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Why the U.S. (still) can’t train the Iraqi military
Since the Islamic State’s stunning gains in Iraq in summer 2014, the United States has gotten back into the business of trying to train Iraqi security forces. Although it didn’t work the first time — when the United States spent $25 billion over more than a decade in the wake of the 2003 invasion — recently some U.S. officials have expressed guarded optimism about what the new training effort can achieve, both publicly and privately.
Although it is true that recent U.S. efforts may have yielded some tactical improvements in Iraqi forces, these have been limited at best. More importantly, social science research on military effectiveness suggests that these gains are unlikely to translate into the larger operational and strategic military successes that the administration’s “Iraq-first” approach against the Islamic State militant group requires.
This is mainly because the underlying problems with the Iraqi security forces are political. The regime in Baghdad has little interest in building the neutral, nonsectarian professional army that the United States has long wanted to create, and this fundamental clash of objectives, common in instances of security forces assistance, has produced serious obstacles to the Iraqi combat effectiveness needed to push back the Islamic State. Furthermore, the United States has relatively little leverage to pressure Baghdad into conforming to its wishes, in part because it lacks a credible exit option and in part because Iraq can turn to Iran as an alternative patron.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/22/why-the-u-s-still-cant-train-the-iraqi-military/
Since the Islamic State’s stunning gains in Iraq in summer 2014, the United States has gotten back into the business of trying to train Iraqi security forces. Although it didn’t work the first time — when the United States spent $25 billion over more than a decade in the wake of the 2003 invasion — recently some U.S. officials have expressed guarded optimism about what the new training effort can achieve, both publicly and privately.
Although it is true that recent U.S. efforts may have yielded some tactical improvements in Iraqi forces, these have been limited at best. More importantly, social science research on military effectiveness suggests that these gains are unlikely to translate into the larger operational and strategic military successes that the administration’s “Iraq-first” approach against the Islamic State militant group requires.
This is mainly because the underlying problems with the Iraqi security forces are political. The regime in Baghdad has little interest in building the neutral, nonsectarian professional army that the United States has long wanted to create, and this fundamental clash of objectives, common in instances of security forces assistance, has produced serious obstacles to the Iraqi combat effectiveness needed to push back the Islamic State. Furthermore, the United States has relatively little leverage to pressure Baghdad into conforming to its wishes, in part because it lacks a credible exit option and in part because Iraq can turn to Iran as an alternative patron.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/09/22/why-the-u-s-still-cant-train-the-iraqi-military/
