Who should own CAS & why it can't be trusted to an Air Force (from A-10 retirement thread)

[Zoomie]

Loving the rants, pointless attacks and useless diatribe in the past 4 pages.

Happy to see that baiting Max is not succeeding - he has taken every single gibe thrown his way and answered logically and without emotion.  BZ Max - you are doing the AF proud.  The usual suspects with their hard-on for slagging the boys in blue - this is getting tiresome and only showing your immaturity.  Contribute in a smart way or shut up.

I have no stake in this fight - I just know that a fighter-guy knows his shit inside out, this is what they live and breathe - they don't have to have "been there" for their knowledge and opinion to count.

 

[Kirkhill]

So, I freely admit to not having read all the submissions on this latest iteration of air wars.... but I'm going to pitch in in any event.

Tell me again:  What is the difference amongst the following?

HE delivered by CG-84.
HE delivered by 81mm mortar.
HE delivered by C3
HE delivered by LG-1
HE delivered by M777
HE delivered by MRLS
HE delivered by CH-146
HE delivered by AH-64
HE delivered by CH-148
HE delivered by P51-F4F-A10-F18-F35-B52-B1B-B2. (with or with out intervening rocket assist).

All of them deliver HE to a target by air.

Assuming that any and all of them can actually hit what they are aiming at (the gunners, after a few centuries of effort are finally hitting their targets and their air force offspring, after a single century, are catching up to them), it seems to me that the issue is not which bunch of shade tree mechanics get to maintain the really neat launchers.  The issue is who gets to tell the  mechanics to shove their toys close enough to FEBA so that they can actually contribute to the delivery programme.

Alternate history time:

BOMARC is not decommissioned.  Voodoos and Starfighters never make it into the skies.

BOMARC was modified to accomodate range increases (400 km initially) and to accomodate Air to Surface Munitions.

That makes BOMARC a very long range GMRLS as well as SAM.

Is BOMARC an Air Force system or an Arty system?  And when would the Gunners/Aviators that keep them nice and shiny be forced to send them down range to support the Infanteer on FEBA?

Do the Gunners/Aviators get brownie points for the number of missiles they have in inventory (ie they don't use) or they send down range (ie they do use) ?

 

[Old Sweat]

This is getting frustrating. It seems to me, and I may be waaay out of date, that CAS is the application of air power when the use of the weapon, whatever it is, is within an area where the ground force has responsibility for the control of the delivery. Having said that, the difference between air and land based delivery systems is that the former is subject to diversion to higher value or priority targets by the air force controlling agency at virtually any time up to weapons release. This is not the case with, for example, artillery and is because of the relatively limited number of weapons available and their usually greater effects that land based stuff. That is the big difference between CAS and the other means of fire support including AH and probably a lot of UAVs. This has to be accepted as a limitation of CAS, but in return the weapon system makes a big, honking BOOM when it hits.

A bit of a red herring - the CAS aircraft does not have to come screaming in fast and low; it can launch from a relatively long distance away if it can identify the target and be cleared by the FAC/JTAC controlling the mission. An example was the engagement of a party of Taliban who had taken cover in a compound after being engaged by Canadian artillery. A Harrier with a guided weapon was available and the Battle Group FSCC coordinated an engagement by observing the target via an UAV image, marking the target with an artillery illuminating round that landed in the compound and confirming that the Harrier pilot had identified the target because of the round burning on the ground. Result 12 out of 15 Taliban killed and a marked decrease in activity in the area. (True story.) Another example was Karnak Farm back in 2002, but we will leave that one alone because it is not germane to our discussion.

Lesson One - always have an alternate if the aircraft is diverted to another task.

Lesson Two - take nothing for granted. Effective CAS requires effective control from the ground.

Lesson Three - the CAS asset need not be a fast mover, but can be an AH, an UAV or Lord know whatever else.

The RCAF will not have enough airplanes in theatre to do everything, but that goes for the Canadian Army and our SOF as well. Let's cut each other some slack.

 

[a_majoor]

To flip that and perhaps take Max and MAJONES side; where do you want to place the FSCC?  In your futuristic scenario, the FSCC could be anywhere, even in that 747 or even Colorado.

No, the FSCC still resides with the battlespace commander. The physical battlespace will be much larger, and Chief Fires (or Chief Effects if you prefer) will have a much larger tool kit to use (since we are talking about kinetic effects, we will leave out the IO tools for now), ranging from UCAVs that could be controlled at the Coy level to long range weapons dispensed by aircraft in racetrack patterns hundreds of kilometres away. Since the battlespace commander needs a continuing presence, the TOC will be on the ground (or in exceptional circumstances on board a ship).

While it is quite possible that Canadian institutional bunfighting could result in a scenario where an armed UCAV designed for intimate support of the manoeuvre element is considered an "Air Force" asset rather than a company level weapons system (with all the issues that brings), in that case the fault is not in the weapons system. You could draw an analogy with the USAF and the US Army's so called "Key West Accord", where systems were essentially divvied up on basis of airspeed and if they were fixed or rotary wing assets, rather than what actual role they played. In that regard I think the USMC with its tight integration has the right idea, Marines on the ground get support from artillery, rotary wing and fixed wing assets that are also owned and operated by Marines.

 

[Journeyman]

OK, I will add one last post to this to try and clarify some points, then I will bow out.

1.  I bear absolutely NO animosity towards SupersonicMax and his CF-18 compatriots. They are doing their job, and as I understand it, doing it well.  Clearly my questioning his operational record came across as a personal attack; it was intended to critique 'the system,' not the individual.  For that, I sincerely apologize.

2.  My overarching complaint (perhaps I've been too subtle    ), concerns the amount of money we Canadians are investing in the fighter world, if they are not going to be used.  This is the same logic that sees the US government legislate that several decommissioned USN battleships must be kept ready to deploy.....just in case.  "Use it or lose it" -- Canada does not have the fiscal flexibility to pour money into a capability that the government is reticent to actually use.1 

3.  I've noted that this topic is my personal anger issue hobby-horse; it sure would have been nice to see Canadian roundels on CAS aircraft above us, but obviously it was not to be.  :dunno: 

4.  I would like to thank Baz in particular for his insights, and SupersonicMax for his composure [you're still wrong, but I blame that on too much Douhet, Trenchard.....Horner.....maybe even Jim Corum's early work.... and not enough exposure to the non-fighter world    ]


And with that, I back away. 


1.  Before it's mentioned, I don't believe that a half-dozen CF-18s in Romania has the intimidating effect on Putin that they would have had in Panjwai.

 

[Baz]

Ditch,

I'm not sure that you have understood the tone of the discussion.

I, as well, apologize if I came across as attacking an individual.  Not my intent; I haven't even met him.

As I've said quite a few times, the tool that precision weaponry, and the ability to deliver it, brings to the fight, is incredible.

The point I was trying, and possibly have failed, to make was that there are lots of people, led by the USAF, with plenty of RCAF buy in, who think that operational effect is the only important tool in the arsenal.  In that environment, it is very easy to understand why the other services want to own, or at least control, capabilities, like CAS, that are more important to their fight.  Its not that they can't do it, and from all accounts do it well, but whether they will be available to do so.

By the way, from what I understand, it wasn't the CF-18 community that kept them out of the Afghan fight.  It was the politically driven cap to the number or pers on the ground and money being spent (a cap that should exist, we work for them), and resource trade-offs had to be made.

As a relevant aside, this discussion about the use of air power should be at the core of the F-35 discussion in my mind.  What we need is the nations intent on how to use the fighter force: if the nation wants it to go expeditionary and play that strategic role Max talks about, then in my mind we need the F-35.  Over-simplified, yes, but just an opinion, based on my set of insights.

 

[Good2Golf]

CAS and/or AI could be provided by any capability that is responsive to the requirement.  In the case of CAS, the requirement is to respond to elements of the manoeuvre force, and for AI (sometimes referred to as Deep Attack Ops) the requirement is to shape the battlefield appropriately to enable subsequent formation operations.  For those who believe that, as a coordinating measure, the FSCC belongs anywhere else than as a sister coordination centre along side the TACP and ASCC in any nation's JTF Land Component, I would be very interested to see the logic.

The challenge in Canada regarding employment of the fighter force is primarily political.  Max, I note your point about pre-ECP583 R2 upgrade, but the lack of such eqpt did not stop employment of CF-18s in OP ALLIED FORCE.  In contemporary history, the Government appears unwilling to project its fighter capability forward to intimately support Canadian troops (or any other troops for that matter) in the CAS role.  It appears willing only to use the force in a classic AI, or OCA and DCA (e.g. OP MOBILE's Task Force Libeccio enforcement of the Lybian no-fly zone) , or lethal operations using more recently developed terms such as SCAR (Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance) wherein both CF-18 and CP-140 aircraft coordinated lethal action (weapons dropped by CF-18, but intimate targeting well inland by CP-140) against Ghadaffi's forces.  So the government goes for highly visible, coalition reinforcing activities where projection of power is seen to be something that the fighter force can participate, or like in OP ALLIED FORCE (Cdn: OP ECHO) in Kosovo in 1999, assume a leading role (strike package leads and dropping 10% of OP AF ordnance), or OP UNIFIED PROTECTOR (Cdn OP MOBILE) taking a significant action and support role (aside from the overall command role by LGen Charlie Bouchard).

My personal thoughts (folks can probably line this up with official policies or actions taken/non taken with regard to Canadian air force elements considered in Afghanistan other than multiple transport types, green helos, grey patrol, 'black' helos, grey helos and two types of UAVs) is that if there are enough Canadian troops on the ground in a theatre of operations that warrant CAS (and all the other air force enablers), then the Government will decide that there are enough troops on the ground, and will not....ever....deploy RCAF fighters as CAS.  It has nothing to do with equipment (we know this from OP ECHO) and everything to do with expense.  Even during OP UNIFIED PROTECTOR, there were internal warnings of the rapid wearing out of the fighter force in location (Ref: RCAF Fretted Over Libya Bombing Campaign's Wear and Tear on CF-18s ).

Folks in the fighter force (particularly the front line people in the squadrons) may always say they wanted to be with Canadian troops in Afghanistan, and I think that is genuinely true.  However, and this is a big HOWEVER, the institutional fighter force (i.e. fighter generals) appears not to agree with its front line personnel.  It is clearly an institution that centrically believes in the National/Continental DCA role and the occasional OCA/AI/SCAR role abroad, and has believed ever since MOBILE COMMAND's/10TAG's CF-5s were assigned to Fighter Group in 1975 with the stand up of AIR COMMAND, that the AF/RCAF does "air stuff" and that "ground stuff" is a detractor.  It even seems at times that the institutional air force seems to rank search and rescue as a role more important than anything to do with supporting the Army or the Navy.  It does so at its own peril though, and only time will tell if we ever see anything other than niche support to the other elements in deployed operations.

:2c:

Regards,
G2G

 

[MarkOttawa]

Brit blogger's view:

The A-10 retirement
http://defencewithac.blogspot.ca/2014/06/the-10-retirement.html

My only observation: fighters just don't have the gun fire-power.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[KevinB]

Weird my reply vaporised.

I don't think any of the non fixed wing folks here are making personal attacks - its just observations over several hundred combined years of service that the "Fighter Command" folks do not take intimate ground support roles to heart.

While poking at Max may be a fun subset - the issue here is that it is a systemic problem in the CF.

Look back for Gulf War 1 - and the deployment of CF-18's - that then spawned the deployed of Air Defense and Infantry (RCR) to defend the fighter in their friendly base...

While their may have been a Political lack of will to deploy fighter in SWA, I believe that had senior Canadian Fighter Pilot Generals wanted to - they could and would have made a compelling case successfully for the deployment

 

[Cloud Cover]

Got no bone in this fight< but have a few questions for those who keep focusing on Afghanistan:

1. Was there ever a time when CAS was called for by Canadian forces and it was not delivered by coalition aircraft? [lets exclude the times when the coalition aircraft decided to bomb and strafe Canadian troops either by design or by accident].

2. At the material time, was the only fighter aircraft we have really equipped to deliver the type of support requested. It seems to me that when a better arty tube was required, it was delivered. When choppers were required they materialized. When tanks were required, there they were. When more than 10 mags were required, all the stupid criticisms were doused when casualties began to mount. I am of the view that if CF-18 were really required, they would have put on the tarmac but that didn't happen. I do not for one second believe it was cost. I do believe the optics of an errant bomb disrupting a wedding party, or mistakenly attacking friendly forces [the Canadian public really did appear to enjoy the period of 'victimhood" after Tarnac farms].

3. For the first time I am reading Hasting's book on Normandy and am caught by his comments regarding close air support and the few champions there were in any air force for the role, let alone the USAF and especially the RCAF who seemed particularly enamored with air superiority in a no-contest environment and keeping their heavy bombers beating the crap out of distant bridges, railway junctions, workers domiciles and sometimes got luck enough to take out the odd factory.  Pete Quesada from the USAAF seems to have been pretty much the only command exception in WW2 that fully understood and embraced CAS as a ground battle asset. Has there ever been a Canadian equivalent of this man as a command champion of CAS in the RCAF at anytime in it's history?

4. FWIW I believe the RCAF should be focused on NORAD, Air Superiority, Strategic Airlift and Air battle space management and they should also definitely mandated to form up small but specialized formations tasked with CAS, properly equipped [ie not necessarily with the F35- I am thinking gun equipped C27 and C130, maybe some sort of F15E type of jet. ]

5. Rotary wing assets painted green [Gun ships, Tac hel, Chinooks], battlefield drones and all the rest of the stuff that the army needs to fight on the ground from platoon and 3x company sized actions should in fact be army formations, and furthermore, perhaps they should even be integrated with the units they are assigned to fight with.

I don't even want to get into the Naval Air situation, that's just a fine mess except to say that SAR for civilian purposes could be under the Navy or even the RCMP if only to better focus the RCAF on missions that are relevant to what I've outlined above. (the exception being actual CSAR to rescue downed pilots>>> that is a niche specialty role that could fit Army or RCAF and even the RCN).     

But most of all, Im really interested to know if having RCAF support on station in Afghanistan would have changed one single outcome, for better or for worse.

Cheers               

 

[Old Sweat]

Whiskey 601, you raise some interesting points. I will leave the commenting of Afghanistan to those better qualified by training and experience, to concentrate on some of the historical aspects.

This Army Historical Section report comments on air support to First Canadian Army in North West Europe.

http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/ahq074.pdf

Now, there are some unsaid or underdeveloped themes in that paper, but the RAF (and by extension the RCAF) was concerned primarily with maintaining its own independence. This was compounded by personality issues - any senior RAF officer who had served with Montgomery hated him for among other reasons, his tendency to hog any credit that should have gone to the air forces for himself. Among this group was Coningham, the commander of 2 Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) which supported 21 Army Group. While this did not percolate down to the wing and squadron level, 2 TAF and its major groups, 83 supporting Second British Army and 84 supporting First Canadian Army, were apt to ignore or downplay army requests in favour of selecting their own missions.

This was not universal: Air Vice Marshal LO Brown, the AOC of 84 Group up to about October 1944, was relieved by Coningham for being too willing to do what the army wanted. However there were too many instances of 2 TAF flying in its own air show for it not to have been policy. Example - in the final planning for Operation Totalize HQ First Canadian Army requested that 83 Group (HQ 84 Group was still moving to the continent) fly missions along the Caen-Falaise Highway during the morning of 8 Aug to attack the anticipated move forward of counter-attack forces from 12 SS Panzer Division. Instead most of the group effort was spent in armed reconnaissance missions deeper inside the German area as far back as the Seine River. That morning the only German reserve in the area, a battle group of 12 SS Panzer Division and 101 SS Heavy Tank Battalion which included about 50 tanks including eight Tigers moved forward unimpeded and blocked the Allied advance. In fact, Kurt Meyer, the divisional commander, later wrote that he could not understand the absence of Allied tactical air on that occasion. There are others, but I know this one best.

Shortly after the war, Brigadier Churchill Mann, who had been the chief of staff of First Canadian Army, delivered a long, nasty tirade to the students of the Canadian Army Staff College on the failings of the Allied air support structure in North West Europe. There had to have been a reason for this - and Mann did cite beaucoup examples - and it only could have been a policy of demonstrating that the air force was not subordinate to the army. Unfortunately the RCAF was not asked or perhaps chose not to respond with its side of the story. Did this poison the army's attitude towards air support? I think not, as the students were all experienced officers with lots of combat experience and they had experienced the system first hand.

It must be added that the Spitfires and Typhoons of 2 TAF were not well suited for anything but strafing. The much vaunted rockets on the Typhoons were grossly inaccurate and the odds of a hit by one on a tank were pathetically low. However the morale effect and the general bugger factor on movement was quite impressive, at least with REMF type units.

 

[tomahawk6]

There is a reason its called "close air support".Coming in low and hard is the most effective.It is also a risk for the pilot and aircraft which may be the reason the RCAF was not tasked with the mission.Also the USAF had plenty of assets for CAS so the RCAF wasnt needed.A wasted opportunity for the RCAF to develop the skill set for CAS IMO.The A-10 was ideal for this role as it was built to take the punishment that often comes with supporting the infantry up close and personal.A drone is a poor substitute for the CAS role.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

T6- I am curious as to your views on why you think UAVs make poor CAS platforms?

Is there, in your view, something inherently wrong with the technology?

 

[GR66]

Perhaps the real issue here isn't over who "owns" CAS, but rather that the technology is changing to the extent that CAS as a distinct category may no longer exist.

In the short term, we are seeing an increasing reliance on UCAVs to get up close and personal with the enemy, and a continuing increase in the capabilities of small UAV's. Nothing will say "CAS" like the company support platoon unleashing an ATV sized armed quadcopter to support a platoon under contact in some near future battle. Artillery weapons like Excalibur shells and FOG-M also have the ability to hit pinpoint targets at long ranges. Artillery weapons are also not limited by weather or time on station in the same way aircraft are.

On the other side of the equation, rolling in and blasting a target with an A-10 is a bit old fashioned when a Strike Eagle can release a glide bomb with a smart seeker or guidance kit from airliner altitudes and still make a pinpoint strike on target. Future support aircraft will carry large numbers of smart munitions, or perhaps attack targets with high energy lasers or railguns, vastly expanding the air defense envelope for potential enemies (and for us as well). Instead of an A-10 or F-16 sized aircraft, we might be looking at B-1 or 737 sized aircraft to provide fire support to the battlefield (those carrying laser or railgun weapons can attack targets on the surface, in the air and even in low orbit).

This gets back to the idea of aircraft as a form of artillery, and means tying airpower to the battlespace commander through an evolved version of the FSCC.

So, I freely admit to not having read all the submissions on this latest iteration of air wars.... but I'm going to pitch in in any event.

Tell me again:  What is the difference amongst the following?

HE delivered by CG-84.
HE delivered by 81mm mortar.
HE delivered by C3
HE delivered by LG-1
HE delivered by M777
HE delivered by MRLS
HE delivered by CH-146
HE delivered by AH-64
HE delivered by CH-148
HE delivered by P51-F4F-A10-F18-F35-B52-B1B-B2. (with or with out intervening rocket assist).

All of them deliver HE to a target by air.

Assuming that any and all of them can actually hit what they are aiming at (the gunners, after a few centuries of effort are finally hitting their targets and their air force offspring, after a single century, are catching up to them), it seems to me that the issue is not which bunch of shade tree mechanics get to maintain the really neat launchers.  The issue is who gets to tell the  mechanics to shove their toys close enough to FEBA so that they can actually contribute to the delivery programme.

...

Kirkhill is correct that there are many possible ways of delivering HE on to a particular target.  However is it possible that a problem is is being created because we keep replacing plentiful, inexpensive platforms for delivering this HE with fewer, more expensive platforms?  While each individual platform is certainly more capable than the one it replaces we have less of them because that's all we can afford.  This is true of almost everything in the CF...aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles, support vehicles, support weapons, etc.  Does every target requiring the delivery of HE require a platform as specialized and expensive as an F-35 or a high-tech UCAV or rail gun?  Each one of those platforms (in our fiscally realistic world) reduces the number of lower-tech HE delivery platforms (artillery/mortar tubes, lower tech CAS aircraft,  ATGMs in organic support units, etc) that are available.  Does the higher cost and relative scarcity of these expensive, high tech platforms also affect our willingness to deploy and risk them compared to other, less expensive options?  Does the potential loss of a small number of these expensive platforms have an exaggerated negative effect on our military capabilities because they each individually represent such a big proportion of our total capability? 

This is in no way suggesting that we freeze the CF in time and ignore advances in technology, but perhaps with our obvious fiscal limitations it makes some sense to have more of a mix of "Quality" and "Quantity" in our arsenal to make us more flexible and able to respond in multiple ways to threats.  In relation to this particular thread it may mean obtaining fewer F-35's and focusing their use on those things where their capabilities are required and supplementing them with other, cheaper platforms to fill in the gaps.  This could be anything from more artillery tubes with smart ammo and UAV's tasked to support the ground forces to provide immediate fire support, or lower-tech CAS options like the armed version of the Harvard trainer we already use (the AT-6 Texan II), or whatever.  In other areas it may mean having fewer Aurora's but more DASH-8 MPAs to help them cover more area and find targets for them to prosecute.  Or fewer future Canadian Surface Combatants but more Corvette/Frigate type ships to augment them, etc. 

This doesn't directly address the question of who should control CAS assets, but this question is in itself tied up in the fact that our most advanced platforms out of both necessity and design are required to fulfill multiple roles for our military.  This of course leads to debate over which role takes priority in any given situation.  The less roles a platform is expected to fulfill, the greater clarity there will be over where control of the platform should be placed.

 

[tomahawk6]

T6- I am curious as to your views on why you think UAVs make poor CAS platforms?

Is there, in your view, something inherently wrong with the technology?

UAV's IMO are great for striking targets of opportunity with Hellfire,but if a COP is under assault from several hundred taliban I would prefer a strike aircraft loaded with napalm and 500 pounders.So to answer the question its a matter of payload.Not to mention the 30mm gatling gun mounted on an A-10.We havent done that yet probably because of weight.

 

[George Wallace]

.......Not to mention the 30mm gatling gun mounted on an A-10.We havent done that yet probably because of weight.

Not a pilot, an UAV operator, nor an Aeronautical Engineer, but I don't think that UAVs have the maneuverability that an A 10 has when it comes to supporting a TIC scenario.

Also, while UAVs do have some great capabilities, is not the vision of the operators restricted to the FOV of the cameras and the speed that the cameras can traverse?  Up close and personal, this would be a serious liability.  It would necessitate them (UAVs) having to be more "stand off" than in the thick of things.

 

[tomahawk6]

All great points George.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Related:

Montgomery's Scientists, Operational Research in Northwest Europe
https://www.google.ca/search?q=Montgomery%E2%80%99s+Scientists%2C+Operational+Research+in+Northwest+Europe%3A+The+Work+of+No.+2+Operational+Research+Section+with+21+Army+Group+June+1944+to+July+1945+&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-USfficial&client=firefox-a&channel=sb&gfe_rd=cr&ei=dnGwU6q_KuiM8Qej_oHYDw

Mark
Ottawa

 

[SupersonicMax]

Appologies for the late reply, weather was good and did not have a laptop to write on.  Replies on iPad became frustrating, especially when quoting people...

For the record, I am not offended.  It takes a lot more to get me going.  This is the interweb after all.

I cannot speak for GW; but for myself, as mentioned, the USAF was more than helpful.

Those assets were "owned" by the ACC (OPCON) and TACON to the JTAC/FAC.  I am not advocating making CAS a complete Air Force thing, but for multi-role platforms, in a theater where they are expected to do more than CAS or BAI (ie: they will do "strategic" bombing, or even Air-to-Air), they should be given to the ACC and delegated to the JTAC/FACs when needed. The FAC/JTAC piece should always be owned by the LCC.  ALOs with the Ground Commanders and GLOs with the Air Commanders (like we are doing now).

Were you not just arguing with Loachman that you're more expensive to deploy, by at least a factor of 10? 

I was trying to compare deploying a 6 or 12-pack vs deploying a Bataillion.

Ever done it for real?

Sure did in 2011.  Got the Warn O late Thurs PM and were fling the first combat mission Mon AM.

My point exactly!  The best poker hand in the world is meaningless if the cards don't get laid down.  We are spending an inordinate amount of money on "potential energy" when what we've needed is "kinetic energy."

We do use the Fighter Force, just not in the role you envisionned it should be used.  We deployed a multitude of times. There are the 3 "kinetic" deployments (Gulf War, Kosovo and Libya) as well as many Air Patrolling missions (Bosnia, Iceland (many times), Eastern Europe).  The reality is that we do way more than support the Army. Yup, we do NORAD.  But that's a very little fraction of what we actually do.  Our "Bread and Butter" are CAS and Self-Escort Strike.  We train a lot more to Self Escort Strike because it's the most challenging mission set we do.  If you can do this properly, you can probably do every other mission set we have. 

The reality is that even if we decide to ONLY do NORAD, we will need to buy some sort of modern fighter.  That fighter will be multi-role.  The NORAD mission while critical is a fairly simple mission set.  In order to maintain flying proficiency (just as a pilot), you need to fly some hours.  I think it's accepted that for low to medium expericence pilots, 100 hours a year is the bare minimum to be safe and effective in the aircraft and that 140 hours a year, you can actually be proficient tactically.  We do not need to spend 100 hours a year doing NORAD to be effective in that particular mission set.  If we have the aircraft capabilities, why not use the rest of those hours doing Air-to-Ground as well?  It will not cost more (after all, we need to fly those 100-140 hours a year minimum) and we increase the capabilities of our forces.

As far as supporting the Army, while we did not go to Afghanistan (and trust me, we wanted to go), we did support the Army at home by providing countless FAC Courses and FAC Training Deployments both in Canada and the US to support the FAC training requirements that the Afghan war created. 

I notice that you've chosen not to answer this question; I assume that the answer is "no," notwithstanding your stretching for LCF points by mentioning SF.From the same real-world experience (and credibility) then, I'd like to state that I've had sex with Jenna Jameson hundreds of times.... while watching porn.

I deployed and dropped bombs on target, just not in a CAS role.  We did a lot of SCAR, some Air-to-Air and a good amount of pre-planned strikes.

If we were to use your analogy to compare training to combat (in a fighter), I would say that Groundschool is like watching Jenna Jameson on youporn.  Flying a CAS training mission would be like having sex with her, with a condom.  Having sex without a condom would be doing CAS in a war zone... With all the risks it involves..

Talking about risk... I do not believe that the risk level was the reason we did not send Hornets in Afghanistan.  In relative terms, Afghanistan was (for a fighter aircraft, not ground troops or helicopters) safer than say, Libya.  Nothing too crazy Manpads wise and mostly Small Arms fire.

T6:  Close (in CAS) means the level of integration.  Between FLOT and the FSCL, you'd need some form of coordination between the Air Commanders and the Ground Commanders.  This integration is done with the JTAC/FAC and through some other measures (ie: LCC owns 20K and below between the FLOT and the FSCL or lateral restrictions).  That way, aircraft don't hit each other and rounds don't hit Aircraft transitting:  fires (including CAS) are limited to 20K in this example.

Unless the platform that is used is purely a CAS platform (and there are not too many single-role platforms nowadays, even the A-10 is multi-role), they should be given to the ACC so that the joint "strategic/operational/tactical" (I don't like using those terms...) objectives can be met, with the assurance to the LCC that if he needs CAS, he'll be given CAS.

I guess in the end it's a matter of how we view the Air Force:  a pure support to the Army or its own entity, able to effect the enemy the same way the Army does.  Since the Air Force became its own service, I think it our doctrine (and I believe rightly so) supports the latter.

 

[OldSolduer]

If I may add to the conversation, which so far if find fascinating, I may be able to offer a "grunts" perspective.

I know very little of the technical details of CAS other than usually an infantry company has a FOO/FAC attached and that is the person who we rely on to drop stuff on bad people...who may be shooting at us.

From a section commander perspective, I don't think you'll find too many infantry section commanders who give a rats butt who commands or controls what. What they care about is that the adults who control CAS play nicely with each other and drop explosive stuff on bad people when asked to do so.

Thanks.

Rant ends.