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Infantry of Tomorrow

This is just for discussion purposes.  But maybe someday units will be full strength (dreaming?  yes).  I'm sure sections are at full strength at some point on operational deployments.  IThis was one of the problems the US Army Stryker platoons had in Iraq.  They actually had more people after attachments then they did seats for them in their Strykers.  They attached the platoon medic, a forward observer (similar to our MFC), and a translator and had to cram them into the already crowded Strykers.  Similarly at the company level they had a 3-man sniper team with no assigned vehicle.  They crammed them into one of the two Coy HQ Strykers (which were command variants and had limited seating to begin with) or the First Sergeant's HMMWV.

However, my question was more about the 5th vehicle than strength of units. 
 
Midnight Rambler said:
Holy crap, can we please keep it simple?  Unlike the Armoured Corps, which is organised along platforms, can we please not keep the infantry organised along people?  EG: A platoon is required to do "x", and given hundreds of years of Western Military History, it requires "y" sections.  To transport them in mechanised environment, they need "z" vehicles.

Also, forget not that sections are rarely, if ever, at full strength due to our top priorities: HLTA and medals parades.  (I'm not just being sarcastic.  It's reality)

Canadian soldiers, renowned for their "generalist" abilities, are becoming increasingly specialized.  Gone are the days when QM, signaller, and intelligence functions within a battalion were all done by Infantrymen with rudimentary training.  These are highly skilled jobs requiring some pretty intensive training.  This, combined with the downward push of combined arms functions, means soldiers of many branches/trades working together at lower and lower levels.  At the same time (and as contradictory as it sounds), these specialized soldiers are generalizing in a way.  For the trucker and the mechanic, every sortie outside of the wire is a combat logistics patrol that demands the same detail to low-level tactics as the infantry put into a fighting patrol.  Likewise, an infantryman on patrol is a beat cop, an intelligence specialist, and a rudimentary cultural/linguistic representative all in one.  Gone are the days when "the 7 Section Battle Drills" would suffice as good training (Col Wayne Eyre's "Infantry against the Snakes" article in the CAJ is a good one on this);
  Infanteer - above.

And a third bit of grist - concerns from the Int types that they can't find enough surplus Sgts to fill billets because nearl all their billets require Sgts or some such.

I hark back to earlier comments that I have made that the fundamental disconnect is between staffing an Army and staffing a Police Force.

You guys may be conducting "Army" operations but you are effectively functioning as a rigorous "Police Force".

An Army, IMO, is designed to conduct High Intensity Operations for a limited duration, just long enough to defeat the enemy in the field. 

A Police Force is designed to supply an ongoing and continuous presence, with occasional increases in operational tempo.

The job in "Failed States"  is one of Policing - holding the ring until the locals can get their act together and take over their own policing duties (or maybe not - there are ample historical precedents where "foreign" police have been preferred to locals  because they are not tied up in feuds).

An Army has the luxury of picking and choosing its operations, setting its timings,  deciding when to surge and when to sit back.  It also relies on having uncommitted man-power that it can push to the Schwehrpunkt when the need /opportunity arises.

A Police Force has no such luxury.  It has to be seen to be standing on the corner every day and every night.


The Army can be organized for operations.  The Police have to organize for presence.

The Army organizes for piece-work. The Police organize on an hourly basis.



In a Police Force, you need 24/7 coverage.  IE for every position to be filled you need 5 constables  (40 hours x 50 weeks = 2000 hours per constable per year.  There are 8760 hours in a 365 day year.  Including sick leave, long vacations and training you need at least 5 people to maintain the position on a 24/7 basis). 

At the same time not every constable requires his own Car or his own Radio.  He/She can sign them out at the beginning of his shift.

The Army operates on an entirely different basis.  It supplies everybody all the tools necessary to get the job done and anticipates that once the job is done, minus some wastage, everything goes back to the barracks to wait for the next call.


You are trying to fill a Policing role with an Army structure and coming up short.

If you want to continue doing what you are doing then perhaps you need something like a 5 section platoon so as to keep one section on the ground at all times.  And maybe each section doesn't need its own vehicle - perhaps you can get by with "a pair and a spare"...... and no I am not proposing those solutions , I am just suggesting that you probably will have to do things differently as what you are doing doesn't seem to be working as well as you seem to want.


With respect to the Generalist/Specialist, Int Sgt issue.

I think here what you seem to be saying is that the modern Infanteer is having to pick up a rudimentary knowledge of a whole raft of skills that once were considered esoteric.  Doesn't that play to the strengths of the old system where individuals that excelled technically but were poor leaders could be trained and promoted to optimize their skills and sent up the line to act in their area of technical competence?

Everybody comes in as an Infanteer, or a Trooper, picks up a smattering of everything, then grows into trades as their career advances?
 
FYI most, if not all, LE Depts in Florida give radios, car etc to their officers on a full time basis - the idea in increased presence and the ability to flood in emergencies.
 
Point taken.

I also so that in Greenwood, Indiana when I lived there. The Sheriff's department had the same policy.  The deputies took their cars home with them at night and parked them in their driveways.

Added to that  "presence" thing.

Having said that, I am convinced that there are a number of neigbourhoods in Indianapolis where that would not have been a successful working policy.

A secure compound would be advisable in those areas.
 
Kirkhill said:
Everybody comes in as an Infanteer, or a Trooper, picks up a smattering of everything, then grows into trades as their career advances?

A position I've supported in the past but it is, seriously, seen as a hidden attempt to drive women from the Forces.
 
Infanteer said:
A position I've supported in the past but it is, seriously, seen as a hidden attempt to drive women from the Forces.

I am curious, what is the logic for that argument (I can't really see it)?
 
Which argument -- everyone and infanteer first?  Thats easy - everyone knows the basics, and in an asymetrical environment where everyone is at risk, it offers huge rewards.
  Plus when the point end needs support, those who support have a vested interest.

On the second side - 031 stuff is not as enthralling for most women, and the demands of that can be tougher than most other trades, as such few women join, and less pass BattleSchool.

 
Kirkhill said:
You are trying to fill a Policing role with an Army structure and coming up short.

Pretty much.  I read alot of stuff about the need for "A Counterinsurgency Force" and/or some sort of organization seperate from a "heavy metal" army for "Small Wars", "Imperial Policing", etc, etc where Cultural vice Technological specialists are the go-to-guys.

Whenever I read that I think, "yeah, and let's call it the NorthWest Mounted Police" ^-^....
 
The main issue I see with having everyone rise up through the infantry/combat arms, is whether we have enough combat arms 'feeder' positions to ensure that our supporter trades receive the number of pers they need. 
 
Matt_Fisher said:
The main issue I see with having everyone rise up through the infantry/combat arms, is whether we have enough combat arms 'feeder' positions to ensure that our supporter trades receive the number of pers they need.

Don't the USMC do a good job at this? Everyone goes through boot camp whether they're going to be a dentist or a death tech, right?
 
Matt, in part that goes to the question of Police/Army structure.

Policing still requires numbers.  It is still a matter of face to face interaction between people.

Army stuff is a matter of applying brute force to break up threats (occasionally from other nations' constabularies).  These days fewer and fewer bodies are required to deliver more and more force with ever increasing precision.  However the fewer bodies that are required need greater skills.

I tend to see Policing as a Recce heavy tasking - lots of OPs, lots of Standing Patrols and the occasional Fighting Patrol - of indeterminate duration.
Combat is Armies concentrate on the application of overwhelming force for a limited duration.

I don't see much wrong in recruiting King's Men (Constables, Soldiers) for Policing while at the same time training them for War.

Some few years back on this board we spent some time discussing the difference between a Policeman and a Soldier.  I could never bring myself to accept the dichotomy.  Both are agents of the Government.  Both are authorized to use lethal force.

The Police have their own "Army" (ERTs and SWATs) to support their daily Recce activities.
When they run into more serious trouble then the Army is called in.

The Army has its own Police and Recce forces, in large part to make up for the fact it operates in an Expeditionary mode away from the rest of the King's Men.
When they need more man-power (in a local, permissive environment) it can call on the Police.

The Police specialize in Low Intensity Conflict with occasional forays into High Intensity Conflict.
The Army specialized in High Intensity Conflict with occasional forays into Low Intensity Conflict.  - At least that was true in the past.
Now the Army seems to be needed as an Expeditionary Police Force with greater recourse to High Intensity Conflict skills than your average Peterborough copper.

If Infanteers and Troopers (Male and Female - and  I have no problem adjusting standards to suit)  were recruited in the numbers necessary to create an effective Policing capability then there would be a large pool from which senior trades could be drawn.

And yes - I do realize that more numbers means a larger payroll, higher operating costs and more competition for capital dollars.





 
FWIW, some of the finest recruits of the original Army Commando units in the UK were all policemen. If you read Durnford Slater's book, 'Commando', he mentions that these very high quality recruits made excellent soldiers.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Commandos

Following Sir Winston Churchill's instruction to form a "butcher and bolt" raiding force as a means of continuing the war against Nazi Germany after the evacuation of most of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk, a format for the new force was put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke (Royal Artillery) during his time as Military Assistant to General Sir John Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He penned his proposals on 5 June 1940, just two days after the evacuation, which was approved at a meeting between Dill and Churchill on 8 June, and department M.O.9 of the War Office was created the following day to pursue the idea. M.O.9 continued to foster the Commando idea until disbanded with the creation of the Tri-service organisation known as Combined Operations, encompassing all three services. On Churchill's orders the units were to be armed with the latest equipment and were to launch an attack at the earliest opportunity,


The Commando Memorial located near Spean Bridge in the Scottish Highlands.In 1940, volunteers were called for from serving Army soldiers within certain formations still in Britain and men of the disbanding Divisional Independent Companies originally raised from Territorial Army Divisions and who had seen service in Norway. Some later recruiting was conducted in the various theatres and among foreign nationals joining the Allies. In 1942 the Admiralty agreed to volunteers being sought from the Royal Marines Division and the first Royal Marines Commando, No.40, was formed in mid February. The same year, recruits were also called for from the British Police Force. Some 400 men passed Commando training and were then assigned to various battalions.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Don't the USMC do a good job at this? Everyone goes through boot camp whether they're going to be a dentist or a death tech, right?

Yes, the Marine Corps does a good job of having everybody start with the basics in terms of recruit training (13 weeks), then some very basic level training on dismounted combat operations (4 weeks for non-infantry types). 

However, what I think that Infanteer was referring to, and which my comment was based on the idea that everyone does a stint in the combat arms (i.e. 1-3 years) then are given the opportunity for a occupational transfer into support trades positions.
 
Matt_Fisher said:
Yes, the Marine Corps does a good job of having everybody start with the basics in terms of recruit training (13 weeks), then some very basic level training on dismounted combat operations (4 weeks for non-infantry types). 

However, what I think that Infanteer was referring to, and which my comment was based on the idea that everyone does a stint in the combat arms (i.e. 1-3 years) then are given the opportunity for a occupational transfer into support trades positions.

Seen. I think that's an excellent idea. At the end of a three year tour, troops identified as having potential as logisticians etc should be selected for training and posting as required.

You could also concurrently run it the other way as well: recruiting people directly into log units then, after three years, funelling them to the combat arms.
 
daftandbarmy said:
Seen. I think that's an excellent idea. At the end of a three year tour, troops identified as having potential as logisticians etc should be selected for training and posting as required.

As I posted earlier, I don't think we have enough combat arms positions to use as feeders for all the support trades we have in this day and age, especially considering the tri-service nature of our support trades. If it were just Army supporters, I don't think it would be impossible to do, but when you consider that Army supply tech might bounce between Army, Air Force, and Navy postings throughout his/her career, then the numbers get hard to keep up with that 'initial combat arms experience' requirement.

daftandbarmy said:
You could also concurrently run it the other way as well: recruiting people directly into log units then, after three years, funelling them to the combat arms.

Again, this is problematic, as you'd be taking loggie corporals and putting them through their combat arms trade training with new recruits, and then putting them into the most junior of positions within the rifle section, vehicle crew, gun det, etc.  What are we really looking to accomplish?  Chances are going to be just as high in terms of having that young loggie private deploying to a combat zone before he/she would be doing their 'extro-trades training experience' in the combat arms unit. 
 
Matt_Fisher said:
Again, this is problematic, as you'd be taking loggie corporals and putting them through their combat arms trade training with new recruits, and then putting them into the most junior of positions within the rifle section, vehicle crew, gun det, etc.  What are we really looking to accomplish?  Chances are going to be just as high in terms of having that young loggie private deploying to a combat zone as he/she would when they're doing their 'extro-trades training experience' in the combat arms unit.

On the All Arms Commando Course in the UK, we had a company of 120 candidates, and I was the only infantry guy. All the rest were from every other trade in the army e.g., arty, log, REME, medical/dental, fleet air arm etc etc. All ranks from Capt on down were represented. I recall that one of my fire team partners was a navy dentist, for example.

During a 3 week pre-course and a 5 week commando course, every one of them participated in one of the toughest, physically demanding courses in the world, which included dismounted operations up to and including company level raids (dry, not live). Admittedly, the standard of tactics could have been better, but I was generally impressed with how well they all did during typically miserable, infantry type, operations. The overall pass rate was quite high, in the order of 80% of those starting the last 5 weeks of commando tests.

If you dialled up the tactics and added some live firing, I think that you you could easily turn a group of loggies etc into good section level infantry in 4 or 5 weeks.

 
I don't doubt that you could certainly do something like that, however if you look proportionately at the number of British troops that go through the All-Arms Commando course in order to support the Royal Marines, the number is quite low as compared to those that support the British Army.

In an ideal world, I'd have all the support trades pers complete a 1-2 year stint in the combat arms before being able to go into support trades, but the number of support trades people we need would exhaust such a system and we wouldn't be able to keep up with the manning requirements.
Additionally, I'd love a system whereby all officers joined as rankers and went through a process of selection for officer candidate training, whereby their PERs, a formal application board, and a peer review (essentially asking the members of the applicants platoon "Would you be willing to serve under XXXX with a high degree of confidence that he would be a competent leader?") would select the best soldiers for career opportunities as officers; sort of a 'try before you buy/test drive' type scenario whereby we could better screen those for leadership positions, rather than rely on a system of progressive (and expensive) training courses to weed them out (which due to various external pressures) doesn't always do so.
 
Matt_Fisher said:
Additionally, I'd love a system whereby all officers joined as rankers and went through a process of selection for officer candidate training, whereby their PERs, a formal application board, and a peer review (essentially asking the members of the applicants platoon "Would you be willing to serve under XXXX with a high degree of confidence that he would be a competent leader?") would select the best soldiers for career opportunities as officers; sort of a 'try before you buy/test drive' type scenario whereby we could better screen those for leadership positions, rather than rely on a system of progressive (and expensive) training courses to weed them out (which due to various external pressures) doesn't always do so.

.... and that's more or less exactly the process successfully used by Canada in both World Wars, conflicts in which we excelled due largely to high quality front line leadership. My father went through this process: joined as a gunner in 1941, promoted Sgt by 1943, selected for and attended OCTU in early 1944, commissioned 2Lt, soon promoted to Lt and landed at Normandy in mid-1944, promoted Captain before the end of 1944. Civvy to Captain & Bty Comd, through the ranks, in 3 years. This process depended, however, on a very high op tempo as well as a significant training infrastrucutre and a low tolerance for luxuries, 'fluff' and other BS in the training program.
 
Nice to see this thread come back to life.

The size of the basic sub and sub-sub unit hasn't changed a lot in over a century, and I suspect even if we were all issued "Starship Troopers" battle armour (from the book) the size would remain roughly the same to cover ground, allow for casualty replacement and cover contingencies. While one man can weild far more power than ever, he is still one man who needs to eat, sleep, attend to bodily functions etc.

I would support a more advanced training regime where many of the men in the section and platoon could indeed function as medics, interpreters etc. somewhat along the lines of an SOF brick. The examples of how non combat arms trades can produce excellent candidates for commando training should let us know there is lots of hidden potential out there we just need to know how to tap, motivate and utilize. Expanding platoon sized organizations into micro battle groups with 5 carriers and perhaps a runner to accomodate all the add-ons runs into various tactical and logistical issues, especially if they are going into dispersed ops (now do we need to add extra CSS convoys or helicopters to keep them on the road?)

On the larger issue of size, using Kirkhills Soldiers/Police arguments, the ultimate answer is always to develop a local "constabulary" as fast as possible to take over the "policing" aspect of the mission. Perhaps the force package for future expeditionary forces would include a complete training cadre to start right at ROTO 0.

For expeditionary forces, we seem to have it mostly right, what is really needed is to develop the "Reserve" that can step up while the Expeditionary force is away. Canada's "Territorial Defence Battalion" concept would make sense if it was provided with the additional PY's and equipment to actually function. As it is now, we are just giving the Primary Reserve another hat to wear. Just like you need 5 officers to cover one position in the police, the Canadian Primary Reserve would have to be massively expanded to correctly and effectively cover training, force generation, augmentation, specialist roles for Expeditionary forces and Territorial Defence.

Of course we already know this....
 
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