Echo9 said:
- we're finding that a lot of the skills that we used to think were nice extras are in fact our new core mission- think EOD. Similarly, there are a number of skills that we used to think as important that aren't used much. As a result, things like some of the heavy eqpt, and the ROWPU are being downloaded to the reserves to maintain (at least in my area) so that the CER can focus on what's needed overseas.
…
One thing that I should note is that we're also putting this into action in the development of training courses- skills like EOD search and CMD are getting expanded, while things like bridging (the ultimate engineer skill if there was any) are getting cut back or becoming OSS.
I don’t agree with all of this. EOD (which includes CMD and IEDD) do need much greater emphasis. I think we are doing good as far as CMD is concerned. We do need a small IEDD capability in the Fd Tps (I see this as the ability to do high risk search/EOR in order to safely find and identify explosive threats) and we still have room to make a lot of progress on this front.
However, the Hy Eqpt tasks were constant (both inside and outside the wire) and we could have used more of both operators and equipment. We built roads on KAF to allow for TUAV operations, we remediate old HESCO structures that were no-longer needed but in the way, we supported hardening of the camp medical facilities (until KAF ran-out of material), and a plethora of other tasks inside the wire. We had to shut-down support to the ESU in order to provide enough operators to build FOB Martello. As far as Hy Eqpt, I think we need to:
1. Establish a larger hy eqpt capability within the ESU (which had none of its own) and maintain the hy eqpt capability in the CS sqn (though it could be smaller if it is not supporting the ESU).
2. Expand on our FG base for hy eqpt ops in Canada (ie more fully man the CER eqpt troops). I’ve had mixed experiences with reserve equipment operators, but as a generality the reserves can produce good operators of single pieces/types of equipment. The guys we take overseas need to be good on all types of equipment (especially those in the Fd Sqn).
3. Ensure that the Fd Sqn epqt has prime movers (dependency on NSE tractors that were primarily focused on recovery ops was not helpful).
4. We need to develop the training we have for equipment supervisors/planners. I understand CFSME has been working on a course for Tp Comd & Tp WOs for a while (is it running yet?).
The ROWPU det was 50% reservist and it was more than capable of the maintenance/inspection of the two systems at the start of the tour. After that they were combat engineers filling positions that were required but never authorized in the TO&E. I think the arrangement worked well as long as the ROWPU was not required.
The ILDS is worth mentioning at this point. We had it and there were a couple tasks that it was ideally suited for, but those all went to contractors because there was nobody qualified to operate it (and contracting was faster than seeking approval & waiting for a TAV). If equipment is going to be in theatre, the crews need to be there to operate it (even if they operate it in a secondary function). This is applicable to ROWPU, ILDS and whatever the next fancy gizmo is. We can still launch TAVs to take over operating these special tools, but we must be capable of operating the equipment as the need arises (not onced the TAV arrives).
Bridging skills were required. Canada’s first war-time bridge since Korea was a Bailey across the Helmund River (okay, it was ANA labour, US security, and Canadian Sr NCOs directing the build), and I understand that Op MEDUSA saw at least one combat bridge. I think bridging as a specialist skill might be workable, but it would have to be a specialist skill held by most Engr NCOs in order to have enough depth for when it was required.
Echo9 said:
- there's not nearly enough of us. The ratio of engineers to manoeuvre elements is creeping up slowly but surely. As indicated, sending more Tp HQ is proving to be useful- makes the engr advisor to the company commander a Lt instead of a Sgt, and gives each of the Coys engr recce.
The ability of a Sgt to advise was not so much the problem (the Sgt may not have the tactical training, but he has plenty of experience and technical training to work from); the problem was the sudden lack of a Sgt to supervise. Once a sect comd was tied to a manoeuvre OC (and throw in leave), we found that the technical experience was not adequate once the section was split in two directions. Sappers could find themselves executing tasks they’d done once on QL3 (and this time their lives were dependant on getting it done right). Additionally, infantry platoon commanders would find themselves with attachments that lacked both technical & tactical proficiency on which to advise or support planning.
. . . oh yeah, and two sappers are not enough to meet the needs of a platoon. I became particularly convinced of the suitability of the half section to provide a minimum “framework ops” support to a platoon. Two sections for each company even provides depth for a section commander or 2ic to be on leave, or to have an engineer reserve when everyone is in country.
von Grognard said:
I believe the bridging he's referring to is the old school method of using a Biber (I don't know the canadian designation: leo bridge layer) under contact,
Armoured Engineers have always been specialized training.
von Grognard said:
Not being an engineer, I'm not sure when COMBAT engineer ends and CONSTRUCTION engineer begins, but that is my uneducated guess.
There is not really a clear line at times. I like the British approach of also having combat engineers qualified in a trade. It gives more flexibility to switch between combat operations and reconstruction. I do not think we have enough depth to try this in the Canadian Army (at least, not at this time).
