Defining Foreign and Defence Policy (and hence our Military Force)
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Monsoon
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Only relatively few powers have actually ever had a proper Grand Strategy, and it's debatable if Canada is enough of a world power to warrant having one. Of those that did have a Grand Strategy, I can't think of even one that ever had a public debate about what it should be. Rather, the strategies tend to evolve over the course of generations driven by only a few leaders and, more often then not, what other folks might refer to as the so-called "deep state". Grand Strategies are effectively the embodiment of a power's organizational cultural approach to the world, not a product of consultations and white papers.Thucydides said:
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The Conference of Defence Associations Institute has produced a well-reasoned assessment of the new Defence Policy.
HOW DOES CANADA'S NEW DEFENCE POLICY MEASURE UP?
A Benchmark Analysis by Col Charles Davies (Ret'd)
June 2017
Overall, Strong, Secure, Engaged is a good document that generally stands up well in comparison with the four benchmark policies. It shows a level of breadth and maturity of thought not always evident in previous defence policies produced by governments of either stripe. Most importantly, it breaks the national mold and provides more deeply rational, pragmatic, and comprehensively costed policy direction to departments than we have seen before.
That said, it does have weaknesses and represents but one important milestone in a longer journey towards sound and comprehensive defence policy development and management in Canada. Future iterations, whenever they occur (a major issue in itself), will need to further address the mismatch between the defence needs of the nation and funding. They will also need to institutionalize the integration of defence policy development with that of national security and foreign policy. These policy areas have different characteristics and time horizons, but they require careful alignment and need to be done together if each is to be effective. Perhaps more importantly, future processes will need to include much more substantive consultation and discussion with other political parties in Parliament, and in particular the Official Opposition (the most likely eventual successor government). Failure to improve long-term political consensus-building on Canadian defence policy makes yet more hugely wasteful redirects following future elections likely, and the nation simply can’t afford them.
Recapitalization of large high-cost capabilities represented by complex platforms such as warships, submarines, and fighter aircraft needs to be planned over long time horizons because of the technical, industrial, and other challenges associated with their development, design and construction. To the government’s credit, the new defence policy addresses all of the Canadian Armed Forces’ big-ticket capabilities in one way or another, going so far as to finally publish realistic and accurate cost estimates for the Canadian Surface Combatant program and commit full funding for 15 ships.
However, while the policy provides for modernization of the equally important submarine fleet to keep it combat-capable through the medium term, the fact remains that these platforms will be 40 years old by 2030 (i.e. only 13 years from now) and will need to be replaced beginning around that time. Active planning for this needs to be happening now, a fact that should have been acknowledged and provided for in the new defence policy. Canada cannot afford to continue repeating the strategic failures of the past, for example the retirement of the Oberon submarine fleet in 2000 without replacement, or the more recent similar loss of the Royal Canadian Navy’s at-sea replenishment capability – both events being the direct result of prolonged political neglect.
There's more in the document; it's only 8 pages.
HOW DOES CANADA'S NEW DEFENCE POLICY MEASURE UP?
A Benchmark Analysis by Col Charles Davies (Ret'd)
June 2017
Overall, Strong, Secure, Engaged is a good document that generally stands up well in comparison with the four benchmark policies. It shows a level of breadth and maturity of thought not always evident in previous defence policies produced by governments of either stripe. Most importantly, it breaks the national mold and provides more deeply rational, pragmatic, and comprehensively costed policy direction to departments than we have seen before.
That said, it does have weaknesses and represents but one important milestone in a longer journey towards sound and comprehensive defence policy development and management in Canada. Future iterations, whenever they occur (a major issue in itself), will need to further address the mismatch between the defence needs of the nation and funding. They will also need to institutionalize the integration of defence policy development with that of national security and foreign policy. These policy areas have different characteristics and time horizons, but they require careful alignment and need to be done together if each is to be effective. Perhaps more importantly, future processes will need to include much more substantive consultation and discussion with other political parties in Parliament, and in particular the Official Opposition (the most likely eventual successor government). Failure to improve long-term political consensus-building on Canadian defence policy makes yet more hugely wasteful redirects following future elections likely, and the nation simply can’t afford them.
Recapitalization of large high-cost capabilities represented by complex platforms such as warships, submarines, and fighter aircraft needs to be planned over long time horizons because of the technical, industrial, and other challenges associated with their development, design and construction. To the government’s credit, the new defence policy addresses all of the Canadian Armed Forces’ big-ticket capabilities in one way or another, going so far as to finally publish realistic and accurate cost estimates for the Canadian Surface Combatant program and commit full funding for 15 ships.
However, while the policy provides for modernization of the equally important submarine fleet to keep it combat-capable through the medium term, the fact remains that these platforms will be 40 years old by 2030 (i.e. only 13 years from now) and will need to be replaced beginning around that time. Active planning for this needs to be happening now, a fact that should have been acknowledged and provided for in the new defence policy. Canada cannot afford to continue repeating the strategic failures of the past, for example the retirement of the Oberon submarine fleet in 2000 without replacement, or the more recent similar loss of the Royal Canadian Navy’s at-sea replenishment capability – both events being the direct result of prolonged political neglect.
There's more in the document; it's only 8 pages.
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Journeyman said:There's more in the document; it's only 8 pages.
8 Pages? I suppose you expect me to read ALL of that, as well as at least the Executive Summary of the Policy, if not the document itself?
If I do that, I won't have time to post my unformed, uninformed and uniformed opinion!
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Too blatant an attempt to encourage informed opinion? ;D
There are pictures too, for those tiring of all those ewwww words and stuff...... :nod:
There are pictures too, for those tiring of all those ewwww words and stuff...... :nod:
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The Three U's of online discussion ;DPPCLI Guy said:
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Commentary on Canada's Defence Budget
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/7/13/canada-pledges-to-increase-defense-spending
As I noted earlier, both Trudeau's and Harper's estimates of what is necessary to create a useful military is comparable in dollars and cents. Something like 450 BCAD. The difference is that Harper could skate on the spending because he was given relief on two fronts: The projects would take time to deliver so little money needed to be spent initially. The Bureaucracy was unable/unwilling to spend as fast as Harper was.
The result is the creation of a bow wave of funding that keeps getting bigger and bigger the more that it moves ahead. The problem with bow waves is that they can swamp you and sink you.
I said that I really like the Finn's accounting system for the F35 that essentially treats the project the way that you might buy a car or a house, with a dedicated loan.
To eliminate that bow wave we should have been doing something similar and start paying deposits on the loans immediately, separate from the purchase of the vehicle. Put the money into an escrow account or pay it to the financial institution of your choice that is loaning the money regardless of the vehicle being purchased.
That would even out the payments plan and eliminate the bow wave.
It would also commit the funding and eliminate the uncertainty associated governments changing their minds.
Managing everything from general revenues on an on-going as-needed basis is not getting the job done for Canadian defence.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/7/13/canada-pledges-to-increase-defense-spending
As I noted earlier, both Trudeau's and Harper's estimates of what is necessary to create a useful military is comparable in dollars and cents. Something like 450 BCAD. The difference is that Harper could skate on the spending because he was given relief on two fronts: The projects would take time to deliver so little money needed to be spent initially. The Bureaucracy was unable/unwilling to spend as fast as Harper was.
The result is the creation of a bow wave of funding that keeps getting bigger and bigger the more that it moves ahead. The problem with bow waves is that they can swamp you and sink you.
I said that I really like the Finn's accounting system for the F35 that essentially treats the project the way that you might buy a car or a house, with a dedicated loan.
To eliminate that bow wave we should have been doing something similar and start paying deposits on the loans immediately, separate from the purchase of the vehicle. Put the money into an escrow account or pay it to the financial institution of your choice that is loaning the money regardless of the vehicle being purchased.
That would even out the payments plan and eliminate the bow wave.
It would also commit the funding and eliminate the uncertainty associated governments changing their minds.
Managing everything from general revenues on an on-going as-needed basis is not getting the job done for Canadian defence.
Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Veteran
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Actually, the budget is not even done that way.
The policy document plans to spend money that way, but budget is an annual thing and, other than signed contracts and compulsory program pay outs that are binding on the government, any government of the day can put or not put whatever else it wants in each annual budget without regards to any previously "promised" funding.
The track record of all past promises of funding by ALL political parties in that regard is definitely not something to crow about, nor does it give any member of the CAF any warm feelings.
The policy document plans to spend money that way, but budget is an annual thing and, other than signed contracts and compulsory program pay outs that are binding on the government, any government of the day can put or not put whatever else it wants in each annual budget without regards to any previously "promised" funding.
The track record of all past promises of funding by ALL political parties in that regard is definitely not something to crow about, nor does it give any member of the CAF any warm feelings.
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MarkOttawa said:
I'm using this to revive an old topic ...
For
We were never a great 'warrior' state; Canadians never liked wars, not in 1899 and not, over a century later when we first went to Afghanistan ... but we had, in wars large and small, accepted that we had a 'duty' to share some of the burden of what we can, very loosely, call defending the West.
By the mid 1960s we were tired of paying the price of being a 'leading middle power:' defence spending ran at 3% of GDP during the 1960s ~ in fact it started to decline, markedly, in 1952, when the Korean War ended, and did so, steadily for 30 years; in 1952 we spent 8% of GDP on defence, it was just under 4% in 1962 and had fallen to below 2% of GDP in 1972 and, despite a small 'bump' in the mid to late 1980s (Mulroney) has remained below 2% ever since. Every time Canada has cut its forces political leaders have looked to Washington to check for a reaction. Thus far the Americans have been content to defend us because they needed our territory and the airspace above it as a buffer zone, of sorts.
The nature of the threats to America are changing and so are the means to counter those threats ... I believe that when Canada rejected continental ballistic missile defence, which it has done, implicitly and explicitly, time and time again, American attitudes . began to change. My guess is that President Trump and his top strategic advisors see Canada as a "battle space," within which they might destroy missile headed towards them, not as a trusted ally, kith and kin, in fact, to be defended.
In my opinion , the current government is, shall we say, less that fully focused on grand (hard power based) strategic issues; it has other priorities. But the global strategic calculus is changing as Putin, Trump and Xi juggle their priorities in different ways and Australia, Canada, Europe and Japan and so on are forced to watch and adapt as best they can.
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I assume you mean Hannity... Coulter... Limbaugh.E.R. Campbell said:
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E.R. Campbell said:
Indeed, a worrisome thought. I don't believe Canada is going to have a peaceful, easy ride in the next couple of decades. Too many big things in play and the general population will just put their heads in the sand hoping and praying that things will work out.
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https://nationalpost.com/opinion/opinion-trudeaus-mali-mission-uses-soldiers-for-symbolism-points?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1548343270
Opinion: Trudeau's Mali mission uses soldiers for symbolism points - 24 Jan 18 - David Krayden
A big reason Trudeau sent the contingent to Mali was to demonstrate how gender equity has been so effectively adopted
by our military
Canada’s United Nations peacekeeping mission to Mali is about half-way near completion but so far the experience indicates that it will probably end more with a whimper than a bang — and that is a good thing, relatively speaking. Many suggested that Mali was among the worst places to send our Canadian Armed Forces to keep a peace that didn’t exist. The idea of inserting Canada’s military in an operational environment that is characterized by Islamic extremism and child soldiers is one fraught with difficulties and potential disaster. Mali could have been — and still could be — the perfect storm of peacekeeping. It was not only a public relations nightmare in the making with Canadians potentially engaging with kids but a military fiasco in the making with our soldiers and airmen surrounded by Muslim terrorists.
Canadians had been there before, what with the “Bungle in the Jungle” mission to Congo, the genocide of Rwanda and the withering pain of Somalia. The Canadian military had no enthusiasm for the mission and it assiduously described the operational pitfalls posed by Mali in a March 2017 joint doctrine note that did not omit the potential for interaction with child soldiers.
Mali could have been — and still could be — the perfect storm of peacekeeping
Still Prime Minister Justin Trudeau persisted, and after several missteps announced the June deployment in support of the UN mission. When he finally visited the personnel there in December, it was all fanfare and cheers — though he quietly but emphatically declared the mission would not be extended beyond its 12-month mandate. Good decision.
But going in the first place was not a good decision and might have and still could have serious consequences. Deploying peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep amounts to poor defence planning, and that error was compounded with the haphazard force that the Trudeau government compiled to fulfill its dubious mission. Canadian deployments, especially under Liberal governments in the past three decades, are often characterized by an effort to produce a force of least risk — or in other words, to give the impression of providing a combat-capable contribution that will likely not have to experience combat. The Mali mission was all about appearances but you can’t bank on appearances in the middle of a violent, bloody civil war.
Canada provided a helicopter squadron to medically evacuate casualties in the conflict (as they did after a recent attack on a UN base). If any of the warring zealots in Mali do decide to make a military point with the Canadian contingent, they are ill-prepared to address any potential attack, under-armed and subject to the vagaries of UN rules of engagement that usually have soldiers consulting their manuals before putting finger to triggers. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres noted last October that security has actually deteriorated since Canada arrived.
Another reason Trudeau sent the contingent to Mali was to demonstrate how gender equity — one of the prime minister’s pet causes — has been so insouciantly and effectively adopted by the Canadian military. Just as he created a cabinet bound by sexual quotas, the Department of National Defence was directed to prepare a Mali team that highlighted the preponderance of women in uniform. It may be one degree of stupidity to run your cabinet with that philosophy but it is entirely beyond justification to send people into battle to celebrate political ideology.
Ultimately, Canada’s mission to Mali encapsulates Trudeau’s defence posture. He pressed the Mali mission because he desperately yearns for Canada to have a seat on the UN Security Council, something that he thinks will provide evidence of Canada being “back.” But back to what, one must ask, since any desire to join this collection of detached, tin-pot dictatorships promulgating UN policy is at best a misplaced one. Yet Trudeau remains a supreme acolyte for the UN and its abject failure at providing anything but profligate spending.
Trudeau remains a supreme acolyte for the UN and its abject failure at providing anything but profligate spending
With his misguided trust in the UN, it is not so much that Trudeau’s defence and foreign policy is intentionally dangerous as it is desultory, but that can be a sufficient danger in itself. Trudeau still believes in something called peacekeeping although the military has ceased to acknowledge such an operation for decades now. The kind of peacekeeping that Trudeau fondly recalls from his childhood — of Canadians in blue helmets and berets who kept the warring factions apart in Cyprus and the Middle East — died with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the asymmetrical threat posed by rogue states and group terrorism.
I used to joke that the NDP stood for “No Defence Policy” and deserved our opprobrium because it would relegate Canada’s military to some kind of constabulary force, useful for combating forest fires and stacking sandbags in the event of flooding. But despite making grandiose claims of defence spending spiking in three decades from now in a defence policy review that reads like a prophecy instead of a plan, the label is becoming increasingly apt for the current Liberal regime. Trudeau remains both uncomfortable with talking about the military and profoundly inept with knowing what to do with it.
David Krayden is a former Air Force public affairs officer and communications manager on Parliament Hill. He is the Ottawa bureau chief for The Daily Caller, a Washington-based news service.
Opinion: Trudeau's Mali mission uses soldiers for symbolism points - 24 Jan 18 - David Krayden
A big reason Trudeau sent the contingent to Mali was to demonstrate how gender equity has been so effectively adopted
by our military
Canada’s United Nations peacekeeping mission to Mali is about half-way near completion but so far the experience indicates that it will probably end more with a whimper than a bang — and that is a good thing, relatively speaking. Many suggested that Mali was among the worst places to send our Canadian Armed Forces to keep a peace that didn’t exist. The idea of inserting Canada’s military in an operational environment that is characterized by Islamic extremism and child soldiers is one fraught with difficulties and potential disaster. Mali could have been — and still could be — the perfect storm of peacekeeping. It was not only a public relations nightmare in the making with Canadians potentially engaging with kids but a military fiasco in the making with our soldiers and airmen surrounded by Muslim terrorists.
Canadians had been there before, what with the “Bungle in the Jungle” mission to Congo, the genocide of Rwanda and the withering pain of Somalia. The Canadian military had no enthusiasm for the mission and it assiduously described the operational pitfalls posed by Mali in a March 2017 joint doctrine note that did not omit the potential for interaction with child soldiers.
Mali could have been — and still could be — the perfect storm of peacekeeping
Still Prime Minister Justin Trudeau persisted, and after several missteps announced the June deployment in support of the UN mission. When he finally visited the personnel there in December, it was all fanfare and cheers — though he quietly but emphatically declared the mission would not be extended beyond its 12-month mandate. Good decision.
But going in the first place was not a good decision and might have and still could have serious consequences. Deploying peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep amounts to poor defence planning, and that error was compounded with the haphazard force that the Trudeau government compiled to fulfill its dubious mission. Canadian deployments, especially under Liberal governments in the past three decades, are often characterized by an effort to produce a force of least risk — or in other words, to give the impression of providing a combat-capable contribution that will likely not have to experience combat. The Mali mission was all about appearances but you can’t bank on appearances in the middle of a violent, bloody civil war.
Canada provided a helicopter squadron to medically evacuate casualties in the conflict (as they did after a recent attack on a UN base). If any of the warring zealots in Mali do decide to make a military point with the Canadian contingent, they are ill-prepared to address any potential attack, under-armed and subject to the vagaries of UN rules of engagement that usually have soldiers consulting their manuals before putting finger to triggers. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres noted last October that security has actually deteriorated since Canada arrived.
Another reason Trudeau sent the contingent to Mali was to demonstrate how gender equity — one of the prime minister’s pet causes — has been so insouciantly and effectively adopted by the Canadian military. Just as he created a cabinet bound by sexual quotas, the Department of National Defence was directed to prepare a Mali team that highlighted the preponderance of women in uniform. It may be one degree of stupidity to run your cabinet with that philosophy but it is entirely beyond justification to send people into battle to celebrate political ideology.
Ultimately, Canada’s mission to Mali encapsulates Trudeau’s defence posture. He pressed the Mali mission because he desperately yearns for Canada to have a seat on the UN Security Council, something that he thinks will provide evidence of Canada being “back.” But back to what, one must ask, since any desire to join this collection of detached, tin-pot dictatorships promulgating UN policy is at best a misplaced one. Yet Trudeau remains a supreme acolyte for the UN and its abject failure at providing anything but profligate spending.
Trudeau remains a supreme acolyte for the UN and its abject failure at providing anything but profligate spending
With his misguided trust in the UN, it is not so much that Trudeau’s defence and foreign policy is intentionally dangerous as it is desultory, but that can be a sufficient danger in itself. Trudeau still believes in something called peacekeeping although the military has ceased to acknowledge such an operation for decades now. The kind of peacekeeping that Trudeau fondly recalls from his childhood — of Canadians in blue helmets and berets who kept the warring factions apart in Cyprus and the Middle East — died with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the asymmetrical threat posed by rogue states and group terrorism.
I used to joke that the NDP stood for “No Defence Policy” and deserved our opprobrium because it would relegate Canada’s military to some kind of constabulary force, useful for combating forest fires and stacking sandbags in the event of flooding. But despite making grandiose claims of defence spending spiking in three decades from now in a defence policy review that reads like a prophecy instead of a plan, the label is becoming increasingly apt for the current Liberal regime. Trudeau remains both uncomfortable with talking about the military and profoundly inept with knowing what to do with it.
David Krayden is a former Air Force public affairs officer and communications manager on Parliament Hill. He is the Ottawa bureau chief for The Daily Caller, a Washington-based news service.
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Rifleman62 said:
I can easily think of at least 10 female soldiers who are just as likely to throat punch or double tap* an insurgent with the same degree of spirit as any other form of gender. In fact, I would wager most (if not all of them!!) would not pass on an opportunity to to do the same to some of the political people the author mentions for the simple fact that they are being placed in that position because of their gender, notwithstanding that fact they are just as good as anyone else in the job. The color of their beret and helmet cover doesn't have much to do with that, one can always throw it in the trash when no longer required.
* and I don't mean the urban form of "dancing".
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Dinosaur
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Cloud Cover said:
I agree. And we do these excellent (female) troops a disservice by trying to run 'special' missions or events for them.
I'm pretty sure they hate that too (because several of them have told me that).
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