Old Sweat said:
To me, wearing my cynic's badge, is that the main lesson of Dieppe was the Combined Operations Command had outlived its usefulness. There certainly was a place for it in the dear days of 1940 and 1941, but by mid-1942 the initiative was shifting to the Allies.
Dieppe was planned as a divisional raid, with two brigades (including their headquarters) landing, completing fairly challenging tactical tasks and withdrawing in one day. It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid. The Combined Operations planners were enthusiastic amateurs who seemed to have been wildly optimistic. For example, it should have been obvious it would have been difficult to achieve surprise with staggered H-Hours. As a gunner, I can't avoid adding that the fire plan was a farce.
After Dieppe the planning for the return to Europe fell under the purview of an organization titled Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and this organization developed the initial concept of operations and outline plan for D Day.
Many support that narrative, COC in the top 5 of lessons learned, the "planners" were biting on more then they could chew.
CBC Digital Archives 1942: Carnage on the beaches of Dieppe LISTEN 00:00 14:35
"We have suffered heavy losses, and I saw our men die," says CBC Radio's Robert Bowman, just returned from the bloody beaches of Dieppe. The grim reality of what happened in France yeserday is just setting in: hundreds of Canadians killed, untold numbers taken prisoner. Reading from grimy notes taken during his eight hours ashore, Bowman does not use words like "failure" or "disaster." Instead, he lauds the bravery of the troops, and the lessons learned from the assault.
http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/1942-carnage-on-the-beaches-of-dieppe
Just elaborating on COC: Arising from the armistice concluded by France with Germany in June 1940 and the evacuation of British forces from the Continent, a small organisation was established to take command of subsequent raiding operations against enemy territory and to provide advice on combined assaults. From this emerged a distinct Combined Operations Headquarters, staffed by all three services, but independent of all of them and under the command of a Director of Combined Operations. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, was appointed first director in July 1940; he was succeeded in October 1941 by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten with the title Adviser on Combined Operations. In March 1942 this title was altered to Chief of Combined Operations; it was also decided that the Chief of Combined Operations should attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff as a full member whenever major issues were in question and, as previously, when his own combined operations or any special matters in which he was concerned were under consideration.
From the establishment of a Combined Training Centre in August 1940 at Inveraray, Argyllshire, the Combined Operations Command expanded rapidly both within the United Kingdom and overseas, notably in the Middle East and India. In 1942 it sent a permanent representative to the Joint Staffs Mission in Washington and in the same year a Combined Operations Experimental Establishment was set up at Appledore, Devon. This establishment was much involved in the investigation of problems likely to be encountered on the beaches in connection with an invasion of Europe, particularly as regards the landing of armoured vehicles, stores, supplies, etc. Following the successful invasion of Normandy in 1944, a similar establishment was set up in India to carry out the developments and trials necessary in the very different conditions in the Far East.
From its formation, Combined Operations Headquarters maintained a close, though sometimes strained, contact on the naval side with the Admiralty, which set up a number of combined operations branches within its own departments, particularly in relation to operations, materials and personnel. Raiding forces, such as commandos, came under the command of Combined Operations Headquarters, except when they were employed as part of larger operations. Throughout the war Combined Operations Headquarters played a key role in the development of offensive operations against the enemy. This was notably the case in the raid on Dieppe in August 1942 and the preparation and planning of the North Africa and Sicily campaigns in 1942 to 1943, the invasion of Europe in 1944 and similarly, through its directorate in India, in operations in the Far East.
Following the war it was the Admiralty view that Combined Operations Headquarters should cease to be an independent organisation and should be replaced by a joint Combined Operational Planning Staff within the Chiefs of Staff organisation. In 1947, however, it was decided that Combined Operations Headquarters should continue to be responsible for policy, training and technique in amphibious warfare under the direction of the Chiefs of Staff; at the same time the title of chief of combined operations was changed to Chief of Combined Operations Staff and responsibility for Combined Operations estimates was transferred from the Service ministries to the newly-established Ministry of Defence. On 1 April 1948 Combined Operations Headquarters was placed under the administration of that ministry and in 1951 it was re-named Amphibious Warfare Headquarters.
https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C5760
According too sources: British Combined Operations formed spring of 1940 "to coordinate commando raids along the German-occupied coast of Europe utilizing the integrated support of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. In its seven years of existence, it had four commanders. The first lasted only about a month. Its second, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, lasted about a year before resigning in October 1941 due to an administrative reorganization that he saw diminish his independence."
COMBINED OPERATIONS THE OFFICIAL STORY OF THE COMMANDOS
by LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN: Published 1943.
Free download of book on PDF: https://archive.org/details/combinedoperatio006231mbp
“Too large to be a symbol, too small to be a success.” — Lord Haw Haw, German propagandist commenting on the Dieppe raid.
Illusive Winston Churchill’s explanation; the supposed raid was in fact a “reconnaissance in force.”
Montgomery: “To assault and capture a port quickly, both troops and tanks would have to go in over the main beaches confronting the town, relying on heavy bombardment and surprise to neutralise the defences.”
The British records show the raid party for Dieppe given 16 objects, one mainly being, Pinch secret documents from German Div., H.Q., at Arques-La Bataille.
Adding more:
After humiliated in June, retreating, rescued on mass from Dunkirk, France, it dawned on the British High Brass returning would require new techniques, equipment, etc., for amphibious landings. Their goal, efficiently combining air, land and sea force operations, hence styled combined operations. They first created a task force overseeing labelled as Directorate for Combined Operations (DCO), authorised on July 1940.
Prior of Op Rutter scuttled on 6th July, British Chiefs of Staff approved Mountbatten’s recommendation; if the raid was cancelled it would be rejuvenated. In B. Loring Villa’s 1989 Unauthorized Action: Once Op. Rutter cancelled, Winston Churchill, British Chiefs of staff never authorised, re-launching or renamed the operation. Without their knowledge, Admiral Mountbatten took “unauthorised action,” revising the raid incognito.
It was conceived as a raid, but evolved into a mini-imnvasion. Just as a fighting patrol is not a battalion attack, a multi-battalion assault landing on several beaches was not a raid.
I've heard it styled as a small-invasion, that argument is questionable considering the definition, size of force involved in a "raid" is not relevant, the action taken is. Post aftermath Churchill used it to his advantage, all smoke and mirrors, owing prior to the incident Russia and American were busting his bollocks concerning opening a second front. Churchill stated after Dieppe: With so much fight amongst use, now we can concentrate on fighting Germans.
IMO, mini or small does not apply to the word invasion, however if that small force conquers' ground per say 300 conquistadors, that is certainly a small mini-invasion force.
Invasion Vs Raid.
Invasion: A military action consisting of armed forces of one geopolitical entity entering territory controlled by another such entity, generally with the objective of conquering territory or altering the established government. (figuratively) The entry of a large group into a new area.
Raid: Mission which has a specific purpose and is not normally intended to capture and hold terrain, but instead finish with the raiding force quickly retreating to a previous defended position prior to enemy forces being able to respond in a co-ordinated manner or formulate a counter-attack. A raiding group may consist of combatants specially trained in this tactic, such as commandos, or as a special mission assigned to any general troops. Raids are often a standard tactic in irregular warfare, employed by warriors, guerrilla fighters, or other irregular military forces.
During the Second World War, the British set up the Combined Operations Headquarters organised harassing raids against the Germans in Europe. The first operation conducted by a "commando" formation, known as Operation Ambassador, took place in July 1940, but it was a small-scale operation that resulted in negligible success. The next major raid was Operation Claymore, which was launched in March 1941 against the Lofoten Islands.[19] Throughout the war there were many other operations of varied size, ranging from small scale operations like those undertaken by Z Special Unit against the Japanese in the Pacific, such as Project Opossum,[20] to Operation Chariot – a raid on Saint-Nazaire – and the Dieppe Raid, which was a large scale raid employing about 6,000 soldiers, over 200 ships and 74 squadrons of aircraft intended to take and hold Dieppe sufficiently to cause sufficient destruction to the port.[21] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_(military)
COC was only authorised for small with provisions for large scale raids. Prime war role of the COC, a center for experimentation, innovations, planning in development of equipment and techniques essential too carrying out successful amphibious operations.
C.U.