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The reason I am posting this is to provoke thought and debate about the future of our Army.
In a time of fiscal constraints and budget cuts, I am beginning to see errors and decisions being made that are reminiscent of recent history. DND over the last few years have made fiscal decisions and procurement choices based on a reactive mindset rather than a pre-emptive one. I will start be saying that when it comes to training, no one can refute that our men and women are some of the best trained in the world when push comes to shove. Our equipment is rather lacking. By example, although Afghanistan effectively saved the Armoured Core (proving why we need them), we currently have 3 tank systems.... same platform but all different systems. I am sure any tanker can ratify that. Over a decade ago we decided to mothball our Medium Lift capability in the Chinook. The understanding was that we could rely on our allies for the capability and that we would not need a medium lift capability. Although one cannot have the foresight of the time of Afghanistan and that need, but fiscally, sustaining the capability at a minimum and simply expanding when needed would be 'cheaper' than standing the capability up from scratch.
Moving from that loss and new acquisition I look to the current situation of Canada's now lack of an AA capability with the mothballing of the ADAT system. I acknowledge that the ADAT system was meant for Cold-War era mass air defence, AA is still a capability we require. The argument is said we can rely on NATO allies to provide any AA capacity. And although a valid argument, I will play devils advocate and say not really. We can rely on our allies for a AA capabilities in the event of a Mass Air Attack, but we need to focus on Anti-CAS (Close Air Support) and Anti-Drone capabilities. Maintaining the knowledge and experience developed after years with the ADATs could be used to foster and develop these capabilities easier than starting from scratch. Although I could be wrong, Canada can rely on our allies for standard conventional support, but as a smaller army, we need to be autonomous in different capacities.
Moving away from equipment capabilities, I look towards the means in which we train and educate our men and women. Organizations like LFDTS and the Schools (under CDA and CTC) need to be preserved and should not be the first on the chopping blocks when it comes to fiscal constraints. Unlike operational training it takes years to develop doctrine and ensure that the army has the means in which to training and educate our soldiers. Also certain technical abilities developed and maintained by the schools are necessities to a functioning army (specializations like recce, or SIGINT, etc) need to be maintained cause you cannot start that from scratch without substantial costs (money and errors) and time. The reality is you can stand up an Infantry battalion from scratch in 3 years (maybe less) if you have the proper training methods and doctrine. I am not insulting the infantry but stating that in the grand scope, the infantry's job is to seize and hold the ground. Whereas skill necessary to support the infantry are much more specialized.
In a traditional army, the army is built around supporting the infantry for conventional warfare. The reality is no country that has a stomach for a complete conventional war (WW2). You may hear that the Army has to be able to fight a war, a war meaning Russian Tanks rolling over German plains and attacking by example, but in reality we must be combat efficient and effective. We need to define, not only for the Army but the Air force and Navy, what our role is and move in that direction rather than floundering and making decisions (both fiscally and organizationally) based on a reactive manner. We will save more money, time and effectively more lives if we have a little more foresight and look beyond what is happening in the next 2-5 years and begin looking into 10-20 years from now.
Than again I could be wrong.
What are your thoughts ladies and gentlemen?
In a time of fiscal constraints and budget cuts, I am beginning to see errors and decisions being made that are reminiscent of recent history. DND over the last few years have made fiscal decisions and procurement choices based on a reactive mindset rather than a pre-emptive one. I will start be saying that when it comes to training, no one can refute that our men and women are some of the best trained in the world when push comes to shove. Our equipment is rather lacking. By example, although Afghanistan effectively saved the Armoured Core (proving why we need them), we currently have 3 tank systems.... same platform but all different systems. I am sure any tanker can ratify that. Over a decade ago we decided to mothball our Medium Lift capability in the Chinook. The understanding was that we could rely on our allies for the capability and that we would not need a medium lift capability. Although one cannot have the foresight of the time of Afghanistan and that need, but fiscally, sustaining the capability at a minimum and simply expanding when needed would be 'cheaper' than standing the capability up from scratch.
Moving from that loss and new acquisition I look to the current situation of Canada's now lack of an AA capability with the mothballing of the ADAT system. I acknowledge that the ADAT system was meant for Cold-War era mass air defence, AA is still a capability we require. The argument is said we can rely on NATO allies to provide any AA capacity. And although a valid argument, I will play devils advocate and say not really. We can rely on our allies for a AA capabilities in the event of a Mass Air Attack, but we need to focus on Anti-CAS (Close Air Support) and Anti-Drone capabilities. Maintaining the knowledge and experience developed after years with the ADATs could be used to foster and develop these capabilities easier than starting from scratch. Although I could be wrong, Canada can rely on our allies for standard conventional support, but as a smaller army, we need to be autonomous in different capacities.
Moving away from equipment capabilities, I look towards the means in which we train and educate our men and women. Organizations like LFDTS and the Schools (under CDA and CTC) need to be preserved and should not be the first on the chopping blocks when it comes to fiscal constraints. Unlike operational training it takes years to develop doctrine and ensure that the army has the means in which to training and educate our soldiers. Also certain technical abilities developed and maintained by the schools are necessities to a functioning army (specializations like recce, or SIGINT, etc) need to be maintained cause you cannot start that from scratch without substantial costs (money and errors) and time. The reality is you can stand up an Infantry battalion from scratch in 3 years (maybe less) if you have the proper training methods and doctrine. I am not insulting the infantry but stating that in the grand scope, the infantry's job is to seize and hold the ground. Whereas skill necessary to support the infantry are much more specialized.
In a traditional army, the army is built around supporting the infantry for conventional warfare. The reality is no country that has a stomach for a complete conventional war (WW2). You may hear that the Army has to be able to fight a war, a war meaning Russian Tanks rolling over German plains and attacking by example, but in reality we must be combat efficient and effective. We need to define, not only for the Army but the Air force and Navy, what our role is and move in that direction rather than floundering and making decisions (both fiscally and organizationally) based on a reactive manner. We will save more money, time and effectively more lives if we have a little more foresight and look beyond what is happening in the next 2-5 years and begin looking into 10-20 years from now.
Than again I could be wrong.
What are your thoughts ladies and gentlemen?
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