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Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

Greymatters said:
Hmmm... too broad of a statement - I am thinking of those in an academic position with no military or other government agency experience.
I guess that's the problem with broad statements...and continuing to make them.

Napoleon was accompanied by his baggage mule on every campaign; Pte Numpty has an Afghan Campaign Star for his gruelling six-months' making coffee in the TOC; both therefore have "military experience."

I guess you'd turn to either of those "experts," before reading something produced by an academic who may have spent most of his adult life merely studying conflicts.


Darn those generalizations. Simply having worn a uniform does not necessarily make one's opinions informed, or experiences relevant, to all things military.
 
Afstan: Interview with Commander, ISAF Joint Command, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/afstan-interview-with-commander-isaf.html

Afstan: Mujahedin militias to the, er, rescue at Kunduz
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/afstan-mujahedin-militias-to-er-rescue.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Journeyman said:
Pte Numpty has an Afghan Campaign Star for his gruelling six-months' making coffee in the TOC
*ahem*.  That's "CAPTAIN" Numpty, my good fellow!  I didn't spend a bazillion years at this rank just to be called "Pte" ;D

Oh, and I was there for SEVEN gruelling months  >:D
 
Journeyman said:
I guess that's the problem with broad statements...and continuing to make them.

Napoleon was accompanied by his baggage mule on every campaign; Pte Numpty has an Afghan Campaign Star for his gruelling six-months' making coffee in the TOC; both therefore have "military experience."

I guess you'd turn to either of those "experts," before reading something produced by an academic who may have spent most of his adult life merely studying conflicts.


Darn those generalizations. Simply having worn a uniform does not necessarily make one's opinions informed, or experiences relevant, to all things military.

Darned good point!
I may quote you in other threads  :)

cheers
Frank
 
Letter in the Globe and Mail, rather edited to take out the sting, see original below:

A bigger Afghan presence
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/letters-to-the-editor/a-bigger-afghan-presence/article1417797/

Mark Collins
Ottawa

The article Canada's Kandahar Legacy Rests On A Shift In Strategy, But Is There Enough Time? (front page, Jan. 2)
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadas-kandahar-legacy-rests-on-a-shift-in-strategy/article1416786/
considers how the security situation might develop in Kandahar province. It is important to mention the presence, since the summer of 2009, of the U.S. Army's 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and the fact that a second U.S. Army brigade combat team will be coming to Kandahar this spring.

By this spring some 10,000 soldiers from these two teams will be on the ground. By comparison the total force under Canadian command numbers around 5,000, including more American combat troops than Canadian. In addition a U.S. Army combat aviation brigade, with over 100 helicopters, has been at Kandahar since spring 2009 (our Air Force has 14 helicopters there).

The original (and note the final para, omitted by the Globe):

Kandahar military realities‏

The Globe ran this major front page piece Jan. 2, "Canada's Kandahar legacy rests on a shift in strategy", which amongst other things considers how the security situation might develop in the province.  But the article fails to mention either the presence in the province since the summer of 2009 of the US Army's 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, or the fact that a second US Army brigade combat team will be coming to Kandahar this spring.

One would think that in looking forward it would be helpful to mention the fact that by this spring there will be those two US Army brigade combat teams on the ground, some 10,000 soldiers.  By comparison the total force under Canadian command, now actually including more American combat troops than Canadian, numbers around 5,000.

In addition a US Army combat aviation brigade, with over 100 helicopters, has been at Kandahar since spring 2009 (our Air Force has 14 helicopters there).  There is no note of that brigade--which has been giving considerable support to the Canadians--in your article either.

The piece moreover states that "Earlier this year [2009], the United States finally answered the pleas Gen. Fraser made three years previous for more troops."  In reality a US Army infantry battalion, sent by President Bush, became part of the CF's battle group at Kandahar in the summer of 2008, not in 2009.  That battalion effectively doubled our battle group's combat infantry strength.

References:
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=64232
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=2355035
http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5gmloea49X8xveMTU-8bVB5Gt-hkQ
http://www.nationalpost.com/m/story.html?id=1601361
http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/jtfa-foia-eng.asp#f
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63871&archive=true
http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=2e2b8b97-6c70-439e-baab-fd34ad668795

Mark
Ottawa
 
Aww....with my shyness and inferiority complex, you guys are making me blush.  :-[ 
 
Terry Glavin:

A Letter Of Grief And Hope From Kandahar: "Their Spirit Will Live On Forever."
http://transmontanus.blogspot.com/2010/01/letter-of-grief-and-hope-from-kandahar.html

What follows is a letter from our dear friend Ehsanullah Ehsan, director of the Afghan-Canadian Community Centre in Kandahar,
http://www.canilf.org/projects/afghan-school-project/
"a school that owes its existence to the sacrifices of the Canadian people." I've passed on the letter directly to Canadian Forces officials in Ottawa and to the editor of the Calgary Herald, so that it might make its way to the bereaved families...

Mark
Ottawa
 
Afstan: Reforming inadequate US intelligence
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/afstan-reforming-poor-us-intelligence.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
This, from CanWest:
Prime Minister Stephen Harper says virtually all Canadian soldiers will leave Afghanistan by the end of 2011, making some of his most definitive statements yet on his vision of Canada’s future role there in an interview Wednesday with Canwest News Service.

(....)

“We will not be undertaking any kind of activity that requires a significant military force protection, so it will become a strictly civilian mission,” Harper said.

“We will continue to maintain humanitarian and development missions, as well as important diplomatic activity in Afghanistan. But we will not be undertaking any activities that require any kind of military presence, other than the odd guard guarding an embassy.”

(....)

“I think the reality is that all actors over the past few years have been downgrading their expectations of what can be achieved in Afghanistan,” Harper said.

“But it is still important that we have a viable, functioning state in Afghanistan that has some acceptable democratic and rule of law norms. If we don’t, we run the serious risk of returning in Afghanistan to what we had before. No matter what differences people have on the mission, everybody agrees that the mission has the purpose to ensure that Afghanistan does not return to being a failed state that is an incubator of terrorism.” ....

- edited to add link to story -
 
That is simply amazing.  It never fails to amaze me as to how naive Canadians really are. 

How many 'Humanitarian workers' will we see come home in boxes?
 
So the prime minister finally is as definitive as one can be--and all without any formal consideration in Parliament of the nature of the future Canadian effort in Afghanistan, contrary to what the government seemed to be saying in October 2009.
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/10/post-2011-mission-heading-back-to-house.html

One wonders if our decision will have any impact on the debate in the Netherlands about whether to extend their military mission beyond 2010, when it is scheduled to end.
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/dutch-uruzgan-duty-stay

Now when will our media report that the tours of our current battle group roto and its successor (now to be the last such combat battle group) have been, very quietly, extended?
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/12/afstan-only-two-more-rotos-to-go.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
George Wallace said:
How many 'Humanitarian workers' will we see come home in boxes?

Not very many. Most of their bodies will never be found.
 
MarkOttawa said:
One wonders if our decision will have any impact on the debate in the Netherlands about whether to extend their military mission beyond 2010, when it is scheduled to end.
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/dutch-uruzgan-duty-stay

<Dutch mission tangent>

On this.....

1)  As of yesterday, NLD's cabinet was reportedly undecided on its presence in Uruzgan (although it appears, from this report, that they'll keep their jets in K'Har).

1)  The Civil Leader of Task Force Uruzgan/Director of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan is already talking about this roto being the "last-but-one" as well:
Right from the very start, General Van Uhm and I were asked what the main element would be of our deployment as respective military commander and civil representative of the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) number VII. We knew that our mission would last until February 2010 and that after that - on the basis of political decisions taken in 2007 - there would be one more task force, in the same form, due to operate until 1 August 2010. So, our wasn't simply TFU-VII, but in fact more TFU 'last-but-one' ....

</Dutch mission tangent>
 
Germans are also coming to a crunch:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,670710,00.html

The US clearly expects Germany to increase the number of troops it has stationed in Afghanistan. But Chancellor Merkel's government is a long way from agreement on the issue. With an Afghanistan conference looming in London, however, Berlin is running out of time.

There are a number of ambiguities ahead of the Afghanistan Conference, set to take place in London at the end of the month. Perhaps the most curious, however, is the guest list. Indeed, it isn't even yet clear who will be representing Germany at the Jan. 28 summit...

It is now up to the chancellor. As so often, Merkel has given little indication as to which way she is leaning, preferring instead to let her ministers battle it out. But time is no longer on her side. The US announcement this week that it intends to send 2,500 soldiers of its own into German-controlled northern Afghanistan [I'd missed that - MC]
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,670085,00.html
ups the pressure on Merkel. Furthermore, US special envoy to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke wondered in an interview with the influential weekly Die Zeit whether Germany would honor the West's common interest in bringing the Afghanistan engagement to a successful conclusion.

In order to ensure that Germany doesn't head to London empty handed, Berlin is currently working on putting together a compromise offer, according to government sources. The package is said to include a modest troop increase of not more than 1,000 soldiers, many of them earmarked to help train Afghan forces. In addition, more police trainers are to be sent and Berlin will make more development money available [i.e. no commitment to any real combat role]...

...the pressure from the US is also unlikely to weaken. Only recently, the US demonstrated just how precarious the situation has become in Kunduz, where the German command is based in Afghanistan. In an extended gunfight last weekend, US troops killed 25 insurgents just northwest of the German base. According to SPIEGEL ONLINE information, there were four foreign fighters from Chechnya among the dead as well as five who Western intelligence agencies say belonged to al-Qaida [more on Kunduz here].
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/afstan-mujahedin-militias-to-er-rescue.html

Stomping Ground for Terrorists

The American message seems clear: If the Germans either do not want to, or cannot, help, then US will have to move in and clean up...

Mark
Ottawa
 
ISAF operations: Helmand is beginning to seem quite similar to Kandahar/White House politics
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/isaf-operations-helmand-is-beginning-to.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s Globe and Mail web site is a comment from Prof. (and retired Army (RCAC) LCol) Doug Bland:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/afghanistan-after-2011-then-what/article1422843/
Afghanistan: After 2011, then what?
We should at least be discussing the risks and consequences of a Canadian departure

Douglas Bland

Special to Globe and Mail

Thursday, Jan. 07, 2010

Party leaders, members of Parliament, columnists, advocacy groups, public intellectuals and many citizens have asked: “What, if anything, will we do in Afghanistan after 2011?” A common answer is that Canadians need to discuss the question – and there the matter is left, without much ordered discussion at all.

A decision to walk away from an unfinished war, with all its attendant risks to national interests and dispiriting connotations of retreat and forsaken sacrifices, is only slightly less important than was the decision to enter it in the first place. A decision to go to war or to withdraw ought to be the finale, not the beginning, of a detailed analysis of the consequences in either case.

The House of Commons agreement to set 2011 as the deadline to cease combat operations in Afghanistan was merely a political expedient. There is no record of an analysis by any party of the consequences of leaving. Without a comprehensive consequential analysis, 2011 is simply a date pencilled on a calendar, a point in time floating aimlessly in a policy vacuum. Policy is now commanded by this arbitrary date, not the consequences for both Canada and Afghanistan – a state of affairs beyond reason and honour.

Holding a discussion of Canada's future policies in Afghanistan today, in circumstances stymied by the 2011 deadline, may look like a pointless attempt to drive the policy process in reverse. Others might see it as an opportunity to carefully review the Canadian mission, which has evolved significantly since the Commons decided two years ago to walk away from the commitment. But if Canadians wanted to discuss the mission and their country's interests, what should they discuss?

Some might propose an agenda limited to immediate, seemingly uncomplicated “mission adjustments.” For instance, should we withdraw only from active combat operations, maintaining a cadre of forces to train Afghan national police and military units? Or should Canada withdraw rapidly all military units, leaving allies and Afghans to carry the burden? In lieu of military operations, should we enhance our humanitarian and governance efforts in the region?

However useful a public discussion around these and other immediate issues might be, its conclusions would be largely irrelevant to Canada's wider national interests. A discussion limited to what are in effect second- or third-order questions risks sidetracking significant first-order public policy questions, many of which extend beyond the day-to-day situation in Afghanistan. What we need is a discussion about the consequences of a 2011 withdrawal for a broader range of national policies that are more or less connected to the Afghanistan commitment.

Consider, for instance, these important policy questions:

Canada-U.S. relations: The maintenance of co-operative relations with the United States is Canada's vital national interest. What are the likely security, defence and economic impacts of withdrawal in 2011?

Canada-NATO relations: Would a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan negatively effect Canada's diplomatic and economic relations with the Atlantic alliance and the European Community generally?

The Taliban and other foes: Will a Canadian withdrawal embolden Taliban leaders and weaken the Afghan government, endangering subsequent humanitarian effort in the country?

The Canadian Forces: No one knows how much the Afghan mission will eventually cost Canada. But government officials do know that staying will cost many more billions, eating into budgets for other policies. Leaving will save something. Is the government actually willing to sacrifice the Afghan commitment (and its defence policy aimed at rebuilding the Canadian Forces) in order to reduce the deficit?

Canada and the UN: Will withdrawal from the UN mission in Afghanistan risk forfeiting our credibility as a leader of the “Responsibility to Protect” concept?

Canada's place at the table: When Afghans eventually (and inevitably) decide to negotiate an accommodation among their country's many factions, does Canada expect to have influence if we have abandoned the country?

Does Canada's commitment to the Afghan people actually matter to Canada's interests or to Canadians' security? Will there be no repercussions if we walk away? If not, one might ask why are we waiting until 2011. But if our commitment does matter and there will be significant risks if we leave, then perhaps the Prime Minister should talk to Canadians about them before we walk out the door.

Douglas Bland is chair of the Defence Studies Program at Queen's University.

These are good questions. My answers, worth what you are paying for them, are:

Canada-U.S. relations: There will be few, if any impacts. The Obama administration will be following us out. We are, actually, helping them by pulling the first, maybe second (after Netherlands) brick out of the wall.

Canada-NATO relations: No, not much. We are, nearly, irrelevant now.

The Taliban and other foes: Yes.

The Canadian Forces: The Canadian governments is more than happy to sacrifice Afghanistan for the sake of our deficit. The rebuilding of the CF may remain a priority – within fiscal realities.

Canada and the UN: Sorry, I can’t restrain the laughter. Moving along, now …

Canada's place at the table: No, but we would have precious little if we stayed.
 
US intelligence and Afstan--and friends
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/us-intelligence-and-afstan-and-friends.html

ABC World News from Kabul Jan. 11 and 12 9 (note the poll of Afghans)
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/abc-world-news-from-kabul-jan-11-and-12.html

Afstan: Key previous minister still missing in second cabinet proposed by President Karzai
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2010/01/afstan-key-minister-still-missing-in.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
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