Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[brihard]

FJAG has made some interesting statements.  However, if I recall correctly, the U.S. experience with its integrated reserve model, especially those concerned with service support, did not fare too well during the Iraq and Afghan conflicts.

From my understanding, the Commonwealth tradition in mobilization is that:

1.  Most of the reservists are cashiered right away as too old and unfit for wartime service;

2.  Most of the regulars are cashiered soon after first contact as stale and unfit for the demands of war; and

3.  The organization that comes out of this is a force of very young officers and NCOs who are wartime volunteers led at the higher levels by those few regulars and reservists who had the natural talent to survive the cut.

I don't believe a 'next' world war would last long enough for that to play out, personally. We wouldn't have months in trenches to put everyone through that crucible. Nor would we be able to mass-produce recruits with anything past light infantry skills.

Nope, today it's very much 'going to war with the army you have'. And that'll probably be it. The lead time on production and the resource and technological requirements for modern AFVs would preclude mass producing attrition quantities of modern AFVs; we'd probably have to take a substantial leap backwards in terms of the technical complexity of front line kit simply in order to produce it fast enough. We'd probably have to do it with pre-existing natural resources that we already have in production on our own friendly soil.

So yeha- I don't think a modern war would be prolonged enough for the old dynamic to play out. We'd finally have a modern smashing of the 'militia myth', though, if we tried to call up our reserve regiments wholesale and commit them effectively to battle in amalgamated LIBs.

 

[Infanteer]

I don't believe a 'next' world war would last long enough for that to play out, personally. We wouldn't have months in trenches to put everyone through that crucible. Nor would we be able to mass-produce recruits with anything past light infantry skills.

Nope, today it's very much 'going to war with the army you have'. And that'll probably be it. The lead time on production and the resource and technological requirements for modern AFVs would preclude mass producing attrition quantities of modern AFVs; we'd probably have to take a substantial leap backwards in terms of the technical complexity of front line kit simply in order to produce it fast enough. We'd probably have to do it with pre-existing natural resources that we already have in production on our own friendly soil.

A big assumption to make, especially if such opinion is to inform planning for any contingency.  I've heard this argument made by some middle-management from Ottawa, and I'm not convinced there is any veracity to it.  One simply has to work out a plausible situation to see that a "come as you are" war isn't the only possibility.  Given that the Gulf War was almost 7 months from flash to bang, it is certainly easy to imagine a conflict taking longer to resolve with some bigger players involved.  All it takes is a solid stalemate or a good winter to slow things down enough.  If two forces batter each other pretty good in the opening phases, things could also conceivably slow down while mobilization is taken to some extent on the home front (say, for example, the raising of a Special Force).

A good read on this is Jim Storr's "Embryo of a Wartime Army" from the RUSI Journal.  Unfortunately, the file is a smidge to big for me to post it here.

 

[ArmyRick]

7 months flash to bang for the gulf war. 7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...

 

[Journeyman]

7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...

No government will call for mobilization, at the first rumblings of conflict, so that you'd be given seven months.

 

[Infanteer]

No, however, the Special Force was called up 2 weeks after North Korea invaded south Korea and its first elements were on the ground in 3 months with the rest of the brigade following up 5 months later.

 

[Journeyman]

Yes, an interesting experiment, never repeated. I've often wondered about Brigadier Rockingham coming out of retirement to command; was there no other suitable leadership available in either the Res or RegF world?

 

[Infanteer]

Never say never.  IIRC, the Reg Force was left untouched to keep it focused on committments to Europe and home defence.  This was all a year or two before the large shift in defence posture that saw the Army grow to 4 Brigades.

The performance of the follow up force (Roto 1?) consisting of the Reg Force battalions certainly indicates that was the case (source: A War of Patrols).

 

[Old Sweat]

Actually the army was planning to mobilize a brigade for Europe before the Korean War came along. Two brigades were mobilized by the expedient of tasking selected militia units to recruit companies which were then grouped into the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry, Rifle and Highland Battalions with subunits of other arms and services being formed via the same route. The artillery regiment in Guelph, for example, recruited the 216th Field Battery which perpetuated Guelph's 16th Field Battery and the 284th Field Battery from Yarmouth did the same for that city's 84th Field Battery.

More or less concurrently the special force was forming along with training organizations which eventually became the 3rd Battalions of the permanent force infantry regiments. In a matter of months the army went from three to 15 infantry battalions and maintained two brigades - one fighting a war - on foreign shores at opposite ends of the world. This was possible because of a good reserve structure and because the supply bins were full of equipment. We did have to buy some stuff, like Sherman tanks from the US, but mainly it was just recreate the 1945 army again.

 

[brihard]

How many of those people quickly recruited for the special force in Koreawere WW2 vets- and how many were able to immediately be employed in their old NCO or officer ranks?

I'm not saying we couldn't fill a lot of ranks and files pretty quickly, but what about leadership?

Then again, I suppose we also have a lot of very capable combat arms and CSS leadership sitting in various offices in various places working essentially bureaucratic jobs that could be left vacant for the duration of a sudden conflict... I imagine someone's probably run the numbers on that...

 

[Infanteer]

How many of those people quickly recruited for the special force in Koreawere WW2 vets- and how many were able to immediately be employed in their old NCO or officer ranks?

I'm not saying we couldn't fill a lot of ranks and files pretty quickly, but what about leadership?

How many Afghan vets would return to the colours?

 

[Old Sweat]

The plan was to use as many vets as possible, and there had been some talk about them flocking to the colours. Most, however, were happily engaged in the baby boom in the suburbs and I think most who were enrolled were fresh off the streets. There were enough good quality officers and NCOs willing to come back in that the leadership cadre was pretty experienced. I am not sure if anyone every did a study of the manning of the intake, so my information is based on observation and a bit of personal experience from when I enlisted in 1957.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

How many Afghan vets would return to the colours?

What mechanism are we putting in place to keep RegF Afghan vet members who are releasing involved in the PRes so as to keep their skill sets from atrophying?

 

[54/102 CEF]

Christie Blatchford, Reserves Languishing by not being upgraded, Korea Mobilisation ........ (let me see)

Here's my fly on the wall views

Actually - we have 2 militia's the Permanent Active Militia (Regs) and the Non Permanent Active Militia (Res). These are their 1939 terms.

From 1952 to 1998 (end of Berlin Wall?) I could see a bigger reg force when the Soviets were still out there.

Today - for all the song and dance we see at 101 Colonel By Drive I come to the conclusion its just about Federal Paychecks spread across the country.

To test this - let's play Risk and Deploy a Battle Group indefinitely. That lasts about 5 years then the Regs are so beat up they can't sustain it even with Reserve Support. Happened in Bosnia and Afghanistan - partly for Equipment Issues and manpower affairs.

Then some talking head gives a speech and says we're ready to do it again.

I just watched a Youtube Show on Canada and Korea - Type in Test of Will - Canada in Korea. Its about 90 mins long and a very (to me) well balanced show. It reveals we haven't had a mobilisation since 1939. For Korea we recruited WW2 Vets - Militia and Civvys in that order. Over 3-4 years we deployed about 25000 troops. But it was all done cheap - initial flag waving then ended with indiv soldiers arriving home in the middle of the prairies after dark. No one can keep the buzz going as it will inevitably fade from the front splash page of your m.news app.

So my point to keep it short? We use the Forces in support of a political mission. When that changes we all scale back. Same story in US, UK.

Thus - having an almost 70 year run of DND on the cheap since 1945 we have to face facts. DND isn't a big stick and we all have to keep that in mind despite periodically doing something with the larger Nato Forces.

Jack English and his friends have no voice. Statistics tells you a run of 7 indications up or down is a trend. The run for the Forces has been down for a long time, even adjusted for inflation by our pet bean counters and equipment procurement professionals. The more current year dough shovelled to the Forces - the less it gets - even if we had a budget on par with the UK (a force always under attack by its government) what would we do with a bigger force? We have no long history with a constant big force to police an Empire like the Brits had from 1759 to 1956. We are a force based on small everything. Never been big in peace and only temporarily big in the pre-nuclear warfare period. Once we had the big Firecracker - we were as high as 165,000 but this was in the pre 1968 period - again almost 50 years ago.

What is the impact of all the over head staff we have if all we can do is deploy a Kampfgruppe with some 700 outside the Wire.

The impact is simple - Federal Paychecks - outside the Cadpat Combat side of the Forces - any non Cadpat activity is probably an easily learnable civvy market based skill-trade-profession (insert your civvy equivalent). Yet we overlay it with an Army of managers and Financial Professionals (get your CMA kids and have a job for life!) to dress it up as a modern back end to a modern fighting force.

Really? So why haven't we got a replacement for the Buffalo, the Seakings, let alone the F35 Does our depth drive us to deals like buying Brit subs? Why are our bases wilting for lack of re-investment. What's our plan for the North if shipping lanes open for Euro-Asia trade?

These answers aren't only DND related - probably more than one government department is involved and new policy takes time. But log jams can be broken - the C17, Herc and Chinook replacements weren't evolutionary as far as I can see - it was political will that  did that. In the same vein - in time - we'll see new steel sailing the seas built in Canadian Shipyards.

But barring a Zombie Michael Jackson Army arriving on the scene - the boots we have now on the ground are probably all we'll see for some time to come. Seven is a trend - seventy five is a national policy impervious to whatever political party is in power.

 

[McG]

7 months flash to bang for the gulf war. 7 months is PLENTY of time to get reserve platoons and companys mobilized (if pushed hard in trg)...

That assumes the magical equipment fairy provides for all the weapons, vehicles and support systems for these reserve platoons and companies to use.  If we want the reserve force as a mobilisation base for a 7 months notice war, then we need the equipment ahead of time.

On a less far-reaching note, reserve CSS and Engr put sub-units from opposite sides of a province under a single unit HQ.  Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?

 

[brihard]

On a less far-reaching note, reserve CSS and Engr put sub-units from opposite sides of a province under a single unit HQ.  Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?

Regimental associations, regimental senates, and politically connected former reserve officers and families thereof. It is not a system that, objectively, makes much sense were one outside looking in.

I genuinely believe that it's only a matter of time before the British approach to reserve amalgamation is substantially adopted.

 

[Journeyman]

..... sitting in various offices in various places "working" essentially bureaucratic jobs that could be left vacant for the duration ....

~clutching at chest~
Having once been posted to NDHQ, you have no idea how self-important bureaucracies can be.

Why is it reserve infantry and armoured regiments within the same city each retain a LCol for their company?

Why indeed.  op:

 

[ArmyRick]

Personally, I think the London Regt is a good example of what our reserve infantry and armoured regiments could adopt. Each sub unit perpetuates a unit in headdress and name but the CO and RSM are the same for all (In this case the CO and RSM could choose to wear any one of the affiliated insignia). It would certainly reduce the LT COL and CWO count.

 

[Jed]

The CO and RSM should pull a 'Montgomery or Full Monty  ;D' : Wear multiple cap badges.

 

[OldSolduer]

Personally, I think the London Regt is a good example of what our reserve infantry and armoured regiments could adopt. Each sub unit perpetuates a unit in headdress and name but the CO and RSM are the same for all (In this case the CO and RSM could choose to wear any one of the affiliated insignia). It would certainly reduce the LT COL and CWO count.

It works but is a stop gap measure. If we were to expand, we'd have two COs and two RSMs again.

 

[dapaterson]

It works but is a stop gap measure. If we were to expand, we'd have two COs and two RSMs again.

Canada's Army Reserve is, generously, 20K people, of which 16K are trained to the DP1 level.

Using a very generous 400 trained soldiers per unit, that gives us 40 LCols, nationwide, in command positions.

Currently there are 51 Infantry LCols commanding units.  Gunners: 17.  Recce: 17.  Engineers: 10.  CSS: 10.  Sigs: 10.  That's 115 LCols commanding - almost 3x what the current strength can justify.  (This ignores the growing Int empire & CBG HQs).

Will we see the Army Reserve triple in size in the near term?

Or would a system that has more competition for senior positions, that provides more time in rank to build better-experienced leaders provide a better end-product?