- Reaction score
- 26
- Points
- 430
Oh....I whole heartedly agree with you. Skill fade is a constant concern. I have a hard time everytime I get back to using TCCS. Too much eating out of Aluminium Mess Tins doesn't help either.
cbt arms sub tech said:Great feedback CFL, any feedback for a reservist, that would like operational experience, although works full time, so I don't have the opportunity to take courses in Gagetown or Wainwright....I'm interested in getting G-Wagon or an HLVW course...As I'm a supply tech for a combat arms unit in LFWA!
That's a pretty big spoon you're using, there Teddy! ;DTeddy Ruxpin said:To stir the pot a little:
Teddy Ruxpin said:I have pointed out in previous threads on operations that there is little requirement for the Reserve Force to "augment" the Regular Force on operations.
Teddy Ruxpin said:I honestly believe that there is no value added in forming, preparing, training and deploying P Res sub-units (or sub-sub units) for operations - particularly infantry. The enormous problems in bringing a Reserve company (for instance) to the level to which it can be considered deployable far outweigh any perceived advantages - even without addressing the disparity in individual qualifications.
Teddy Ruxpin said:There is great danger in "advertisements" such as we've seen posted here. They create false expectations...and reflect a "political" mandate to include Reservists rather than a true operational requirement.
CFL said:When they only send 2 companies over at a time that leaves plenty of time for regeneration.
This, of course, didn't quite happen but that is another story.
Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference". There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles.
Good post... However, by leaving a tantalizing hint, as you did (above), you've left out a huge amount of the administrative and operational angst that led to the deployment of the CRIC for Roto 11, angst that (IMHO) was so severe as to preclude the deployment of formed sub-units for overseas operations. As you stated, LFWA did not sustain even the deployment of two back to back companies - Roto 12 had to be sourced nationally, with all the attendent headaches for all concerned - as you know better than I.
I believe, and I was heavily involved in the early stages, that the initial CRIC idea was almost entirely politically motivated. Gunner alludes to some of the major reasons why it was so attractive, but the fact of the matter is that 1 PPCLI was warned for PALLADIUM long before the Reserve Company idea was floated. Yes, the Regular Force was suffering from Bosnia fatigue, yes they didn't want to go, but ultimately (I believe) that's not why the Reserves were tasked with the company. C Coy 1 PPCLI was stood down for the deployment, as was Combat Support Coy. Reroling units was not considered. Use of another sub-unit from outside the Area was not considered. Again, the CRIC was floated long before APOLLO (and the attendant chaos) came along.
Instead, the subunit deployments were designed to give Reserve Sr NCOs and officers a "chance" to "do their jobs" with a minimum of Regular Force "interference". There was enormous political pressure - from the PRes community - to prove that the PRes could deploy in more than individual roles. Did these people get valuable experience? Sure, you do every time you deploy. Was the concept effective in reducing the burden on the Regular battalions? I would argue no, not in the end. After all, the "operational pause" was initiated after the CRIC deployments.
I would argue that PALLADIUM "proved" nothing. Anything can be accomplished with effort, time and money and the CIRCs were hugely expensive in all three. They took over a year to force generate and required an inordinate amount of individual catch-up training and predeployment preparation. The companies deployed into a benign theatre in which even the Reserve company leadership had substantial experience, yet the mounting "bill" was extensive and the administrative angst was out of all proportion to the operational effect. I hope that the same concept is never considered for Afghanistan, unless the Army or Afghanistan significantly changes.
FWIW, Gunner and I worked these operations together and have developed different perspectives over the years. What he says is entirely correct as far as it goes. He believes it was all worth it...I'm a touch more cynical