Armoured RECCE

[IKnowNothing]

So, bringing it back the the Armoured Recce role, what's the point of having a heavy, tank-equipped Cavalry Regiment if we don't have an equally heavy Brigade to follow it up?

Would the tactical and strategic mobility gains (and force symmetry/vehicle commonality) of a lighter tracked (mix of CV90120 and CV9035 with Spike) armoured force be worth the protection loss?

And if so, what about carrying that thought process further and going with something like a (slightly) uparmoured/upgunned version of Stormer 30?

 

[FJAG]

CCV was not originated in CLS lines. A different, retired, artillery general was the originator and driving force behind it.

Yup, but he was A/CLS from 2003-2006 and CLS from 2006 to 2010 when the CCV project was initiated and hit its stride. And yes the other one was also a strong supporter until he left the ADM(Mat) job in 2012.

CCV was originally conceived as providing a more protective and manoeuverable vehicle than the LAV 3 for use with the tanks in Afghanistan. It died because a) Both generals weren't there after 2010/2012; b) the LAV 6.0 was being sold as just as manoeuvrable and protective as anything in the CCV selection and would retain a common fleet; and c) we left Afghanistan and Ukraine v2014 hadn't happened yet.

 

[Kirkhill]

A wild thread on Army organization appears! Again...

Agreed, and I know I am one of the worst offenders. I'm sorry.

In my defence I will say that I find it impossible to ignore the Venn Diagram intersections because that is where the majority of the arguments occur.

"That's my job you have". Vs. "That's my job I don't want."

 

[GR66]

Would the tactical and strategic mobility gains (and force symmetry/vehicle commonality) of a lighter tracked (mix of CV90120 and CV9035 with Spike) armoured force be worth the protection loss?

And if so, what about carrying that thought process further and going with something like a (slightly) uparmoured/upgunned version of Stormer 30?

To be honest, the question is somewhat irrelevant if there is no plan to purchase completely new families of armoured vehicles. With the current and future purchases on the table (CSCs, F-35s, North Warning System upgrades plus a slew of OMG things that we'll likely scramble to finish procuring - GBAD, ATGMs, etc.) I see absolutely ZERO chance that we will purchase CV-anythings, Stormers or anything else with tracks (other than the Arctic Mobility vehicles). I'm thinking we'll be lucky to upgrade all of our existing Leopards to a single standard.

I think any realistic plan should likely assume that we've got the armoured vehicle base that we have for the foreseeable future. New turrets or RWS upgrades or variants of the LAV may be possible, but in my opinion counting on any major new vehicle purchases is dreaming and just delays our taking a serious look at what we can realistically do with what we already have.

 

[FJAG]

Neither vehicle is well suited for sneak and peak, GWagon though having a smaller signature isn't ideal either with no survivability and not enough dismounts, and no weapons outside small arms.

"Sneak and peak" does not need dismounts. The Ferret had a crew of two and the Lynx a crew of three. They could do dismounted ops (ie conduct surveillance away from the vehicle but certainly not fight except to call in fire. I recall that recce squadrons at times had an assault troop which was akin to an infantry platoon to handle "dismounted" fighting. It was usually the first thing to be zero manned when PYs were short.

At this point I figure that a Brigade should be commanded by a Brigadier so that he can continue to outrank his CRA because with that array of assets in a Brigade the CRA needs to be a Colonel because his Regiment needs to be an III Regiment and not an II Regiment just to manage all the Batteries and Independent Troops required.

Just a point. The CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) was a position at the divisional level as in those days all close support regiments were a divisional asset put into direct support roles to brigades. At the brigade level the artillery commander is the commanding officer of the direct support regiment who is a lieutenant colonel. There is no need to inflate the rank of the brigade commander.

I'll get back to the other comments later - have a Zoom meeting to zoom off to.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Sadly I have to agree with you GR66, however I think people are going to be unpleasantly surprised at the lack of mobility of the LAV 6 in a real conflict.

 

[Kirkhill]

"Sneak and peak" does not need dismounts. The Ferret had a crew of two and the Lynx a crew of three. They could do dismounted ops (ie conduct surveillance away from the vehicle but certainly not fight except to call in fire. I recall that recce squadrons at times had an assault troop which was akin to an infantry platoon to handle "dismounted" fighting. It was usually the first thing to be zero manned when PYs were short.


Just a point. The CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) was a position at the divisional level as in those days all close support regiments were a divisional asset put into direct support roles to brigades. At the brigade level the artillery commander is the commanding officer of the direct support regiment who is a lieutenant colonel. There is no need to inflate the rank of the brigade commander.

I'll get back to the other comments later - have a Zoom meeting to zoom off to.

Zoom back.

Didn't know the exact etymology of CRA but figured that "a" Commander Royal Artillery could be "any" Commander Royal Artillery. Conveniently your Divisional Colonel CRA still fits with my thesis - which turns out to be an ancient one. An independent battlefield formation needs lots of independent support. And in the last century or two the consensus has been that the smallest operational formation has to be the Division.

4 CMBG - NATO's smallest Division, operating with one brigade.

 

[IKnowNothing]

To be honest, the question is somewhat irrelevant if there is no plan to purchase completely new families of armoured vehicles. With the current and future purchases on the table (CSCs, F-35s, North Warning System upgrades plus a slew of OMG things that we'll likely scramble to finish procuring - GBAD, ATGMs, etc.) I see absolutely ZERO chance that we will purchase CV-anythings, Stormers or anything else with tracks (other than the Arctic Mobility vehicles). I'm thinking we'll be lucky to upgrade all of our existing Leopards to a single standard.

I think any realistic plan should likely assume that we've got the armoured vehicle base that we have for the foreseeable future. New turrets or RWS upgrades or variants of the LAV may be possible, but in my opinion counting on any major new vehicle purchases is dreaming and just delays our taking a serious look at what we can realistically do with what we already have.

Granted, but given @FJAG 's post about the root of the present's problems being the past's lack of planning, wouldn't it be prudent to answer that type of question about the desired end state of the Corps to inform said serious look into present/ possible capabilities?

Let's take your thought process
re: What's the point of a Heavy armoured regiment without a heavy armoured brigade, and what's the point of either if they won't be deployed?

If the answer is "There really isn't one" and you marry that with the proposed thought process of common doctrine for the mounted fight, that spectrum, etc. and you come up with an end state of an RCAC that is tailored to Armoured Recce /fighting for information but with greater strategic and tactical mobility, shouldn't the plan reflect an effort to make that happen as best as we can with what we have in a coherent manner starting now, rather than a muddled holding pattern and a patchwork of capabilities constrained by the status quo?

I guess what I'm getting at is that if the end state has no tanks, could tank money be better spent on said turrets and RWS updates to get the present to look as much like that end state as possible rather than waiting for fleet replacement. If the end state is a relatively homogenous RCAC in Griffins, or CV9035's, let's have a relatively homogenous RCAC in upgunned LAV 6's, with all three regiments playing from the same book and equipped to fight in that role.

Yes I said end state too many times.

 

[KevinB]

Terminology Clarification Question: I was under the understanding that Canada has Armour, not Cavalry.

Cavalry AFAIK is an American term. Though with research there seems to be an argument that Cavalry refers to a type/style of armor employment.

Are the terms interchangeable or should we be using Armour in the RCAC context?

I know it seems pedantic but the terminology can be confusing.

I don’t see a Screening force effective without Dismounts - so Cavalry.
Armor/Armour shouldn’t been confusing Tankettes with tanks IMHO.
That happened with the Cougar and I think has caused potentially irreparable damage to the RCAC.

 

[GR66]

Terminology Clarification Question: I was under the understanding that Canada has Armour, not Cavalry.

Cavalry AFAIK is an American term. Though with research there seems to be an argument that Cavalry refers to a type/style of armor employment.

Are the terms interchangeable or should we be using Armour in the RCAC context?

I know it seems pedantic but the terminology can be confusing.

The discussion about "Cavalry" came from this response to your original post:

My experience being limited to sitting through some power points and some pre-study for whatever the newest version of Armoured Crew Commander becomes this summer, I can tell you this. At it's core, the new "Cavalry" model is using tactics that in the Canadian Army reserved for heavy armour (and accompanying infantry? Well outside my lane there) of speed, aggression, firepower and mobility and applying it to medium/light forces. TAPV and G Wagon for PRes, TAPV and LAV6 (I've been told anyways, again well outside my arcs) for the RegF. No more are the tactics of sneak and peak recce kicking out dismounts and a heavy reliance on OP's.

In order to do this, there is rumour (and nothing more to my knowledge) of adding heavier armament to the TAPV, which was said to be M2 .50's to the RWS variants and adding an AT capability to the slick tops, which are right now just about useless to the RCAC. Again, rumour only and definitively outside my arcs as a mere Corporal in a PRes unit.

I am far from an expert and stand to be corrected. My attendance has been poor during the initial stages of this transition due to my civilian employment.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don’t see a Screening force effective without Dismounts - so Cavalry.
Armor/Armour shouldn’t been confusing Tankettes with tanks IMHO.
That happened with the Cougar and I think has caused potentially irreparable damage to the RCAC.

Terminology thing again. Cavalry don't dismount. Cavalry have sabres and lances and stuff and never get off their horse.

If you want dismounts that move by horse you call the Light Horse, or the Mounted Infantry, or the Mounted Rifles, or the Dragoons.

 

[FJAG]

At this point I figure that a Brigade should be commanded by a Brigadier so that he can continue to outrank his CRA because with that array of assets in a Brigade the CRA needs to be a Colonel because his Regiment needs to be an III Regiment and not an II Regiment just to manage all the Batteries and Independent Troops required.

I don't want to take this too far of the recce topic of the thread, but CRA is exclusively a term for div arty commanders in the Commonwealth system while CCRA is the Corps Commander Royal Artillery. At brigade its simply a LCol CO.

Didn't know the exact etymology of CRA but figured that "a" Commander Royal Artillery could be "any" Commander Royal Artillery. Conveniently your Divisional Colonel CRA still fits with my thesis - which turns out to be an ancient one. An independent battlefield formation needs lots of independent support. And in the last century or two the consensus has been that the smallest operational formation has to be the Division.

The issue is the wide ranging nature of indirect fire means available to the supported arms and the layering of resources to make its full weight available across the entire AO in a flexible manner yet responding to a common command and control system. In effect, a direct support artillery regiment should not be viewed as an independent battlefield formation, it is part of a system of indirect effects deliver. Canada tends to forget that.

I think that your suggestions below creates too many independent silos which lose cohesion as they are fragmented.

Here's some thoughts.

All of that defensive work - turn that over to Reserve heavy infantry companies. They could even be Independent Companies attached to one of the three Regular regiments but outside the Battalion structure. They don't need to be part of a Battalion because they will be under control of the Service Bn CO, the CRA, the CRE, CRCAF, Bde HQ, on independent taskings.

It is much easier to take a battalion and assign it dispersed company taskings when needed than to try to group independent companies to act as a unit when needed. That runs the gamut from a C&C to a logistics.

Turn all of the Met work, the UAV work, the Air Space Co-Ordination Work, even the GBAD work, over to the RCAF along with the Helicopters as part of their Expeditionary duties. Hire bodies that don't mind being muddy and sleeping under canvas.

That solves nothing except a change in uniform colour. ASCC used to be a pure TACP/FSCC function when we didn't have air defence. With AD it became an FSCC/TACP/ASCC function. ASCC work requires a solid grounding in army capabilities that use airspace which is something that develops in an individual with time and experience as much as course work. The current colocation of the two key operators (TACP and FSCC) with an ASCC cell is actually a good fit. The only unresolved issue is at what level ASC should take place. Our Afghan experience drifted it down to the battlegroup because of the nature of that deployment. IMHO that's too low and even there it should have been at brigade level. Div is a logical place too but with the proliferation of munitions that fly I'm starting to think brigade is the sweet spot.

Transfer the FOO/FAC parties to the Cavalry and the Infantry. Teach them how to request fires to the Arty's satisfaction.

Again, its time and experience added to training which develop capable fire support coordinators and FOO/JTACs. In our system we value the experience and background knowledge our FOO/JTACs bring to the job. To put it into common parlance, teaching people how to request fire is like teaching them to play Chopsticks on the piano; building a proper FOO/JTAC team is developing someone with time and experience to be able to write symphony and conduct an orchestra.

Let the Arty concentrate on STA work, Fire Support and Counter-Battery Fires and Fire Support Co-Ordination and equip them with SP Mortars, SP Guns and SP Missiles - Direct Fire (for taking out tanks, helicopters and UAVs) Indirect PGMs and LAMs and LRPFs

Add in loitering munitions and certain levels of UCAVs and you have my vote. Just do not dump it all into the close support regiment.

There is a good reason why we've developed GS regiments to take care of specialty task not the least of which is that not every manoeuvre brigade needs the specialty assets all the time. We do need to better define the separation of roles of the DS and GS regiments.

I'm wavering on mortars because while I still believe whole heartedly that mortars should remain a battalion commanders weapon, I've seen too much neglect of those mortars in the Canadian infantry. Maybe mortars should be a different MOS from rifleman so that they do not become easily interchangeable.

And that just leaves the RCAC and the RCIC to continue their grudge match as to who gets to lead raids.

Personally I would make the RCAC the ISR specialists using UAVs and conducting their jobs on foot or using what ever vehicle is most suitable to the terrain and environment. Maybe it is a tank. Maybe it is a snowmobile.

I think the RCAC is already Canada's ISR specialists. Your proposal seems to indicate whatever role there is for the tank, however, is confined to the ISR category. Do you still see a heavy armour role outside of ISR?

Like the Arty, the RCAC would find they have more technical specialties to fill than resources to fill them.

This to me is the crux of the matter for both the RCAC and the RCA. There are simply too few PYs to do everything necessary. Three regiments of each is less than 1,500 to 1,800 folks.

What is absolutely essential to each of those two corps is a complete reassessment of how best to leverage the number of ResF positions that are available to do the less frequently needed tasks. The RegF PYs need to be reallocated to:

a) a core group responsible for developing and maintaining competence of all capabilities on a full-time basis;

b) a group in sufficient numbers to train for and deploy on rapid response missions and programmed long term deployments; and

c) a group to provide the leadership, training and logistics support to the ResF which will be equipped and manned for a worst case scenario force.

The nail that you are hitting on the head is that there simply aren't enough PYs in those two branches to properly deal with the varying specialties that each of them should be proficient in. Neither, however, needs to man all capabilities on a full-time basis. The equipment is needed - yes; but as for manning - much of it could and, economically, should be by way of a reserve force.

Off to my model railroad.

 

[FJAG]

Terminology thing again. Cavalry don't dismount. Cavalry have sabres and lances and stuff and never get off their horse.

If you want dismounts that move by horse you call the Light Horse, or the Mounted Infantry, or the Mounted Rifles, or the Dragoons.

As early as the 1870s that is what cavalry was becoming (regardless of the fanciful names that many units retained).

The US cavalry were by the time of Custer's last stand all issued with carbines and he famously left all the sabres in the baggage wagons. The skirmish line had become the standard tactic. There was archeological evidence of the deployment and disintegration of multiple company-level skirmish lines on the Little Big Horn battlefield.

Sure there were still a few lancers and uhlans kicking around as late as WW2 but those were anachronisms. Horse-mounted cavalry's main aim in the first half of the 20th century was rapid movement and deployment and not a lance and sabre charge of positions a la Balaclava.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

We dismounted lots in two man crews. Things like blind corners, bridge classifications. It's nice to have a GIB, but it's not necessary. I had a 30 ft drop cord that let me move awaynfrom the callsign and still be hooked to the radio.Terminology just confuses. We do armoured reconnaissance, not cavalry. I think we should leave that term until it officially appears in our doctrine. In 1970, the Hussars in Pet practiced sneak and peek recce in Ferrets (A Sqn). B Sqn practiced a Light Armour role consisting of Troops running two carriers(as tanks) and five Lynx, doing basically, fighting for info. Every crewman in a recce troop should be capable of calling fire missions. In practice, we normally played dedicated Golf assets to the recce troops. Armoured recce weapons of the trade are binos, radios and The Guns. We look at vehicle weapons as something you need to fire when you fuck up. Most crewman are trained in more than one family of fighting vehicles, weapons and doctrines. Many switch between LAV Sqns and tanks squadrons with ease.

 

[GR66]

This to me is the crux of the matter for both the RCAC and the RCA. There are simply too few PYs to do everything necessary. Three regiments of each is less than 1,500 to 1,800 folks.

What is absolutely essential to each of those two corps is a complete reassessment of how best to leverage the number of ResF positions that are available to do the less frequently needed tasks. The RegF PYs need to be reallocated to:

Is it the case that we have too few tanks and guns for the number of infantry we have, or too many infantry for the tanks and guns we have?

Again to me it comes down to the lack of a coherent strategy for the design and use of the Army. Each Corps is living in its own silo and adjusting its role based on the PYs and equipment it has in hand without someone up above coordinating the whole to determine how much of each we need to achieve the effects we want.

 

[KevinB]

We dismounted lots in two man crews. Things like blind corners, bridge classifications. It's nice to have a GIB, but it's not necessary. I had a 30 ft drop cord that let me move awaynfrom the callsign and still be hooked to the radio.Terminology just confuses. We do armoured reconnaissance, not cavalry. I think we should leave that term until it officially appears in our doctrine. In 1970, the Hussars in Pet practiced sneak and peek recce in Ferrets (A Sqn). B Sqn practiced a Light Armour role consisting of Troops running two carriers(as tanks) and five Lynx, doing basically, fighting for info. Every crewman in a recce troop should be capable of calling fire missions. In practice, we normally played dedicated Golf assets to the recce troops. Armoured recce weapons of the trade are binos, radios and The Guns. We look at vehicle weapons as something you need to fire when you fuck up.

Which I think cements the point that LAV-Recce isn’t…

Is it the case that we have too few tanks and guns for the number of infantry we have, or too many infantry for the tanks and guns we have?

Again to me it comes down to the lack of a coherent strategy for the design and use of the Army. Each Corps is living in its own silo and adjusting its role based on the PYs and equipment it has in hand without someone up above coordinating the whole to determine how much of each we need to achieve the effects we want.

Too many HQ’s for not enough troops.

A CMBG as it currently sits is what ~ 7,634 all ranks.

But doesn’t have enough tanks for all three
I won’t rehash the other missing enablers that most Armies have as well.

Canada could field three of those at best, and would still be light on service support etc.

But is trying to field 4 Bde plus a lot of other HQ’s.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't want to take this too far of the recce topic of the thread, but CRA is exclusively a term for div arty commanders in the Commonwealth system while CCRA is the Corps Commander Royal Artillery. At brigade its simply a LCol CO.

The issue is the wide ranging nature of indirect fire means available to the supported arms and the layering of resources to make its full weight available across the entire AO in a flexible manner yet responding to a common command and control system.

I think that your suggestions below creates too many independent silos which lose cohesion as they are fragmented.

It is much easier to take a battalion and assign it dispersed company taskings when needed than to try to group independent companies to act as a unit when needed. That runs the gamut from a C&C to a logistics.

I counter and say "Not a problem". Elevate the Infantry Regiment from a collection of independent Battalions with the same capbadge to a functional Regiment with 3 battalions (with companies) AND a group of independent companies that can be atted and detted as required.

That solves nothing except a change in uniform colour. ASCC used to be a pure TACP/FSCC function when we didn't have air defence. With AD it became an FSCC/TACP/ASCC function. ASCC work requires a solid grounding in army capabilities that use airspace which is something that develops in an individual with time and experience as much as course work. The current colocation of the two key operators (TACP and FSCC) with an ASCC cell is actually a good fit. The only unresolved issue is at what level ASC should take place. Our Afghan experience drifted it down to the battlegroup because of the nature of that deployment. IMHO that's too low and even there it should have been at brigade level. Div is a logical place too but with the proliferation of munitions that fly I'm starting to think brigade is the sweet spot.

Fine. Except that there appears to lots of work for the Arty with or without new bodies added. If you can get the additional bodies then great. On the other hand I would like to see more blue-suiters integrated with the troops on the ground. For exactly the same reason that FOOs were attached to Battalions from Batteries. The FOOs were mates of the gunners on the gun line. The PBI were strangers. Both the FOOs and the Gunners suddenly had a stake in the future of the PBI.

Again, its time and experience added to training which develop capable fire support coordinators and FOO/JTACs. In our system we value the experience and background knowledge our FOO/JTACs bring to the job. To put it into common parlance, teaching people how to request fire is like teaching them to play Chopsticks on the piano; building a proper FOO/JTAC team is developing someone with time and experience to be able to write symphony and conduct an orchestra.

I understand the value of mastering a trade. Do we have an army where we can afford a bunch of PhDs in their field or should be build on from handymen that are Jacks of all trades even though they may be masters of none? How much OJT do you reckon the average Ukrainian is getting just now?

Add in loitering munitions and certain levels of UCAVs and you have my vote. Just do not dump it all into the close support regiment.

Nice to know we occasionally agree.

There is a good reason why we've developed GS regiments to take care of specialty task not the least of which is that not every manoeuvre brigade needs the specialty assets all the time. We do need to better define the separation of roles of the DS and GS regiments.

I'm wavering on mortars because while I still believe whole heartedly that mortars should remain a battalion commanders weapon, I've seen too much neglect of those mortars in the Canadian infantry. Maybe mortars should be a different MOS from rifleman so that they do not become easily interchangeable.

I'm not bothered about how the pie gets sliced. I am bothered about the amount of time wasted in deciding how the pie gets sliced. I don't care what cap-badge, what colour hat or uniform does the job, or the rank or the organization. I started this out by pointing out how many different tasks there are under consideration in our discussions and on the modern battlefield.

I argue that all are necessary. There are no positions that can be sloughed off to higher, or to allies.

We need to be able to do all the job to operate a Brigade Group - By definition a Brigade Group is a Brigade Plus. The Plus, the atts come from Higher therefore we need a Higher (a Division) from which to attach them.

Thus our base organization has to be the Division, not the Brigade and we need the Divisional Support elements (like a CRA) even if it means trimming the Division to a two Brigade structure with only two Infantry battalions each. And only one Brigade deployed at a time.

Or perhaps 3x Two Battalion Brigades and 1x a Light Brigade, all minus Support but with all support centered on the Division.

I think the RCAC is already Canada's ISR specialists. Your proposal seems to indicate whatever role there is for the tank, however, is confined to the ISR category. Do you still see a heavy armour role outside of ISR?

Actually I would prefer to see the Tank Regiment retained as a Divisional Asset while the Field Brigades focused on the light armour/cavalry/ISR role.

This to me is the crux of the matter for both the RCAC and the RCA. There are simply too few PYs to do everything necessary. Three regiments of each is less than 1,500 to 1,800 folks.

What is absolutely essential to each of those two corps is a complete reassessment of how best to leverage the number of ResF positions that are available to do the less frequently needed tasks. The RegF PYs need to be reallocated to:

a) a core group responsible for developing and maintaining competence of all capabilities on a full-time basis;

b) a group in sufficient numbers to train for and deploy on rapid response missions and programmed long term deployments; and

c) a group to provide the leadership, training and logistics support to the ResF which will be equipped and manned for a worst case scenario force.

The nail that you are hitting on the head is that there simply aren't enough PYs in those two branches to properly deal with the varying specialties that each of them should be proficient in. Neither, however, needs to man all capabilities on a full-time basis. The equipment is needed - yes; but as for manning - much of it could and, economically, should be by way of a reserve force.

Agreed, agreed and agreed. The only quibble I would make is that Regiments are not Battalions despite the extraordinary lengths the CA seems to go to in order to make it so.

Just because an Infantry Battalion has five Majors doesn't mean an RCAC or RRCA regiment should be limited to 5 Majors. The RCIC Regiment has something closer to 20 to 24 Majors under a Colonel with 3 Lt Cols. Why can't an RCAC or RRCA regiment have more Majors and a couple of Lt Cols. And Squadrons and Batteries are not Companies. Do they have to have similar numbers and organizations? Why not a 7 Troop Squadron if 3 Troops are going to be detached in direct support?

We both agree on the under-utilization of the part-time soldier howsumever she is called. Keep the tasks for which they train simple and straight forward and leave the co-ordinating activities and the high-speed low-drag stuff to the Regs.

Off to my model railroad.

Jealous I am. OO or HO?

 

[Kirkhill]

As early as the 1870s that is what cavalry was becoming (regardless of the fanciful names that many units retained).

The US cavalry were by the time of Custer's last stand all issued with carbines and he famously left all the sabres in the baggage wagons. The skirmish line had become the standard tactic. There was archeological evidence of the deployment and disintegration of multiple company-level skirmish lines on the Little Big Horn battlefield.

Sure there were still a few lancers and uhlans kicking around as late as WW2 but those were anachronisms. Horse-mounted cavalry's main aim in the first half of the 20th century was rapid movement and deployment and not a lance and sabre charge of positions a la Balaclava.

The reason I included the Light Horsemen as a reference was because there was a scene just before the sun-up, where force commander decided that the Light Horse were going to lead the charge. A very British cavalry commander objected on the grounds that if there was any charging to be done then the Cavalry does it. He lost the argument.

The point is, in my opinion, amid the buttons and bows and cap badge debates that play out here what gets lost is that it doesn't matter a damn who does the effin' job as long as somebody effin' does it and it gets done.

 

[Kirkhill]

Which I think cements the point that LAV-Recce isn’t…




Too many HQ’s for not enough troops.

A CMBG as it currently sits is what ~ 7,634 all ranks.

But doesn’t have enough tanks for all three
I won’t rehash the other missing enablers that most Armies have as well.

Canada could field three of those at best, and would still be light on service support etc.

But is trying to field 4 Bde plus a lot of other HQ’s.

So fine.

Figure out how to make those 7,634 people useful on the field with the kit they have and forget all the notions about what a Company or a Regiment is supposed to look like.

Take one Brigade. Give it to a Brigadier. And have everybody fall in and toss their head dress.

Then start the re-org.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Terminology thing again. Cavalry don't dismount. Cavalry have sabres and lances and stuff and never get off their horse.

If you want dismounts that move by horse you call the Light Horse, or the Mounted Infantry, or the Mounted Rifles, or the Dragoons.

Just one.question why the hell isn't their a movie about Strachan winning his V.C. Or Flowerdew's charge ?