Generals, Generalship and History; split from Re: The Somme

[xavier]

Michael:
Thanks. I remember reading Keegan rather scathing assesement of Haig. I was  quite taken aback because it's the section of the book where you immediately sense Keegan's disgust whereas in rest of the book, he maintains a certain historian's detachment.
Here's a blog post  referring to a new book by Christopher Duffy on the German perspective of the Somme.
According to the conclusions.
1) The Germans suffered heavy casualities and regarded it as a defeat
2) The German respected the British military's growing professionalism.

Of course this raises a related question: if the Germans were indeed 'defeated'  in the Western Front; why it didn't affect them on the Eastern front. After all, the Germans and Austrians were still conducting successfull attacks against the Russians?
A tangential question:  Did the British/Commonwealth learn from Somme experience that ensuring that men aren't pointless killed to attain some general objective? Pétain and the French generals appear to have it. Or is my question inaccurate?

Thanks!

xavier

 

[ExSarge]

Well, comparing McNaughton the scientist gunner to, say, the profane and blustering Vokes seems like apples and oranges. Competent, to be sure (though critics of his Moro River campaign would disagree, and I think Granatstein argues convincingly that he was unsuited to command an Armoured Division but did anyway due to a mixup between Foulkes and Vokes), but one of the few infantrymen to gain high command in the war.  Hoffmeister did too, but he was a militiaman and eventually commanded an armoured division (successfully). Keller was another example of a less than adequate commander that came from the infantry.

Mike,

Not comparing them as such, just commenting on the number of them that reached positions of high comand in the Canadian Army. I do not have your expertise in this field but from my reading I would regard Hoffmeister as the best division commander of the bunch.

 

[Old Sweat]

Vokes was a sapper, as was Burns  who followed Crerar in command of 1 Canadian Corps in Italy. When he was relieved, Burns was replaced by Foulkes, an infantryman. Thus, corps command was not the exclusive purview of gunners.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Mike,

Not comparing them as such,

No, I was. ;D

just commenting on the number of them that reached positions of high comand in the Canadian Army. I do not have your expertise in this field but from my reading I would regard Hoffmeister as the best division commander of the bunch.

Yes, I think Hoffmeister was the best also.  I was trying to point out the number of infantrymen in command positions was low - but Old Sweat has corrected me on Vokes - he commanded the Patricias early in the war but I was wrong about his prewar vocation - Engineers.

 

[Old Sweat]

Mike,

The infantry did not do that badly in terms of divisional command. Offhand, besides Hoffmeister, I can think of Foulkes, Keller, Spry, Kitching and Blackader (at least in an acting capacity for several weeks in Normandy after Keller was wounded). All but Hoffmeister and the last two were permanent force, and it is important to remember that the regular infantry was about the same size as the artillery - seven rifle companies divided among three battalions compared to eight batteries (three field, one medium, one anti-aircraft and three coastal). All arms were grossly understrength and the infantry was established with only one officer platoon commander per company.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

Mike,

The infantry did not do that badly in terms of divisional command. Offhand, besides Hoffmeister, I can think of Foulkes, Keller, Spry, Kitching and Blackader (at least in an acting capacity for several weeks in Normandy after Keller was wounded). All but Hoffmeister and the last two were permanent force, and it is important to remember that the regular infantry was about the same size as the artillery - seven rifle companies divided among three battalions compared to eight batteries (three field, one medium, one anti-aircraft and three coastal). All arms were grossly understrength and the infantry was established with only one officer platoon commander per company.

I thought Keller was yeller.... Copp talks about the suitability of artillery officers as division commanders and argues in The Brigade that since doctrine was based on artillery they were more than capable of doing the job. I can't remember if he argues against the "suitability" of infantry officers to command infantry divisions or not... My question given the path this thread has taken, is - how much did their prewar vocation really matter? I guess the formation commanders had plenty of time in the UK to learn new crafts - don't we judge them by how much they learned in battle rather than what they did before the war in any event?

 

[ExSarge]

I thought Keller was yeller....

I've been madly searching for my source without success, I'm sure I read somewhere a claim that Keller(?) was found in a drunken funk prior to an attack?

don't we judge them by how much they learned in battle rather than what they did before the war in any event?

Exactly so! It's immaterial whether an officer was Militia or Regular, or what their "trade". The only yardstick they can be judged by is their performance under the stress of combat. Currie is an excellent example of that. If they knew in 1914 what we know now, he would have been lucky not to have gone to jail.

 

[Old Sweat]

Commanders shoud certainly be judged on their performance in battle, not on their previous empolyment or their cap badge. Unfortunately a number of writers have criticized the Second World War Canadian army because of the number of gunners that rose to high command. In my opinion the conditions in the prewar army were such that no one could have been considered properly trained or developed by the standards of either the Cold War or today's small wars.

I have heard a number of less than glowing stories about Keller, but never about him cowering in a drunken funk before a battle. Ex Sarge, you may be confusing him with Brigadier Leslie Booth of 4 Armoured Brigade, who was discovered passed out drunk on the floor of his tank by his divisional commander during Operation Totalize.

 

[ExSarge]

I have heard a number of less than glowing stories about Keller, but never about him cowering in a drunken funk before a battle. Ex Sarge, you may be confusing him with Brigadier Leslie Booth of 4 Armoured Brigade, who was discovered passed out drunk on the floor of his tank by his divisional commander during Operation Totalize.

You are right, I am confusing him with Booth. My apologies.

I concur with the request to the DS. This thread has wandered away from the original premise and should be split off.

 

[Old Sweat]

I once came across a statement in an American book that one third of all divisional commanders were incompetent. A look at the Canadian experience in the Second World War - but probably not the First, were only Turner and perhaps Watson were sub par - might bear that out. Certainly the performance of Keller, Foulkes and Kitching in Normandy was not very good and Spry was relieved for failure in the Rhineland (he may have been ill or burned out, or both). We already have been reminded on one historian's assessment of Vokes in command of 4 Div.

Is anyone aware of any analysis of Stacey's statement in The Victory Campaign on the standard of Canadian commanders at the brigade and unit level? The attrition of brigade commanders in Normandy because of battle casualties was rather high, a point Stacey did not make. I can think of at least three who were killed or wounded - Lett, Wyman and Booth - and Blackader moved up after Keller was hit. That is a significant part of the 14 individuals at the two levels cited in the official history. I can off hand only recall three battalion commanders who were sacked for cause in Normandy, while the number of killed and wounded was very high.

(I will be off thiis means for the next few days as I am having a triple bypass tomorrow morning, but plan to continue this discussion in the middle of next week.)

 

[Michael Dorosh]

First off, good luck with the surgery - YIKES.

I find it interesting that Simonds had a rule about six month tour of duties as a battalion commander (according to Copp in The Brigade) - were there similar limits for brigade and division commanders? I could understand not being able to do that due to limited manpower resources as far as experienced senior commanders, but is it fair to think the bde and div comdrs were just as likely to get stressed out as a battalion commander?

 

[Old Sweat]

I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.

MacLauchlan of the Calgary Highlanders was also relieved in Oct 1944, as both Bercuson and Copp discuss. I don't recall immediately if the "rule" was the reason though I think that is why Copp brings up the subject to begin with. MacLauchlan was not well respected in the battalion - War Diary to the contrary - and was seen as "nervous" and was rumoured to wear a US steel helmet because it offered more protection, in addition to digging deep bunkers. His successor, Ross Ellis, is reported to have worn his balmoral habitually and toured front line slits often. Bercuson is diplomatic about it, and rightly points out that MacLauchlan was not brilliant but he did get the battalion through Normandy, and did well enough at Clair Tizon to get the DSO. How much was really his doing, I can't say. The battalion, from what I recall, kind of blundered forward in the dark and managed to infiltrate a German defensive line - they actually encountered a field hospital before meeting German troops.  At any rate, MacLauchlan is described as worn out by Oct and his replacement was a surprise to the battalion. He was also "old" - being in his 40s.  Tommy Thompson of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders in the Rhineland was a LCol at the age of 23...

It seems likely to me that any such "rule" was, as you suggest, invoked only when prudent. In MacLauchlan's case, it was probably thought wise to do so. The Calgary Highlanders were often being asked to lead the brigade given the poor luck of the Black Watch and IIRC problems in keeping French language regiments like R de Mais up to strength.

 

[ExSarge]

I wonder if that rule was really followed for battalion/regimental commanders? I can think of three - Wotherspoon of the South Albertas, Fulton of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Whitaker of the Rileys who commanded for longer than that. There may not have been a policy for higher commanders as Jefferson of 10 Brigade, Megill of 5 Brigade and Rockingham of 9 Brigade all led their formations from Normandy through to VE Day. If a commander or CO was delivering, the pragmatic approach would have been to leave him in place.

It would appear that this rule was followed only for those commanders who's performance did not measure up. It's unlikely based on Simmonds command style, but the "rule" may of been a way for relieved officers to save face.

I once came across a statement in an American book that one third of all divisional commanders were incompetent.

For the most part the Canadian army was learning as it went. From Private to Army Commander the experience the level simply was not there. Perhaps if regiments/battalions had been assigned to the British for a combat baptism in North Africa in 1940 the overall performance in Italy and north west Europe may have been better? At the least the process of sorting the wheat from the chaff may have been accomplished much earlier. Those that were incompetent or unsuitable for combat command relieved and replaced by others. It's interesting to speculate what might have occurred if Rockingham or Hoffmiester or others like them had held higher commands earlier in the war.

 

[Michael Dorosh]

For the most part the Canadian army was learning as it went. From Private to Army Commander the experience the level simply was not there. Perhaps if regiments/battalions had been assigned to the British for a combat baptism in North Africa in 1940 the overall performance in Italy and north west Europe may have been better?

But they did that with several hundred individuals - officers and warrant officers. Strome Galloway was one; he commanded a company of the Royal Irish Fusiliers in Tunisia before landing in Sicily with the RCR.  These guys did tours of duty in North Africa and then came back to the Canadian Army to fight in Sicily or Normandy with their own battalions, bringing combat experience with them.

 

[reccecrewman]

That the German Army was able to roll up the allied front in the Spring 1918 offensive after almost four years of combat doesn't say a lot for the strategic level of leadership on the allied side.

They didn't roll up the allied front at all.........  The attempted a breakthrough that sputtered out and failed for reasons I already stated in another post.  Infantry only move so fast, no cavalry or tanks, supply lines that were too long and out of support range of their guns.
Secondly, did your 32 page pamphlet mention that the Germans were also able to move some 60 first rate Divisions from the Russian front after their collapse to use in the Micheal offensive of 1918?  That the allies held the line is more of a wonder than your statement.

The French learned after Chemin des Dames and Verdun, Haig gave us Passchendaele.

The French were REACTING to a German offensive that was designed to bleed them white and break their will to fight and thus knock them out of the war.  After Verdun, the French were in no shape to undertake an offensive - therefore it was only the British who could take offensive action.  Haig's reasons for Passchendaele were quite legitimate.  First, the Germans occupied the best ground there, it was high and dry while the BEF was stuck in the mud in Flanders.  Secondly, Ostend & Zeebrugge were targets for the Somme offensive.  These were strategic sub bases for the German Navy and their capture would relieve alot of pressure off the British supply lines across the channel.  Third, the offensive took pressure off the French Army who suffered nearly 500,000 casualties at Verdun.  While people want to crucify Haig for the Somme, how about Falkenhayn deciding to launch the Battle of Verdun?  The German's suffered over 400,000 casualties and what did they gain? Ft. Douamont & Ft. Vaux, both of which were re-captured by French forces in counterattacks.
Fourth - Had the British captured these two ports, the entire German front would have shifted, because the rail centres for reserves and reinforcements would have been in British hands.

Passchendaele broke the back of the German Army........... from that point on, it was just a matter of time until they conceded defeat.  So by you saying "Haig gave us Passchendaele" you're also inadvertently saying "Haig won us the war". Which he did.    Consider this; Haig attacks on July 1, gets casualty reports and calls the whole operation off. So, 60,000 casualties for NOTHING gained.  Meanwhile, the German Army accepts the Russian surrender a few months later and shifts those 60 plus Divisions to the Western Front.  NOW, they procede with their Micheal offensive with one BIG difference.  The 400,000 casualties they suffered at the hands of the BEF in the Somme offensive, are now on hand to take part in the Micheal offensive.  I shudder to think what the result would have been.

Regards

 

[xavier]

Recceguy:
I agree with you about Falkenhayn. If we wanted to break the French, there were more effective means. Using more stormtroopers to infiltrate  the trenches knock them off balance and break their spirit.  I guess it shows the gulf between our mentality and theirs but I've always been surprised that the Germans and Austrians didn't pass on their tactical experiences with Italians to use against the French and British.
I've always been sympathetic towards the poilous mutinying after Verdun.

xavier

 

[Infanteer]

Passchendaele broke the back of the German Army........... from that point on, it was just a matter of time until they conceded defeat.

Did it?  They seemed quite capable of rolling up the Eastern Front and launching 3 large scale offensives after Passchendaele concluded.  Doesn't strike me as a broken army.  I'm no buff, but the failure at Second Marne or the Black Day of Amiens (go Canada!) would be better days to pick as "back-breakers".

History of WWI tends to revolve around the Western Front; just finished reading Robert Citano's The German Way of War which took a refreshing look at the big picture.

 

[reccecrewman]

I've always been surprised that the Germans and Austrians didn't pass on their tactical experiences with Italians to use against the French and British.

What?    OK, you lost me. What exact tactical experiences are you referring to?  I can't htink of a single valuable lesson the Central Powers learned in the Alps that could be effectively used against the French & British on the Western Front.  It's apples and oranges you're comparing.  First of all, the Italian Front was nothing but mountains, second, the Italians were second rate when compared to British & French troops, and third, the Austrians never actually defeated Italy.  They won most battles against them, but the Italians never signed an armistice with the Central Powers.

If we wanted to break the French, there were more effective means

This was actually the most effective way of bleeding the French, and it very nearly succeeded.  Verdun was a symbol of all that the French held near and dear and they would bleed themselves to death defending it.  The interesting thing about the French Army mutinies of 1917, is that the Germans somehow never detected it!  It is one of the greatest kept secrets of the Great War.  Had the Germans known the state of the French Armies and concentrated on them, the war could have taken a completely different turn, however, the BEF saved the French bacon by launching the Somme offensive and keeping German pressure off the French.  Gen. Sir Arthur Currie, the Commander of the Canadian Corps, only learned of the French Army's mutiny when Haig pulled him aside and told him after the armistice had been signed with Germany.  At the time, in November 1917, when the Canadian Corps was returned to the Ypres salient and given the task of taking Passchendaele Ridge, Currie wanted to know what the reasoning behind it was and Haig told him, "Someday I will tell you why, but today I cannot".  When Haig told Currie after the war ended, Currie finally understood why his Corps made the sacrifice of 16,000 casualties to take that cursed place.

I've always been sympathetic towards the poilous mutinying after Verdun

Lastly, I don't sympathize with them for mutiny.  Soldiers don't mutiny. We are not disorganized rabble who decide they don't like the way things are going so we don't play anymore. It don't work that way.  Of all Armies fighting on the Western Front, the French Army SHOULD have been fighting the hardest.  This was THEIR homeland that was being invaded.  The fact that they were content to sit a year out while the British Empire did THEIR fighting for them says much to me about the pride and fighting spirit of the French Army.  The German Army in WWII fought right to the bitter end.  That was THEIR homeland and by JC, they were not going to just roll over.  The French should have had that same fire in their bellies in WWI.

 

[reccecrewman]

Did it?  They seemed quite capable of rolling up the Eastern Front and launching 3 large scale offensives after Passchendaele concluded.

There was no Eastern Front for them to "roll up".  The Russians were in the midst of full blown revolution and wanted an end to the war.  The Russians bowed out and allowed the Germans to send 60+ Divisions to the Western Front.  Passchendaele was the beginning of the end for Germany.

The British battled the cream of the German Army, alone and unaided, while their French allies did nothing. Opposing forces in Flanders were about equal, the Germans had 86 Divisions, the British 51 (German divisions were smaller than their British counterparts)  The British, attacking in mud, rain and the most deplorable conditions man can imagine and at even odds (3 to 1 is the equation usually required for success when attacking) still managed to rock the German Army to it's very foundations.  The Germans lost 250,000, many of them first rate troops and as such, irreplacable.  So badly mangled was the German Army after Passchendaele, that it had to be extensively reorganized into attack and defence Divisions. (From "The Canadians At Passchendaele")

The Micheal offensive of 1918 was a huge gamble the Germans were taking.  They wanted to try for a decisive victory before the Americans showed up in force, and the offensive was doomed to failure from day 1.  In my opinion, the best thing the Germans could have done in early 1918, was to sue for peace and get themselves the best possible deal, rather than be defeated militarily and be forced to take all impositions the allies inflicted upon them at Versailles.