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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
Honest question, what does the Regular Force do day to day in Garrison that makes them so special?
How many live training days of training do the Regular Force conduct in a year?
How many hours a day, week, month, year are spent doing PT, sweeping the lines or doing routine maintenance on equipment? That is just filler time.

In garrison we probably spent 8-10 hours training a week. That’s a week that we aren’t on course or doing an exercise. We run 4 PCF cycles a year, and probably spend somewhere in the 100 ish range in terms of days in the field. Beyond that it’s maintaining that kit, pre and post ex drills. Also PT isn’t filler time, that’s a critical job task, thinking kit maintenance is filler time is equally foolish, every minute a guy spends working on their LAV / Tank / MSVS is important a) to ensure they work and b) to ensure the soldiers are familiar with fixing them when they are being used operational. Nothing “makes the reg force special” it’s just a professional job.


I call shenanigans that there’s 100 gunners in any reserve artillery regiment. Even pre so that will show up for the non sexy routine training.
 
I call shenanigans that there’s 100 gunners in any reserve artillery regiment. Even pre so that will show up for the non sexy routine training.
This is the link to the 2021 Canadian Gunner. Starting at pg 62 are the annual reports of each of the ResF artillery units including their nominal roll as of Dec 31st.

You'll find that almost all units have a strength of over 100 but, like all ResF units, these include some individuals who have not yet completed basic artillery training and also includes some who are not regular attendees on training and exercises - and possibly the odd bandsman.

I tend to agree with you that most regiments are challenged to put a battery in the field on exercise under our current system (especially the A Ech which is usually missing many key tradesmen).

That said, because I tend to be aspirational, I think that it wouldn't take much effort to create a system whereby most of the ResF artillery regiments could form the nuts and bolts of a gun battery and several dismounted FOOs. FSCCs would be a challenge as would JTACs (too complex a skill these days) and is one area where a RegF core team is required. There are other areas where smaller ResF units (independent field batteries and geographically challenged regiments) could help out as well such as UAV troops, counter mortar and acoustic system troops, and independent gun troops to round out RegF batteries.

🍻
 
This is the link to the 2021 Canadian Gunner. Starting at pg 62 are the annual reports of each of the ResF artillery units including their nominal roll as of Dec 31st.

You'll find that almost all units have a strength of over 100 but, like all ResF units, these include some individuals who have not yet completed basic artillery training and also includes some who are not regular attendees on training and exercises - and possibly the odd bandsman.

I tend to agree with you that most regiments are challenged to put a battery in the field on exercise under our current system (especially the A Ech which is usually missing many key tradesmen).

That said, because I tend to be aspirational, I think that it wouldn't take much effort to create a system whereby most of the ResF artillery regiments could form the nuts and bolts of a gun battery and several dismounted FOOs. FSCCs would be a challenge as would JTACs (too complex a skill these days) and is one area where a RegF core team is required. There are other areas where smaller ResF units (independent field batteries and geographically challenged regiments) could help out as well such as UAV troops, counter mortar and acoustic system troops, and independent gun troops to round out RegF batteries.

🍻
I suppose we differ in that I think the reserves has to be adjusted in organization because the legislation simply isn’t a priority and will not happen. Fundamentally if you were to tell me each troop will have a 3rd gun manned by reservists and a battery a third troop manned with reservists I’d be quite happy. The dismounted foo parties are also filling PCG tasks so if that can be manned by reservists is questionable at best, I’d rather have FOO parties that can fill either roll myself and if that means less manning on the guns so be it. You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.
 
I suppose we differ in that I think the reserves has to be adjusted in organization because the legislation simply isn’t a priority and will not happen. Fundamentally if you were to tell me each troop will have a 3rd gun manned by reservists and a battery a third troop manned with reservists I’d be quite happy.
That was definitely behind the system behind going to four-gun batteries when PYs had to be found to form bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and all of the STA. The various RegF regiments cross training reservists in their region on the M777. I just happen to have X Bty 5 RALC's nominal roll open in front of me from TF 3-07. A gun troop had 33 all ranks so three troops were 99 all ranks. 24 of those were reservists spread around the six gun detachments and three command posts. One thing though, while there are reserve force gunners capable of augmenting M777 batteries, there are not enough M777s in the system without moving active guns from one battery or regiment to the other.

The dismounted foo parties are also filling PCG tasks so if that can be manned by reservists is questionable at best, I’d rather have FOO parties that can fill either roll myself and if that means less manning on the guns so be it. You’re 100 correct on JTAC not being doable by reservists.
PCG? Not sure what that is.

Re FOOs; when the big reorg happened under the CLS directive in 2005 each RegF regiment was established to have 12 X RegF FOO parties (up from 6) and 3 X RegF battle group FSCCs which are sufficient to man three battlegroups complete. I'm not sure right now how many LAV OPVs each regiment has but I believe all RegF FOOs are still all trained on both mounted and dismounted ops.

🍻
 
That was definitely behind the system behind going to four-gun batteries when PYs had to be found to form bigger FSCCs, more FOO parties and all of the STA. The various RegF regiments cross training reservists in their region on the M777. I just happen to have X Bty 5 RALC's nominal roll open in front of me from TF 3-07. A gun troop had 33 all ranks so three troops were 99 all ranks. 24 of those were reservists spread around the six gun detachments and three command posts. One thing though, while there are reserve force gunners capable of augmenting M777 batteries, there are not enough M777s in the system without moving active guns from one battery or regiment to the other.


PCG? Not sure what that is.

Re FOOs; when the big reorg happened under the CLS directive in 2005 each RegF regiment was established to have 12 X RegF FOO parties (up from 6) and 3 X RegF battle group FSCCs which are sufficient to man three battlegroups complete. I'm not sure right now how many LAV OPVs each regiment has but I believe all RegF FOOs are still all trained on both mounted and dismounted ops.

🍻
PCG - parachute company group

The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.
 
PCG - parachute company group

The M777 numbers are why I hate the idea of training guns. Even regular gunners show up to regiments without M777 qualifications, so they essentially have to retrain every person that arrives at regiment. Waste of time and effort.

Based on my experience a Para role isn’t a non starter for reserves.
But I’d fully agree the FOO role isn’t ideal - mainly as that should have a JTAC in it.

WRT conversion training, in the 80’s everything started with the C1, 109 or L5 (even 81mm Mortar) was a simple bolt on, as the fundamentals didn’t change.
109 Drivers required Driver, Light Track (same as 113, 548 or Queen Mary) as a STT/PCF
Now towed Arty still requires Driver Wheeled, and Gun Tow, plus for the 777 I’m assuming Air Brakes and whatever the gunntractor acronym is. So that’s basically a wash.

I’m of the opinion the PRes ideally would make up personnel to allow for enough guns for 4 gun Troops and 3 Firing Battery’s/ Reg’t, plus augmentation to CP and Recce/Survey (if that is still a thing given GPS etc).
With the hope that DArty and DLR are pushing for a 109 type vehicle for two of the Bde’s, and a Rocket Reg’t for Div GS.
 
Based on my experience a Para role isn’t a non starter for reserves.

Yes, yes it is a non-starter for Reserves in Canada.

Having tried to keep a reserve unit's Airborne Platoon up and running against the tide of no courses, no exercises, not enough time to select enough of the right people and keep them fit enough, usual levels of militia turnover, and no refresher equipment or instructors available - amongst other general f*ckery like Reg F disinterest and ARes Senior Officers and staff who have no idea what and Airborne Platoon is or does or care - I can tell you it's a fool's errand. The troops were very keen and capable I thought, but the system continually let them down.

At best you might achieve 'parachute club' status. At worst, you're going to kill people... IMHO.
 
Whelp, there goes this thread ;)

I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?
 
I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?
Norther Iraq in 2003, the seizure of Kandahar airfield, but in general I agree it’s a niche capability we likely don’t need.
 
I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?
My kids used to say that when I said "Eat your vegetables."
 
I think alot of the issue is the major complexes the CAF and Canada in general has towards the UK. We want to be better but we can't look as good as them well because Canadian you know....Can't spend money on fancy la dee da uniforms or even operational gear without massive interference and red tape.

And actually Dan Carlin brought this up. He basically said you can equip other people like Romans, give them the same training but at the end of the day they aren't Romans nor do they perform the same way.

I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?
Crete is a really bad example. If the British had even the faintest clue as to what was really happening around. Instead of surrendering. They might have demanded that the Germans surrender.
Given how badly the Jerry airborne had mauled damned near massacred to be honest. They might have surrendered themselves.
 
I am Navy guy... Anything green is unnecessarily ridiculous to me.

But seriously, when was the last time a massed airborne operation was overwhelming successful outside of the German invasion of Crete and DDay ?
I’m not in disagreement. Is massed airborne ops a relevant thing in this day and age? And more importantly relevant in what the CAF is doing or wants to do (something I am not sure has been determined).

At the end of the day, parachuting is an insertion method.

SOF, SAR, and Pathfinders. That makes sense.

The only reason to keep any other capability might be to integrate with other forces should they decide to do massed airborne ops.

The concern is maybe we don’t need it now but what if we need it later? We’ve already seen what getting rid of some capabilities we thought were not needed has gotten us.
 
I’m not in disagreement. Is massed airborne ops a relevant thing in this day and age? And more importantly relevant in what the CAF is doing or wants to do (something I am not sure has been determined).

At the end of the day, parachuting is an insertion method.

SOF, SAR, and Pathfinders. That makes sense.

The only reason to keep any other capability might be to integrate with other forces should they decide to do massed airborne ops.

The concern is maybe we don’t need it now but what if we need it later? We’ve already seen what getting rid of some capabilities we thought were not needed has gotten us.

Very valid point.

I would say we can't be all singing all dancing. We haven't the will or the capitol. Hard questions need to asked. And some golden cows need to turned into ground beef.

Ive already expressed that I don't think Canada needs an Army. Especially not structured as we have now. So I'm standing outside the fire and asking.
 
In the 80's we had two FOO parties of 3-4 each using jeep with trailers, simulators were a puff table. Plus two CP's and survey party, supporting a 6 gun battery. I don't know how good our FOO's were but with modern simulators they can do the majority of the training indoors and use the exercises both dry and live fire to learn approach and concealment.
I argue that based on the Ukrainian experience, reservists can do these jobs. I would stand up a UAV Troop in every Reserve artillery regiment right now. Buy them a commercial drone and use it to develop techniques and procedures based on current Ukrainian lessons. The young solider will figure out the basics faster than the Army can write procedure down. I would keep procedures basic, let the troops try out different ideas, submit results, while feeding in techniques learned in Ukraine as they develop. Cost of this program would be peanuts (well unless you resurrected the Peanut).
 
Yes, yes it is a non-starter for Reserves in Canada.

Having tried to keep a reserve unit's Airborne Platoon up and running against the tide of no courses, no exercises, not enough time to select enough of the right people and keep them fit enough, usual levels of militia turnover, and no refresher equipment or instructors available - amongst other general f*ckery like Reg F disinterest and ARes Senior Officers and staff who have no idea what and Airborne Platoon is or does or care - I can tell you it's a fool's errand. The troops were very keen and capable I thought, but the system continually let them down.

At best you might achieve 'parachute club' status. At worst, you're going to kill people... IMHO.
For a long time PRes units had Jump Coy’s
The issue isn’t that reservists can’t, it’s an issue if it’s not being supported beyond that.

Let’s face it any idiot can exit a plane and let gravity take over, it’s not rocket science. Both of us are proof of that ;)

Most of the those companies where reliable CT sources when they got sick of their leadership. The only way those entities are of value is with a direct Ops task to a Para entity.

IMHO (having done it) Airborne deploying into the arctic is a quick and reliable method of showing the flag and posturing. There are also a lot of reasons to hang onto Para capabilities outside of strictly SOF roles.
No self respecting SOF entity wants to do a static line low level airfield seizure - or any sort of mass jump.

Now I don’t think there is any point to a conventional Para Coy - ideally it’s a Bde an a Bn Group at min
 
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