- Reaction score
- 2,913
- Points
- 1,260
From the Secretary General's latest report on AFG (.pdf) - highlights mine:
(....)
B. Security situation
5. Although the expanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
increasingly capable Afghan National Army have accrued multiple military
successes during the reporting period, the Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups
continue to prevent the attainment of full security in a number of areas. Access to
rural areas of south and south-eastern Afghanistan for official and civil society
actors has continued to decline. The boldness and frequency of suicide bombings,
ambushes and direct fire attacks have increased.
6. Following counter-insurgency operations in the south and east, the Taliban
have lost a significant number of senior and mid-level commanders. In Hilmand,
Kunar, Paktya and Uruzgan Provinces, insurgent leaders have been forced to put
foreigners in command positions, further undermining the limited local bases of
support. This has heightened the importance to the Taliban of the support it receives
from the border regions of Pakistan.
7. Rates of insurgent and terrorist violence are at least 20 per cent higher than in
2006; an average of 548 incidents per month were recorded in 2007, compared to an
average of 425 per month in 2006. There have been over 100 suicide attacks to date
in 2007, compared to 123 in all of 2006. While 76 per cent of all suicide missions
target international military and Afghan security forces, their victims have been
largely civilian bystanders: 143 civilians lost their lives to suicide attacks between
1 January and 31 August 2007. Suicide attacks have been accompanied by attacks
against students and schools, assassinations of officials, elders and mullahs, and the
targeting of police, in a deliberate and calculated effort to impede the establishment
of legitimate Government institutions and to undermine popular confidence in the
authority and capability of the Government of Afghanistan.
8. Defeating the insurgency has been complicated by the growth of criminal and
drug gangs, which enjoy a symbiotic relationship with anti-Government armed
groups. While these groups may not share the political goals of the Taliban, they do
have a common interest in preventing the imposition of State authority in certain
areas or corrupting what State authority exists. In the poppy-cultivating Provinces of
Badakhshan, Hilmand and Kandahar, the State is extremely weak or non-existent
throughout much of the countryside, while corruption is endemic in provincial
centres.
9. The successes of the counter-insurgency in conventional battles and in
eliminating Taliban and other insurgent leaders are undeniable. If the trends of the
past two years are to be reversed, however, a more comprehensive counterinsurgency
strategy will be needed to reinforce political outreach to disaffected
groups and address the security gaps that allow insurgents to recover from their
losses and, with very few resources, still manage to terrorize local populations or
enlist criminal gangs to further their goals.
(....)
- edited to make title clearer -
(....)
B. Security situation
5. Although the expanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
increasingly capable Afghan National Army have accrued multiple military
successes during the reporting period, the Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups
continue to prevent the attainment of full security in a number of areas. Access to
rural areas of south and south-eastern Afghanistan for official and civil society
actors has continued to decline. The boldness and frequency of suicide bombings,
ambushes and direct fire attacks have increased.
6. Following counter-insurgency operations in the south and east, the Taliban
have lost a significant number of senior and mid-level commanders. In Hilmand,
Kunar, Paktya and Uruzgan Provinces, insurgent leaders have been forced to put
foreigners in command positions, further undermining the limited local bases of
support. This has heightened the importance to the Taliban of the support it receives
from the border regions of Pakistan.
7. Rates of insurgent and terrorist violence are at least 20 per cent higher than in
2006; an average of 548 incidents per month were recorded in 2007, compared to an
average of 425 per month in 2006. There have been over 100 suicide attacks to date
in 2007, compared to 123 in all of 2006. While 76 per cent of all suicide missions
target international military and Afghan security forces, their victims have been
largely civilian bystanders: 143 civilians lost their lives to suicide attacks between
1 January and 31 August 2007. Suicide attacks have been accompanied by attacks
against students and schools, assassinations of officials, elders and mullahs, and the
targeting of police, in a deliberate and calculated effort to impede the establishment
of legitimate Government institutions and to undermine popular confidence in the
authority and capability of the Government of Afghanistan.
8. Defeating the insurgency has been complicated by the growth of criminal and
drug gangs, which enjoy a symbiotic relationship with anti-Government armed
groups. While these groups may not share the political goals of the Taliban, they do
have a common interest in preventing the imposition of State authority in certain
areas or corrupting what State authority exists. In the poppy-cultivating Provinces of
Badakhshan, Hilmand and Kandahar, the State is extremely weak or non-existent
throughout much of the countryside, while corruption is endemic in provincial
centres.
9. The successes of the counter-insurgency in conventional battles and in
eliminating Taliban and other insurgent leaders are undeniable. If the trends of the
past two years are to be reversed, however, a more comprehensive counterinsurgency
strategy will be needed to reinforce political outreach to disaffected
groups and address the security gaps that allow insurgents to recover from their
losses and, with very few resources, still manage to terrorize local populations or
enlist criminal gangs to further their goals.
(....)
- edited to make title clearer -
