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Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
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The first question

What current resources do Army Reserves get and what future resources will they get.

You can't evaluate a plan without numbers.
 
54/102 CEF said:
The first question

What current resources do Army Reserves get and what future resources will they get.

You can't evaluate a plan without numbers.
Yes,that is a very good question because over many years we have never ever heard a clear answer.
 
Sorry. You'll have to be a bit more specific with your question. Do you want to know financial, equipment or personnel resources? Or all of the above? I can probably dig that information up for you but I won't be able to do so until the new year as I start my leave in just a few hours from now and I'm currently trying to get some things tidied up before I go.

Also, can anyone tell me if there's a way to post powerpoint slides on here? That would make my life a heck of a lot easier to answering this question.

(edited for spelling. Guess I should use that spell check more often)
 
I would say that everything depends on finances. Being a WO and from the Argylls I see many financial constraints on the unit. Will LFCA download money to units to train for specific overseas tasks? As of right now they do not.

SHARP WO
 
Mama,

You can post individual Powerpoint slides that you save and host at an internet site - or the entire slide show hosted at a site.

For the direct attach method it may work if you resize the slide...
 
A_Majoor,

To counter, what about putting certain positions as reg, ie. Company 2ic and Ops. WO (if that position exists at Canadian Coy. level?) along with select other "cadre" staff positions necessary.

I am interested to see what other ways could minimize the financial impact of creating a 4th rifle company within the infantry battalions that are on their 'readiness' phase.

Sorry it took so long to find this, I didn't realize it had been moved at first!

Cadre staff is also workable, and I believe it is how many Nordic Armies are organized (i.e. the soldiers show up at the warehouse during the two week training period and are met by the professional cadre who take charge and organize them into a fighting unit.) There will have to be a lot of work in determining the "right" cadre, both in terms of what positions can/should be filled by Regular Force and which can be held by Reserves. The other danger is the Cadre might be seen as a sort of "dumping ground" for the less talented members of the Battalion. My suggestion of bulking up existing rifle companies was an attempt to get around these limitations, limit the amount of extra staff required by direct mentoring, and have something to offer the Reserve as well (trained and experienced troops). The weakness' that have been pointed out will require more work to solve, but perhaps there is no "right" answer.
 
George Harrison - now dead Beatle said

Its gonna take Money

Hey Nancy - we know you are on the inside - good - you can only do your slice of the pie - my point is progress can only be measured if they show the resources   ALL

Else - unfortunately our highly respected and able CLS is just a babe in the woods getting the warm fuzzy from his higher ups   in a town that runs on BS
 
I agree with the increase in paid ceiling....


Many times I have hear regular force comrades scoffing at the minute size of reserve "battalions"...
What they sont realize is that even if a unit has an incredibly successful year for recruiting soliders, you cut your own throat the next years as your allowed slots is reduced.......

The reserve regiments are the strength they are because that is what Ottawa wants them to be.....

By way of example.....

In 1970 my regiment paraded 400+ soldiers on a regular basis....... and the other 3 units in my city paraded similar amounts....
And then, evils of integration were in full swing, a 'manpower cap' was placed on the reserves....Each unit was not allowed to have more than 120+/- pers (Perhaps not the exact figure but the figure that has been quoted to me by soldiers that lived through that era.)
Almost overnight my regiment had to release 300 soldiers...all due to paid ceiling,,,,,

Although the manpower cap was later lifted..(early 90's?)... the funding model served much the same purpose....
And by place the cost of training the recruits fully on the regiments, the reserves were now faced with the choice of providing trained soldiers or providing recruits....

Its a very difficult balancing act between providing excellent training (the reason troops stay in the reserve) and providing not only recruit trg but QL4's and PLQ's as well.

The units within the Hamilton Garrison could easily recruit enough soldiers to put them each at wartime strength...there is that much interest in the military and I do not think I am wrong when I say that the same sit. applies across the country....

The critical situation is the money............

Given the above, I would ask that my reg force bretheren to try and understand WHY a reserve unit calls itself a Battalion at 200+/- pers

By all means offer criticism if we (the reserves) are falling below the high standard that the regular force units set for the army, offer assistance and advice....We WANT to learn, to improve... and to be professional....

But please don't slag us because the purse strings that determine our str  are not held by us, or the even the Army for that matter.
 
Infanteer said:
pbi said:
Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.
I'd venture that Regimental politics has been in our blood since day 1. None of the history I read seems to look favorably on the Regimental contribution to operational efficiency in the past.

To me, it's a toss up. The change is definitely needed - it allows fragmented units to combine training assets and recruiting areas. However, amalgamation seems to balance the bad (eliminating historic units) with the good (the lineage of the units will carry on). Our path has been to put units to zero strength, which also balances the good (the units with their unique heritage still "exist") with the bad (the zero-strength units exist in stasis).

Either way, the imperative of matching the Regimental system to operational realities should be the overarching consideration - kudos to the Brits for having the institutional fortitude to do so.

Infanteer: I agree with most of what you have said, although I am not sure that amalgamation necessarily leads to the complete loss of   Regtl traditions. IIRC, some of the various TA Regts of the British Army represent several former County or Volunteer Regts that were merged, but preserved a large portion of the heritage of the former units by means of allowing the resulting sub-units to keep (bracketed) desgnations and in some cases items of dress or insignia. As well, there is no reason that other traditions and customs such as special days, events, mess practices, etc. have to be dropped completely either.

What amalgamation would do, IMHO, is help to overcome the age-old obstacle that Army Reserve struggles with when it comes to producing leaders at sub-unit and unit level: the "gene pool" of the average unit is so small that selection of CO and RSM (or even OC and SM) too often becomes a question only of "the last man standing". If, instead of having to select a CO/RSM from a limited (and sometimes regrettably "inbred") pool of 80 or 100 total all ranks (actually from a small slice of even that limited total), the selection could occur from amongst the much larger pool represented by the amalgamated strength of several units. I do not see amalgamation as a veiled way of cutting strength, since the positions to be reduced are those few at the redundant unit HQs. Instead of five or six units with establishments of 120, the idea would be to have full-strength sub-units combined into something that much more closely resembles a full-TOE unit, and more importantly provides a much deeper and broader succession pool.

Of course, we can also advance the theory that the answer is not to amalgamate but to recruit all unts up to full battalion strength. Personally, and based on what I have seen in the last 30 years, this is not a realistic COA in Canada unless we were to find ourselves once again in a general war with widespread popular support. Other than that, I think that we face the same reality of unit strengths that our Res units have for most of the last century: only a few Canadians are actually inclined to (or capable of...) making the sacrifices and effort involved in beng a citizen soldier. We need, IMHO, to tailor our structure to that reality, instead of constantly searching for a return to an imagined "Golden Age" of overflowing armouries.   Cheers.

[Modified to include quote from source thread]
 
pbi

I think you're right on the amalgamation issue.   There is an awful lot of ways that antecedent units are commemorated in amalgamated units. Cap from one, hackle from another, collar dogs from the third, stable belts, lanyards, kilts, trews, bugles, pipes, tunes and banners, not to mention all the regimental silver.   Part of the fun and privilege of belonging to a unit is being able to draw on the history of all those antecedents.  

For those of us that are or were Calgary Highlanders we not only drew on the Highlanders WW2 heritage, we also celebrated the heritage of 10th Bn CEF as well as the 103rd, our forming unit. As well we associated with   the history of our sister unit, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which itself was an amalgamated unit with antecedents that had previously existed as numbered units.

In fact, I'll indulge myself and be a bit pedantic just now to make a point.

In 1794 the 98th (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot was raised.
In 1798 it was renumbered as the 91st (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot, reflecting a rise in precedence because the Army shrank I believe.
In 1799 the 93rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot was raised because some character name of Napoleon was making life miserable again so the Army had to re-expand.
In 1804 the 91st raised a second battalion with the 93rd raising a second in 1813.   Both 2nd battalions were disbanded in 1815 after Waterloo.
In 1809 the 91st (Argyllshire Highlanders) Foot was renamed 91st Regiment of Foot
In 1861 the 93rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot was renamed 93rd Sutherland Highlanders.
In 1864 the 91st Regiment of Foot was again renamed, this time to 91st Argyllshire Highlanders.
In 1872 the 91st got a new royal patron and became 91st Princess Louise's Argyllshire Highlanders
In 1881 the 91st and the 93rd amalgamated as the Princess Louise's Sutherland and Argyllshire Highlanders of 2 battalions.
In 1882 the regiment was renamed Princess Louise's (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders)
In 1920 it became The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's) and was reduced to one regular battalion.   (In WW1 and 2 a number of temporary service battalions were formed and disbanded)
In 1970 it was reduced to 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Balaklave Company (Princess Louise's) - (The letterhead was longer than the muster roll)
In 1972 it was reformed as 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)
and now, I believe it is The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (5th Battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland).

Conveniently I happen to have at my elbow a book The Scottish Regiments by DM Henderson that was loaned to me by a buddy.   Must remember to get it back to him.

The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards sustain the memory of 3 regiments while the Highlanders were raised as the 72nd, 75th,78th, 79th and 100th regiments of foot between 1778 and 1794.

By the way dress, accoutrements, roles, equipment and recruiting areas have all changed drastically over time.

As you say the history issues can be overcome and become a great source of pride and strength.

Setting aside the history and the emotions, operationally I might suggest a mixed system for the reserves.   In places like Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, where numbers and proximity permit I think amalgamated battalions with conventional orders of battle would probably work just fine.   In places where numbers and distance conspire against the formation of units perhaps independent companies or squadrons would be a better anwer.   For example The Calgary Highlanders might become the 10th Independent Company (Calgary Highlanders) Western Canada Field Force or some such and be constituted as a combat team complete with a 5 or 6 platoon structure and incorporating service support.

That has actually been a pet construct of mine, at least for western Canada, for some time.

Anywhooo...... Cheers.
 
Some of the talk on this forum has been creating amalgamated infantry/armour regiments - cue The King's Own Calgary Highlanders, eh?

 
Kirkhill: actually, the amalgamation could work even in areas of geographic dispersal. I give our Bde as an example: it is not uncommon for us to have soldiers drive two hours to get to the Armoury, and we already have a few COs who commute a considerable distance to their HQs. On top of that, the Bde Comd Gp is selected from across three Provinces: our Comd and DComd are from Wpg but our ACOS and BRSM are from Thunder Bay, seven hours travel time to the east.

In the case of a unit amalgamated across a wide area (as we have proposed for our Artillery and our Svc Bns) it really would not result in a huge change for the majority of soldiers, who would continue to parade at their home armoury as they do know. The people erquired to move would be those in key unit-level positions. Under this system the leadership of the component sub-units would be provided by the OC and SM (as it really should be...) with the unit-level folks concentrating on unit-level issues and dealing with Bde HQ.

Our proposals further provide for the eventual redistribution of full time staff, with the sub-units having an FTS somewhat smaller than it is now, composed mainly of Class B, while the majority of the RegF positions would be concentrated in a stronger and more capable bn HQ FTS that also included Class B.

A few of the key tenets in our approach to the issue were:

-no reduction is strength (other than unt Comd Gp posns);

-no reduction in eqpt or facilities at any location;

-no closure of any location;

-no reduction of community footprint;

-re-allocation of funding such that the increased TD costs for combned units were taken into account; and

-appropriate method of designating the unit and preserving traditions, with full input of the unit, the senate and the Branch.

All to say that IMHO amalgamation need not be the frightening monster some people seem to make it out to be. Cheers.
 
The use of "civvie" contractors to support the force either in garrison or on deployment goes back to the beginning of warfare. The growth of the professional logistics corps really dates to @ the 1700s, based on the consolidation of centralized power (royal armies vs feudal levies)and the large scale introduction of firearms. The trend really took off with the introduction of mass armies in the industrial era, when the need to outfit armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions became paramount.

I think the objection to civvie contractors is based on a lack of experience, and the well founded fear they will become like the baggage train of ancient armies, requiring a fair proportion of resources to protect and hindering operations because of the sheer size and unwieldiness. If 1/3 or the force needs to stay in "Camp X" to protect the contractors, then there is a big problem. In theory, military "cooks and clerks" can also act to protect themselves, allowing the field force to carry out operations, but as the thread about the "Ombudsman having soldiers break into tears" shows, double hatting them with their day jobs and the D&S role might not work out to well either.

This is moving a bit off topic, but if we don't want to have large logistics trains or "baggage trains" of contractors dragging behind us on deployment, then we will have to make a big investment in organizational structures which do not require as much support, and technologies which are more "self sufficient". (For an example, a laser weapon will not need to be replenished with ammunition, although it will need a source of energy. A sufficiently powerful laser on an air born platform might be able to provide coverage equal to many batteries of mortars or artillery pieces, resulting in an overall logistics reduction). The practical result of this might be "fire and forget" type deployments, where troops debuss from the JSS, do the job, mount up and go home to a "superbase" where the second and third line support is done.

So where do the reserves fit in? Given the lack of money and equipment, perhaps they should be given defined tasks, in the way the Navy reserve is into MCM, harbour defense etc. Reserve DOMOPS Coy's might be a better use of resources, letting the reg units off the hook for IRU and making them the "second team", allowing them to concentrate on the expeditionary force model. We are clearly spinning our wheels under the current system, meeting obligations by shunting resources from other jobs to the detriment of long term planning and preparation. Much more out of the box thinking is needed.
 
I fully agree with a_majoor in the finding a niche concept.  (I can hear Infanteer cringe)

Like it or not our system cannot keep functioning in the current manner.  We need to lift the IRU task for domestic ops off the regular force and have a solid local system in place much like the US ARNG.  It makes no sence to ship an Artillery Reg't from Manitoba to BC to fight a fire and likewise for floods and icestorms.
Local troops shoudl be immediately (within 12hrs) be able to be deployed towards a thread of that nature.  

Some postions Artillery for one (where the Regs are weak in numbers - three batteries for a Brigade...) are an area where Reserve troops could be fitted into a regualr force system - the FOO Partied being regulars and excersise with the reg batteries but on deployment they slide into a reserve field battery.
Many of the CSS postions could be filled for deployment by reservists as well - and fruthermore I beleive that for mature (stable) theatre where the requirement for the LAV/Coyote system was low a Battlegroup could be easily filled by 90% reservists.

However I think the LFRR must focus on identifiying some units for DOMOPS only - thus they can be tailored for certain roles (WMD taskings etc.)
Furthermore I think the regular force inf should be tailored light and the reserve inf units that are selected as deployable units should be fitted into an Armoured Cavalry system with 011 crew.


I detest the idea of civilian contracting - simply from my experiences in Op Athena...
 
Some of my points.
The 8CH in Gagetown was a 90/10 Sqn. Most that were with them, well it sucked. Most reses don't have the training to may a full Coy/Sqn. It is my unit is better, my unit does it this way, my unit doesn't do that. We have it on tour, in a mixed Sqn, well?
As for in the Boar War-Korea, it was a different time. Soldiers didn't get out of parades, or exercises. Now, we have I cannot showup because "My dog died", I have to take my mom to the store", or etc.
We get soldiers on task here at the school. And most have more adm problems. Most don't get the full courses. Last yr there was one yng soldier, that showed up for a task. She was not ever qualified. Her unit told her, the school would give it to them. We have had Snr NCOs, showup that couldn't instruct. Or fired from tour.
For some tasks, yes on the Log side. But in the F ech. Res have to be there more than 3 months. I'm not anti Res. Just I have been on tour with Reserves. And some were better than Regs, but most were not.
 
Dave
Sorry, but it's kinda the truth. My gunner I got stuck with, well. I could have put a fig 13 target, in their place.
 
Recce41 said:
Dave
Sorry, but it's kinda the truth. My gunner I got stuck with, well. I could have put a fig 13 target, in their place.

Did you ask yourself why that might be? How can we expect our Res soldiers to have the same skill levels as Regulars on 37.5 days of unit trg and a few weeks in the summer each year? We have a hard time keeping up skills in Regular units as it is: To expect much more from Res under our system is IMHO not very realistic. I agree that most RegF are probably better than most Res, but then that is our job and the reason the country has us in the first place, as opposed to relying on a totally or largely Res system.

My attitude is that we need to look at Res soldiers for what they can do, instead of what they can't do. Considering the obstacles in their path, overall I'd say they do pretty well. They have some unmotivated wanks who are in it for the pocket money too, but then we've got our ration thieves in the Regular Army as well. Cheers.
 
pbi said:
but then we've got our ration thieves in the Regular Army as well.

Ditto

IMHO We should run everyone through the deployment wringer in DLOC (well more than what we currently call DLOC anyway) - Irregardless of rank - I've seen the sash covered up to often to mention.  Recce41 I know a few 031 Sgt's I'd gladly take a Fig11 in trade for - you can at least use a Fig 11 for something...
 
Which is why the Reserve should concentrate on jobs that can be mastered in 37.5 days.

DOMOPS Coy's is a good place to start, since a lot of the skill sets would actually be the ones the soldiers have from their "day jobs", with military organization added to get the most use out of these skills.

Line Infantry, basic Engineering, Artillery, Armoured Recce (Light) or Armoured D&M are other possible tasks as well for backfilling Regular units, so long as there are limited resources for training and equipping reserve soldiers.

We should also consider just what is going on with how we train, since during the World Wars Canadians were going "0 to 60" in about a month (from raw civilian to "trained soldier" able to take his place in a line unit). Granted these weren't at the level of "Sturmtruppen" or Waffen SS, but they did get the job done. Todays reservist is advertised as the "most educated" ever, so they should be able to handle complicated concepts like "Following direction" and so on.....
 
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