1st Wing or First Aviation Regiment

[Loachman]

"The Leopards would have been deployed anywhere where there was a need for tanks. So far, since the Cold War ended, there has been no need."

- Leopards were deployed to Kosovo as a 'conservation of force'  measure.  Easterm Europeans respect tanks, and parking a tank outside the church in a village had the same effect a coy of Grizzlies would have had.  Leopards could also go virtually anywhere, the heavier NATO MBTs could not use a lot of the bridges.

Tom

Oops, sorry, forgot - it still proves my point to Iterator. When there's a need, it goes. When there isn't, it doesn't or goes as something else.

 

[TCBF]

"If a design existed for a hovercraft that could carry the same load as an MLVW and operate for only slightly increased cost, who should own it?"

(There should be a smiley for "Whistles in awe.").

- Another excuse to 'centralize' CSS and strip the Coy/Sqn/Bty of their A1, A2 and B Echelons.

Tom

 

[mdh]

Great discussion,

Isn't it also matter of military culture between the two services? (And beyond the discussions of organization above, perhaps the crux of the matter?)

The Air Force and its RCAF antecedent was fixated on the strategic priorities of the Cold War, its NORAD and NATO commitments, so much so that Tactical Aviation was probably considered a primitive intrusion into what AF commanders really thought - that sooner or later a showdown with the Soviets would go nuclear and ground armies would be largely destroyed in a series of tactical nuclear strikes; that done the war would shift to strategic launches of nuclear ballistic missiles and bomber attacks.

The primacy of the fighter (from the AF's viewpoint) and the desire to maintain air superiority seems to have engendered a culture that continues to trace a line back to that period, and indeed all the way back Battle of Britain and the Bomber Offensive in WW2. 

The army's outlook in contrast seems more utilitarian; these are air assets to be deployed to support the grunt, period. There isn't that nimbus of romance floating over Tac Hel (Black Hawk Down didn't do a good job in romanticizing army aviation  :-X.)

In terms of recruiting the right personnel, I would think the army would want guys who really, really want to fly army helicopters, not AF guys who are assigned to it.

cheers, mdh

 

[warrickdll]

Iterator:

There is no guarantee that Tac Hel would receive any better priority were it back in the Army where it belongs. There will always be competition for scarce funding. It could not be any worse than it is now, however, where the a** f**ce is reluctant to spend anything on something that works for somebody else.
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You are too wrapped up in the method of mobility rather than the overall function. On the battlefield, the helicopter is simply a platform for sensors, weapons, or transportation of troops and cargo for short distances. If a wheeled or tracked vehicle could perform those tasks equally as well then there would be no need for rotors at all.

A** f**ce units have no direct connection to the battlefield or to any ground commanders. They may contribute significantly to a ground battle, but are still really not part of it. Tac Hel involves a far greater level of intimacy - full, round-the-clock, we'll-all-be-home-by-Christmas integration into the ground commander's battle just like any Infantry, Armoured, Artillery, Engineer, or Logistics unit. That is the significant and critical thing, and outside of the Tac Hel community, the a** f**ce has no more demonstrated understanding than you show.
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Our current situation is not working. It has never worked. It never will. I've been living it for 24 years. Others here are saying the same thing.
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Regardless of what you may think, what we do now does not work well here or anywhere else and I am not the only one saying that.

Reality trumps theory.

I'll try one more angle on this.

I do not doubt that the prioritization problems exist (Tac Hel without Attack helicopters is indicative of this).

However a list of nations with Army Tac Hel, that also have more effective Tac Hel than Canada, does not readily reveal a solution. Given our current structure could not the CDS or MND (if given the funding) affect a change in priority for Tac Hel? - And given that, wouldn't you see much less reason in removing aircrew and ground crew training from the Air Force?


That Air Force personnel posted to a Tac Hel squadron may operate almost completely in an Army context only highlights the added competency that should be expected of them. I wouldn't be so quick to assume that all those currently wearing green t-shirts are "Field Ready". The knowledge that these problems exist in an integrated CF should be a big indicator that painting something green will not give you the capabilities of other nations or even of a previous Canadian military structure.

...
As for the Engineers and full-time water activities, ...
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I will just clarify that, once your river requirements exceed the Engineer outboard motorboats, bridging, rafts, barges, and floats, then you will be requiring a Riverine force (which should be Navy).

...
If a design existed for a hovercraft that could carry the same load as an MLVW and operate for only slightly increased cost, who should own it?

The First Aviation Regiment.

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

I'm a Sig, and we get stuck with everybody.  From ships, to airbases, firebases, or humping through the sticks with the PPCLI.  This gives us a unique perspective on the whole unified force fiasco.  It also gives us a good view of what works, and should work better.
    What impressed me the most about the paper by the good major, was how he noted the effectiveness of the joint training by 3PPCLI and the Tac Helo people.  I had a chance to work with the Tac Helo types, (usually when the dropped my on some g#d forsaken rock or tower to fix something) and most of them were dedicated professionals, but without the same frame of reference as those of us from Force Mobile Command (although technically, I was Communication Command, and could as easily be stuck on some Frigate).
   To have the air mobile battalion training with the Tac Helo people who make them air mobile turns them from the paper tiger of most of our peacetime organizational charts, and into a real tiger, like we field at the END of the wars we fight.  I have heard both air and land types talking as if the Tac Helo isn't a weapon, that is not true.  The Tac Helo doesn't do the killing, neither does a longbow, or a howitzer.  The infantry it delivers, maneuvers, scouts for, medivacs for, resupplies and extracts IS a weapon.  Would you ever consider training and brigading the LAV III and Coyote drivers in different regiments than the infantry they mount? No?  So why do it with the Tac Helos?
    The Tac Helo drivers are not bus drivers to get infantry to the battlefield and go home.  Look at Afghanistan.  The Tac Helo is a force multiplier for ground commanders.  Like the cavalry of old, the Tac Helo's allow the alert commander manoeuvre his troops inside his enemies decision curve to achieve local superiority with smaller troop levels.  How effective can the Tac Helo people be if they are totally divorced from the war on the ground, from the strategies and tactics of the troops they are supporting.  Why are we having bright, well trained professional military aviators flying support on missions that they have little understanding of?  When we could have the same well trained professional military aviators who are trained to employ their weapon system (the Tac Helo) to support ground warfare operations.
    Like the LAV III and Coyote drivers, the Tac Helo pilots should not be separate from the infantry they support, they should be part of it.  How much better coordination would we have in the field, if our Tac Helo officers understood the ground planning enough to see how they could better be employed, and be involved in the development of those plans early enough to make the changes?
   Keeping the horses and riders separated until the battle starts sounds like a bad way to train cavalry, even air cavalry.

 

[TCBF]

As others will attest, in the LOH patrol 'Kiowa' days we had two machines with two pilots and two hel observers - one arty, one crmn.  The artymn knew the guns and the crmn knew tank and recce.  The pilots learned both, and flew between the trees, not over them, if needed. 

Once we adopted a two pilot machine to replace the Kiowa, the hel obsvrs in the THS were lost, and the THS lost a lot of it's 'Army' culture.

As the old 'cold war' pilots retire, that experience turns to dust.

Tom