Infantry Vehicles

[WinnipegFella]

This is where I go when I rant about reserve restructure - names and badges are a side piece. We need the Army to task organize itself, and that has to include its reserve. We do not need to buy a vehicle for the reserves, we need to buy vehicles for that do a job for the army that are manned by the reserves.

I propose the vehicles as div recce assets. Not passive cold war recce but a more second world war style recce in force which uses armoured cars, light tanks, jeeps, assault troops, etc. Ideally the reserves could provide the div an understrength regiment (2 Sqns) perhaps with the regs providing the RHQ and a Sqn to fill out the regiment if war is declared. Otherwise they could beef up the Sqn as augments operationally.

The jaguar would be perfect for that while still having the teeth for ATCs, raids, pursuits and whatnot on lighter targets. It's not buying a vehicle per se, but the buying of a capability that can't be met by what we have now. That said this would require new doctrine, a new regiment (or they just grab the name of one of the reserve units), new infrastructure, etc. About as likely as us receiving 2% GDP and procurement reform but I digress, were essentially shit posting anyways.

I didn't state that clearly, and I apologize.

 

[KevinB]

I propose the vehicles as div recce assets. Not passive cold war recce but a more second world war style recce in force which uses armoured cars, light tanks, jeeps, assault troops, etc. Ideally the reserves could provide the div an understrength regiment (2 Sqns) perhaps with the regs providing the RHQ and a Sqn to fill out the regiment if war is declared. Otherwise they could beef up the Sqn as augments operationally.

The jaguar would be perfect for that while still having the teeth for ATCs, raids, pursuits and whatnot on lighter targets. It's not buying a vehicle per se, but the buying of a capability that can't be met by what we have now. That said this would require new doctrine, a new regiment (or they just grab the name of one of the reserve units), new infrastructure, etc. About as likely as us receiving 2% GDP and procurement reform but I digress, were essentially shit posting anyways.

I didn't state that clearly, and I apologize.

I don't think that role exists anymore - Armor Recce is a dinosaur event, that has been eclipsed by UGV and UAS.
Some mud recce tasks still exist - but the concept of Armor Recce as in the Canadian concept is done and buried.

The US Army concept of Recce by Force is also in deep question.

So there is zero sense in putting any effort into a concept that is OBE, and more importantly without realignment of the CA to create an actual deployable Army for LSCO.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Ever since we started putting infantry in organic transport and giving them a ride close to, if not upon, the intended battlefield, we've restored the mounted infantry (dragoon) function. The wonder is that the infantry usurped it from the former cavalry. Inexpensive abundant unmanned observation threatens battlefield concentration, suggesting equipment and procedures are needed for quickly achieving tactical dispersion and concentration, and also for screening/guarding in more depth.

A high degree of trade specialization would be needed regardless which traditional branch(es) of the Res F were brought into any of this.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think that role exists anymore - Armor Recce is a dinosaur event, that has been eclipsed by UGV and UAS.
Some mud recce tasks still exist - but the concept of Armor Recce as in the Canadian concept is done and buried.

The US Army concept of Recce by Force is also in deep question.

So there is zero sense in putting any effort into a concept that is OBE, and more importantly without realignment of the CA to create an actual deployable Army for LSCO.

Which kind of leaves Lines Of Communication security as a key enabler. Which in turn means getting the TAPV to work properly. But it also means more emphasis on highway driving and less need for off road work.

Revert to the original M1117 ASV concept and focus on blast resilience.

 

[markppcli]

I don't think that role exists anymore - Armor Recce is a dinosaur event, that has been eclipsed by UGV and UAS.
Some mud recce tasks still exist - but the concept of Armor Recce as in the Canadian concept is done and buried.

The US Army concept of Recce by Force is also in deep question.

So there is zero sense in putting any effort into a concept that is OBE, and more importantly without realignment of the CA to create an actual deployable Army for LSCO.

I see the ideal task as essentially a combination of security, and providing mobility for light infantry. A senator MRAP could do that job.

 

[FJAG]

This is where I go when I rant about reserve restructure - names and badges are a side piece. We need the Army to task organize itself, and that has to include its reserve. We do not need to buy a vehicle for the reserves, we need to buy vehicles for that do a job for the army that are manned by the reserves.

Couldn't agree more.

The problem is that the army still in the "deploy a battle-group based on company-sized modules" mode. This model considers a brigade headquarters as just another module that is ad hoc'd for the particular mission. That concept really only requires 1) the equipment to be deployed, 2) a sufficient amount of equipment to train the next rotation, 3) sufficient rotations to allow manning a reasonable amount of rotations.

The model is anathema to having a standing force of equipped regulars and reservists organized into fighting and sustainment formations above the battle group (and brigade headquarters) level. Canada can bumble along with what it has (and even less) and still meet the basic battle group model.

The problem with the army organizing itself is that, like @KevinB frequently reminds us, Canada needs to know what it wants it's army to be when it grows up. How big of a tactical force do we want to be prepared to deploy out of country in short order complete with its equipment (regardless of whether it comes from the regular or reserve force)? Will we never deploy more than a battle group (with a bde headquarters)? or a brigade? or even a division (whether multinational or fully Canadian with all enablers)?

The last time we did this evaluation was in the 1980s when we adopted a divisional model (albeit with very little ability to sustain it after hostilities commenced).

IMHO, for many reasons, that structure still needs to be a division. Considering Canada's economy and the amount already being spent annually on forces in being, an expeditionary division (and all the equipment and forces need to deploy it and make good combat losses for a given timeframe) is the model we should organize and equip on. With the numbers we currently support that equates to a division that can be fully deployed (either as one entity or several smaller ones) and another division to generate the follow-up/replacement forces and be equipped for expected domestic operations (and by domestic I mean warfighting in North America).

Neither division needs to be fully regular force, they can easily be a mix as long as there is a rapid response vanguard force within each. They can both easily be partially reserve force BUT, both must be fully and properly equipped to fulfill their expected roles. Dollars spent on equipment for either regulars or reservists that is not military pattern and not capable of use during hostilities are, IMHO, wasted dollars.

I tend to agree with you on the names and badges issue albeit I find more usefulness in them than many here on this board. The names and badges issue are ones of third or fourth order importance which ought to be dealt with once the big issues are resolved. However, they do matter in order to get the requisite consensus needed for the big issues.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

This is where I go when I rant about reserve restructure - names and badges are a side piece. We need the Army to task organize itself, and that has to include its reserve. We do not need to buy a vehicle for the reserves, we need to buy vehicles for that do a job for the army that are manned by the reserves.

You need vehicles that we can afford in quantity, that are easily maintained and fixed, thanks to our weak support system. A support system that is extremely weak in supporting the Reserves.
We actually need to reduce the number bayonets to bolster our supporting arms and I don't see the Army doing that.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think that role exists anymore - Armor Recce is a dinosaur event, that has been eclipsed by UGV and UAS.
Some mud recce tasks still exist - but the concept of Armor Recce as in the Canadian concept is done and buried.

The US Army concept of Recce by Force is also in deep question.

So there is zero sense in putting any effort into a concept that is OBE, and more importantly without realignment of the CA to create an actual deployable Army for LSCO.

If I remember rightly another major role of "cavalry" was "screening". LOC Security is another form of screening?

So, if that, what is the nature of the threat against which own forces need screening? UAS and PGMs?

If that then is this the nature of the "Cavalry Vehicle" that is required?




The USMC's MADIS system?

A complete MADIS system in its current form consists of two 4x4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) with similar, but different air defense configurations. One vehicle has a remote weapon station armed with a 30mm automatic cannon capable of firing proximity-fuzed rounds and Stinger missiles. The second vehicle has the same type of remote weapon station, but no Stingers, and has added electronic warfare, electronic support measures, and sensor capabilities, including active electronically-scanned radar arrays (AESAs). Small form factor AESA radars are an increasingly popular component of counter-drone systems, in general.

There is also the "Light" version of MADIS, or L-MADIS, which consists of 4x4 Polaris MRZR all-terrain vehicles equipped with a mix of sensors and electronic warfare jammers. The L-MADIS vehicles can be carried inside the main cabin of an MV-22 Osprey and Col. McCarthy highlighted how this system is ideally suited for supporting smaller echelons, including forces embarked on amphibious warfare ships.

L-MADISs have already been in use for years now and there are now multiple configurations of the system. An L-MADIS buggy, lashed to the deck of the Wasp class amphibious assault ship USS Boxer, was actually used to knock down an Iranian drone that came within "threatening range" of the ship as it transited through the Strait of Hormuz in 2019.

Marines To More Than Triple Size Of Air Defense Forces By 2029

The Marines' growing number of air and missile defense units are set to begin receiving new Iron Dome and counter-drone systems next year.

www.twz.com

It strikes me that the key element is situational awareness.

What happens if the MADIS system were mounted on a pair of TAPVs while another pair, mounting the same RWS but outfitted with UAS and the APKWS after the fashion of the VAMPIRE system became the standard troop model?

With the UAS less time needed slogging through mud or even getting within 7.62 range.

in 2019, when Force Design [2030] started, we had four air defense batteries the Marine Corps armed with Stinger missiles and machine guns. That was it," McCarthy said.

"As we approach 2029, we're going to have 15 batteries of air defense in the Marine Corps, to include the reserve component, and the weapon systems they're going to employ are night-and-day better than what we had three [to] four years ago," McCarthy continued.

From 4 batteries to 15 batteries. A lot of them are going to be supplying mobile light anti-aircraft defence as VSHORAD C-UAS while there will be a number of MRAD and LRAD batteries operating from fixed sites.

What would happen if the cavalry were re-tasked to supply C-UAS screens and UAS recce?

Let the Artillery handle the fixed site GBAD tasks.

USMC MRIC with Tamir


...

And it is not just the Marines

....

Huge Boost To Army's Air Defenses Planned In New Force Structure

A new Army force transformation plan puts major emphasis on long and sorely needed added air and missile defense capacity.

www.twz.com

The U.S. Army has laid out plans to significantly expand its air and missile defense units, with a particular focus on counter-drone and counter-cruise missile capabilities, as part of a larger restructuring of its forces.

five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). These task forces will include air and missile defense units, as well as ones equipped with new long-range missile systems, including hypersonic types.

The Typhon system, elements of which are seen here and that is capable of firing multi-purpose SM-6 missiles and Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, is one of the key components of the Army's new Multi-Domain Task Forces. U.S. Army

special operations forces, cavalry, and certain other units will be downsized

The white paper makes clear that new air and missile defenses are absolutely central to these plans. Each of the five MDTFs will include what is currently being called an "indirect fire protection capability (IFPC) battalion." In addition, the service wants to stand up four more independent IFPC battalions. The Army has defined this unit's core mission as "providing a short to medium-range capability to defend against unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, rockets, artillery and mortars."

9 Indirect Fire Protection Capability Battalions

the IFPC battalion's primary weapon is expected to be the Enduring Shield. The service has said in the past that a typical Enduring Shield platoon, of which multiple would be assigned to each IFPC battalion, consists of four launchers linked to at least one AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel-series radar using the Army's Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network.

The Enduring Shield launchers are palletized and have been designed from the start to be able to fire multiple types of surface-to-air munitions. The system is set to be initially fielded with AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range heat-seeking missiles as its primary effector, but the Army is already pursuing another interceptor more optimized for shooting down incoming subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles.

The Army's new force structure plans also call for the creation of nine "counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) batteries" that will be attached to the IFPC battalions and existing division-level air defense battalions.

also actively exploring a variety of other systems designed to help tackle lower-tier drones, including man-portable and vehicle-mounted electronic warfare jammers and laser and high-power microwave-directed energy weapons.

Lastly, the Army's force structure white paper outlines plans to stand up four more Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) battalions to help "counter low altitude aerial threats, including UAS, rotary wing aircraft, and fixed-wing aircraft." The Army already has two M-SHORAD battalions and is in the process of establishing a third.

....

US Army

9x IFPC Battalions (SM-6?)
9x C-sUAS Batteries (Sidewinder)
7x M-SHORAD Battalions (Stinger)

USMC

15x GBAD Batteries (Tamir and Stinger)

 

[quadrapiper]

Question: someone mentioned lines of communication. How rough should those vehicles be able to handle? Even in BC, there's a pretty quick, steep dropoff from "paved road" to "the bulldozer followed the goat."

 

[GR66]

Which kind of leaves Lines Of Communication security as a key enabler. Which in turn means getting the TAPV to work properly. But it also means more emphasis on highway driving and less need for off road work.

Revert to the original M1117 ASV concept and focus on blast resilience.

Does it really? With the proliferation of UAV's for both recce and strike I think even your LOC will want to be off road where they are less easily detected and attacked.

 

[Kirkhill]

Does it really? With the proliferation of UAV's for both recce and strike I think even your LOC will want to be off road where they are less easily detected and attacked.

Does it depend on how far the LOC extends? I'm thinking that most of the transport is going to be wheeled but that there is going to be a long jump from the wheeled LOC to FEBA - An Air Gap? Heliborne and UAVs to the front line?

 

[KevinB]

Question: someone mentioned lines of communication. How rough should those vehicles be able to handle? Even in BC, there's a pretty quick, steep dropoff from "paved road" to "the bulldozer followed the goat."

Age old question.

What is mobility? No one likes to hear ‘it depends’.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Question: someone mentioned lines of communication. How rough should those vehicles be able to handle? Even in BC, there's a pretty quick, steep dropoff from "paved road" to "the bulldozer followed the goat."

If we invest in enough of the right combat engineering resources, maybe it doesn't matter that much...

 

[Brad Sallows]

Does it depend on how far the LOC extends? I'm thinking that most of the transport is going to be wheeled but that there is going to be a long jump from the wheeled LOC to FEBA - An Air Gap? Heliborne and UAVs to the front line?

Not very long. B to A.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not very long. B to A.

But B to A is going to be a longer jump. BMA is going to be further back and smaller and more dispersed, no?

 

[quadrapiper]

If we invest in enough of the right combat engineering resources, maybe it doesn't matter that much...

Beyond the shovel-and-C4 realm, and setting aside airborne units, does that look more or less the same whether it's supporting light, medium, or heavy?

 

[KevinB]

Beyond the shovel-and-C4 realm, and setting aside airborne units, does that look more or less the same whether it's supporting light, medium, or heavy?

No

Which means it’s critical for the Army to figure out what it wants to be.

 

[markppcli]

You need vehicles that we can afford in quantity, that are easily maintained and fixed, thanks to our weak support system. A support system that is extremely weak in supporting the Reserves.
We actually need to reduce the number bayonets to bolster our supporting arms and I don't see the Army doing that.

We can actually afford a lot, we don’t even spend our whole budget. We need vehicles that are fit for the mission. Period. If that means they need to be easily fixed then fine.

If we buy a bunch of training vehicles that prioritize scale and easy for reserve use - guess what we’ll be using in war when the time comes. Seen AVGP Cougars.

I agree we need to increase the number of support trades. That’s not the topic of this thread though.

 

[KevinB]

Given the ARNG can run Abram’s and Bradley’s it make zero sense that Canada’s Army Reserves couldn’t do the same.

Yes it would require real units, and support, and it appears that having multiple paper Divisions is more important to the CA than actually having a functioning combat capable force that is actually realistic in scope.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I agree we need to increase the number of support trades. That’s not the topic of this thread though.

Without that support you will not have serviceable vehicles. So I will argue that support personal, repair equipment and a reliable spare parts system is as important to this debate as are the sensors and weapons the vehicles should have.