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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Steve Coll of the New Yorker is right on the mark, in my view:

What If We Fail in Afghanistan?
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/11/what-if-we-fail-in-afghanistan.html

Last week, I found myself at yet another think tank-type meeting about Afghan policy choices. Toward the end, one of the participants, who had long experience in government, asked a deceptively simple question: What would happen if we failed?

First, the question requires a definition of failure. As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan—a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

What would be the consequences of a second Islamic Emirate? My scenarios here are intended analytically, as a first-draft straw-man forecast:

The Nineties Afghan Civil War on Steroids...

Momentum for a Taliban Revolution in Pakistan...

Increased Islamist Violence Against India, Increasing the Likelihood of Indo-Pakistani War...
   
Increased Al Qaeda Ambitions Against Britain and the United States [not to mention Canada]...

An earlier Torch post on Mr Coll:

How to deal with Afstan, AfPak, Indo/Pak, and al Qaeda/Update on strong horses
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/how-deal-with-afstan-afpak-indopak-and.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Globeites hard at their agenda --from Norman's Spectator:
http://www.members.shaw.ca/nspector4/MIND.htm

...

--What the Globe reported on Afstan yesterday

Brown aims for Afghan withdrawal
http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20091116.escenic_1365820/BNStory/DOUG+SAUNDERS

Britain and other NATO partners could join Canada in withdrawing from active combat in Afghanistan, shifting the war to the Afghans in a process that could begin by the end of next year, according to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

Mr. Brown announced in a speech Monday night that he hopes to hold an international conference in London in January to decide on a withdrawal timeline in which his country's 9,000 troops, along with the rest of the NATO force, would hand over power to the Afghan National Army.

--What a former Globester now with the NY Times is reporting today

Brown Vows to Continue War Effort in Afghanistan
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/world/europe/18britain.html?ref=todayspaper

As President Obama moves closer to a decision on the United States military’s request for more troops in Afghanistan, the British government has made an unflinching commitment to continue its role as the second largest troop provider in the 43-nation coalition fighting the war.

In the face of opinion polls suggesting that British public opinion has moved sharply against the war in the face of rising British casualties, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and David Miliband, the foreign secretary, used major speeches in the past two days to reaffirm Britain’s determination to fight on in Afghanistan alongside the United States...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Start of a Torch post:

New Canadian commander at Kandahar/More US troops to be under his command?

Interesting development, see speculation about the US unit at the end...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Let's look at these torture allegations again, shall we:

http://thealbertaardvark.blogspot.com/2009/11/trip-down-memory-lane-on-torture-and.html

A trip down memory lane on torture and Liberal spin.
(Reproduced from the original post April 26, 2007.)

I find the Liberals to be full of nostalgia as of late for a time when they were still in power. For them everything was rosy and much better than it is today, take the Afghan prisoner ruckus that the Liberals and their close friends are trying to milk for all it is worth as an example.

Care to join me in a trip down memory lane......


Does anyone remember this picture?

For those that do not, this picture is of Canada's own JTF 2 in Afghanistan with prisoners that they had taken and was published Jan 2002 (AP / DarioLopez-Mills) .

Please note the date of the photo January 2002. A time where the Liberal led Government of Canada was not even admitting to Canadians that we had troops in Afghanistan; never mind that they were already involved in active combat and were taking prisoners.

When asked in QP about how Canadian Forces would deal with prisoners, PM JeanChrétien said "You are asking me a purely hypothetical question at this time." totally unaware that the event(s) had even happened and having no idea what was going on with prisoners. CBC NEWS SOURCE

The Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, the man that sent our troops into war, did not know what our forces were doing on the other side of the world in the name of Canada!

Good times, good times.

A more positive note for the Liberals was that after a few years in Afghanistan, and after numerous prisoners were handed over to the Afghan authorities, the Paul Martin government negotiated a prisoner transfer agreement. Does anyone want to guess why the Liberals negotiated that deal? Could it be that allegations of coercion and torture just did not start in March of last year when the CPC took over, and that this has been an issue from the time Chrétien first showed all that "Liberal compassion" for the Canadian Armed Forces in question period?

That same transfer agreement, which was good enough for the Liberals, remained intact right up until yesterday when the Conservative Government negotiated the right for Canadian authorities to visit all detention facilities to check on prisoners. Why this was not in the agreement in the first place is beyond me, but maybe while those Liberals are going back down memory lane they could ask themselves why they didn't add this clause when they negotiated the deal!

Thanks for the memories, Liberals.

----------------------
On another related point; I am getting tired of Liberals deliberately misleading Canadians on the role of the International Red Cross with Afghan prisoners.

From a Liberal Press release: "...Minister O’Connor told Canadians the Red Cross was responsible for monitoring the treatment of detainees, until the Red Cross came forward to confirm that was not its mandate."

This from the ICRC: "According to its international mandate, the ICRC visits detainees held as a result of armed conflict and other situations of violence being held by the Afghan authorities and forces such as the United States and NATO. Delegates regularly assess the conditions of detention, the treatment of detainees and respect of their fundamental judicial guarantees."

I don't think the truth could be any clearer. The Liberals again are lying for their own political gain and while lying may bring back memories of the good old days for many Liberals, it just goes to show the rest of us that the Liberal good old days should be remembered for what they really were.

---------------------------
Mr.Colvin was in Afghanistan from April 2006 until September 2007*. Compare those dates to what you have read above and ask yourself under whose watch did most of the problems occur and who was it that tried to make the situation better once they found problems.

Then ask why the time line seems to be completely ignored by most of the media in their quest for smear.


*Does anyone have the exact dates?

Update:A must read Interview with an Afghan Warden.
 
At the Torch:

More on the consequences of failing in Afstan
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/more-on-conequences-of-failing-in.html

Canadian reliance on US forces for protection of development (and other) efforts/Dutch update
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/canadian-reliance-on-us-forces-for.html

NATO/US "surge" in Afstan?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/11/natous-surge-in-afstan.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Back to militias?  News story in NY Times:

As Afghans Resist Taliban, U.S. Spurs Rise of Militias
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world/asia/22militias.html?ref=todayspaper

ACHIN, Afghanistan — American and Afghan officials have begun helping a number of anti-Taliban militias that have independently taken up arms against insurgents in several parts of Afghanistan, prompting hopes of a large-scale tribal rebellion against the Taliban.

The emergence of the militias, which took some leaders in Kabul by surprise, has so encouraged the American and Afghan officials that they are planning to spur the growth of similar armed groups across the Taliban heartland in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

The American and Afghan officials say they are hoping the plan, called the Community Defense Initiative, will bring together thousands of gunmen to protect their neighborhoods from Taliban insurgents...

By harnessing the militias, American and Afghan officials hope to rapidly increase the number of Afghans fighting the Taliban. That could supplement the American and Afghan forces already here, and whatever number of American troops President Obama might decide to send. The militias could also help fill the gap while the Afghan Army and police forces train and grow — a project that could take years to bear fruit.

The Americans hope the militias will encourage an increasingly demoralized Afghan population to take a stake in the war against the Taliban...

The Americans say they will keep the groups small and will limit the scope of their activities to protecting villages and manning checkpoints. For now, they are not arming the groups because they already have guns. The Americans also say they will tie them directly to the Afghan government. These checks aim to avoid repeating mistakes of the past — either creating more Afghan warlords, who have defied the government’s authority for years, or arming Islamic militants, some of whom came back to haunt the United States...

The first phase of the Afghan plan, now being carried out by American Special Forces soldiers, is to set up or expand the militias in areas with a population of about a million people. Special Forces soldiers have been fanning out across the countryside, descending from helicopters into valleys where the residents have taken up arms against the Taliban and offering their help...

In the Pashtun-dominated areas of the south [emphasis added] and east, the anti-Taliban militias are being led by elders from local tribes. The Pashtun militias represent a reassertion of the country’s age-old tribal system, which binds villages and regions under the leadership of groups of elders. The tribal networks have been alternately decimated and co-opted by Taliban insurgents. Local tribal leaders, while still powerful, cannot count on the allegiance of all of their tribes’ members.

Militias have begun taking up arms against the Taliban in several places where insurgents have gained a foothold, including the provinces of Nangarhar and Paktia...

And a Washington Post column by David Ignatius:

Afghan tribes to the rescue?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/20/AR2009112002617.html

While military officers wait for President Obama to conclude his agonizingly slow review of Afghanistan policy, they've been reading a paper by an Army Special Forces operative arguing that the only hope for success in that country is to work with tribal leaders.

This tribal approach has widespread support, in principle. The problem is that, in practice, the United States has often moved in the opposite direction in recent years. Rather than supporting tribal leaders, American policies have sometimes had the effect of undermining their ability to stand up to the Taliban.

The paper by Maj. Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time,"
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf
has been spinning around the Internet for a month. It contends that in an Afghanistan that has never had a strong central government, "nothing else will work" than a decentralized, bottom-up approach. "We must support the tribal system because it is the single, unchanging political, social and cultural reality in Afghan society," he insists...

As tribal politics have come back in fashion in Afghanistan over the past year, a number of experiments have been launched. The Afghan Public Protection Program is working with tribal leaders in Wardak province and elsewhere. The Community Defense Initiative is recruiting and training local militias in western Afghanistan. Across the country, CAAT units (short for Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team) are working on local development and security projects.

The U.S. approach in Afghanistan now is a mix of national and local, government and tribe, top-down and bottom-up. There are frantic plans to expand the national army and police, even as the Northern Alliance rearms its fighters. That's one reason Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy is confusing -- it's going in several directions at once, looking for game-changing opportunities to halt the Taliban's advance.

This jumble of ad hoc ideas isn't necessarily a bad thing...

Torch post this April:

The US and the Afghan Public Protection Force
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/04/us-and-afghan-public-protection-force.html

AKA in some quarters as "militias"...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Rick Hillier is reported to be testifying before the Commons Committee this week. I expect he will tell it like it is and put the NDP and the LPC members of the Committee in their place. Not listed on the CPAC website yet.
 
I think Mackay would get better milage by sticking closer to the truth instead of the usual CPC/Harper tactic of discredit  the messanger.
What to do with Afghan prisoners was an issue with no good options as explained in Rosie DiManno's article:


DiManno: Disdain for U.S. led to Afghan torture fiasco
November 23, 2009

Rosie DiManno


Perhaps convenient amnesia has set in. But few of those clawing at their faces today in angst and shame over who-knew-what-when-generated hysteria with regard to mistreatment of Afghan detainees have paused to recall how this mess originated.

It's because Canada picked Afghans over Americans as front-line allies.

This was not done out of respect for Afghan sovereignty – their right to assume custody of prisoners captured on their own soil. Damn well known from the start was the lay of the land in a war-ravaged country and medieval society: jails of unimaginable wretchedness, guards desensitized to violence and cruelty who'd never heard of the Geneva Conventions and would double over in laughter if informed of its contents, no justice system to speak of, and the overwhelming power exerted by the feared National Directorate of Security whose torturer-in-chief, while denying any physical abuse of detainees, once told the Star that "interrogation is not negotiation, it's not chatting over coffee."

It was a disastrous decision and, despite probing repeatedly at it over several years, I've never been able to ascertain, indisputably, who was to blame as primary architect of the policy, nor why it was thus constructed.

Was it a military decision influenced by domestic politics? Or was it a political decision fronted by top-tier military commanders who are, after all, a particular brand of civil servants? Until Gen. Rick Hillier came along, the breed had historically done government's bidding and kept their mouths shut. Hillier opened his and roared – his "scumbags," as descriptor for Taliban militants, endlessly quoted by the forces of moral equivalency and military-loathing holdovers from the peacekeeping generation. Because, apparently, in the Canadian matrix of military and diplomacy, enemy combatants blowing up your soldiers with roadside bombs or murdering their fellow Afghans – teachers, nurses, aid workers and the like – shouldn't be, you know, called bad names.

There was a 2005 prisoner agreement, negotiated by Hillier. "At the time, we felt that was the right thing to do,'' he told the Star three years ago, when the previously unpublicized document hit the headlines following media reports of appalling abuse inflicted on detainees transferred to Afghan custody. No provision had been put in place to independently monitor their treatment afterwards.

The issue of torture-by-proxy went viral and a new agreement was written to replace the old and, for a period of months, no transfers were allowed until someone decided the inserted safeguards were sufficient to protect prisoners' human rights, as determined by this country. But that episode began the federal government's shuck-and-dodge strategy of constantly underplaying the seriousness of the allegations and what had been a monumental lapse of judgment in the first place.

The original agreement was crafted against the miserable backdrop of Abu Ghraib, a scandal of shocking proportions that had exploded in the U.S. media a year previous. Given the toxic view of American forces – no matter that the horrific mistreatment of Iraqi detainees was, at least in terms of supporting evidence, limited to specific rogue units in one notorious facility – it was clearly decided, by who knows whom, Canada could not put detainees in such soiled hands, despite the U.S. being this country's closest nation-friend.

Someone bought into the dubious premise that the entire American military was not to be trusted and that Afghan wardens, Afghan guards, Afghan officials, were preferable partners in the disposition of detainees, although the only remotely up-to-Western-par prison facility was at the American base in Bagram.

Canada did not have the resources to build its own detention facility in Kandahar. And, even if such a building could have been constructed, there was no way to staff it with our own rights-conscious people. If such a prison had ever been erected, it would still have been placed in Afghan hands for management because that has been, throughout, the Canadian/ISAF mantra – Afghan-led everything.

That was the original sin, as has become ever more evident, because Afghanistan is nowhere near ready, all these years on from the 2001 invasion and ouster of the Taliban regime, to administer itself. Corruption has worsened, security is at an all-time low and most Afghans don't give a fig about how militants are treated or mistreated.

This is the one note that rings untrue in the whistle-blowing memos distributed by diplomat Richard Colvin — a contention that the insurgency would gain impetus because Afghans were outraged by the torture of the detainees. While it certainly has been used as a recruiting tool by the Taliban and Al Qaeda, few Afghans beyond the families of those incarcerated – often without legitimate cause, since so many were subsequently released – have much pity for Taliban rank-and-file. They are too busy simply trying to survive poverty and chronic violence.

So let's be clear: This isn't about Afghans, it's about us – what we deem the standards of conduct should be, even in a lawless, chaotic hellhole like Afghanistan.

Colvin has done nothing to deserve the character assassination unleashed last week by Prime Minister Stephen Harper's pitbulls. He appears to have tried to fulfill diplomatic responsibility with integrity. But he is colossally naive if truly believing the mission's merits were contaminated by the detainee sidebar.

Canadian troops should certainly not be made to wear a "T" for torturer-enablers on their forehead because they followed the instructions as issued. It was the politicians in Ottawa who dropped them in that unsavory position. And, frankly, it was a vocally anti-American attitude, a crescendo of Canadian moral superiority, which sent those politicians and their mandarins scurrying for a palatable option in the detention of prisoners.

Those who now toss around words like "shame" and "national disgrace" should examine their own complicity in Canada pursuing such a peril-fraught alternative to detention by those damned Yankees.



LINK



 
And for something completely different. This comment, reproduced under the fair comment provisions of the copyright act, is taken from:  http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2009/11/whispers-of-surrender-in-afgha/

Note that it is single source from a Saudi paper and is unconfirmed.

Whispers of Surrender in Afghanistan?
It comes to our attention that the MEMRI Blog highlights an article from the Saudi al-Watan in Arabic that - according to an Afghan source - the United States is talking to the Taliban seeking to trade control of 5 provinces in exchange for the cessation of attacks on US bases. MEMRI summarizes:

An Afghan source in Kabul reports that U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry is holding secret talks with Taliban elements headed by the movement's foreign minister, Ahmad Mutawakil, at a secret location in Kabul. According to the source, the U.S. has offered the Taliban control of the Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar and Nuristan provinces in return for a halt to the Taliban missile attacks on U.S. bases.

Kunar province borders the Khyber Pass region where the majority of US and NATO supplies pass enroute from Pakistan. And the remaining four provinces constitute fully the southern 25% of Afghanistan's territory.

This, if true, is a disturbing development.

I have tried to come up with scenarios of why someone would lie about it in a leak. What would be to gain? Who would gain, and what would they gain? Without sleeping on it, the options for such appear narrow at best.

What does seem logical is that an Afghan privy to the negotiations could have become (rightly) spooked that they might just pull it off, and leaked word in hopes that it might so anger American public opinion that the entire endeavor might be scrapped. That's the most logical explanation for motivation I see at the moment.

It would also fit in consistently with Ambassador Eikenberry's leaked cables recently railing against a 'surge' in forces in Afghanistan. He wouldn't voice such without thinking he has his hands on something else. Could this be it? The surrender of 25% of Afghan territory in exchange for some form of ceasefire?

One would hope not. But if so, this demonstrated type of 'effort' in Afghanistan would prove to be the strongest indication that it may be time to advocate the full pullout of American forces from Afghanistan.

If this is true, then not one more drop of American blood for a path that resembles Pakistan's path. You recall Pakistan's series of surrenders touted as agreements, right?

 
Funny this - the latest RUMINT of such talks seems to be leading to a LOAD of "we're surrendering" commentary this past week or so, while similar RUMINT in the past drew nowhere near as much attention, like earlier this month.

Admittedly, this IS a higher level of detail from previous rumours of mediated talks between the US, Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, but we've also heard what the Taliban had to say about other alleged sets of discussions (links to pro-jihadi web sites, so mind your IP information):

“Ours is the same old stand there is no other way except jihad in Afghanistan until the invader forces are present in Afghanistan. If you wait for 3000 years, our stand is the same that Taliban will never hold talks in presence of invader forces in Afghanistan.” (13 Mar 09)

“A dialogue which is in favour of Afghanistan and Islam it will never be hidden from the nation. Our struggle will continue until the departure of all foreign troops.“ (28 Sept 08)

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has neither held talks in Saudi Arabia nor in the United Arab Emirates nor in any other place. I did not send a letter to the leader of the Islamic government of Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Haramain, Mr. Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz, or to the opposition officials. Additionally, I have not received any formal message from any of the aforementioned entities. These reports are completely baseless and are part of a planned propaganda campaign created by the enemy. (Signed) The servant of Islam and the Leader of the Believers, Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid” (23 Dec 08)

Hmmm, wonder who would want to show the U.S. president (or any Western leader with troops in AFG) as weak?
 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/11/23/obama-lock-afghanistan-decision/

Updated November 24, 2009

Official: Obama to Announce Afghan War Strategy Decision on Dec. 1
by 
FOXNews.com

The president will address the nation next Tuesday on his vision of the way forward in Afghanistan, a White House official told Fox News.
More on link.

Prime Time of course.
 
And from the New York Times:

November 24, 2009, 7:26 am

Afghan Address Planned for Next Week
By JEFF ZELENY
President Obama has conducted a final meeting on his military review for Afghanistan, administration officials said, and he is planning to explain his decision in an address to the nation next Tuesday.

“After completing a rigorous final meeting, President Obama has the information he wants and needs to make his decision and he will announce that decision within days,” Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary, said Tuesday morning.

For two hours on Monday evening, Mr. Obama held his ninth meeting in the Situation Room with his war council. The session began at 8:13 p.m., aides said, and ended at 10:10 p.m.

The president’s military and national security advisers came back to the president with answers he had requested during previous meetings, most of which focusing on these questions: Where are the off-ramps for the military? And what is the exit strategy?

Mr. Obama did not announce his specific decision to his advisers. He is scheduled to stay at the White House over the Thanksgiving holiday to finish making his decision, as the White House plans to prepare for what could be Mr. Obama’s first prime-time address to the nation from the Oval Office.

But the venue of the announcement has not been finalized. While an Oval Office address fits the gravity of the moment, one official said Tuesday that a full-length speech – rather than a short message, delivered as the president sits behind a desk – is a more likely way for Mr. Obama to explain one of the most important decisions yet in his presidency.

A growing part of the discussion at the White House is the cost of sending more troops to Afghanistan, as detailed in an article by Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper in today’s Times.

For the first time, Peter Orszag, director of the Office of Management and Budget, joined the group of advisers in the Situation Room on Monday evening. A photograph released by the White House shows Mr. Orszag sitting four seats away from the president, next to Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

As the White House prepares for how the president will explain his decision to the nation, the president is trying to allay deep concerns inside his own party.

The first in a series of meetings with Congressional leaders comes on Tuesday, when Mr. Obama plans to meet at 3:10 p.m. in the Oval Office with Speaker Nancy Pelosi. That meeting is to be followed by a private session with Mr. Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates at 4:30 p.m.

The White House is preparing for the president’s announcement to take place next Tuesday evening, aides said, which would likely be followed by hearings in the House and Senate. But the date could be changed, one official said, depending on briefings with Congress and allied leaders.

While the president is expected by several of his advisers to announce sending more than 20,000 new troops – perhaps closer to the 40,000, as recommended by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal – the White House is working to make the announcement more than simply a number of troops. It will include an outline of an exit strategy, officials said.

LINK
 
Lots more at Foreign Policy's "AfPak Channel", with links:

Daily brief: Obama expected to announce Afghanistan decision December 1
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/24/daily_brief_obama_expected_to_announce_afghanistan_decision_december_1

Getting closer

Around 20 members of U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team met for the ninth or tenth time last night to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, and rumors are coalescing around "early next week" for the president to announce his decision of a "middle-ground option that would deploy an eventual 32,000 to 35,000 U.S. forces" to the Afghan theater (AP, NPR, Reuters, AP, AFP). Politico, Reuters, NPR, and McClatchy all report the much-anticipated decision will come in a presidential television address on December 1 (Politico, Reuters, NPR, McClatchy)...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Interesting graphical representation of data from the GUardian:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/nov/13/information-beautiful-afghanistan
 
Sort of make or break for the COIN campaign (useful graphic at end, usual copyright disclaimer):

Surge Targets Taliban Bastion
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125910374196463061.html?mod=WSJ_hps_MIDDLEThirdNews

Commanders in Afghanistan say they will devote the majority of the fresh troops expected from the White House to securing the country's troubled south and will especially target this volatile city, the Taliban's main power base.

View Full Image
AU.S. soldier snaps an image of anAfghan man's iris to be used for identification. Commanders will concentrate any newtroops in the southern part of the country, putting a ring around the Taliban power base of Kandahar.
Reuters

A U.S. soldier snaps an image of an Afghan man's iris to be used for identification. Commanders will concentrate any new troops in the southern part of the country, putting a ring around the Taliban power base of Kandahar.
AU.S. soldier snaps an image of anAfghan man's iris to be used for identification. Commanders will concentrate any newtroops in the southern part of the country, putting a ring around the Taliban power base of Kandahar.
AU.S. soldier snaps an image of anAfghan man's iris to be used for identification. Commanders will concentrate any newtroops in the southern part of the country, putting a ring around the Taliban power base of Kandahar.

President Barack Obama will announce his revamped war strategy in an address early next week, likely Tuesday. He is widely expected to adopt a plan that sends between 20,000 and 40,000 more troops to bolster a flagging military campaign and the 68,000 U.S. troops now fighting it.

But even before Mr. Obama takes his case to the public, military commanders on the battlefield are ready to implement a plan that makes a defensive ring around Kandahar a linchpin of the fight to come. No matter how many troops the president decides to authorize, the Kandahar campaign will be an early, large-scale test of U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan of refocusing allied military, political and economic efforts on population centers and away from sparsely peopled rural areas.

The new commander of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, and his staff detailed how they will put the McChrystal approach into action, in interviews with The Wall Street Journal: They plan to mass thousands of troops now scattered around the south and pack them into a tight cordon around the outskirts of Kandahar city.

WSJ's Michael Phillips reports from Kandahar with an exclusive look at how the Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy will be carried out on the ground. He's joined by Jerry Seib in Washington and Alan Murray in New York, in a News Hub extra.

At the same time, the coalition plans to pour economic, police and political assistance into the urban core to try to persuade residents that the Afghan government serves them better than the Taliban alternative. "We have to regain the initiative, and we have to get some momentum going," said Gen. Carter.

As Gen. McChrystal's team scrambles to reverse Taliban gains in Kandahar, they will also dispatch thousands of American soldiers to secure the major highways that pass through the city to Pakistan and southern Afghanistan.

As soon as this weekend, officers expect to order the fast-moving armored Stryker Brigade to devote itself full time to securing roads plagued by hidden bombs and illegal checkpoints run by insurgents, bandits and corrupt police...

Thousands of the new troops also would likely be deployed to expand the Kandahar approach to the most densely populated districts of the Helmand River Valley in neighboring Helmand province. Together, the two areas contain about two million of the estimated three million residents of southern Afghanistan.

View Full Image
A U.S. soldier from the armored Stryker Brigade, soon expected to secure roads in the Kandahar area, patrols the city recently.
Reuters

A U.S. soldier from the armored Stryker Brigade, soon expected to secure roads in the Kandahar area, patrols the city recently.
A U.S. soldier from the armored Stryker Brigade, soon expected to secure roads in the Kandahar area, patrols the city recently.
A U.S. soldier from the armored Stryker Brigade, soon expected to secure roads in the Kandahar area, patrols the city recently.

The new southern strategy is an explicit recognition that a move this past summer to position a few thousand Canadian and U.S. troops outside Kandahar failed to stop insurgents from infiltrating the city.

For years the coalition paid little attention to the city, despite a huge allied presence at the airfield outside town. That neglect allowed the Taliban, whose Islamist movement was born in Kandahar, to again make inroads...

...allied and Afghan officials say Kandahar is too crucial to lose. "The history of Afghanistan always was, always is and always will be determined from Kandahar," provincial Gov. Tooryalai Wesa said in an interview...

For security reasons, allied officers don't want to publicize how many soldiers will be involved in the Kandahar operation. They say their plan will boost the troops encircling Kandahar by 50%, while reducing the area they cover by 90%, making the cordon harder for insurgents to penetrate.

Gen. Carter is wary of inserting large numbers of foreign troops into the center of Kandahar, an ethnically Pashtun city in a Pashtun insurgency. There is a small Canadian security and economic-aid team inside the city and a 150-man U.S. military-police company. Gen. Carter plans to boost that with another small MP unit to bolster the Afghan National Police...

The coalition also plans to flood Kandahar and its environs with economic aid, including a $50 million Canadian irrigation system, a U.S. farm-and-jobs project and a new electrical-distribution network expected to cost some $20 million...

Improving links with the ANA is not as easy as perhaps it should be--and other intelligence challenges:

U.S. intelligence chief in Afghanistan wages battle for resources
Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn encounters military resistance in his task of overhauling U.S. intelligence-gathering in Afghanistan to boost efforts to defeat the Taliban.


The peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains create a stunning backdrop for the U.S. military's Kabul headquarters, but Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn rarely notices. Sheltering Taliban fighters and American combat outposts, the mountains symbolize the old way of fighting. Flynn was sent here to help define a new strategy for the war...

Flynn's boss, Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and allied commander, has ordered an overhaul of how intelligence is collected, disseminated and, most of all, used by troops in Afghanistan...

To institutionalize the sharing of intelligence in Afghanistan, Flynn is building new intelligence "fusion cells." These centers are staffed and equipped to gather all available intelligence from video feeds, audio intercepts and other sources and make it available immediately to combat units across the country.

An even bigger hurdle for Flynn is improving how the allies share intelligence with the Afghan security forces. Earlier this year, Flynn proposed installing a secure video connection between the U.S. and Afghan military headquarters to allow officers to share intelligence and plan operations.

The project bumped up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization bureaucrats. In one meeting, Canadian and Polish officers, adeptly staying in their lanes, said Flynn's plan faced serious problems [emphasis added]: No money was budgeted for the equipment, installing it would violate NATO rules and there were not enough technicians for the job.

As the meeting dragged on, Flynn became exasperated. "This isn't the Balkans and a peacekeeping mission," he told them. "This is a combat zone."

After the meeting, Flynn stopped the two officers in the gravel courtyard behind the NATO headquarters and tried to enlist them in his cause.

"We are going to move this command into the 21st century as fast as we can," Flynn told them. "If you want to push back, push back. If what I am saying isn't right, tell me. But from my experience, we can do this, and we can do it faster. Do not worry about perfect."

When they seemed to be coming around, he pressed his point. "We are beyond the nonsense," he said. "There is not a lot of time for us to show progress here in Afghanistan."

A few days later, Afghanistan's military command center got its top-secret communications equipment and a direct link to McChrystal's war room in Kabul, the capital...

More on this sort of problem from a post by BruceR. at Flit:
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_08_24.html#006507

...
3. Force protection measures in a warzone limit our mentoring. Our own unwillingness to risk or lose soldiers works against us, setting at least three huge barriers in our path. It's very difficult within established force protection measures, for mentors in the South to spend continuous time with their Afghan counterparts. Our limited access to them means they're left to their own devices a lot. If you're not living and working with them at all times, that's when the corruption and incompetence will inevitably slip back in. And while we have trouble maintaining a persistent presence in their headquarters, for the same reason, they can't enter our inner sanctums, drastically limiting the sharing of intelligence and operational planning [emphasis added], let alone military culture...

Because of arrangements that have been made with the Pakistani government--as a result of its important place in international counterterrorism efforts--it has been, ironically, considerably easier to share intelligence with the Pakistanis than with the Afghans.

Mark
Ottawa
 
This is Brennan's mother here, and I have just come across your conversation regarding my son's abilities, or lack thereof, and supposed false identity.  Brennan is not a ghost writer, nor is he Brennan Sr, nor did he sit down with a member of the Associated Press!  He DID write this article for his speech at school, in fact he won the speech contest for our city! Perhaps he is a child prodigy, and I thank you gentlemen for thinking as much.  As for the immature comments about a 10 year old not being concerned about issues such as war in Afghanistan, clearly you who are speaking have a lot to learn.  Thank goodness that many of the children of today DO care enough to concern themselves with issues of this nature, and you should be proud that one of our Canadian children cares enough that he wants to speak out to the public on an issue that is dear to his heart. I would hope that you people would want children this courageous to be the children of our Canadian future.  As for the ridiculous comments about him enjoying looking on ebay for coins for his coin collection, gosh darn he's a kid!!  Can't a kid who looks for coins on ebay also have the ability to feel so strongly about an issue?!  I have raised my children to look critically at things, and think for themselves, and I am proud of what Brennan has accomplished.  And you, whoever you are, that has gone to the trouble of looking my son up on the internet to see his reading speech, don't you have BETTER things to do with your time??  Please stop this discussion on my son's speech - he's a kid, he's the author, he feels strongly about an issue, he had the courage to speak out, THE END!
 
..and since you let him publish an article in a newspaper and made his life [reading problem] public maybe you should look at ALL the implications of what you did. THE END!
 
Speech

Just out of curiousity, where exactly do you stand on "free speech"? 
1.  Do you stand on the side that allows all and sundry to comment on published articles; OR
2.  Do you stand on the side that believes in "free speech" as long as it is in agreement with your personal thoughts?
 
Speech:

When you put your child's writing out in public in the media, they, and you became a public figure. Part of that involves positive press, and part of it involves negative press. If you don't want your ideas (or the ideas of your children) criticized, then they should not be made public.

The staff here will not intervene because people disagree with a statement. That right is defended in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These people are speaking their opinions, just as your son spoke his, and they have the same freedoms to do so as your son.

Milnet.ca Staff
 
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