Grand Strategy for a Divided America

[a_majoor]

Devaluing the US currency seems to be the only goal this policy has in mind, but the secondary effects of inflation and Hayekian credit bubbles will wreak havoc on the American economy for years to come. Of course, since many metrics coming from the US are suspect anyway (consider the constant use of the BLS unemployment statistics, rather than the more accurate and inclusive U3 figure) the "targets" that are being aimed for are little more than mirages.

The other problem is this is simply more fun with Keynesian economics. Back when I was learning the IS/LM theory of trading inflation for unemployment I was forces to wonder why Stagflation existed outside the classroom window (something totally impossible under the Keynesian model), or how the Reagan revolution was crushing inflation and generating huge inceases in empoyment despite the vehement assertation of my instructors and leading pundits that this could not be happening. Years of "stimulus", low interest rates and flooding the economy with "liquidity" has failed to move unemployment or economic growth much, so suggesting that supercharging the process will work so much better is madness:

http://opinion.financialpost.com/2012/12/12/terence-corcoran-bernake-steers-feds-monetary-machine-into-uncharted-waters/

Terence Corcoran: Bernanke steers Fed’s monetary machine into uncharted waters

Terence Corcoran | Dec 12, 2012 8:34 PM ET | Last Updated: Dec 13, 2012 11:41 AM ET
More from Terence Corcoran | @terencecorcoran

The problem with the policy is that the cause-and-effect link between zero interest rates and the unemployment rate does not exist

In a stunning and history-making policy departure that challenges some basic tenets of economic theory, Ben Bernanke is taking the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary machine where it has never been before. It may even be where no central banker has ever been before.

Using the printing presses and control over interest rates, Mr. Bernanke’s Fed said Wednesday it will hold interest rates at near zero and continue to buy up to $1-trillion a year in bond and mortgage securities at a rate of $85-billion a month until the cows come home.

Targets imply that rock-bottom interest rates will prevail through to 2015 and beyond
In this case, the cows are measured by the U.S. unemployment rate and inflation. Specifically, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) said it will remain in super-stimulist mode “at least as long” as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5% and inflation is projected to be below 2.5%.

Related
U.S. Fed announces fresh stimulus in new approach to support growth
Fed announces new round of stimulus: What the analysts say
The targets imply — for Americans and likely Canadians as well — that rock-bottom interest rates will prevail through to 2015 and beyond.

The appearance of a specific unemployment rate objective — well below the current rate of 7.5%— is a radical departure in economic and monetary theory. The idea, however, has been high on the agenda of monetary liberals for some time and is not a total surprise.

When Chicago Fed president Charles Evans delivered a keynote lecture to the C.D. Howe Institute in Toronto two weeks ago, he outlined the rationale for the jobless target. With inflation low, he said, “a number of macro-model simulations … indicate that we can keep the funds rate near zero until the unemployment rate hits at least 6.5% and still generate only minimal inflation risks.”

Joblessness is determined by a range of economic and policy forces, all of which are beyond the reach of monetary policy
Mr. Evans implied that his Fed colleagues were mostly in agreement. An even lower unemployment target might be doable. “Even a 6% threshold doesn’t look threatening in many of these [macro-model] scenarios. But for now, I am ready to say that 6.5% looks like a better unemployment marker than the 7% rate I had called for earlier.”

And so 6.5% it is, as of Wednesday announcement. The policy — already widely referred to as “the Evans rule”— is an easy sell to politicians, the public, interventionist economists and unions. Use fast money and zero interest rates to create jobs and reduce the high-profile unemployment rate. Of course! Simple, graspable, clear.

The problem with the policy is that the cause-and-effect link between zero interest rates and the unemployment rate does not exist. Joblessness is determined by a range of economic and policy forces, all of which are beyond the reach of monetary policy.

http://financialpostopinion.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/ben-bernanke.jpg?w=620


The $1-trillion-a-year U.S. fiscal mess, for example, creates the threat of massive tax increases, spending disruptions and uncertainty that kills growth and investment. New financial regulations and government policies disrupt and distort economic behaviour. If unemployment stays high due to bad policies and economic change, no amount of monetary stimulus can bring down the rate.

It could, however, create inflation. The Fed claims to reject the idea of using inflation to boost job creation, although more than a few economists think that tradeoff is worth the risk. Mr. Evans once thought 3% inflation might be acceptable. On Wednesday, the Fed sawed it off at 2.5%, above its official target of 2% but below a possible 3%.

The idea that central banks can target the narrow statistic of unemployment, rather than stick to inflation while keeping an eye on some broader measure of economic performance, is relatively new. So is the companion idea that the Fed and other central banks should begin broadcasting the fact that they will continue to stimulate the economy even after economic recovery has set in.

To again quote Mr. Evans, the new approach is to “make it clear that the highly accommodative stance of monetary policy would remain in place for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens,” which the Fed has said will take it to 2015.

So the question, asked by Mr. Evans: “Why should policy remain accommodative even after we have a stronger recovery? The delay is a feature of what modern macroeconomic theory tells us is the optimal policy response to the extraordinary circumstances we have faced over the past four years.”

Another way of reading the central bank policy shifts, however, is as outright admissions that the past four years of unprecedented monetary expansionism and experimentation have been a failure.

In America, Canada and around the world, central banks have taken risky bets on their new interventions — now estimated to include nearly $15-trillion in asset purchases along with zero interest rates over almost five years. But still there are no signs of real sustained recovery. Instead, there are widespread predictions of fresh recessions.

As for the “modern macroeconomic theory” Mr. Evens refers to, it turns out to be a couple of papers by other economists, including one by Michael Woodford at Columbia University delivered to the annual meeting of central bankers in Wyoming in August. Mr. Woodford, over about 100 pages, attempts to figure out what should be done when economies are still stagnant and interest rates have been at zero for years.

His answer: Central banks should use “forward guidance” to announce how long they intend to keep rates low. If the Fed can’t lower interest rates to below zero, then maybe it can generate growth by telling people it will keep rates low until the cows come home.

Finn Poschmann, vice-president, research, at the C.D.Howe Institute, says the Woodford paper is essentially a concession. “Roughly,” he said, Mr. Woodford has concluded that “it’s not working, so we have to promise to do it for a really long time and, not only that, promise to keep doing it long after.”

Mr. Woodford credits Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney with having been a bit of a pioneer in the forward-guidance business. In a speech this week, Mr. Carney — clearly anticipating the FOMC action Wednesday — warned however that “this forward guidance is never a promise.” Actual policy will always “respond to the economic and financial outlook as it evolves. Expectations of policy should do the same.” Mr. Carney also said central banks should adopt precise numerical “thresholds” for inflation and unemployment. He didn’t set any thresholds for Canada, but maybe Canada is next in the great global central banking experiment/gamble/big bet that monetary policy can save us all.

 

[Edward Campbell]

The Twitterverse is suggesting that Chuck Hagel will the the next Secretary of Defence in Washington.
 

 

[Edward Campbell]

Online rumour mill now says that Susan Rice has withdrawn her name from consideration as Secretary of State.


Edit to add: and it is confirmed by NBC News.

 

[Edward Campbell]

To illustrate what wrong with the implementation of the the Asian pivot strategy:

1. China almost got what it wanted ("back burner" treatement) last week at the ASEAN meeting; but

2. It, China, settled for less (public disunity), but only because of ASEAN internal disagreements, not as a result of any US influence; and

3. Now the Philippines, a not inconsequential Asian power, has called a separate meeting (with Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam) to deal with China's island claims without US (or ASEAN) involvement.

It looks to me as though some Asians are less than convinced that the US "here to stay": or, for that matter, even "here."

More on the Asian Pivot in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Global Asia (A journal of the East Asia Foundation, a Korea based think-tank):

http://globalasia.org/V7N4_Winter_2012/Michael_McDevitt.html

America’s New Security Strategy and Its Military Dimension

By Michael McDevitt

December 2012

Much has been made of the military implications of America’s pivot to Asia, especially in the context of perceptions that the US is engaged in an effort to contain China.

Retired US Navy Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt argues that while China is an important factor in the US strategic shift, the pivot is about much more than China. It is about shaping the environment so that a US-China conflict never becomes necessary, and perhaps someday is even inconceivable.

In November 2011 the administration of US President Barack Obama announced a rebalancing of its strategic focus away from the wars of the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. It also announced that this new strategic rebalancing, or pivot, included an integrated mix of diplomatic, economic, budgetary and security-related initiatives.

The strategy was widely interpreted in the Western media as being all about China, which the administration denies, while in China, the strategy was widely perceived as being one more step in a Washington containment strategy. The truth, of course, is that China is a significant consideration, but it is also true that the rebalance is not all about China, nor is it an attempt to contain China. In fact, anyone who knows anything about Asia realizes that none of China’s neighbors would support a containment strategy. While they may be nervous about China’s growing power, they are also, in one way or another, historically, culturally and economically linked with China. After all, China is every Asian nation’s largest trading partner. They also recognize that China is always going to be their largest neighbor.

The rebalance, to be sure, is not officially blind to China’s rise. In a Foreign Policy article that provides the most comprehensive written description of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote: “China represents one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.”1

The rebalance strategy is really about the fact that over the past 10 years Washington has poured immense resources into Iraq and Afghanistan. In effect, America’s strategic focus was “out of balance.” It was much too heavily weighted toward fighting wars in the Persian Gulf region and Afghanistan—at the expense of America’s more traditional security focus, which was more balanced among regions.

Thus, the administration’s strategy is more accurately understood as an attempt to restore the traditional balance of interests and focus to American security policy, which since 1898 has always had a strong Asia-Pacific orientation, and at the same time to reassure friends and allies that the US remains committed to the Asia-Pacific and to stability in East Asia. The rebalance is intended to counter the regional narrative of American decline in the face of Chinese growth; hence, the real diplomatic and informational focus of the strategy is reassurance.

The Evolving Strategic Setting: China Moves to Sea

In those 10 years of US involvement in the wars of the Middle East, the strategic balance in Asia has been changing. For half a century, the military balance of power in East Asia was unchanged. The continental powers of East Asia, the Soviet Union and “Red” China were effectively balanced by the offshore presence of the US and its island and archipelagic allies. This balance began to change about 16 years ago, when China had the political motivation and economic resources to begin to address a historic strategic weakness — its vulnerability to military intervention from the sea. The incentive for Beijing was the fear that newly democratic Taiwan was moving toward de jure independence and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), short of nuclear escalation, was essentially powerless to prevent it, particularly if the US elected militarily to support such a course of action.

Beijing also had plenty of historical motivations. China’s “Century of Humiliation” started in the mid-19th century with its defeat in the Opium War by the British, who came from the sea. Over the decades, China was repeatedly humiliated by foreign powers that exploited China’s weakness along its maritime approaches.2

As a result, the combination of economic and geo-strategic factors related to security merge to form the strategic motivation for a historically unique Chinese defense perimeter that extends hundreds of miles to sea. The strategic drivers for Beijing are: the issue of Taiwan itself; the fact that the vast majority of China’s unresolved security issues are maritime in nature; the reality that its economic development depends upon imports of raw materials and exports of finished goods that travel mainly by sea; and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that China’s economic center of gravity is located along its eastern seaboard, exposed to attack from the sea.

If China is only defending its interests, is this a problem?

By moving its defenses far to sea, China is effectively undermining the traditional maritime-continental balance that has provided the security and stability that have enabled the Asian economic miracle of the last 30 years. As China improves its defenses, it is making the security situation of the countries that live in the shadow of China worse. It is creating what academics call a “security dilemma” — one country’s defenses become so effective that its neighbors fear for their own security.

In 2001, the US Department of Defense began publicly to fret about this situation, characterizing the military problem as “anti-access” and “area denial.”3 The Chinese have also coined a term to describe what they are trying to achieve militarily: PLA strategists refer to it as “counter-intervention operations.” In practical terms, this refers to the knitting together of a large submarine force, land-based aircraft carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, and in the near future, ballistic missiles that have the ability to hit moving ships. All these capabilities depend on a very effective ocean surveillance system that can detect and accurately locate approaching naval forces.

No matter what one calls this concept, the desired military outcome is the same — to keep US naval and air forces as far away from China as possible. The strategic implications of this for China’s neighbors, many of whom depend upon the US to underwrite their security as alliance or strategic partners, are obvious. If “we” get into a confrontation with China, can “we” depend upon the United States to be able to support us?

Beijing argues that its strategic intentions are clear: China is on a path of peaceful development and is not a threat to its neighbors. I believe that China’s leaders believe this. The trouble is that, as any strategist will argue, intentions can change in an instant; what really matters are the military capabilities that China will possess when its counter-intervention force is completed. Will China be able to defeat US forward-deployed forces and prevent additional forces from the US from reaching East Asia in the event of a conflict? Addressing this worry over American staying power in Asia in the face of a rising China is a key issue that the Obama rebalance strategy intends to address.

The long term US response

The US response to the challenge posed by the PLA’s “counter-intervention operation” was actually unveiled in the US’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It announced that the US Air Force and US Navy had combined to develop a new operational concept known as Air-Sea Battle (ASB). ASB aims to counter any anti-access threat in the world, including that posed by China. Details of this concept have for understandable reasons remained highly classified, but recent statements by the heads of the Navy and Air Force have indicated that ASB will focus on three lines of effort: 1) disrupting enemy surveillance systems, as surveillance is the backbone of any anti-access system. If you can’t locate an approaching naval force, you can’t attack it; 2) destroying enemy launching systems so that precision weapons cannot be launched (during the Cold War, this was known as shooting at archers not at arrows); 3) defeating enemy missiles and other weapons. This means shooting them down, or decoying them away.4

Near-term actions

During his November 2011 trip to Asia, Obama announced the creation of a US Marine Corps presence in Australia. Today only 250-strong, it is planned to grow to 2,500, a full Marine Expeditionary Unit. This is likely to trigger an increase in amphibious ships that rotate to the Western Pacific so that these Marines have the lift necessary to be employed within the region. The Obama announcement built upon the statement made earlier in 2011 by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, that several of the US Navy’s newest surface combatants, known as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), would be permanently stationed in Singapore. Finally, the US Navy Chief of Naval Operations also addressed re-establishing some sort of rotation presence in the Philippines.5 Collectively, these posture announcements are intended to signal that the rebalance strategy includes improving the US presence in Southeast Asia, an area that had been neglected when compared to the US presence in Northeast Asia.

Also announced were specific force posture changes that build on initiatives launched during the second term of former US President George W. Bush. Specifically, the US said that over the next seven years it intends to gradually increase the overall percentage of US Navy ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet to 60 percent. Today, according to the Secretary of the Navy, the fleet is already home to about 55 percent of the US Navy. Since the US Navy currently has 287 ships, that means about 158 are in the Pacific Fleet. Plans are to gradually increase the numbers to the 60 percent target, not by transferring ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific, but by adding newly built ships to the Pacific Fleet. Building plans for the future indicate that by 2019 the Navy hopes to have between 295 to 300 ships. So, to reach the target of 60 percent of this fleet size suggests that by the end of this decade, the Pacific Fleet will be between 177 to 180 ships strong. So, the rebalance will gradually grow the Pacific Fleet by around 20 ships.6

Until recently, there had been no public announcements regarding US Army and Air Force posture changes associated with the rebalance strategy. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter broke this silence in August 2012. In a speech in New York, he indicated that the Air Force intends to shift very important surveillance capacity from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific, to include the MQ-9 Reaper, U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and the Global Hawk, a high-altitude, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force will also be able to allocate space, cyber and bomber forces from the US to the Asia-Pacific region with little new investment. As operations in Afghanistan end, for example, B-1s will become available, augmenting the B-52s already on continuous rotational presence in the region. Carter also indicated that Washington was working with Australia to establish a rotational bomber presence, building on the success of bomber rotations to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam. 

The Army’s presence in South Korea will be protected from any budget changes, according to Carter. He opined that the Asia-Pacific region will see more Army and Marine Corps presence for the simple reason that they will not be in Iraq and Afghanistan any more.7

Thoughts on the future

It is unlikely that China will halt development of what it considers necessary for its defenses. It is also clear that the US does not intend to sit idly by and permit the introduction of military capabilities that could deny it access to East Asia in a time of conflict, and in peacetime undermine its credibility as a capable ally. Thus, it seems likely that for the foreseeable future the region will witness a “military capabilities competition” in which China introduces capabilities that could deny access, while the US military, especially the Navy and Air Force, introduces capabilities that will assure access. It will be a period of competing strategic concepts, assured access vs. denied access, manifested by the introduction of military capabilities by both sides to accomplish these ends.

Importantly, however, as the recent CSIS report on the US posture in Asia advises,8 the top priority is not to prepare for a conflict with China; rather, it is to shape the environment so that such a conflict is never necessary and perhaps someday inconceivable. The military posture changes that Washington and its allies are pursuing are intended to achieve this objective.

Michael McDevitt, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Alexandria, Virginia. This paper reflects the views of the author, and not necessarily those of the US Department of Defense or of the CNA.

NOTES
1 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, Nov. 2011, www.foreign policy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century
2 See Robert Bickers, The Scramble of China: Foreign Devils and the Qing Empire, 1832-1913, Penguin paperback, 2012, for a recent well-researched assessment.
3 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, Sept. 30, 2001, p.25. It describes anti-access and area-denial as relating to a fundamental US strategic concept, deterring forward. Specifically, it adds, “Deterrence in the future will continue to depend heavily upon the capability resident in forward stationed and forward deployed combat and expeditionary forces.”
4 Norton Swartz and Jonathan Greenert, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty,” The American Interest, Feb. 2012, www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1212
5 Christain Le Miere, “America’s Pivot to Asia: The Naval Dimension,” Survival, Vol. 54, No 3, pp81-94
6 Mike McCarthy, “New Ships Will Account for Asia-Pacific Buildup, SECNAV Says,” Defense Daily, Mar. 9, 2012.
7 Ashton Carter, “The US Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective,” Asia Society speech, August 1, 2012, www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1715
8 David Bertau, Michael Green et al., “US Force Posture Strategy in Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,” CSIS, Washington DC, Aug. 2012, csis.org/files/publication/1208_final_pacom_optimized.pdf.

I agree with the three main conclusions:

1. China will not halt development of necessary defences;

2. The US aims to not allow China to dominate East Asia; and

3. The US plans aim to prevent rather than provoke confrontation.

 

[Edward Campbell]

And the Globe and Mail reports that President Obama has, formally, nominated Senator John Kerry to be Secretary of State, a job, the report suggests, that Sen Kerry has long coveted.

 

[Retired AF Guy]

And the Globe and Mail reports that President Obama has, formally, nominated Senator John Kerry to be Secretary of State, a job, the report suggests, that Sen Kerry has long coveted.

Lord help us all.

 

[Jed]

Lord help us all.

Why? What is the story behind your comment? Just asking and I don't have an opinion one way or another.

 

[tomahawk6]

At least he wont be Secretary of Defense.

 

[a_majoor]

Why? What is the story behind your comment? Just asking and I don't have an opinion one way or another.

Perhaps you should look at his history. A lot of very unsavoury stuff came to the surface when he ran for President, much of which suggests he does not have a very good sense of judgement (to say the least). He is a first class hypocrite as well, he might mouth class warfare rhetoric like the rest of the Dems, but docks his yacht in a different State to avoid paying taxes in Massachusetts, to use a very open source example.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Here, posted under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the National Defense University (NDU) Prism, is a wide ranging interview with Richard N Hass who has some qualifications to speak on American strategy.

If you read nothing else, please take note of the last paragraph re: how to formulate strategy:

"The government has its own formal process because of Goldwater-Nichols [Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986], and that’s of some limited utility. But by and large, governments aren’t good, or groups aren’t good, at “big think.” That’s actually a role for outsiders to government. that’s what think tanks, people who think strategically, ought to be doing. It’s what people do in war colleges. It’s what people do on planning staffs. The idea that an interagency committee is going to think of a grand strategy—no, that’s not going to happen. Containment didn’t come out of a committee. Containment came out of an individual, an extraordinarily talented individual. Ultimately, ideas have to be vetted by governments and internalized by governments. Policies have to be designed and then implemented by governments. But ideas don’t by and large come out of governments. Ideas come to governments. That is, from individuals. It could be an individual in government, but more likely an individual outside of government. that’s a much more realistic creative process."

 

[Edward Campbell]

Perhaps you should look at his history. A lot of very unsavoury stuff came to the surface when he ran for President, much of which suggests he does not have a very good sense of judgement (to say the least). He is a first class hypocrite as well, he might mouth class warfare rhetoric like the rest of the Dems, but docks his yacht in a different State to avoid paying taxes in Massachusetts, to use a very open source example.

But here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from The Washington Times is a fairly well known conservative's view of Sen Kerry ~ the best liberal choice:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/18/a-better-choice-for-obamas-secretary-of-state/#.UNIEP0gXDNM.twitter

[size=14ptA better choice for Obama’s secretary of state[/size]
Kerry more qualified than Rice for top position

By Michael Taube

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, recently withdrew her name from consideration as President Obama’s next secretary of state. This paves the way for Massachusetts Sen. John F. Kerry to assume the role.

This probably is the best scenario that could have happened.

Regardless of your political affiliation, it boils down to a choice of the lesser of two liberal evils: Who is better suited for this role, and who would provide stronger leadership on the international stage? Using those criteria, Mr. Kerry is more qualified than Mrs. Rice ever could dream of being.

Certainly, Mrs. Rice has solid experience. She worked in the White House under President Clinton in various roles, including on the National Security Council and as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She was a senior fellow for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. She also served as a foreign policy adviser to Mr. Obama in his 2008 presidential campaign and to Mr. Kerry during his 2004 presidential run.

Those are impressive credentials. That being said, they haven’t translated into strong political acumen or a proper balance between leadership and diplomacy.

In 2008, Mrs. Rice attacked then-GOP presidential candidate John McCain for being “reckless” on foreign policy matters, claiming “his tendency is to shoot first and ask questions later.” When Mr. McCain went to Iraq, she mocked his fact-finding mission as one in which he strolled “around the market in a flak jacket.”

Mrs. Rice also used colorful language to publicly criticize foreign policy positions held by President George W. Bush and her former boss, Mr. Clinton. As Washington Post columnist Dana Milbank wrote, she also “appalled colleagues by flipping her middle finger at Richard Holbrooke during a meeting with senior staff at the State Department.”

The worst was yet to come, in the form of Mrs. Rice’s troubling comments about the attack in Benghazi, Libya. First she told CBS‘ “Face the Nation” on Sept. 16, “We do not have information at present that leads us to conclude” that the attack “was premeditated or preplanned.” Then she went on ABC’s “This Week” the same day and proclaimed the attack was “hijacked, let us say, by some individual clusters of extremists who came with heavier weapons.” As the motives for Benghazi became clearer, many prominent Republicans, including Mr. McCain, correctly claimed Mrs. Rice had misled the American people.

In spite of all this, Mr. Obama fiercely defended Mrs. Rice as his top choice to replace Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. It quickly became obvious, however, that a Senate confirmation would have been very messy. While the White House publicly expressed disappointment when Mrs. Rice withdrew her name, I would guess the president breathed a heavy sigh of relief in private.

This brings us to Mr. Kerry. He has an extensive military background, having served in the U.S. Navy, including in Vietnam. (Alas, he joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War upon his return to civilian life.) He has served in the U.S. Senate since 1985 and ran for president in 2004. He played an active role in the Iran-Contra hearings, served as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and called for a no-fly zone in Libya last year.

Most important, he was an envoy in Afghanistan and Pakistan during heightened periods of tension in that part of the world.

Mr. Kerry was a visible and confident presence on the scene. He used his political skills to sell the Obama administration’s message after the assassination of al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden. He told The Washington Post, “We are at a moment where we have to resolve some very serious issues. This is not a moment for anything except very sober, serious discussion with an understanding that there’s a lot at stake. There’s no other way to put it.”

Sure, Republicans don’t care for Mr. Kerry’s political ideas. Yet they know they can work with him when it comes to war, terrorism and international relations. Unlike Mrs. Rice, he’s a person who knows how to work properly with people across party lines and what it takes to get things done.

That’s why Mr. Kerry is a better choice than Mrs. Rice to be the next secretary of state. In time, Mr. Obama may come to realize this, too.

Michael Taube is a former speechwriter for Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and a columnist with The Washington Times.

The US has had some great (or, at least, famous) Secretaries of State: Jefferson, Webster, Seward, Stimson, Marshall, Acheson and Kissinger come to mind; and some pretty poor ones, too. I would assess Clinton as "fair to middling" and I expect Kerry to do about as well for the reasons Michael Taube mentioned.

 

[cupper]

Diplomacy has just become a bigger ordeal than it was.

Seriously, the man can bore a statue to tears with his speeches. :facepalm:

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Any bets on how fast the Swift boat controversy gets started again if Kerry's nomination starts gaining traction?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Any bets on how fast the Swift boat controversy gets started again if Kerry's nomination starts gaining traction?

I'm sure it will, but it was a controversy in 2004, not a proven, factual case and it is totally irrelevant now. To remind everyone: Barack Obama won the presidential 2012 election; the Senate is, more or less duty bound to approve a qualified nominee for a cabinet appointment. Controversial ≠ unqualified; unpopular views (with some senators and some political factions) ≠ unqualified; even boring ≠ unqualified. If the GOP tries to deny President Obama his choice of a qualified appointee then it will just prove what I said above: the conservative movement is broken, driven only by hate of liberals in general and Obama in particular, and in need of a long "rest" in the political wilderness.

 

[Brad Sallows]

All that ERC wrote.

Plus, it's good to have a wealthy tax-avoiding ex-nominee for the office of president occupying a high position in this administration.  He will demarcate the difference between promises and statements of intent, and reality.

 

[GAP]

All that ERC wrote.

Plus, it's good to have a wealthy tax-avoiding ex-nominee for the office of president occupying a high position in this administration.  He will demarcate the difference between promises and statements of intent, and reality.

Until he gets his hinny in a sling, get a concussion so he can't testify, and moves on to greater things...... :

 

[cupper]

Kerry gets a free ride through the nomination process.

The GOP has an agenda here. They want to put one of their own in his senate seat. Many want Scott Brown back in, but that could change if he continues to go against the herd like he did recently after the Sandy Hook shootings.

 

[tomahawk6]

Kerry gets a free ride through the nomination process.

The GOP has an agenda here. They want to put one of their own in his senate seat. Many want Scott Brown back in, but that could change if he continues to go against the herd like he did recently after the Sandy Hook shootings.

Scott Brown will not be selected to fill the Senate seat vacated by Kerry. Deval Patrick is a democrat and would most likely select the wife of Ted Kennedy Vicki or Dukakis or some other Kennendy. A new election would occur in the spring.

 

[tomahawk6]

The democrats have a majority in the Senate thats why Kerry has a lock on the nomination. In fact his nomination has to first get enough votes in the Senate Foreign Affairs committee.Guess who the chairman is ? If you guessed John Kerry then you would be right.

 

[cupper]

Scott Brown will not be selected to fill the Senate seat vacated by Kerry. Deval Patrick is a democrat and would most likely select the wife of Ted Kennedy Vicki or Dukakis or some other Kennendy. A new election would occur in the spring.

The democrats have a majority in the Senate thats why Kerry has a lock on the nomination. In fact his nomination has to first get enough votes in the Senate Foreign Affairs committee.Guess who the chairman is ? If you guessed John Kerry then you would be right.

The seat will be temporarily filled by an appointment by Deval Patrick, but they need to hold a special election within a specific period of time to fill the seat until Kerry's full term ends.

All during the Rice speculative period any GOP senator interviewed said Rice was a not starter, but they would welcome and recommend Kerry for the position.

The GOP has been all but drooling over the prospect of regaining the lost senate seat from Mass. I suspect that Kerry will get an all but unanimous vote of approval from the committee (one symbolic vote against) and will win several GOP votes in the senate vote as well.

The problem for the GOP though is do they renominate Brown to run against the Dems or do they find someone else?