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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
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"I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures."

They maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency.  Odds of that happening soon?  Remote.  But, we don't disband fire departments because we havent't had a fire in a while.

The structure we have now works, if we let it.  Lets sort out the people who don't, first.
 
TCBF said:
...we don't disband fire departments because we havent't had a fire in a while.

Yes, but these rural volunteer fire departments are geared and structured to deal with the threat they are most likely to see.   You don't have hypothetical training on using ladder trucks to fight fires in high-rise buildings (ie. how until recently Canadian reserve armoured units were training to fight the Soviet hordes) and within a rural fire department you don't have a command structure that is more suited to that of a fire department that has multiple units/stations, etc. (ie. how a regiment that can only field a sub-unit of company minus size has a full battalion headquarters and headquarters company command element).

As pbi noted, the issue of disbanding units wasn't a concern.   Quite the opposite, the growth of sub-units and specialty units is something that is a goal.   However, streamlining an antiquated, redundant and inefficient regimental hierarchy is something that needs to be addressed.
 
TCBF said:
"I just don't see the benefit of all these little unit-level command structures."

They maintain traditional and historical ties to the towns they are based in, and provide a framework for anything up to and including general mobilization during an emergency.   Odds of that happening soon?   Remote.   But, we don't disband fire departments because we havhaven'td a fire in a while.

The structure we have now works, if we let it.   Lets sort out the people who don't, first.

TCBF: One of the specific points in our tactical grouping process (and one which would be largely respected should amalgamation eventually occur) is that there is to be no reduction in community footprint. We also specified that there was to be no impact on unit heritage or identity. However, if we were to go to amalgamation, we could still probably respect heritage and identity. I would use the Volunteer battalions of the British Army (TA) as a very good example. Some time ago the Brits found that they could not sustain a large number of little "battalions" each parading only about a coy or two of soldiers, and having great difficulty generating suitable COs and RSMs. So, they engaged in a series of amalgamations. Instead of four understrength little battalions, with four miniature command structures, a single battalion exists, but with each company carrying the parenthetic traditional title after the coy designator.   So, instead of the decrepit and non-effective "Duke of Numptyshire's Light Infantry" you might have " B Coy/Fourth (Volunteer) Battalion The Light Infantry (The Duke of Numptyshire's Light Infantry)". The sub-unit (IIRC) preserves as much of its heritage as is compatible with the new structure, and keeps its ties to its former communities. But, instead of a hopelessly undermanned and ineffective "battalion", they have a properly manned and much more effective company, and a much broader and more competitive base from which to select COs and RSMs. This, IMHO, is the way we should go. We could strengthen our actual (as opposed to our imaginary...) capabilities, reduce unneeded and largely unsustainable command structure, introduce healthy competition and selectivity into succession for CO and RSM, but preserve much of what is good about our Reserve system. If we compare the Army Reserve to a tree, sometimes it is necessary to prune the branches in order to keep the trunk and the roots strong. A simplistic analogy, I know, but it gets my point across. And, I think, you might find an increasing number of Res soldiers who believe this too.

Cheers.
 
I agree with the logic both you and Matt have presented.  I think it just may end up going a notch to far.  We have understrength units because they have been given an artificially low strength and man-day ceiling, no funds for unit collective trg, and no command or tactical framework in which to function as a unit, even if they were at full strength.  We have mini-regts because we want them that way, not because of a failure in the regimental system. If we wanted them to be full strength functioning units they would be, but we (Canada) do not.

Simply restrict each present regt to company size, and add a few extra to do 'Local' and away you go.  The kit/accoutrements/tradition aspect of it is a minor administrative price to pay, and cheap dollar wise.  The sub units can function as 'primary role is to provide a lt inf coy trained to level(?), as B Coy, Manitoba Inf Rdy Bn' or some such.  Then, if we decide we need an NBCD Coy, that Regt could raise a second Coy.  Need a CIMIC Coy?  Another Regt gets to raise it.  A building block approach.

Ammalgamation saves no money and reduces flexibility.

In the early 1980s, before we started building up for Lahr, the 8CH(PL) in Petawawa was established at 327 all ranks, and manned at 229.

A few years later, in Lahr, we were at 528, all ranks.  We did it by lifting the restrictions imposed on our structure when we needed to.  That's how the system works.

I think of this as an aquarium.  We have had the water mostly taken out, and the remaining fish are doing poorly.  Do we just add water?  Or buy a dog instead, because the aquarium is obviosly failing due to it's antiquated structure?

Tom
 
I doubt, with the limited obligation required of our reservists, that a unit that was a "full strength" battalion would actually be one - I remember my Mo unit, at just over 200 boots, could put a platoon or two on the parade square or the field.
 
TCBF: your mistrust of "good ideas" about Reserve restructure is fully understandable and well-founded. The history of inflicting "good ideas" on the Army Reserve has, unfortunately, often demonstrated that they were not good ideas at all but were actually poorly thought out and harmful. To a great extent, this was (IMHO) due to the imposition of these "good ideas" on the Res with very little understanding of, or input from, the Class A Reserve world. Too often they were dreamed up either solely by Regulars or by a few "token" Reservists who typically had spent years on Class B and C away from the armoury floor and knew not whereof they spoke. These measures were regarded with suspicion and fear by the Res and to a great exent I think were the fuel for groups such as Reserve 2000, etc.

I can see plainly that although we are not fully out of the woods yet, that environment has changed. The role, involvement and voice of Res leadership within the Army (as opposed to standing out on the institutional sidewalk carping) is far, far beyond where it was when I joined the Militia in 1974, or even when I left it in 1982. I believe that this provides certain checks and balances to help guard against excesses such as "Snakes and Ladders", "Op Tasking", "10/90", etc, etc.

Further, it is important that these initiatives be guided by the CLS Intent, but developed by Reservists. This is definitely the case for our two Tac Gp initiatives in 38 CBG. The only RegF person intimately involved in the process was me, in a staff  capacity as "scribe" for the proposals. The development and implementation, and the conduct of the info operations to support the implementation, are wholly Reserve, supported by Honoraries. In fact, in a number of our locations there has been talk for some years of going beyonf tac gp to amalgamation: these Res do see the point of it, and certain advantages.

You are probably correct that in absolute terms, amalgamation would not save much money: only six or eight senior posns per Branch per CBG, which overall is not huge $$ in Class A terms. There is a very important advantage to tac gp and amalgamation: they reduce the pressure to source an inordinate number of COs and RSMs, which is a perennial problem, at least in our Bde. Only a small percentage of the soldiers in the unit have the drive, time and qualities to be good COs and RSMs (the same is largely true in the Reg Army...), but as things stand now we must constantly dip well below the quality line just to fill these slots. I have seen clearly what the results of this can be on a Res unit: disastrous. Reservists come to the unit after a day at work or in school because they are motivated to do so. One of the greatest single motivators is the quality of leadership that they receive that keeps them coming back. If you have filled your senior positions (assuming that you can even fill them...) with the "last men standing", you will probably not get this leadership.

Simply restrict each present regt to company size, and add a few extra to do 'Local' and away you go.  The kit/accoutrements/tradition aspect of it is a minor administrative price to pay, and cheap dollar wise.  The sub units can function as 'primary role is to provide a lt inf coy trained to level(?), as B Coy, Manitoba Inf Rdy Bn' or some such.  Then, if we decide we need an NBCD Coy, that Regt could raise a second Coy.  Need a CIMIC Coy?  Another Regt gets to raise it.  A building block approach.

This is almost exactly what exists now, across the Army, if we speak in absolute numbers (ie: a subunit should be 100-200 pers) vice apparent structural size: a "battalion" with one or more "mission elements". There is no institutional desire to make the Res smaller: quite the opposite. At the moment, and for the last few months, our recruiting limits have been lifted and we are doing very well in some locations, not so well in others, but overall we are showing progress.

Cheers.
 
I enter this thread at my peril but here I go anyway.  I served in an Armoured unit in the Reserves from 1989 to 1996.  When I joined we had A Sqn, C Sqn, HQ Sqn and RHQ.  My first Tp had twelve people on the nominal roll, but five were NES and had been so for a year prior to being in my Tp.  They were, in effect, paper soldiers.  On exercise my Tp would be lucky to muster three Iltis and six soldiers, including me.  We were spread so thin that my Tp WO had to drive his own Iltis (with a GMT soldier in the jeep with him).  This extended across the Regiment. 

Several years later the Warrior program and Combat Readiness Evalutions came along like a hurricane.  As we recovered from the Warrior run we were given the warning that we would be evaluated as a Cougar Sqn in a tactical setting in a couple of months.  I sat down with the Ops WO (I was now a Lt on Class B) and started to fill the TO&E for a Sqn to include three Troops, SHQ and an A1 echelon.  By collapsing all three Sqns into one we could field a proper Sqn without any NES troopers filling slots.  The CO took a look at our proposal and we went with it.  We re-organinzed into B Sqn which was split between two locations. There was some grumbling at first but the Sqn worked well and it showed during the evaluation.  In my fourth and last year as Tp Ldr in the reserves I had a full Troop (four crews) who were there for every training event.  I had one factory worker for whom we were flexible about parade nights but he made every exercise and gun camp.  I might end up out on a limb here, but I do think that MGen Vernon transformed the militia in LFCA for the better. 

I think that there is definately merit in having Reserve units focus on fielding one good sub-unit rather than trying to maintain the pretense of a unit.  Perhaps we turn the CBG HQs into Unit HQs and draw the command staff from the units.  It will take some jiggery for the different combat arms units but it could certainly be done.  I worked with a USMC Reserve Battalion and I was impressed with their structure.  It was an honest to goodness Battalion that we would call a Brigade.  It had a large footprint but good cohesion.

I think that some form of tactical grouping is the the way to go.

Cheers,

2B
 
2Bravo said:
I think that some form of tactical grouping is the the way to go.

...hence my proposal a few pages ago that advocated just this organization.

The more you post, the more I like you 2B.... ;)
 
PBI, Infanteer, and 2B:

You have converted me from radically opposed to cautiosly optomistic.  I would, however, guard against a 'good' plan being adopted, approved, and contorted so that the un-doing gets undone, but the doing never gets done, if you gets my meanin'.

The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.  Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.  I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.  Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.  Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?  A company each from many units?  I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...

If we HAD to amalgamate, I think it might be best to reduce to nil strength the other affected units, rather than amalgamate them.  That would allow an expansion later. 

Is Sam Hughes laughing in his grave?

Tom
 
TCBF said:
The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.   Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.   I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.   Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.   Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?   A company each from many units?   I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...
This is what is suggested.  A battalion with multiple regiments grouped within it as companies (or possibly even as platoons). 

However, I am still not convinced that we could down-grade all the CBGs to battalions.  Within the Ontario CBGs, I think new groupings would see two to three battalions within each of the existing CBGs.
 
My experience with the Reserves in LFCA is getting somewhat dated, but 3 to 4 Infantry Battalions, a Recce Regt, an Arty Regt and a Svc Bn seems about right based on what comes out to the annual exercises.  For the non-infantry units this would admittedly mean a wide geographic dispersion. 

This has been stated before, but have one CO/RSM for each tactical grouping and the other "units" have Majs/MWOs in addition to their sub-unit leadership to run the garrison aspects of each armoury.  We'd keep the RSS and daystaff at the armoury locations.  Have one Reserve Bde HQ per Area.  Perhaps the whole LFA concept needs to be looked at as well. 

My next thought is perhaps a little controversial.  I was never very impressed with what we got out of "training" nights.  I might have been warped by my exposure to a USMC reserve battalion but they just had weekends.  This meant that people could travel long distances to keep active.  Some even flew.  If applied to our system, the CO and RSM would not have to live in the same city as the HQ.  Units would have one training weekend a month (which would hopefully be in the field or on the ranges).  The unit day staffs would need to be intimately involved in planning these exercises, but my own experience was just that.  This would also mean that specialists would not need a local unit to join (they could belong to some holding unit in Toronto, Halifax etc).  It would certainly hamper mess life. 

The USMC Reserve battalion that I trained with did not have a mess per se.  They did have an annual mess dinner.  They had an annual training calendar published in advance and they stuck to it.  They also went for annual two week exercises in places like the USMC Mountain Warfare Training Centre in Bridgeport, Bn combined arms live fire training at 29 Palms, amphib training at San Diego and even winter warfare in Norway.  They also deployed as a Battalion for six months during GW I (and probably places since).  The last part would need some legislation to enact in Canada, but the rest is within our power for our Reserves if we ruthlessly prioritize. 

Cheers,

2B
 
2B:  Because of the very dispersed geography in our Bde (Thunder Bay ON  to Prince Albert SK) we deal with long commutes to units on a pretty regular basis.We have two units that went to parading on weekends for the very reason you mentioned, with only key staff in during weeknights. It is a great way to let a unit (especially in a smaller centre) recruit from a "wide" recruiting area when a "deep" one (like the GTA or Lower Mainland) is not available. It also allows key appointments to come from a wider area.  I think the main reason that it hasn't caught on more in our Bde is just a culture shift issue.

In both our Arty Tac Gp and our CSS Tac Gps, the Gp CO and RSM will be selected from across all three units. They will be "mobile", focusing on "unit"(ie: Group)-level issues and dealing with Bde, while the "DCOs/OCs" in each location will provide local leadership and focus on issues at Lvl 4 and below.

We are not imposing a new level of command-there is still only one level between the btys/coys and the Bde-it is just that now people can focus where they should, instead of having COs and RSMs mired in minutiae.

Cheers.
 
  The Arty tactical grouping is simply formally putting in place what was informal before. Instead of 3 CO's informally agreeing to certain aspects of training, it will have 1 CO calling the shots. Moving to weekend trg also made better use of trg time. Being Artillery, we have to trg at Bty level or greater, just by our nature, so grouping the guns was a logical step. As well lineage is with Battery so indiv Regt identity isn't as great an issue.

The biggest impediments are resistance to change and Regimenatal turf. Before moving ahead these must be overcome, sometimes by strong direction. Some people fight change for the sake of fighting change as opposed to seeing the logic of the matter. Group together or wither on the vine. I see the armoured already moving in this direction (within 38 CBG), but the infantry barley talk to one another.

  As for the way ahead,the Tac Group will be moving into uncharted terroitry because it is the first, but I can say regarless of the nay-sayers, it will never go back to the staus quo.
 
What is the general opinion on the scale of these "tactical groupings"?  I tend to think that the existing CBGs should be left in place with the component regiments grouped into fewer battalions.  Others seem to believe that the CBGs themselves should be down graded to Bn size.  A potential middle ground might see the number of CBGs reduced and new Bn groupings being formed inside of these (as an example, Ontario and Quebec could each be reduced to two CBGs of multi-regimental battalions).  I'm particularly intrested in thoughts from some of the others that have spent any time in a CBGHQ.
 
I will give you my perspective as COS of a Res CBG after three years on the job. We are somewhat different from other CBGs in some ways, so my perspective may be unique.

It really varies from Bde to Bde, as well as on the circumstances in each Bde. Some CBGs do not need to make this move, and not evey unit necessarily needs to be tac gp. However, in our case, as RCA posted, we had a long history with the Gunners in our Bde so it has been a "natural" move for them. The CSS have not trained together as much, but they have been discussing tac gp/amalgamation for several years now, and they have similar concerns to the Arty. Their tac gp will require a bit more work, but we will have the Arty model  to build on. Tac gp for the Armoured Recce and the Inf hasn't really been looked at yet. We have an interesting form of "tac gp" with our new "38 CBG Fd Engr Sqn": it is being raised inside the FGH in what we call the "incubator option".

At present in 38 CBG we see no need to go beyond Branch-level groupings to a single Tac Gp instead of a CBG: that would be a bit premature IMHO.

As far as the continued existence of the CBGs vice going to a "mega-Tac Gp" or "BG" HQ, I think that while that is certainly possible, CBGs have continued usefulness for three reasons:

-they provide the first level in the Army Res at which there is truly adequate full time trained staff horsepower to plan, develop and coordinate to the degree now required in our Army Res. This horsepower simply does not exist at Res units at present;

-the increasing involvement of the Army Res in Dom Ops (a fully appropriate and necessary move that I support 110%) requires a strong regional command and control capability, as well as the ability to generate forces locally at short notice while maintaining a comprehensive liaison footprint. The Res CBGs are naturals for this, as LFCA recognized some time ago and LFWA is now recognizing under CONPLAN PORTAL; and

-the Res CBG offers a transition point for Res leaders (both offrs and CWOs) from the somewhat narrow "four walls of the Armoury" view of life that tends to prevail at unit level, to the much broader concerns, needs and priorities at CBG, Area and Army levels. I have watched with interest as the eyes of some Class A folks widen as they enter "the Dark Side" and see how big a waterfront the Bde Comd, BRSM and staff cover, how many issues are on the burner, and that the particular private concerns of their own home units are actually NOT the be-all and end-all of the Bde's existence. By encouraging our Class Bs and our Class A's to stay active with their parent units as much as possible, we provide an interchange between the two levels. The issue to me is not just "more braid for the boys": but one of educating and developing our Res ldrs.

Could we get rid of CBG HQs? Yes, probably we could, But, I suggest that we think carefully before doing so, and ensure that whatever we replace them with provides the same positive effects.

Cheers.
 
Another way of forcing the move to Tac Groups is the evolution of "task force" structures to deal with the confused securety environment of a "three block war" AKA "full spectrum ops". In LFCA we should start seeing some movement in 06 when the summer concentration changes to reflect "Full Spectrum Ops".

Although I have not seen any official direction, my guess is the composite LIB, AAR, FLG and Artillery formations we have been creating for training purposes will morph into one or two Task Force HQs, which may be Infantry heavy, but have elements of all the arms and services integral to its operation. Since we already stand up and train with the composite formations during the training year, raising a Task Force HQ and training with a composite Task Force during the training year is not a big change.
 
While I am getting a couple of echelons above my comfort level, I think that a good structure would have four or five Reseve Brigade Groups HQs across the country, each with four or five composite units in them.  The unit and bde HQs would be commanded by reservists but have a heavy infusion of Reg F staff to manage day to day operations.

We may find that the reserve voice in the army actually strengthens.  There would be twenty or so COs and four or five Comds.  They would actually have units and bdes under them.

One lower level question is whether to have combined arms "unit groups" or keep pure units.  There are advantages and disadvantages to both.

Cheers
 
So, we keep a 'social' structure - with all of it's advantages - as we have it now, but train and exercise in a quasi 'mobilization' structure: tac groupings - with all of it's advantages.  Yes?
 
a_majoor said:
Another way of forcing the move to Tac Groups is the evolution of "task force" structures to deal with the confused securety environment of a "three block war" AKA "full spectrum ops". In LFCA we should start seeing some movement in 06 when the summer concentration changes to reflect "Full Spectrum Ops".

Although I have not seen any official direction, my guess is the composite LIB, AAR, FLG and Artillery formations we have been creating for training purposes will morph into one or two Task Force HQs, which may be Infantry heavy, but have elements of all the arms and services integral to its operation. Since we already stand up and train with the composite formations during the training year, raising a Task Force HQ and training with a composite Task Force during the training year is not a big change.
LFQA milcon this summer is going to run on a TF basis, with each of 34 and 35 Bde forming an all arms TF (heavy on inf).  Should be interesting.
 
TCBF said:
The Tac Gping is a good idea, but I am unsure on amalgamation.  Perhaps we could Tac Gp similar to the 6 (eventually 4) CMRs in the First War.  I believe many reserve regts contributed to them.  Reform the CMRs - or whatever - as tactical groupings, and retain the current regts.  Did they not form the CIBG in Germany in the fifties like this?  A company each from many units?  I realize that we are looking at a platoon each from many units, but...

Is Sam Hughes laughing in his grave?

Tom

Tom, It was very short lived, but your thinking about 27 CIBG, the PANDA brigade for NATO.

I don't know if he's laughing, but it is amusing that M.D.10 (now 38 CBG) did have a Field Artillery HQ to direct it's then 7 artillery
units. Everything old is new again.

OM


 
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