Leadership, which suggests 2 things:

a.  Selected Reserve Infantry senior Lts and Capts DO in fact possess a basic level of competence in the planning and execution of mechanized combined-arms operations at the sub-unit level.  I know this because I teach these skills to Reservists every summer, and

b.  Influential elements within the Reserve Senior Leadership evidently still envision some form of potential mechanized role for Reservists, otherwise there would be no justifiable reason for their insistance that those junior officers receive the ATOC course.  We could quite readily develop and teach a "non-mech" version of ATOC to Reserve infantry officers that would provide much more applicable preparation for their  subsequent attendance on ACT Infantry (eg.  the Company-Group Commander's Course).  However, the Reserve Senior Leadership confirmed again this year that they specifically want the Mechanized Combined Arms Team focus of the ATOC for their senior Lts and junior Capts.  Things that make you go "Hmmmmm".....  

Not that I am trying to further obfuscate the terminology or roles debate....  

 

[McG]

The problem with a more specialized stream such as this in our small Army is that it would make personnel movement between LAV and Lt battalions difficult, and at the moment the Inf is still standing firm on the idea of mobility between battalions.

The idea has been raised before, but would grouping the light battalions into one formation & one infantry regiment resolve this problem?   The common regiment would eliminate inter-battalion mobility concerns, and a light formation would bring emphasis to other arms (light engineers, arty, CSS,   etc).

Edit:   I found where this was suggested.   (From: Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation)

1 Canadian Light Brigade Group
Bde HQ & Sigs
1 Cdn Para Bn (Airborne)
5 PPCLI (Light Bn)
5 RCR (Light Bn)
5 R22eR (Light Bn)
1 Cbt Engr Bn
1 Fd Amb
1 Svc Bn

 

[Bartok5]

Sorry to break the flow of the thread, but we keep posting around one another.

CFL,

To quickly answer the other half of your question, I know for a fact that Sgts who are loaded on the QL-6B (now DP 3B?) and lack the LAV qualification are required to report early and receive the Crew Comd's course prior.  I would assume that it is the same for the QL-7 crse, the Advanced Recce Crse and (perhaps) the Small Arms Instructor Crse (now DP 3A?). 

I'm sure someone will correct me if I am wrong about the courses other than the 6B....

 

[pbi]

MarkC: you have hit on an interesting issue, and one that I have noted myself over the last couple of years, especially during the RRMAT Town Hall process and the subsequent LFRR Phase II Change Proposals.

First of all, I do not think that the Army Reserve can be regarded as a monolithic bloc when it comes to ideas about things such as this. By way of illustration, during the recent LFRRPhII submission round, the COs and Honoraries of our Brigade strongly supported two proposals for (GASP..) amalgamation of several of our units into one. Well, when THAT got out beyond the Bde, you'd think Satan had slipped his chains! What made perfect sense to us in our Bde (and was in fact several years old as a concept) was met by others in the Reserve world with horror and disbelief! Traitors! Sell Outs! Uncle Toms!

But, more to the point and more importantly,I believe that I see a gap opening between the Reserve leadership at unit and below, and some of these folk we regard as "Senior Reserve Leadership". I am not 100% certain what has contrbuted to this, but I believe a much greater role of Reserve leaders up to LCol and CWO on operations, as well as an improved relation between the two solitudes of Reg and Res, has made it easier for some Res folks at the coalface to buck the party line. Now, of course, perhaps it is just us weird and disruptive types in SASK/MAN/NWONT who think this way (could be something in the pemmican...), but I wonder.

Anyway, I do not doubt that in certain operations we might have to convert some Res soldiers to employment in a mech role, but I would much rather see this done from a solid Infantry core skill base, perhaps with periodic LAV "famil" (I don't know the practicality of this..) as opposed to a sorry creature that is neither fish nor fowl. Cheers.