- Reaction score
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- Points
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Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar, can be found online free to read.
Around P.273-75 -81 and so on, discusses Keller’s sacking, Monty, Croker, Cunningham Simonds ect.
I fined it hard to swallow, Simonds showed remorse, guilt. Without Keller the Simonds witchhunt aka inquiry, to lay blame for his failures
and the sacking of many would be hard for Simonds without Keller, Crerar gives his version of events, meeting with both as he was contacted
twice to have him removed early July and around the 18th.
7th July, Monty wrote a long letter to the Canadians and made it known to Brooke he wanted Keller sacked.
However not knowing, on July 9th Keller lost his chance in replacing Burns. Keller contacted Army HQ to report he wanted the
CO of 9th Inf. Brigade, Cunningham removed.
Keller wanted pay back for the complaints he received, and the unjustified stick poking from others. Keller had issues with Lt. -Gen. Croker
and Cunningham. The letter and rumours among the division that “Keller was yeller” a drunk, incompetent ect ect, must of been hard to swallow.
However the USAF precision bombing took care of Monty’s problem on the 8th.
I knew them as rumours longtime ago, then led to believe it was documented or should I say account. What about the complaints concerning
daylight open field Op’s., or attacks, causing high casualties, which were supposedly very critical of Simonds incompetence?
They found Griffin on Aug. 8th on the reverse side of the crest, lying among his men. The Watch and Griffin received the brunt of blame
for the “detailed execution” as failures of the infantry Regiments and C.O’s, in Op. Spring. Even though some mistakes were made by
Battalion’s and Coy C.o’s. ect. There’s no evidence that I’ve found to support that Griffin was responsible nor The Regiments or C.O’s ect.,
In Op. Atlantic or Spring.
It’s evident by Jerries overwhelming force from the start. The Cameron’s had one hell of a time in St. Andrea, Calgarians in St. Martine,
Factory Aera, their forward Coy’s and 1st H chopped down in May ect., not counting all the friendly fire the Regiments endured from Simonds’s
infamous artillery.
By 09:00hrs Spring, should of been called–off, Megill and many other Officers voice same opinion according to accounts and by action taken by
many, that’s the Foulkes & Megill mutiny. Megill is also the only one I belive from Brigade that went forward to asses the situating, which he stated
was hopeless. Simonds and the Brigadiers lacked C-3 and in Us against them, the regiments were seriously outnumbered and outgunned.
However the evidence clearly show’s Griffon, is responsible for the casualties the Watch endured when he lead the attack. For his reckless actions,
resembling the battle of Magersfontein Dec. 1899. Once all were back many survivors where critical of Griffins actions, his young age, inexperience,
and lack of judgement led many to their graves needlessly, however praised his courage. Many concluded that a more seasoned leader,
the Watch would of not suffered such high casualties, and should of retreated while many were still alive ect. However all that, was sweep
immediately under the rug by the Watch’s highbrows and brass. It’s evident since survivors would only discuss the matter in privet or
away from other ears at the regiment.
At the end around 60 reached the crest and many instantly became casualties. Finally when the front gentle slopes of V Ridge laid littered with
bloody red stain hackles… Griffin got a reality check, and gave the order to retreat,,, Too little too late. He should of listen when others saw
the reality of the matter and hopeless to continue the attack. survivor, Private Montreuil, reported that Capt. Kemp, C.o. "D" Coy, urged Maj.
Griffin to call off the attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were to attack and that the battalion would therefore carry on.
Megill went on record concerning Op. Spring: "To attack uphill into a strong enemy position was bad enough, but it seemed suicidal when
every step forward exposed your flank to enemy tanks, mortar and artillery from the west bank of the Orne"
Around P.273-75 -81 and so on, discusses Keller’s sacking, Monty, Croker, Cunningham Simonds ect.
I fined it hard to swallow, Simonds showed remorse, guilt. Without Keller the Simonds witchhunt aka inquiry, to lay blame for his failures
and the sacking of many would be hard for Simonds without Keller, Crerar gives his version of events, meeting with both as he was contacted
twice to have him removed early July and around the 18th.
7th July, Monty wrote a long letter to the Canadians and made it known to Brooke he wanted Keller sacked.
However not knowing, on July 9th Keller lost his chance in replacing Burns. Keller contacted Army HQ to report he wanted the
CO of 9th Inf. Brigade, Cunningham removed.
Keller wanted pay back for the complaints he received, and the unjustified stick poking from others. Keller had issues with Lt. -Gen. Croker
and Cunningham. The letter and rumours among the division that “Keller was yeller” a drunk, incompetent ect ect, must of been hard to swallow.
However the USAF precision bombing took care of Monty’s problem on the 8th.
I knew them as rumours longtime ago, then led to believe it was documented or should I say account. What about the complaints concerning
daylight open field Op’s., or attacks, causing high casualties, which were supposedly very critical of Simonds incompetence?
The Black Watch role (and other Regiments) in Operation Spring is largely based on survivor testimony compiled by C.P. Stacey’s historical
section during and after the war. Stacey and his, team faced a significant challenge understanding what happened to the Watch on 25 July 44
using recollections almost exclusively. Or the challenge understanding was lost in the clutter of incoherent contradiction in the “accounts,”
as Col. A. Duguid stated.
“Colonel A.F. Duguid acknowledged a need to be conscious
of contradictions within those accounts and between memories
and the written record. Stacey and his team encountered both of these
challenges in their work on Operation Spring.”
The battalion memory of the event insisted that Griffin had been ordered to proceed directly to the objective { On the reverse side of
the crest facing Fonetany.} This incident later became a central feature in the Normandy episode of Brian McKenna’s doc.. The Valour and
the Horror in which it was alleged that there had been a cover up. McKenna later accused C.P. Stacey, the official historian, of having a role
in this scheme to obscure the truth.
{ No startline? Attack the front of the ridge for the Watch} which rises 37 metres over a distance of 1,000m, the point where they would
All assemble and follow a creeping barrage towards the wooded area leading to Fontenay, after all had “Fill in behind” once clearing May?
On the crest facing Fonetany after the Calgary’s advanced down route D162 S into May turn left at the crossroads, where the houses end
the road turned into a small dirt path, called “the minors road” leading to Fonetany, pass the two quarries where the start-line, to attack
the reverse to, crest.}
They found Griffin on Aug. 8th on the reverse side of the crest, lying among his men. The Watch and Griffin received the brunt of blame
for the “detailed execution” as failures of the infantry Regiments and C.O’s, in Op. Spring. Even though some mistakes were made by
Battalion’s and Coy C.o’s. ect. There’s no evidence that I’ve found to support that Griffin was responsible nor The Regiments or C.O’s ect.,
In Op. Atlantic or Spring.
It’s evident by Jerries overwhelming force from the start. The Cameron’s had one hell of a time in St. Andrea, Calgarians in St. Martine,
Factory Aera, their forward Coy’s and 1st H chopped down in May ect., not counting all the friendly fire the Regiments endured from Simonds’s
infamous artillery.
By 09:00hrs Spring, should of been called–off, Megill and many other Officers voice same opinion according to accounts and by action taken by
many, that’s the Foulkes & Megill mutiny. Megill is also the only one I belive from Brigade that went forward to asses the situating, which he stated
was hopeless. Simonds and the Brigadiers lacked C-3 and in Us against them, the regiments were seriously outnumbered and outgunned.
However the evidence clearly show’s Griffon, is responsible for the casualties the Watch endured when he lead the attack. For his reckless actions,
resembling the battle of Magersfontein Dec. 1899. Once all were back many survivors where critical of Griffins actions, his young age, inexperience,
and lack of judgement led many to their graves needlessly, however praised his courage. Many concluded that a more seasoned leader,
the Watch would of not suffered such high casualties, and should of retreated while many were still alive ect. However all that, was sweep
immediately under the rug by the Watch’s highbrows and brass. It’s evident since survivors would only discuss the matter in privet or
away from other ears at the regiment.
At the end around 60 reached the crest and many instantly became casualties. Finally when the front gentle slopes of V Ridge laid littered with
bloody red stain hackles… Griffin got a reality check, and gave the order to retreat,,, Too little too late. He should of listen when others saw
the reality of the matter and hopeless to continue the attack. survivor, Private Montreuil, reported that Capt. Kemp, C.o. "D" Coy, urged Maj.
Griffin to call off the attack but Griffin replied "that the orders were to attack and that the battalion would therefore carry on.
Megill went on record concerning Op. Spring: "To attack uphill into a strong enemy position was bad enough, but it seemed suicidal when
every step forward exposed your flank to enemy tanks, mortar and artillery from the west bank of the Orne"