C3 Howitzer Replacement

[Petard]

Ref blast and overpressure effects on towed gun dets: Canada only began testing for this with the M777 last year

Yet another thing I looked after in DLR was artillery ancillary eqpt, including PPE. I had tried to get testing done back in the 2010's, but it kept getting delayed due to resource limitations. So the max daily (rds) exposure limits given in Range Training Safety, based on the M109, remained the sole ref for 155mm fire for years after the M777 came into use and the M109 was long gone

To any Gnr that operated on the M777 fighting VAC over hearing loss, PM me, I'd be glad to help

 

[Maxman1]

If rocket artillery made a comeback, that would presumably mean standing up 1 SSM again. So we could also stand up a reserve battery as 2 SSM.

 

[MilEME09]

If rocket artillery made a comeback, that would presumably mean standing up 1 SSM again. So we could also stand up a reserve battery as 2 SSM.

plenty of options for PRes arty, many batteries near reg force bases, Edmonton, Calgary (soon to be), Lethbridge, Saint John, Brandon, and thats before we touch the sup ORBAT. That said any new capability to the Ares will need a comprehensive plan to roll out, train and maintain that capability, and commitment from Army HQ to make it happen and not just see it as an after thought.

 

[FJAG]

While the options for ranges is good, in all probably a system like this would be deployed with 4 GS Regt (RCA) in Gagetown.

That raises an issue that @Petard and I raised with a recent GOFO DArty interview about the Army Reserve Establishment concept from the 2010s and the fact that PRes personnel were never allocated to the MRR as was originally discussed with the project. Further initiatives to have ARes units trained in STA with light counter mortar radars and acoustic weapon sensors. That initiative failed as the limited amount of equipment made it difficult to issue to reserve units and, quite frankly, for folks coming off howitzers it wasn't interesting enough.

The learned lesson here is that the allocated ARes troops must either have the equipment or be close enough to it to use it routinely and that there must be a training program to keep it interesting. The Brits have an ARes regiment that has been tasked with the MLRS for many years - so it is doable. I'd say that ARes arty units in the Maritimes are the only ones that should be considered for this.

Moreover there are several US ARNG arty units with HIMARS parked at their local armouries in Smallville USA that can easily do a road move to their ARNG state training centre. I presume Canada won't get that adventurous because - risk management.

 

[markppcli]

While the options for ranges is good, in all probably a system like this would be deployed with 4 GS Regt (RCA) in Gagetown.

That raises an issue that @Petard and I raised with a recent GOFO DArty interview about the Army Reserve Establishment concept from the 2010s and the fact that PRes personnel were never allocated to the MRR as was originally discussed with the project. Further initiatives to have ARes units trained in STA with light counter mortar radars and acoustic weapon sensors. That initiative failed as the limited amount of equipment made it difficult to issue to reserve units and, quite frankly, for folks coming off howitzers it wasn't interesting enough.

The learned lesson here is that the allocated ARes troops must either have the equipment or be close enough to it to use it routinely and that there must be a training program to keep it interesting. The Brits have an ARes regiment that has been tasked with the MLRS for many years - so it is doable. I'd say that ARes arty units in the Maritimes are the only ones that should be considered for this.

Moreover there are several US ARNG arty units with HIMARS parked at their local armouries in Smallville USA that can easily do a road move to their ARNG state training centre. I presume Canada won't get that adventurous because - risk management.

How many people do we expect to be house in 4 GS with two VSHORAD batteries, the ASCC, Radars, and now LRPF?

 

[GR66]

How many people do we expect to be house in 4 GS with two VSHORAD batteries, the ASCC, Radars, and now LRPF?

Does it even make sense for VSHORAD and LRPF to be in the same unit? After all, VSHOR = Very Short Range and LR = Long Range.

 

[markppcli]

Does it even make sense for VSHORAD and LRPF to be in the same unit? After all, VSHOR = Very Short Range and LR = Long Range.

Sort of what I’m getting at. Are they just becoming a hold all unit because we are, institutionally, reluctant to actually adjust our structure to absorb incoming capabilities?

 

[FJAG]

How many people do we expect to be house in 4 GS with two VSHORAD batteries, the ASCC, Radars, and now LRPF?

The last Canadian Gunner listed 375 members which I think is about 80 under establishment. There are additional PYs associated with the GBAD project and I don't know about LRPR will add any. As it is its smaller than the CS regiments which, you might recall, are greatly understaffed and underequipped with just 2 X 4 gun batteries.

Does it even make sense for VSHORAD and LRPF to be in the same unit? After all, VSHOR = Very Short Range and LR = Long Range.

Actually not that much, but it doesn't make sense to put them in a CS regiment either and no one is about to form an additional regiment for two batteries of the AD folks. I'll wait to see what the project eventually buys before making any comments about how adequate the manpower allocation is.

4 GS was a bit of brilliant staff work meant to keep gunner PYs from being robbed after ADATS was shut down and while LRPRs and MRR were slowly moving through acquisition. ASCC and SUAS added to that. Then LRPR moved down in the priority list. Remember too that 4 GS provides the FSCC for 1 Cdn Div. It's the all singing and all dancing Swiss Army Knife of the Artillery.

The ASCC has a big role with air defence and I can see those teams being integrated into the AD batteries albeit they will still perform the same functions at bde level.

MRR is an interesting issue. While its title is Medium Range Radar its nickname is "Multi-Role Radar" because it can perform both air defence and weapon locating functions, albeit it's a poor idea to have one radar perform both functions simultaneously. I could see some radars integrated with AD and others with the LRPR as its STA component.

That leaves SUAS. It's basically an STA asset albeit I'm not sure that I see how far it can penetrate into a hostile AD environment to seek out deep targets.

At the end of the day, under the scope of our current operating concepts, I do not see 4 GS deploying as a regiment per se. I see perhaps a composite AD battery attached to the brigade in Latvia together with an ASCC and several MRRs. In addition I would also see a troop of LRPR with a radar and perhaps a troop of SUAS. The brigades arty CS arty regt would be the coordinating headquarters. Effectively that's the way we used to handle CS guns and bde AD in the 80s. I would see the LRPR with bde and CS regt because of the unique organization over there even though that's not doctrinal.

 

[GR66]

The last Canadian Gunner listed 375 members which I think is about 80 under establishment. There are additional PYs associated with the GBAD project and I don't know about LRPR will add any. As it is its smaller than the CS regiments which, you might recall, are greatly understaffed and underequipped with just 2 X 4 gun batteries.


Actually not that much, but it doesn't make sense to put them in a CS regiment either and no one is about to form an additional regiment for two batteries of the AD folks. I'll wait to see what the project eventually buys before making any comments about how adequate the manpower allocation is.

These really are the two very sad parts of your post. 4 GS already understaffed and adding more tasks. The CS Regiments seriously understaffed and under-equipped.

And the highlighted portion is possibly the saddest part of all. "Two batteries of AD folks". With everything we're seeing in Ukraine in terms of aerial threats, Canada's response is two AD batteries. Realistically we should probably have an AD Brigade in order to provide and sustain an AD Regiment in support of our Latvia Brigade.

 

[markppcli]

These really are the two very sad parts of your post. 4 GS already understaffed and adding more tasks. The CS Regiments seriously understaffed and under-equipped.

And the highlighted portion is possibly the saddest part of all. "Two batteries of AD folks". With everything we're seeing in Ukraine in terms of aerial threats, Canada's response is two AD batteries. Realistically we should probably have an AD Brigade in order to provide and sustain an AD Regiment in support of our Latvia Brigade.

AD Regiment per Bde would be pretty excessive.

The last Canadian Gunner listed 375 members which I think is about 80 under establishment. There are additional PYs associated with the GBAD project and I don't know about LRPR will add any. As it is its smaller than the CS regiments which, you might recall, are greatly understaffed and underequipped with just 2 X 4 gun batteries.

Which is all accounted for in current task lines.

Actually not that much, but it doesn't make sense to put them in a CS regiment either and no one is about to form an additional regiment for two batteries of the AD folks. I'll wait to see what the project eventually buys before making any comments about how adequate the manpower allocation is.

It makes even less sense to group SUAS, Air Defence, and LRPF.

4 GS was a bit of brilliant staff work meant to keep gunner PYs from being robbed after ADATS was shut down and while LRPRs and MRR were slowly moving through acquisition. ASCC and SUAS added to that. Then LRPR moved down in the priority list. Remember too that 4 GS provides the FSCC for 1 Cdn Div. It's the all singing and all dancing Swiss Army Knife of the Artillery.

The ASCC has a big role with air defence and I can see those teams being integrated into the AD batteries albeit they will still perform the same functions at bde level.

MRR is an interesting issue. While its title is Medium Range Radar its nickname is "Multi-Role Radar" because it can perform both air defence and weapon locating functions, albeit it's a poor idea to have one radar perform both functions simultaneously. I could see some radars integrated with AD and others with the LRPR as its STA component.

That leaves SUAS. It's basically an STA asset albeit I'm not sure that I see how far it can penetrate into a hostile AD environment to seek out deep targets.

At the end of the day, under the scope of our current operating concepts, I do not see 4 GS deploying as a regiment per se. I see perhaps a composite AD battery attached to the brigade in Latvia together with an ASCC and several MRRs. In addition I would also see a troop of LRPR with a radar and perhaps a troop of SUAS. The brigades arty CS arty regt would be the coordinating headquarters. Effectively that's the way we used to handle CS guns and bde AD in the 80s. I would see the LRPR with bde and CS regt because of the unique organization over there even though that's not doctrinal.

I think my issue is that 4 GS is going to rapidly have to account for 2 AD batteries, it’s ASCC, an FSCC for 1 Can Div (for some reason), the SUAS capability, and then some in known number of MLRS. That’s frankly a massive span of control bith in terms of differing capabilities and simply numbers of elements. My worst fear is that “we’ll use reservists” will be enabled which isn’t going to result in an efficient plan of integration but rather means they’ll simply not add PYs.

 

[GR66]

AD Regiment per Bde would be pretty excessive.

Is it really though in light of the airborne threats? One battery to maneuver with the battalions, one battery to cover Camp Adazi and one battery to cover whatever airfield we're using as a logistics hub.

Even f you instead assume that everything other than the battery operating in direct support of the Brigade is provided by the multi-national Division then you'd need a full regiment to sustain that battery in combat just like you'll need a full infantry regiment to sustain a single battalion during a conflict.

Assume a 2nd AD Regiment to support an additional Brigade deployment and one more for either homeland defence or for a mobilization Brigade (rounding out our total deployment to a single Division) then a full AD Brigade is likely what we would need.

 

[markppcli]

Is it really though in light of the airborne threats? One battery to maneuver with the battalions, one battery to cover Camp Adazi and one battery to cover whatever airfield we're using as a logistics hub.

Which air borne threats? That’s an important Destin goon.

Even f you instead assume that everything other than the battery operating in direct support of the Brigade is provided by the multi-national Division then you'd need a full regiment to sustain that battery in combat just like you'll need a full infantry regiment to sustain a single battalion during a conflict.

Batteries are generally very self sufficient, and include their own rearming assets. Further support would be via the Bde Svc Bn. Our Regiments don’t sustain our Bns.

Assume a 2nd AD Regiment to support an additional Brigade deployment and one more for either homeland defence or for a mobilization Brigade (rounding out our total deployment to a single Division) then a full AD Brigade is likely what we would need.

Again not really because of the scope of air defence ranges. As an example the open source range for a ZSU 23-4is 8km (I’d pick a western one by just by virtue of what I do I’m more familiar with Russian AD threats). How many n a battery you ask - 6. If we go outside of gun to missile those ranges increase dramatically. This is of course a silly line of reasoning because we are now comparing apples and oranges - CUA and AD are linked by different. A swath of EW, and lower level tools will proliferate for the UAS, which as we see reported over and over again is primarily a threat of observation vs strikes.

Our AD assets are going to be aiming at fixed a rotary wing threats, as well as CRAM. With CUAS being held by the artillery regiments in the STA Bty as a seperate capability

 

[FJAG]

AD Regiment per Bde would be pretty excessive.

By our organization - yes. We used to have a battery per brigade. 4 AD Regt had two batteries in Lahr but the aim was to support 1 Cdn Div which had two bdes - 4 and 5. The US Army has one AD bn per div but there is both higher coverage and there were Stinger Manpads. BUT. The Russians have two AD bns per bde (not to mention 4 arty regts)

In short, I'm not so sure that a 2 bty - or even 3 bty - AD bn per bde is too much in light of our level of dispersion, rear areas that need cover and the proliferation of things that fly these days.

Which is all accounted for in current task lines.

Poorly, I think. A lot of folks have deluded themselves into accepting that a battery is four guns and that a bde can get by with 2 gun batteries. That all worked when regiments merely formed the force generation base for single composite battery deployments. The bde in Latvia will change the paradigm. While we may not have to actually deploy three Canadian batteries at a time, we will have to command a regt/bn of three six-gun subunits (I expect) and at least one air defence battery.

I'll say that with one reservation - Canada is not well known for deploying doctrinal forces. We tend to ad hoc things based on government imposed manpower limitations.

It makes even less sense to group SUAS, Air Defence, and LRPF.

What's your solution then. To have free-ranging batteries scattered around the country?

I think my issue is that 4 GS is going to rapidly have to account for 2 AD batteries, it’s ASCC, an FSCC for 1 Can Div (for some reason), the SUAS capability, and then some in known number of MLRS. That’s frankly a massive span of control bith in terms of differing capabilities and simply numbers of elements. My worst fear is that “we’ll use reservists” will be enabled which isn’t going to result in an efficient plan of integration but rather means they’ll simply not add PYs.

ASCCs aren't large - its about a half dozen folks each and they get nested into the bde HQ. The FSCC is probably no more than a dozen folks if fully deployed and its nested in the Div HQ (and I agree - we probably won't see that happen other than on CAXs.

We only have two Blackjack systems with 10 aircraft (assuming they are all still operational) and the troops are small. Ditto for radars. The CS Regt COs FSCC will control those as well as the guns, AD and rockets. The span of control is actually not hard. This is what gunners used to do for a living before Afghanistan made everything all about the battery. What's happening here is we're getting back to basics. Believe me, the tactical employment of all this is far simpler than the career progression for gunner officers and NCMs is going to be.

The one tactical area that is difficult is CSS and particulalry the technicians. There are many disparate and delicate systems that are spread over hell's half acre in a bde setting that need care and feeding. That's going to take some work under our current logistics models.

ARes shouldn't be an issue if done right. When we were into AD in a big way, almost half the gunners were reservists concentrating on the Javelin while the RegF concentrated on the ADATS, Oerlikons and C&C. I honestly can't think of anything easier to run with reservists than a HIMARS battery. Add some RegF maintainers and a half dozen RSS and Bob's your uncle. That said I doubt if that will happen as the RegF has a penchant for grabbing hold of shiny new toys with a quick declaration of "readiness."

 

[markppcli]

By our organization - yes. We used to have a battery per brigade. 4 AD Regt had two batteries in Lahr but the aim was to support 1 Cdn Div which had two bdes - 4 and 5. The US Army has one AD bn per div but there is both higher coverage and there were Stinger Manpads. BUT. The Russians have two AD bns per bde (not to mention 4 arty regts)

In short, I'm not so sure that a 2 bty - or even 3 bty - AD bn per bde is too much in light of our level of dispersion, rear areas that need cover and the proliferation of things that fly these days.

I’m just using our doctrine as my basis. We don’t have theatre level AD, even with our GBAd purchase, so accounting for our rear areas isn’t feasible.

Poorly, I think. A lot of folks have deluded themselves into accepting that a battery is four guns and that a bde can get by with 2 gun batteries. That all worked when regiments merely formed the force generation base for single composite battery deployments. The bde in Latvia will change the paradigm. While we may not have to actually deploy three Canadian batteries at a time, we will have to command a regt/bn of three six-gun subunits (I expect) and at least one air defence battery.

Agreed and this is the gist of my issue - the current structure barely accounts for what we are operating now.

I'll say that with one reservation - Canada is not well known for deploying doctrinal forces. We tend to ad hoc things based on government imposed manpower limitations.

What's your solution then. To have free-ranging batteries scattered around the country?

No, I never said that. I think with what I wrote you could reasonably infer my solution - adjust our structure to increase the number of artillery regiments. LRPF / Rockets ought to be under their own regiment, so the their own support, and controlled by division per our doctrine. Now if we had a structure with a division that actually controlled troops that would be easier, but I’d accept a 3 RCHA in 6 CSSB.

ASCCs aren't large - its about a half dozen folks each and they get nested into the bde HQ. The FSCC is probably no more than a dozen folks if fully deployed and its nested in the Div HQ (and I agree - we probably won't see that happen other than on CAXs.

18 across the Bdes, 12 to Div so around 30 ie a large troops.

We only have two Blackjack systems with 10 aircraft (assuming they are all still operational) and the troops are small. Ditto for radars. The CS Regt COs FSCC will control those as well as the guns, AD and rockets. The span of control is actually not hard. This is what gunners used to do for a living before Afghanistan made everything all about the battery. What's happening here is we're getting back to basics. Believe me, the tactical employment of all this is far simpler than the career progression for gunner officers and NCMs is going to be.

10 Dets of 5-6 makes up a battery on its own.

The one tactical area that is difficult is CSS and particulalry the technicians. There are many disparate and delicate systems that are spread over hell's half acre in a bde setting that need care and feeding. That's going to take some work under our current logistics models.

ARes shouldn't be an issue if done right. When we were into AD in a big way, almost half the gunners were reservists concentrating on the Javelin while the RegF concentrated on the ADATS, Oerlikons and C&C. I honestly can't think of anything easier to run with reservists than a HIMARS battery. Add some RegF maintainers and a half dozen RSS and Bob's your uncle. That said I doubt if that will happen as the RegF has a penchant for grabbing hold of shiny new toys with a quick declaration of "readiness."

Shouldn’t but is in our current reality. If you know where I can find “some Reg For e maintainers” that aren’t being worked to the bone I’d love to know, I need to get some LAVs fixed.

 

[GR66]

Batteries are generally very self sufficient, and include their own rearming assets. Further support would be via the Bde Svc Bn. Our Regiments don’t sustain our Bns.

You misunderstand what I mean by the Regiment sustaining a deployed Battery. I don't mean providing logistical support, I mean being able to maintain through reinforcement of troops and equipment of a battery in high intensity conflict.

According to Oryx Blog, to date the Russians have lost the following AD assets:

Anti-Aircraft Guns (52, of which destroyed: 33, damaged: 1, captured: 18)​

Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns (25, of which destroyed: 14, damaged: 2, abandoned: 2, captured: 7)​

Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (260, of which destroyed: 187, damaged: 45, abandoned: 4, captured: 24)​

Radars (76, of which destroyed: 46, damaged: 20, captured: 10)​

Jammers And Deception Systems (83, of which destroyed: 62, damaged: 12, captured: 9)​

If our Brigade in Latvia is engaged in a full-scale conflict then we will inevitably take combat losses. We should have at least three full AD batteries (i.e. a Regiment) minimum in order to sustain a combat effective full battery in the field.

If our ORBAT is calling for a total of TWO AD Batteries than we're already falling short of our reasonable ability to sustain AD coverage for a deployed (and engaged) Brigade in Latvia.

This of course assumes that Latvia would be our only requirement for AD. What if at the eve of conflict an opponent were to launch a coordinated drone attack against Trenton to cripple our airlift capability? Or against our MPA squadrons in order to cripple our ability to defend resupply convoys from North America to Europe/Asia against enemy submarine operations?

My point is that we are not taking AD seriously by only planning for two batteries.

 

[markppcli]

You misunderstand what I mean by the Regiment sustaining a deployed Battery. I don't mean providing logistical support, I mean being able to maintain through reinforcement of troops and equipment of a battery in high intensity conflict.

According to Oryx Blog, to date the Russians have lost the following AD assets:

Anti-Aircraft Guns (52, of which destroyed: 33, damaged: 1, captured: 18)​

Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns (25, of which destroyed: 14, damaged: 2, abandoned: 2, captured: 7)​

Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (260, of which destroyed: 187, damaged: 45, abandoned: 4, captured: 24)​

Radars (76, of which destroyed: 46, damaged: 20, captured: 10)​

Jammers And Deception Systems (83, of which destroyed: 62, damaged: 12, captured: 9)​

If our Brigade in Latvia is engaged in a full-scale conflict then we will inevitably take combat losses. We should have at least three full AD batteries (i.e. a Regiment) minimum in order to sustain a combat effective full battery in the field.

I don’t disagree with that but that’s. It how we are structured at all. Our regiments don’t exist to replace casualties in the field.

If our ORBAT is calling for a total of TWO AD Batteries than we're already falling short of our reasonable ability to sustain AD coverage for a deployed (and engaged) Brigade in Latvia.

See my below comment.

This of course assumes that Latvia would be our only requirement for AD. What if at the eve of conflict an opponent were to launch a coordinated drone attack against Trenton to cripple our airlift capability? Or against our MPA squadrons in order to cripple our ability to defend resupply convoys from North America to Europe/Asia against enemy submarine operations?

If they managed to some one fly a drone squadron into central Ontario, undetect by our radar, and not get engaged by our ready air craft by the time they got them I am going to be deeply impressed. If they engage our MPA squadrons in the coast they’ve defeated our Navy’s AD, as well as NORAD so we’ve already been catastrophically defeated. Our “homeland AD” is the responsibility of the actual guarantors of our sovereignty: NORAD, the RCN, and RCAF.

My point is that we are not taking AD seriously by only planning for two batteries.

Battery per Bde is about the norm, so two batteries should be able to provide a deployed and a sustaining or training Bde.

We’re and how do you see us forming a AD Bde?

 

[FJAG]

No, I never said that. I think with what I wrote you could reasonably infer my solution - adjust our structure to increase the number of artillery regiments. LRPF / Rockets ought to be under their own regiment, so the their own support, and controlled by division per our doctrine. Now if we had a structure with a division that actually controlled troops that would be easier, but I’d accept a 3 RCHA in 6 CSSB.

You're preaching to the choir here. I'm of the view we could easily manage to build around eight artillery regiments and the RCAS based on the authorized artillery manpower (Reg and Res). We are obviously limited in that with the equipment that we have which essentially permits the building of one full regiment and some small training elements.

The army has what is, IMHO, a bastardized system which, even before SSE, was funded and designed to support the expeditionary deployment of one large battle group led by a bde headquarters sustained indefinitely and a second, much smaller battlegroup for a short period of time. That leads to oh so many compromises some of which have been addressed by institutional ad hocery.

Before Advancing with Purpose, the concept of STA was dead in Canada. But we did have three fleshed out and equipped gun regiments and one air defence one. Rust out without replacement killed the in the 00s. Lack of an enemy with aircraft slowly killed AD. Building an STA capability and adjusting the FOO/FSCC upward killed off gun batteries and the number of guns. I could go on, but you get the point. The last two decades have been a struggle to adjust to the "reality" of funding and the type of conflicts our government was prepared to accept we may be tasked with. Never mind the platitudes that we were a force capable of engaging with a peer. I guess it matters what you actually consider a peer.

I'd love to see 3 RCHA come back (albeit, I'd much prefer it if 1 Fd in Halifax, 3 Fd in St Johns and 84 Ind Fd Bty in Yarmouth were combined into one unit together with about a hundred and fifty PYs in Gagetown and they and 4 GS become the 1st Fd Regt (GS) and 4 AD Regt respectively. Between them they would have enough RegF pers and ResF augmentees to meet the peacetime commitments to Latvia (which I guess would not exceed a full-time troop of LRPR and a full-time battery (-) of AD and yet be capable of mobilizing to the doctrinal support of a deployed division (depending on how many LRPRs and AD systems we actually end up buying)

Canada has the authorized manpower strength (Reg and Res) to properly man two divisions which, in my perfect world, would allow for the expeditionary deployment of one div in the event of a major conflict while the second offers the sustainment capability needed. That is all dependent on acquiring sufficient equipment of all types doctrinally required and a modified system of both Reg and Res service to facilitate it. However, we are not planning for that. Instead we plan for a smaller role where maybe 10% of the army (maybe 3,000 troops) are deployed at any given moment and our equipment holdings are aimed towards supporting that. Further our structure on those deployments is so unique in each case that doctrine is merely a rough guideline.

 

[GR66]

I don’t disagree with that but that’s. It how we are structured at all. Our regiments don’t exist to replace casualties in the field.

That's semantics. If 1 PPCLI is deployed in combat and becomes combat ineffective due to casualties/equipment losses then it will be replaced by another Battalion. You're right technically that PPCLI as a Regiment does not exist to explicitly replace casualties from it's component Battalions in the field but the reality is that you need multiple Battalions (or AD Batteries) in the ORBAT in order to replace combat losses. The most logical way to organize those additional Battalions/AD Batteries is in Regiments.

If they managed to some one fly a drone squadron into central Ontario, undetect by our radar, and not get engaged by our ready air craft by the time they got them I am going to be deeply impressed. If they engage our MPA squadrons in the coast they’ve defeated our Navy’s AD, as well as NORAD so we’ve already been catastrophically defeated. Our “homeland AD” is the responsibility of the actual guarantors of our sovereignty: NORAD, the RCN, and RCAF.

The Ukrainians are regularly using FPV drones to take out armoured vehicles as in the video below (even in the face of Russian EW and AD systems). They could do the same to an aircraft on the ground. Good luck counting on our fighters or Navy to take them out.

Battery per Bde is about the norm, so two batteries should be able to provide a deployed and a sustaining or training Bde.

So the entirety of Canada's AD assets to support a single Brigade-sized deployment with extremely limited depth for replacing losses.

We’re and how do you see us forming a AD Bde?

The same way @FJAG and others have been suggesting for various missing/understrength CA capabilities - hybrid Reg Force/Reserve units. Make better use of the part-time PY's we have available and give them the equipment they need to be effective. We need a variety of AD systems from C-UAS to SHORAD to MRAD (and possibly even LRAD) and that requires more that two Batteries devoted to the role.

I stand by my statement that the CA doesn't take AD seriously and is not adapting rapidly enough to the impacts that unmanned systems are having on the battlefield.

 

[FJAG]

I stand by my statement that the CA doesn't take AD seriously and is not adapting rapidly enough to the impacts that unmanned systems are having on the battlefield.

I belief that they should do more. On the other hand, I think that the CA is taking the AD issue as seriously as the government lets them with funds. IMHO, since the Conservatives' cut in defence spending that started after 2011, when the budget dropped from CA$21.4 billion (1.19% GDP) to CA$17.8 billion (.99% GDP) by 2016, and when Lawson took over as CDS in 2012 and refocused capital spending internally, the CA has been playing a desperate game of trying to squeeze every penny out of its share of the budget.

There's a difference between not taking something seriously and in understanding the problem but having no ability to deal with it properly. I'm not saying that I agree with the decisions taken within the CA but I can understand them. There are some major friction points both within DND (including the CA) and the Canadian government that make personnel allocation and equipment acquisition much more difficult than it ought to be. The AD situation is not a failure point in and of itself, but both a sign and a symptom of the ailing health of the country's defence over the last decade and a half.

There was a time in the early part of the 2010s when the CA, understanding the role of AD, decided to manage the risk by letting Canada's GBAD die. Risk management was to take on missions where AD was not necessary or, if it was, making sure that someone else provided it. Those decisions, IMHO, were tremendously short sighted because not only did it let the capability die, but also it completely lost the human capital necessary to revive such a capability when needed. Today's army understands that and is taking the steps to correct it albeit not able to do so at the levels that you and I would like.

 

[markppcli]

That's semantics. If 1 PPCLI is deployed in combat and becomes combat ineffective due to casualties/equipment losses then it will be replaced by another Battalion. You're right technically that PPCLI as a Regiment does not exist to explicitly replace casualties from it's component Battalions in the field but the reality is that you need multiple Battalions (or AD Batteries) in the ORBAT in order to replace combat losses. The most logical way to organize those additional Battalions/AD Batteries is in Regiments.

Well actually we form a replacement unit, as if it’s a LSCO all 3 Bns are likely fighting.

The Ukrainians are regularly using FPV drones to take out armoured vehicles as in the video below (even in the face of Russian EW and AD systems). They could do the same to an aircraft on the ground. Good luck counting on our fighters or Navy to take them out.

An FPV drone could indeed destroy a parked plane. However, if you read what I wrote, that scenario would involve flying a drone into the middle of Canada, so I assume you’re talking about something much much larger. The FPV drones in Ukraine are averaging an 5-10 k range with repeaters, and teams of 10-20 planning and executing. Unless you mean it’s being flown from the states or much closer in which case we’ve had yet larger breaches of national security. Your example is far fetched is what I’m saying, and would required an AD Bty on every base with ROEs to engage and destroy every drone within a given range. Let’s keep this to reality.

So the entirety of Canada's AD assets to support a single Brigade-sized deployment with extremely limited depth for replacing losses.

No that’s just the UOR, GBAD will be expanded.

The same way @FJAG and others have been suggesting for various missing/understrength CA capabilities - hybrid Reg Force/Reserve units. Make better use of the part-time PY's we have available and give them the equipment they need to be effective. We need a variety of AD systems from C-UAS to SHORAD to MRAD (and possibly even LRAD) and that requires more that two Batteries devoted to the role.

Sure and when the reserve Bty has to defend Trenton from your surprise FPV strike how to I ensure they actually all showed up? Current system does not align to that structure. Read what I wrote above, we are tethered to a structure that doesn’t work.

I stand by my statement that the CA doesn't take AD seriously and is not adapting rapidly enough to the impacts that unmanned systems are having on the battlefield.

Unmanned systems, like the video you showed, are having an effect. However much like the video you showed some people are having their perspectives heavily skewed because of the success bias of the videos, the use of these videos as propaganda, and the funding nature of these units making showing their success a critical point.

Beyond that I agree with what @FJAG says: inability is not the same as not wanting to. But I don’t think we need an AD Bde, we need probably a division with 3 shooting Bty’s and CUAS pushed lower.