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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
ArmyRick said:
daftandbarmy,

IF, big IF a war of nation on nation started TODAY, and lets just throw it out there that PM JT suddenly changed his heart and multiplied the defence budget many times over, how soon could we have those armoured reserve units manning AFV and ready to do their jobs as intended?

There is no such thing as a majic wand that will produce a Div of Armour vehicles overnight with fully trained, even partially trained, crews and support troops and vehicles.

It takes years to gear up, tool and produce armour vehicles and their support equipment and vehicles.  A future war may be over well before JT could make that decision.
 
George Wallace said:
There is no such thing as a majic wand that will produce a Div of Armour vehicles overnight with fully trained, even partially trained, crews and support troops and vehicles.

It takes years to gear up, tool and produce armour vehicles and their support equipment and vehicles.  A future war may be over well before JT could make that decision.

Which is why the Reserves need to be more than a "manpower" pool for the regular force. If we are going to keep reserve armour/artillery than they need to be given an "operational role" to go along with DOMOPs. The talk previous in the arty had been to equip the reserves with 120mm mortars to give them an operational role. armour units, not trained in armour, offer only limited value, particularly if a force on force war.

First step is to remove the limitations on reserve units, give them roles (such as the US reserves) and equip/train them appropriately.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
Which is why the Reserves need to be more than a "manpower" pool for the regular force. If we are going to keep reserve armour/artillery than they need to be given an "operational role" to go along with DOMOPs. The talk previous in the arty had been to equip the reserves with 120mm mortars to give them an operational role. armour units, not trained in armour, offer only limited value, particularly if a force on force war.

First step is to remove the limitations on reserve units, give them roles (such as the US reserves) and equip/train them appropriately.

Another proposal is to do what the Germans have done.....They cascade their equipment down, as opposed to putting it out as targets on the ranges, or sold off as scrap.
 
ArmyRick said:
daftandbarmy,

 

I am saying that with the current political will, lets build on capabilities that we can in the reserves, such as LOTS of infantry. No one ever went to war and said "we have too many infantry battalions".

Actually thatès exactly what Canada said at the beginning of WW II. They called up the Militia, and transferred many units to the CASF and trained them to be infantry only to decide the units weren t needed as Infantry, so they were retrained as Armour or Artillary or even Headquarter units.  Many of these units accepted the few months of training and excelled in those tasks. Donèt tell me the militia or Primary Reserve are unable to fulfill the roles of armoured drivers, gunners and loader. Back in the sixties, my first trade was a driver and then I was on a gunnery course when I was accepted for a commission.

I
 
SherH2A said:
Actually thatès exactly what Canada said at the beginning of WW II. They called up the Militia, and transferred many units to the CASF and trained them to be infantry only to decide the units weren t needed as Infantry, so they were retrained as Armour or Artillary or even Headquarter units.  Many of these units accepted the few months of training and excelled in those tasks. Donèt tell me the militia or Primary Reserve are unable to fulfill the roles of armoured drivers, gunners and loader. Back in the sixties, my first trade was a driver and then I was on a gunnery course when I was accepted for a commission.

I

While I agree with you with regards to the employability of the Army Reserve in Armor and Artillery roles, the broad trend of occupational re-assignment in the Canadian Army in WW2 was into the Infantry and not out of it.  Once the Italian and Normandy campaigns ramped up and the casualties mounted (concentrated in the infantry) there was wholesale occupational reassignment of other arms and services into the Infantry.  A few complete units were even converted to Infantry.  As an example, my grandfather started the war in the 1st Light Anti Aircraft Regiment and he was re-roled into infantry when that unit became the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish. 
 
Valid point. You never truly have "too many infantry". 1939 aside, lets face our current restraints.

I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them.... The term equip. Is not going to happen from now until 2019 when this government is up for another job interview with its 36 million employers. I may be annoying but I truly believe we need to face what we have available, what funds there are (or NOT available), the POLITICAL will and what can we do.

Its not being negative, its more of a shelve that idea and lets deal with the today.

Realistic roles for reservist
1. Domestic Operations (Most likely disaster related, may be security related like Olympics or G20 stuff)
2. Individual Augmentation for Reg F (Has worked and will continue to work)
3. Platoon/Troop and Company/squadron Deployment (in roles like Force Protection)
4. Specialist roles such as IA

With what I see above and keeping in mind we have no money available for new stuff. What would you have us do? What do we need?
First thing we truly need is MANPOWER, more troops, our greatest resource. I would scarifice really cool gear like 120mm Mortars or MBT for additional troops. Thats me.
For kit, the stuff we need as a higher priority is personal kit (a real issue right now), radios, log vehicles (newer versions of MLVW and other utility vehicles) and ensure we have adequate small arms (do not think that an issue at this time. Anybody seeing different?)

Big point over and over, what POLITICAL will is there for the reserves? That is from both inside the Forces hiearchy and the government itself.

 
A good start would be to shut down units that aren't effective and role them into one unit.
 
ArmyRick said:
I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them....
The OAG Report states that the Reserves are tasked with four roles already: Influence Activities; Convoy Escort; Force Protection; and Persistent Surveillance -- noting that only IA has been provided with some semblance of guidance and training.  It's much like when Air Defence went to a 10/90 unit, specific tasks for Reserves only crop up when it's something the RegF doesn't, or has stopped, caring about.

In fact, if you read through the entire report, the recurring theme is OAG: "Recommendation" DND: "Agreed. However, waffle, waffle..."  suggesting strongly that the Reserve is something the RegF doesn't particularly care about. 

Or as stated previously:
recceguy said:
Nothing is going to change. These are the same problems we've had for the last 50 years.

Hamish Seggie said:
A good start would be to shut down units that aren't effective and role them into one unit.
      :panic:    That disturbance in the force you felt was Sam Hughes.
 
ArmyRick said:
Valid point. You never truly have "too many infantry". 1939 aside, lets face our current restraints.

I would caution against calls for lets give the reserves a real role and equip them.... The term equip. Is not going to happen from now until 2019 when this government is up for another job interview with its 36 million employers. I may be annoying but I truly believe we need to face what we have available, what funds there are (or NOT available), the POLITICAL will and what can we do.

Its not being negative, its more of a shelve that idea and lets deal with the today.

Realistic roles for reservist
1. Domestic Operations (Most likely disaster related, may be security related like Olympics or G20 stuff)
2. Individual Augmentation for Reg F (Has worked and will continue to work)
3. Platoon/Troop and Company/squadron Deployment (in roles like Force Protection)
4. Specialist roles such as IA

With what I see above and keeping in mind we have no money available for new stuff. What would you have us do? What do we need?
First thing we truly need is MANPOWER, more troops, our greatest resource. I would scarifice really cool gear like 120mm Mortars or MBT for additional troops. Thats me.
For kit, the stuff we need as a higher priority is personal kit (a real issue right now), radios, log vehicles (newer versions of MLVW and other utility vehicles) and ensure we have adequate small arms (do not think that an issue at this time. Anybody seeing different?)

Big point over and over, what POLITICAL will is there for the reserves? That is from both inside the Forces hiearchy and the government itself.

If the biggest need is manpower but there is also little political will to provide more money, then maybe we could look at a variation on earlier discussions about a volunteer militia.

Would it be possible to expand the militia with a partial volunteer service model.  It might look something like this:
- local units recruit their own volunteer Militia members.
- volunteer Militia receive local weekend basic training
- some volunteers may choose to remain at this level and participate in parade nights, exercises and Domestic Ops call-ups (would receive pay if called-up)
- those interested in going further and completing training in a CF trade would then apply to the CF as a Reservist (would require recommendation from their unit)
- new Reservists would be paid while taking their career courses but would continue to to parade and take part in exercises on a volunteer basis.
- once a trade-qualified Reservist is promoted to Corporal and they begin to have leadership responsibilities they would earn their Class A days as per the current system.

Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.

This would allow the paid "Reserve" force to be the leadership base and source for Reg Force augmentation while at the same time allowing local units to expand their size with unpaid volunteers, providing a greater pool of at least partially trained personnel for training and operations and more leadership opportunities for the NCM and officer corps.
 
just out of curiosity. 

Why is it so long and hard for someone from the reserve to switch over to Reg Force.  Don't get me wrong I don't want to come out and say that this is BS and everything.
But if we speak about the role of the reserve.  A lot of time people from the reserve want to switch over to Reg Force and eventually they just end up dropping the Idea or releasing.

How is it that someone who is fully trained in a trade has a harder time becoming Reg Force than someone new straight out of the streets ?

I do realise it's all about Quotas and what the CF is looking for.  But why would someone who is already somehow trained ( I'm not going to say that a reserve pvt as the same training as a regular one , we all know this is not true. )
But why would this person not be priotised in the papers? 

Is it only because there is only like 4-5 people working for the CT side of the CF or ?

If this is not the right place to post this let me know and I'll put it down !

P.S. Spell Check dosen't work at my workplace right now so sorry for the mistakes !
 
Journeyman said:
:panic:    That disturbance in the force you felt was Sam Hughes.

I thought the slam on Sam was that he disconnected Force Generation and Force Employment.  Yes, he raised many militia units.  But when it came time to deploy them he created an entirely new functional structure that was infantry heavy. (And, just as in World War 2, morphed over time as needs changed - machine guns, mortars, tanks, sappers, railway troops....)
 
GR66 said:
If the biggest need is manpower but there is also little political will to provide more money, then maybe we could look at a variation on earlier discussions about a volunteer militia.

Would it be possible to expand the militia with a partial volunteer service model.  It might look something like this:
- local units recruit their own volunteer Militia members.
- volunteer Militia receive local weekend basic training
- some volunteers may choose to remain at this level and participate in parade nights, exercises and Domestic Ops call-ups (would receive pay if called-up)
- those interested in going further and completing training in a CF trade would then apply to the CF as a Reservist (would require recommendation from their unit)
- new Reservists would be paid while taking their career courses but would continue to to parade and take part in exercises on a volunteer basis.
- once a trade-qualified Reservist is promoted to Corporal and they begin to have leadership responsibilities they would earn their Class A days as per the current system.

Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.

This would allow the paid "Reserve" force to be the leadership base and source for Reg Force augmentation while at the same time allowing local units to expand their size with unpaid volunteers, providing a greater pool of at least partially trained personnel for training and operations and more leadership opportunities for the NCM and officer corps.

I think it would be possible. 
 
krimynal said:
If this is not the right place to post this let me know and I'll put it down !

Nothing wrong with posting about it here, but we already have a 44-page Component Transfers (Reserve to Regular) discussion.
 
mariomike said:
Nothing wrong with posting about it here, but we already have a 44-page Component Transfers (Reserve to Regular) discussion.


Yeah I know about that one , I usually post in that one too.  I just thought since that one was about the role of the reserve force it might of been on some interests.

But I do get what you mean tho!

As far as reserve role.  I am not trained / have enough experience to really comment and put in my 2cents !
 
krimynal said:
Yeah I know about that one , I usually post in that one too.  I just thought since that one was about the role of the reserve force it might of been on some interests.

But I do get what you mean tho!

As far as reserve role.  I am not trained / have enough experience to really comment and put in my 2cents !

I've always enjoyed your posts, Krimynal. Wherever they are.  :)

From reading them ( yours and others ) I can understand the frustration of the painfully long CT process.
 
mariomike said:
I've always enjoyed your posts, Krimiynal. Wherever they are.  :)

haha well I'll take that as a compliment :) ! I'll try to keep that up then !
 
Chris Pook said:
I thought the slam on Sam .....
Oh, where to start....  ;D 

He's the spiritual godfather of the "militia myth" (although it pre-dated him), that Canadians are natural warriors and woodsmen, inherently superior to full-time soldiers of other nations (esp, Britain). His arrogance and public bragging about his awesomeness/British leadership incompetence got him thrown out of South Africa during the 2nd Boer War -- where he fought for the British because the Canadian commander wanted nothing to do with him.

Back home, he eventually cajoled his way into Minister of Militia and Defence under Borden.  He worked hard to build up the Militia, at the expense of the Permanent Force, right up to 1914.  With the declaration of war, he threw out the straight-forward mobilization plan built by LGen Gwatkin (Brit RegF; Chief of General Staff for Canadian Army) to gather troops at Petawawa for pre-deployment training. Instead, he sent telegrams to individual COs to get their troops to Valcartier....where they had to actually build the camp before they could even start pre-deployment training -- leaving little time for actual training.

Getting troops and equipment to Halifax, loading, and unloading in England was even more of a nightmare, because there was no plan, rhyme or reason to it. 

Micromanaging; foisting poor equipment based on his personal preference; political interference and media muck-raking.  He's got it all.

.....except one or more Victoria Crosses, which he felt he deserved for his South African exploits.


In effect,  Sam Hughes is a role model for the "Mess-kit Militia" (which is why we can't amalgamate understrength units; the Reserves would lose way too many LCol/CWO positions, and then who would organize the Army Ball, campaign for new/old rank badges, claim to be SAS, and stuff)  >:D
 
Journeyman said:
Oh, where to start....  ;D 

He's the spiritual godfather of the "militia myth" (although it pre-dated him), that Canadians are natural warriors and woodsmen, inherently superior to full-time soldiers of other nations (esp, Britain). His arrogance and public bragging about his awesomeness/British leadership incompetence got him thrown out of South Africa during the 2nd Boer War -- where he fought for the British because the Canadian commander wanted nothing to do with him.

Back home, he eventually cajoled his way into Minister of Militia and Defence under Borden.  He worked hard to build up the Militia, at the expense of the Permanent Force, right up to 1914.  With the declaration of war, he threw out the straight-forward mobilization plan built by LGen Gwatkin (Brit RegF; Chief of General Staff for Canadian Army) to gather troops at Petawawa for pre-deployment training. Instead, he sent telegrams to individual COs to get their troops to Valcartier....where they had to actually build the camp before they could even start pre-deployment training -- leaving little time for actual training.

Getting troops and equipment to Halifax, loading, and unloading in England was even more of a nightmare, because there was no plan, rhyme or reason to it. 

Micromanaging; foisting poor equipment based on his personal preference; political interference and media muck-raking.  He's got it all.

.....except one or more Victoria Crosses, which he felt he deserved for his South African exploits.


In effect,  Sam Hughes is a role model for the "Mess-kit Militia" (which is why we can't amalgamate understrength units; the Reserves would lose way too many LCol/CWO positions, and then who would organize the Army Ball, campaign for new/old rank badges, claim to be SAS, and stuff)  >:D

So the archetype for the Canadian military then.  >:D

:surrender:  ;D
 
Chris Pook said:
So the archetype for the Canadian military then.  >:D

:surrender:  ;D

Journeyman was being kind to Sam's memory. Don't forget the Ross Rifle and the meddling and interference with commanders in the field, as well as his hatchet job on Sir Arthur Currie.

Perhaps the best thing he ever did was to have an agent secretly buy land near Quebec City starting a few years before the war. This became Valcartier, and he shifted the contractors building the Connaught Ranges on the outbreak of the war.
 
GR66 said:
Instead of a completely volunteer Militia this would be something like a cross between volunteer firefighters/police auxilliary (for those who wish to be in the Militia but don't have the desire/time to become trade qualified) and a trade with an unpaid apprenticeship period while the members learn their trade.

Even Auxiliary members of the police department, must volunteer ( although unpaid, while on duty they must be covered by WSIB ) a minimum of 150 hours per year. From what I have read in this tread, a paid Reservist can parade as little as 12 days / 24 nights a year. How many days / nights would an unpaid Reservist ( aka militia, auxiliary, volunteer ) be required to show up?

As far as volunteer firefighters are concerned, take a look at some of the collective agreements negotiated by their union, including "Wages and Rates of Pay",
http://www2.hamilton.ca/NR/rdonlyres/3EF302D1-5D1A-4BCD-B9C6-D2A54F965939/0/GHVFFA911Jan12012Dec312015CollectiveAgreement.pdf

Volunteer firefighters vote overwhelmingly to unionize
http://www.mykawartha.com/news-story/4383230-volunteer-firefighters-vote-overwhelmingly-to-unionize-update/

Volunteer firefighters now unionized
http://www.thesudburystar.com/2013/02/13/volunteer-firefighters-now-unionized

etc...


 
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