• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

CAN Enhanced (Permanent?) Fwd Presence in Latvia

They were there because the then head of Army Training, Col (later, in HK, A/Brigadier) J.K. Lawson had declared -spring of 1941 - both units as being NOT ready to go to England and join a division.

The assertion was they were new, untrained recruits who did their basic training overseas, which is incorrect. The troops were already trained when they departed for Hong Kong, even if the brigade wasn't ready for combat.

Of course they did. But we recruited and had a basic unit training before going over seas. I mean it’s not like entire divisions were just kitted and send overseas and learn how to drill and shoot.
Well actually that did happen, with predictable results in Hong Kong.
 
The assertion was they were new, untrained recruits who did their basic training overseas, which is incorrect. The troops were already trained when they departed for Hong Kong, even if the brigade wasn't ready for combat.
According to the army of the time, they were still essentially recruits not ready for action.
 
According to the army of the time, they were still essentially recruits not ready for action.
Col Lawson had a "standard" which, it appears, he applied, consistently across the Army - the Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadier were partially trained - NOT well enough to go to England and join a division but sufficiently for garrison duties outside ion Canada. My personal belief is that, in selecting them for Hong Kong, AHQ displayed a serious weak appreciation of the situation in Asia.
 
I believe, as above, they were Class C Inf Bn's. Cannot find a definition for that.
 
I believe, as above, they were Class C Inf Bn's. Cannot find a definition for that.

Both battalions were organized into a mini brigade designated as "C Force".

I don't know of any other classification system other than individual fitness for service where a Class A soldier was fit for any general duty and Class B restricted to lines of communication troops.

🍻
 
Aware it was C Force. Read somewhere that they ware classed as C Inf Bn. Could have been the author misconstruing.
 
Aware it was C Force. Read somewhere that they ware classed as C Inf Bn. Could have been the author misconstruing.

Such as this?

“C” Force is the name given to the group of Canadian soldiers in Hong Kong. The name’s origins are unclear: the “C” probably refers to Canada, but it could also refer to “C class,” the military category of the two regiments dispatched to the colony. In the Canadian army, “C-class” regiments are those that are insufficiently trained to be deployed in combat.

There is a brief passage in Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol 1 Six Years of War (pg 445/PDF pg 484) that discusses the selection of the two battalions for Hong Kong. The use (twice) of the terms "Class A" and "Class B" to refer to the fitness of formed units are the only times that those terms are used in the volume even though there is much discussion about the training and evaluation of the Canadian Army.

. . . The Committee confirmed the approval for the dispatch of the two battalions, noting that the actual units would be selected by the Minister of National Defence in consultation with the General Staff.

The selection received careful attention. The Director of Military Training was asked to prepare a list of infantry battalions in Canada in order of priority according to training, and sent it to the Director of Staff Duties on 24 September. The ten battalions which he listed under Class "A", i.e., those best trained, were with one exception units of the 4th Division, which at this time was still in Canada.* Seven other units were included in Class "B", these being either units of the newly-organized 6th Division or employed on coast defence. Finally, the D.M.T. listed nine battalions, which "due either to recent employment requiring a period of refresher training, or to insufficient training, are not recommended for operational consideration at present".

On 26 September the Director of Staff Duties (Colonel W. H. S. Macklin) made a submission to the Chief of the General Staff, based on these recommendations, providing for consideration lists of alternative selections from both Class "A" and Class "B". The G.O.C. 4th Division (Major General L. F. Page) strongly reprobated the suggestion that his formation should be robbed of two battalions for the Hong Kong task; and after considering the whole situation the C.G.S. decided that the best course was to select two battalions, The Royal Rifles of Canada and The Winnipeg Grenadiers, which had been included by the Director of Military Training among those not recommended for operational consideration. Both had recently returned from garrison duties in areas adjacent to Canada (the Royal Rifles from Newfoundland, the Winnipeg Grenadiers from Jamaica), and the D.M.T. had presumably considered that they were among those in need of "refresher training".

On 30 September the C.G.S. made his formal recommendation to the Minister. He wrote: "As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances." It would be unsound, he said, to "disrupt" the 4th Division, and it seemed to him best to select units from among those on coast defence duty or from the 6th Division. In recommending specifically the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, General Crerar wrote:
10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and Jamaica respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.​
11. In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a period of "semi-overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selection represents both Eastern and Western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion, while nominally English-speaking is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French-speaking in character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent.​

Nor are those classifications used to describe the fitness (or unfitness as the case may be) in two other contemporary reports that discuss the Canadian Army in Hong Kong.

Not in REPORT NO. 163 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong December. 1941

Nor in the report of the commission of inquiry by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada held in 1942 (it wouldn't be Canada unless we held an inquiry to try to assign blame).
Report on the Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown colony of Hong Kong by Sir Lyman P. Duff, commissioner

Chief Justice Duff's report has probably the best description of the selection, training and preparation of "C" Force.
 
Blackadder1916, yes that was it. Was going to look that reference on line as I recently donated all my military hard covers.
 
German Bde to be Fomed in Lithuania

Some details about the German Bde in Lithuania. I believe this is intended to become a permanent Bde, home stationed in Lithuania to replace the current arrangement of a Bde based in Germany with a HQ cadre permanently forward on a rotation schedule.

The various articles talk about the Bde having three Bns. One Panzer, one Panzer Grenadier and then the German eFP BG. No specific mention of what Bde troops will be included but it seems the number of German personnel being discussed is IVO 4000.
 
Great overview. Learned lots of new info such as new upcoming bases, training areas and plan for the brigade.
 
What is this Light Tactical Vehicle of which the Lt Col speaks?
The one that is going to be forward positioned to carry the light battalion equipped with new ATGMs and ManPADs/SPADs.
 
What is this Light Tactical Vehicle of which the Lt Col speaks?
The one that is going to be forward positioned to carry the light battalion equipped with new ATGMs and ManPADs/SPADs.
My understanding is it’s a Latvia-specific UOR purchase, around 100 vehicles, close to off the shelf. Mobility for light forces to move troops and kit around. The bigger picture project to buy a fleet of vehicles for light forces CAF wide is going to take longer to deliver.

Someone will correct me with I’m wrong.
 
So our contribution is to be a Light Battalion in LTVs, reinforced by a Square Combat Team of LAVs and Leos, a battery of M777s and some other new enablers (GBAD, EW, UAS, LAMs) together with Griffons. Canada will also be supplying armoured logistics AHSVSs and command and control.

The LAVs and the TAPVs will....?
 
So our contribution is to be a Light Battalion in LTVs, reinforced by a Square Combat Team of LAVs and Leos, a battery of M777s and some other new enablers (GBAD, EW, UAS, LAMs) together with Griffons. Canada will also be supplying armoured logistics AHSVSs and command and control.

The LAVs and the TAPVs will....?
The Canadian light battalion will be a surge (flyover), providing another battalion to the soon to be established MN eFP Brigade. The Bde HQ will be Canadian-led but not exclusively Canadian. The surged MN Bde will have the eFP BG, the (surge) light battalion and the Danish battalion.

The existing eFP BG is adding a Canadian tank squadron. That eFP BG (which is mech) has a Canadian BG HQ, a Canadian LAV Coy, a Canadian Admin (CSS) Coy and a composite/multinational Combat Support Coy in addition to all the sub-units provided by other troop contributing nations. Then there is all the other Canadian CS and CSS going into the Bde-level units.

So there are LAVs and TAPVs everywhere - not sure what your question was?
 
The Canadian light battalion will be a surge (flyover), providing another battalion to the soon to be established MN eFP Brigade. The Bde HQ will be Canadian-led but not exclusively Canadian. The surged MN Bde will have the eFP BG, the (surge) light battalion and the Danish battalion.

The existing eFP BG is adding a Canadian tank squadron. That eFP BG (which is mech) has a Canadian BG HQ, a Canadian LAV Coy, a Canadian Admin (CSS) Coy and a composite/multinational Combat Support Coy in addition to all the sub-units provided by other troop contributing nations. Then there is all the other Canadian CS and CSS going into the Bde-level units.

So there are LAVs and TAPVs everywhere - not sure what your question was?

Usual snark....

My point is that we are positioning a force forwards with lots of time to react. My expectation would be that we have heavy(ish) equipment available and a theater that would seem to be a good fit for heavy(ish) gear. Consequently I might have expected the movement of LAVs along with the Leos to new warehouses in Latvia so that those new air transports could flyover to drop into the LAVs.

Instead we are going to supply a new buy of MRZRs to sit in warehouses and supply light troops to the theater. As much of a fan as I am of light role troops I just find it strange.

If the LAVs that we have aren't going to be used in Latvia where are they going to be used? And if our domestic troops are going to be LAV based isn't that going to continue to be a drag on deployment - both with respect to reaction time and areas of deployment?

...

Why wouldn't the forward force be an entirely prepositioned LAV based force with flyover troops? Why wouldn't the domestic force be a lighter force, or at least have a larger light component, that could be rushed anywhere, including Latvia if necessary? We have already conceded that there is a role for light forces on the Russian front.

...

The less said about TAPVs the better.
 

Worth the listen, goes over the plan and command relationship.
That is a very good podcast. There are some strong signals here that the army is recognizing the difficulties of the rotation system and the MRP in general. Moving the high end Maple Resolve to Latvia is an excellent move. I do wonder about the 10 week predeployment phase. It's an improvement over what was but since it is now left at the coy level surely it could be done in smaller blocks at home bases so that people aren't as separated from families for so long.

While I'm always in favour of reserve force participation in these missions, 20% of a force of 2,200 adds up to 440 reservists on Class C. Considering that the contract will be for a full year and two rotos, that means roughly 900 Class C's at any given time over a period of several years. It gets me back to the legal difference between reg f and res f on the issue of "continuing, full time service" or not. Essentially we have grown the number of continuing, full-time positions (i.e. the reg f) by 900 positions. Luckily, the funding comes out of a different pot and not the res f pot (or so we're told) and concurrently taken a core of trained and essential reservists away from the Class A units where they would be providing leadership and training. With Afghanistan the reserves lost quite a few of their vets - some went reg f (which is a good thing) but many just couldn't stand the pedestrian pace of their Res F units and quit. In general, not enough stayed around to make a difference within the unit with their new found skills.

Changing the overall focus to Europe is good but that begs the question of who, if anyone, is thinking about defence of the homeland.

Overall its a very positive message, IMHO. It's especially good to see that there is a recognition that continued rotations at this level are a major challenge and will need to be addressed with a plan B. I think this could have a very positive outcome for the army to get out of their Afghanish-MRP model for something much more relevant. For me the negative issue is the number of UOR projects to fix the years of neglect and poor equipment decisions. There is a need for a much more robust army re-equipment program overall. Something that applies to the entire force and not just an operational stock and training stock for a partial battle group level rotations/deployment. One can only hope that the UORs lead to more general acquisitions down the road.

🍻
 
Back
Top