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C3 Howitzer Replacement

Our Politicians will say: "Hold my beer and watch me show you my ignore superpower"

UOR's will be their bandaids and the average voter does not understand how dilapidated our Reserve artillery is. Sadly we need a gun to blow up ,, killing and maiming a gun crew of Reservists to get the issue on the front page of the media.
I don’t think it will need to go that far, I have some confidence that the CA is at least somewhat aware of the needs of Artillery and the fact that the RegF are PY limited for the requirements of the tubes etc that are needed.
 
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Related - the mailed fist of the RCAC.

The RCAC as a projectile that can be thrown against the enemy to punch through the lines - Armoured guns (tanks and howitzers), Armoured engineers and Armoured infantry.

Not reallly related at all. Tanks provide mobility, direct fire, and shock action - they are organized and led to achieve this. Artillery provides indirect fires, and is organized and led to achieve and coordinate that. Infantry, be it in an IFV or a parachute, is organized and led to be optimized for the dismounted fight. Three distinct task organized in three distinct corps to achieve three distinct effects which are synchronized to achieve the mission.

I further suggest that infantry equipped with sensors and broadly distributed so as to give a continuous common picture of the battlefield is reducing the need for dedicated recce.

Not reducing, changing the way it’s achieved.

I'll go further and suggest that infantry will do much of the job of Forward Observers.

I’ll echo @FJAG, you’ve never been exposed to how or what a FOO does and thus do not understand it. We see FOOs hard pressed to keep up with fire planning when it’s their only job, I can’t imagine trying to do it while leading a section or a platoon. There’s a reason why the USMC isn’t perusing their idiotic JFO dreams.

What infantry can't do is make use of that which has been observed.

The business of seeing all that has been observed, analyzing that which is seen, and then deciding which targets need to be served, for how long and with what - that obviously requires co-ordination. Now the question in my mind is this:


View attachment 87032 OR View attachment 87033

Ah yes such a deep question, if only we had some sort of system that linked ground and air based fires and sat them side by side for better communication and deconfliction. Ah science fiction I’m sure.

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So anyways I like the m109A* but I wonder how that would work for some far flung armouries. Is that an argument in favour of wheeled systems or is it an obstacle that we can overcome via simulators?
 
UOR's will be their bandaids and the average voter does not understand how dilapidated our Reserve artillery is.
Agreed on both but, don't forget, even UORs need funding and approval at the government level. It's just a bit easier to talk in small amounts and immediate needs. UORs greatly complicate the in-service support of the system which is tied to the project and not to the life cycle maintenance and manning of the weapon system involved. It creates major second and third order effects on the system beyond maintenance but including manning and training for them which are generally not programmed in but sliced out of existing resources.

We'll never get the voters interested until a public education program is put in place - preferably through massive and pointed recruit advertising. I'm not sure if dead gun dets will do it albeit that seemed to work on Iltis and various pieces of Brit equipment.
So anyways I like the m109A* but I wonder how that would work for some far flung armouries. Is that an argument in favour of wheeled systems or is it an obstacle that we can overcome via simulators?
I'm kind of on the M109 side myself - and not just because of nostalgia but because of the continental access to parts and factory level support. The L52 barrel bugs me and I think will be the modification requirement that will forever be dropped down on the army's priority list because - we're not at war right now. There may be an M109-52 available at BAE but my guess is it will cost twice or more as much as a refurbished M109A6 out of US war stocks.

As for ResF units. As you know, I'm a hybrid fan. I think that you can easily get by with concentrating the live-fire guns at Meaford and Shilo. Invest in a turret simulator or two on each armoury's floor to run through all the drills. Invest in a good computerized driving simulator (and if necessary several turretless chassis (maybe six complete guns broken into six turret simulators and six driver chassis.)) Place those chassis in Meaford and Shilo as well. Invest in a low-cost, short range 155 mm practice shell and fuze and a few dozen dummy training shells and charge bags that can be manipulated and loaded like the real thing but won't rammed all the way so that they can be easily "unloaded." That just leaves CPs and other vehicles (except LAV OPVs) like ACSV CPs and maybe TAPVs for BKs, BSMs, Recce and TSMs and Bob's your uncle.

I'll go a step further. I think any armoured brigade (or a mech brigade with some armour) needs a HET company in its Svc bn or as an available div sustainment asset. HETs are something easily run by mostly ResF pers. That would let you station a pair of SP guns at each of say Edmonton or Downsview and CFB London for Toronto, Brantford and Guelph based batteries. They don't need to go on the armory's floor - just in a proper storage shed outside. Then use the HETs to transport them to a range and back once or twice per year for live fire.

For me the question of wheeled or tracked has to do with how we intend to use them tactically in the framework of the overall brigade structure. The issue of how you train reservists on them is simply an administrative problem that can easily be solved if the will is there. Unfortunately I find that too few people have the will and instead too many people see this problem as an insurmountable one and dismiss the concept out of hand. IMHO, those people should not be in a leadership role as this attitude prevents the overall optimization of the army as a whole.

I keep saying, if the ARNG can run M109A7 battalions and HIMARS battalions then we can do it if we simply grow a pair. Can you imagine what it would do for recruiting if we but four ResF M109A6 or A7 batteries into Southern Ontario. Or four ResF M777 batteries into southern Quebec. We'd have to beat them off with a stick.

🍻
 
As for ResF units. As you know, I'm a hybrid fan. I think that you can easily get by with concentrating the live-fire guns at Meaford and Shilo. Invest in a turret simulator or two on each armoury's floor to run through all the drills. Invest in a good computerized driving simulator (and if necessary several turretless chassis (maybe six complete guns broken into six turret simulators and six driver chassis.)) Place those chassis in Meaford and Shilo as well. Invest in a low-cost, short range 155 mm practice shell and fuze and a few dozen dummy training shells and charge bags that can be manipulated and loaded like the real thing but won't rammed all the way so that they can be easily "unloaded." That just leaves CPs and other vehicles (except LAV OPVs) like ACSV CPs and maybe TAPVs for BKs, BSMs, Recce and TSMs and Bob's your uncle.

🍻
For routine maintenance beyond whatever the battery might be expected to provide, would a locally-contracted heavy equipment shop likely be able to deal with everything that isn't armament or comms?
 
You could also lease some M109A7, keep them in Yakmia with contracted US support and cycle 15th and 5 FD through there.
Just as a very rough review (using Wikipedia and photos) there are USAR or ARNG M09 bns in Utah, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, California, and Georgia. There are HIMARS bns- N Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin, Kansas, Texas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Tennessee, New Hampshire, West Virginia, Wyoming, Kentucky. And an MLRS bn - South Dakota.

That's just the reserve side. Many of these have equipment and ranges easily accessible by a short to moderate CC330 flight or CC130 flight.

But the real issue is not the access of borrowed equipment in the US but actually equipping them at home.

Incidentally, 5 BC and 15th field IMHO would jointly become a single light battery supporting a single large (four company) infantry battle group in BC concerned with mountain ops.

The problem I see with the M109A6/7 idea is the CA will never then get the larger barrel version
Probably not, but right now neither is the US. That's down the pipes yet.

Everything that I read - which to date is glossy brochure stuff - shows that upgrading various versions of the M109 with the Rheinmetall L52 is viable and a less expensive option than buying a new armoured L52 system made in Europe.

Maybe we should remilitarize a whole bunch of M109 monuments around the country. :ROFLMAO:

I'd only be speculating as to what Canada intends to do albeit that I have an educated guess. The UOR is short term and Latvia specific. I think that pretty much excludes an M109-L52 and probably most European L52 guns whose production cycles are already booked up for several years.

For routine maintenance beyond whatever the battery might be expected to provide, would a locally-contracted heavy equipment shop likely be able to deal with everything that isn't armament or comms?
It depends on the system. M109 engines are pretty standard North American diesels and most diesel mechanics with access to parts and a manual could handle basic repairs. The basic track system isn't rocket science either and most mechanics who deal with tracked bulldozers and the like should be able to adapt. In fact much track maintenance is done by the gun det itself.

As you say, Communications and digital gun management systems are highly specialized and need a specially trained and security cleared electronics tech. The cab itself has hydraulics (for older systems - electric for the A7) and weapon systems that are also very specialized and would need a trained army weapons tech.

I generally do not like the idea of contracting to civilians. Not because I don't think that they can do it but because actually doing maintenance - whether by the dets or technicians - is training in its own right. Every military unit should be designed for and should expect that at some point they'll go to war. That means that you need all the proper personnel who will maintain things in combat fully trained during peacetime. Canadians undervalue and under resource logistics. That's why we have such a high VOR rate. IMHO, using civilians, even for commercial pattern vehicles, has become a band-aid solution that will bite the army in the ass. I'm not a fan of the wide use of commercial pattern vehicles for the same reason. You can't go to war with them.

🍻
 
Your claim was specific to squads. Saying that squads would be dropping munitions that’s where I commented.


How on earth are they getting 50 k out of a loitering munition, ah well sure. It’s doubly interesting since they only launched tenders for their loitering munition project in April. Of course the USMC also said there were going to have a JFO in every squad and that never happened.
is 50km a big deal?


I used to have a chart somewhere with lots of info on different capabilities
 
is 50km a big deal?


I used to have a chart somewhere with lots of info on different capabilities
Yes because I doubt strongly in the idea that sections have any business operating in the 50k range and also the links you sent quoted 40.
 
Much of what weapon to use and who uses it depends on the phase of war you are operating under. At 50 kilometers the pers in an infantry section are still in the back of their IFV during the approach march during the attack or improving their trench system and getting some rest during the defence.

There are forces that far out coming from bde or higher that can both sense targets as well as other resources (arty and air) that can strike them.

Combined arms means just that. Specialist agencies that each have their role and work in concert. Infantry-centric doesn't (or at least shouldn't) mean that the poor grunt has to do it all.

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Even in my day 15th and 5 Battery worked together on some of the gun camps. It was a chance to have 10-12 (Can't recall if they had 4 or 6 guns at that point) guns for the FOO's to work with and YFC had minimal limitations on what they could do.
 
Even in my day 15th and 5 Battery worked together on some of the gun camps. It was a chance to have 10-12 (Can't recall if they had 4 or 6 guns at that point) guns for the FOO's to work with and YFC had minimal limitations on what they could do.
I always had to laugh at the chutzpah of the BC bunch. 5 BC Ind Fd Bty back in the 1970s were always a struggle and they usually needed to team up with 15th Fd to put a proper bty in the field. They did okay but always had delusions of grandeur and lobbied hard to become a regiment. For the life of me I could not figure out what anyone saw in them to say - yup! them guys need to be a regiment.

I felt the same way about Pacific Militia District which had been a part of Prairie Militia Area and Thunder Bay which had been a part of Manitoba Militia District. I guess the Pacific boys didn't think of themselves as part of the Prairies and lobbied hard, and did become, a Militia Area in their own right. Thunder Bay split off and became its own district. Promotions and more Class B staff all around.

;)
 
Just as a very rough review (using Wikipedia and photos) there are USAR or ARNG M09 bns in Utah, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, California, and Georgia. There are HIMARS bns- N Carolina, Florida, Wisconsin, Kansas, Texas, Colorado, Oklahoma, Tennessee, New Hampshire, West Virginia, Wyoming, Kentucky. And an MLRS bn - South Dakota.

That's just the reserve side. Many of these have equipment and ranges easily accessible by a short to moderate CC330 flight or CC130 flight.

But the real issue is not the access of borrowed equipment in the US but actually equipping them at home.

Incidentally, 5 BC and 15th field IMHO would jointly become a single light battery supporting a single large (four company) infantry battle group in BC concerned with mountain ops.


Probably not, but right now neither is the US. That's down the pipes yet.

Everything that I read - which to date is glossy brochure stuff - shows that upgrading various versions of the M109 with the Rheinmetall L52 is viable and a less expensive option than buying a new armoured L52 system made in Europe.

Maybe we should remilitarize a whole bunch of M109 monuments around the country. :ROFLMAO:

I'd only be speculating as to what Canada intends to do albeit that I have an educated guess. The UOR is short term and Latvia specific. I think that pretty much excludes an M109-L52 and probably most European L52 guns whose production cycles are already booked up for several years.


It depends on the system. M109 engines are pretty standard North American diesels and most diesel mechanics with access to parts and a manual could handle basic repairs. The basic track system isn't rocket science either and most mechanics who deal with tracked bulldozers and the like should be able to adapt. In fact much track maintenance is done by the gun det itself.

As you say, Communications and digital gun management systems are highly specialized and need a specially trained and security cleared electronics tech. The cab itself has hydraulics (for older systems - electric for the A7) and weapon systems that are also very specialized and would need a trained army weapons tech.

I generally do not like the idea of contracting to civilians. Not because I don't think that they can do it but because actually doing maintenance - whether by the dets or technicians - is training in its own right. Every military unit should be designed for and should expect that at some point they'll go to war. That means that you need all the proper personnel who will maintain things in combat fully trained during peacetime. Canadians undervalue and under resource logistics. That's why we have such a high VOR rate. IMHO, using civilians, even for commercial pattern vehicles, has become a band-aid solution that will bite the army in the ass. I'm not a fan of the wide use of commercial pattern vehicles for the same reason. You can't go to war with them.

🍻
Thank you for the detailed reply! I was curious about the possibility of civvy maintenance to keep possible Reserve guns driveable without a great deal of expensive and time-consuming trips to a depot.

Complement that with a travelling weapons and electronics tech team, maybe? Don't know where that capability usually lives: battery? Regiment? Service battalion?
 
I always had to laugh at the chutzpah of the BC bunch. 5 BC Ind Fd Bty back in the 1970s were always a struggle and they usually needed to team up with 15th Fd to put a proper bty in the field. They did okay but always had delusions of grandeur and lobbied hard to become a regiment. For the life of me I could not figure out what anyone saw in them to say - yup! them guys need to be a regiment.

I felt the same way about Pacific Militia District which had been a part of Prairie Militia Area and Thunder Bay which had been a part of Manitoba Militia District. I guess the Pacific boys didn't think of themselves as part of the Prairies and lobbied hard, and did become, a Militia Area in their own right. Thunder Bay split off and became its own district. Promotions and more Class B staff all around.

;)


A beautiful set up and well maintained.
 
Thank you for the detailed reply! I was curious about the possibility of civvy maintenance to keep possible Reserve guns driveable without a great deal of expensive and time-consuming trips to a depot.

Complement that with a travelling weapons and electronics tech team, maybe? Don't know where that capability usually lives: battery? Regiment? Service battalion?
Regiments have their weapons and EO shops.
 
Regiments have their weapons and EO shops.
Exactly. In my M109 battery I had between 12 and 14 or so technicians who were assigned to the battery. A weapons tech, a Rad tech, several veh techs and several heavy tracked techs. We had an M578 tracked light recovery vehicle that could tow an M109 or M113 as well as a 2 1/2 parts truck and several 5/4 tons for the wpn and rad tech and mobile repair teams. They would deploy with my battery as part of our A Echelon. When not in the field, all the various battery technicians would work pooled out of one facility back on base under the direction of the regt'l maint officer.

It's tougher for ResF units. They generally do not have techs on their establishment and need to get their equipment serviced at nearby bases where they are generally low on the priority list for attention. It's especially tough where there isn't an army base close by - like Toronto - and some other base support facility does the work. This is why civilian maintenance systems came into vogue. I don't have any experience as to how well they do their job, but as I said above they don't accompany you on an operation nor an exercise. You lose out on both service and training.

The thing is that when you have low levels of equipment in reserve units and the army is already short of technicians, it doesn't make much sense to have a full-time technician in a place where there isn't much work. If on the other hand Toronto had all the equipment that a brigade should have, then it would be absolutely proper to have a large full-time maintenance staff there. IMHO, much of their training could be done through local community colleges during the winter with military conversion training in the summer.

IMHO, we should stop investing in RMC and put the money into tech training at community colleges and officer training at civilian universities where we pay for tuition but not salaries during the winter months - only during the summer military training.

🍻
 
Exactly. In my M109 battery I had between 12 and 14 or so technicians who were assigned to the battery. A weapons tech, a Rad tech, several veh techs and several heavy tracked techs. We had an M578 tracked light recovery vehicle that could tow an M109 or M113 as well as a 2 1/2 parts truck and several 5/4 tons for the wpn and rad tech and mobile repair teams. They would deploy with my battery as part of our A Echelon. When not in the field, all the various battery technicians would work pooled out of one facility back on base under the direction of the regt'l maint officer.

It's tougher for ResF units. They generally do not have techs on their establishment and need to get their equipment serviced at nearby bases where they are generally low on the priority list for attention. It's especially tough where there isn't an army base close by - like Toronto - and some other base support facility does the work. This is why civilian maintenance systems came into vogue. I don't have any experience as to how well they do their job, but as I said above they don't accompany you on an operation nor an exercise. You lose out on both service and training.

The thing is that when you have low levels of equipment in reserve units and the army is already short of technicians, it doesn't make much sense to have a full-time technician in a place where there isn't much work. If on the other hand Toronto had all the equipment that a brigade should have, then it would be absolutely proper to have a large full-time maintenance staff there. IMHO, much of their training could be done through local community colleges during the winter with military conversion training in the summer.

IMHO, we should stop investing in RMC and put the money into tech training at community colleges and officer training at civilian universities where we pay for tuition but not salaries during the winter months - only during the summer military training.

🍻
You had 12 techs for your battery? That must be nice
 
When Ops tasked we had a vehicle tech with 5/4 ton full of parts and tools. He restored old army vehicles as a hobby and was quite talented and we were able to maintain our fleet of trucks quite well. I will argue that the Reserve goal should be 1 vehicle tech per unit with a basic tool setup and parts. Have some of them on Class B and you have enough techs to keep the fleets in much better shape.
Clearly this will not work everywhere, but should be encouraged and supported.
 
When Ops tasked we had a vehicle tech with 5/4 ton full of parts and tools. He restored old army vehicles as a hobby and was quite talented and we were able to maintain our fleet of trucks quite well. I will argue that the Reserve goal should be 1 vehicle tech per unit with a basic tool setup and parts. Have some of them on Class B and you have enough techs to keep the fleets in much better shape.
Clearly this will not work everywhere, but should be encouraged and supported.
Class B or a civilian contractor full time. Either or. This is also part of why I don’t like the way we spread out units, reserve service Bns are a terrible way to organize maintenance for Bdes dispersed across a province. I digress though f
 
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