But did it?
What would have happened had those resources been spent on, say, developing better tanks, as Dowding advocated? How would the Battle of the Atlantic have played out had Coastal Command not had to wait for Halifaxes and other obsolescent Bomber Command hand-me-downs?
As to just how many resources Bomber Command consumed, about a third of the British war budget paid for Bomber command. Of the over 4 million Britons who served in WWII, almost a million served in Bomber Command (though the exact number is hard to calculate, and does not include thousands more allied and Commonwealth members) - with Bomber Command having a strength of about 250,000 at any one time in the later war years. Over 150,000 aircrew served over the course of the war and of these 77,000 became casualties and 55,000 were killed - a higher casualty rate than any other military branch.
Remember that towards the end of WWII Britain faced a serious manpower shortage that forced serious limits on the operations of its army commanders, and that the Bomber Command personnel were uniformly highly skilled officers, NCOs and technicians and reflected a huge outlay of training resources.
Large portions of the British industry and research establishment were dedicated to the development and production of heavy bombers and bombing methods. Tank development directly suffered as a result, and Coastal Command, which had a desperate need for long range aircraft had to play second fiddle to Bomber Command's needs, with serious results for the early years of the U-Boat war.
So for all its effects on Germany we have to remember the effect the strategic bombing campaign had on the British war effort as well. It was manifestly not a free ride, and Britian paid for every drop in German factory output with the toil of its own industries. It's a complex and interwoven affair, and historians will probably continue to argue whether the campaign was cost effective for generations, but my position is that - in the case of Britain at least (the US is a slightly different story) - it was not.
Not materially anyway. The necessity for the British people to feel they were striking back and the effect the campaign had on British morale and political will is another matter entirely.
*Edited for spelling 'cause I'm a sloppy typer *
What would have happened had those resources been spent on, say, developing better tanks, as Dowding advocated? How would the Battle of the Atlantic have played out had Coastal Command not had to wait for Halifaxes and other obsolescent Bomber Command hand-me-downs?
As to just how many resources Bomber Command consumed, about a third of the British war budget paid for Bomber command. Of the over 4 million Britons who served in WWII, almost a million served in Bomber Command (though the exact number is hard to calculate, and does not include thousands more allied and Commonwealth members) - with Bomber Command having a strength of about 250,000 at any one time in the later war years. Over 150,000 aircrew served over the course of the war and of these 77,000 became casualties and 55,000 were killed - a higher casualty rate than any other military branch.
Remember that towards the end of WWII Britain faced a serious manpower shortage that forced serious limits on the operations of its army commanders, and that the Bomber Command personnel were uniformly highly skilled officers, NCOs and technicians and reflected a huge outlay of training resources.
Large portions of the British industry and research establishment were dedicated to the development and production of heavy bombers and bombing methods. Tank development directly suffered as a result, and Coastal Command, which had a desperate need for long range aircraft had to play second fiddle to Bomber Command's needs, with serious results for the early years of the U-Boat war.
So for all its effects on Germany we have to remember the effect the strategic bombing campaign had on the British war effort as well. It was manifestly not a free ride, and Britian paid for every drop in German factory output with the toil of its own industries. It's a complex and interwoven affair, and historians will probably continue to argue whether the campaign was cost effective for generations, but my position is that - in the case of Britain at least (the US is a slightly different story) - it was not.
Not materially anyway. The necessity for the British people to feel they were striking back and the effect the campaign had on British morale and political will is another matter entirely.
*Edited for spelling 'cause I'm a sloppy typer *