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Infantry of Tomorrow

c4th said:
I disagree that blood doping and drugs are a path we should go down.  Enhancing mental performance can be accomplished by education.  Pattern recognition can be taught and practiced in many ways.  Problem solving, war gaming, CMX, or even chess will do more than Ritalin.  I would argue in Canada that we are well ahead of the pack.  It is pretty common for soldiers to have at least some post secondary education.  That would probably be rare even in most NATO countries let alone our likely enemies.  If we need a pte/cpl to unravel an Al Queda network in his head, we are in big trouble.  Computers are employed to handle large volumes of data, and it won't be long before every commander could access that information from their vehicle.

Pattern recognition can be taught in many ways, and indeed in the article, pattern recognition was placed under "mental training" as opposed to chemical enhancement. Although the average Pte or Cpl is not going to unravel the entire Al Qaeda network by himself, the ability to remember a large amount of data could lead to those "aha" moments when the soldier recognizes a "player" or person of interest during a dismounted patrol. Perhaps that sort of information is best fed into a data bank, BUT there could be a reason to act on that information immediately by the Pte or Cpl who identifies the player.

I would be very leery of the risks of performance enhancing drugs over any benefits.  Unnaturally increased blood volume (doping) combined with increased heart rate (combat) seems to be playing with fire and heart attacks.  Maybe there is an MO in the forum who can answer that.

There is already a fairly extensive database for the use of performance enhancing drugs and other techniques: professional sports and the Olympics. We don't have to go to extremes like the Americans (unexplained growth spurts when athletes are in their late 20's) or former East Germans (female athletes changing their sex characteristics), and without the need to use "masking" drugs, this may actually be safer for a soldier than an Olympic sprinter. As well, these sorts of techniques can and should be limited to deployments, better exercise programs during the soldiers career will do the rest.

40 hours without sleep is no big thing as anyone who has done a combat arms leadership course can tell you.

On my ISCC course that was the norm, but I can safely say that no one in the section was much good for anything after that until we got some good, deep sleep.

The anti-narcolepsy drug allows the soldier to remain mentally alert for the full period (no hallucinations and attacking a section of enemy trees like one of my course-mates did), which is certainly an advantage over the non medicated opponent, who will be making errors in judgment and be progressively worn down during the same passage of time, especially if the soldiers mounting the operation can apply pressure through patrolling/advancing etc. for the continuous period.





 
a_majoor said:
On my ISCC course that was the norm, but I can safely say that no one in the section was much good for anything after that until we got some good, deep sleep.

The anti-narcolepsy drug allows the soldier to remain mentally alert for the full period (no hallucinations and attacking a section of enemy trees like one of my course-mates did), which is certainly an advantage over the non medicated opponent, who will be making errors in judgment and be progressively worn down during the same passage of time, especially if the soldiers mounting the operation can apply pressure through patrolling/advancing etc. for the continuous period.

Ditto - I 've done w/o sleep for close to 72hrs - I eventually crashed and burned and was a huge LIABILITY.  I've also gotten to see what people w/o sleep do around weapons  :eek:
Anything for an edge that would not turn us psychotic or cause a huge recovery time I am all for.
 
KevinB said:
Ditto - I 've done w/o sleep for close to 72hrs - I eventually crashed and burned and was a huge LIABILITY.  

Lack of sleep is as bad as bullets for causing problems, and not allowing for it is a failure of command, just as in excessive carried loads.

WAR STORY: Me, in Recce Platoon after about only >60 hours of no sleep and being on the go. Sgt Maj spots me sitting on the bonnet of my Land Rover, brushing my teeth while staring into space and crying all at the same time.

Sgt major: "What's wrong son?"

Me: "Nothing, as soon as you f**k off."

Sgt Major walked away and not a word was said except for the 3 extra Guard Commander duties I got for the next month... :)
 
Joint Service Guy said:
Sgt major: "What's wrong son?"

Me: "Nothing, as soon as you f**k off."

That's pretty funny.  This would be worth crossposting to the "Most Memorable Quotes..."  thread.
 
From MIT's Technology Review:

Hypermotivational Syndrome
By Ed Tenner August 2005

Recently, the Partnership for a Drug-Free America recently gave its
imprimatur to a new buzzword: Generation Rx. Its annual report on what
Americans think of controlled substances showed that for the first time,
more teenagers are abusing prescription painkillers than are using a variety
of common illicit drugs.

What are these prescription drugs being used for? Some of them mimic the
effects of street drugs. For instance, the pain reliever Oxycontin, when
stripped of its coating, can produce a heroinlike high. The consequences of
this kind of abuse are familiar. Antidrug advocates have warned for decades
that drugs impair not only users' health but also their work. Drug-induced
torpor even earned its own name: amotivational syndrome. Timothy Leary's
flameout on the Harvard fast track probably frightened more middle-class
parents than the warnings of J. Edgar Hoover.

But there is an aspect of prescription drug abuse mentioned only briefly in
the report: ingesting to excel, not rebel. There's now a hypermotivational
syndrome, use of prescription drugs not to escape the commanding heights of
education and the economy but to attain them.


The powers that be have long blessed chemical performance enhancement.
Employers once encouraged stimulants: a hundred years ago, African-American
dock workers in the South were given cocaine to fuel their back-breaking
labors. In the Southern textile industry, traveling "dope wagons" brought
milder stimulants like caffeinated, sugary soft drinks and snuff to mill
hands. The U.S. armed forces distributed cigarettes to help servicemen cope
with the combat stress of World War II. Amphetamine use by military flyers
began at the same time and persisted even during later antidrug campaigns,
though at lower dosages, with stricter controls.

Returning veterans stayed with tobacco; their grandchildren are looking
elsewhere for a mental boost. For students with full-blown attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), Ritalin can be a miracle. In 2000,
People magazine profiled a Rhodes scholar who had overcome ADHD as well as
dysgraphia--the inability to organize, spell, or write legibly--partly by
taking Ritalin.

It is thus not surprising that non-ADHD students often try to persuade
family doctors to prescribe off label. Failing that, some students buy pills
on a growing black market. A junior at Yale University claimed that,
fortified with Adderall, he read Crime and Punishment and completed a
15-page paper on it in about 30 hours. The drug is "more efficient" than
caffeine, he told an ABC News correspondent. And Modafinil, also sold as
Provigil, lets military pilots remain alert during prolonged missions
without the perilous feelings of omnipotence or the addiction risk sometimes
linked to the older amphetamines.


Why is there so much passion for enhancing memory and decision-making and so
little for firing the imagination? Until the American Medical Association
declared its opposition to LSD research in 1963, leading to U.S. Senate
hearings in 1966 that resulted in a virtual ban, prominent medical
researchers and artists embraced it as a possible means of therapeutic
insight and expanded creativity.

LSD was marketed to psychiatrists by the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Sandoz.
At first the drug was widely acclaimed as a promising therapeutic tool. In
Saskatchewan, a psychiatrist, Humphry Osmond, and an architect, Kyio Izumi,
ingested LSD in an attempt to empathize with schizophrenia patients while
co-designing a new mental hospital. Aldous Huxley and Allen Ginsberg praised
LSD as a source of knowledge. John Markoff's What the Dormouse Said...
reports that, in the early 1960s, Myron Stolaroff, a former Ampex employee,
founded an institute that recruited volunteers, including some of the
electronics industry's brightest researchers, to explore LSD's potential to
stimulate creativity. Many became believers. (Bill Joy reviews Dormouse in
another article.) A founding programmer of Microsoft told the Washington
Post in 1996, "I consider the insights from LSD to be very useful, both
professionally and personally." The circle of distinguished people taking
LSD constituted a veritable hallucinogentry.

The moment didn't last. The dangers of LSD-induced psychosis and even death
were real. Imagination-enhancing substances were outlawed by the late 1960s.
And proscribed they have remained. Yet the newer drugs also have their
risks, especially psychological dependency. They compete with proven
nonpharmaceutical techniques like meditation. Taken indiscriminately, they
may not provoke users to leap out of windows, but they could lead them to
shut some doors.

Mental performance is what counts in a "Full Spectrum Ops" scenario, so careful investigation and experiments should be conducted to give the service member at the sharp edge any additional boost in performance. Physical training should also be modernized. Training for the Modern Pentathalon using Olympic coaching techniques would allow the soldier to operate under the most physically demanding conditions.

Combining these various techniques would give us more capable soldiers for more demanding missions.
 
No question infantry have to be fit to be able to carry 100 pounds worth of gear in any type of environment. The US Army wants to cut this in half. How they get there is the hard part. In Iraq a soldier has 18 pounds of body armor, plus ammo, plus water, helmet ect. Here is a good article on combat load.

http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/combatlight.htm

I dont think a soldier needs to be a pentathlete, in fact a varied training regime is best. Runs with combat gear.
Lots of road marches all with equipment. Climbing is a great training vehicle. Troops like a good confidence course. Lots of live fire exercises and range time is important as well.
 
Doesn't this one keep going round in circles?

Soldier carries 100 lbs.

Reduce weight of load by making things lighter.

Soldier carries 50 lbs

O Good, soldier has 50 lbs of spare carrying capacity, we can add that axe and radar set now.

Soldier carries 100 lbs

Marius's Mules, the Roman Legionnaire carried 100 lbs all over Europe.
The Paras and Marines in the Falklands carried 100 lbs
The Canadians and Americans in Afghanistan are carrying 100 lbs.

Its done because it is possible.

Therefore training needs to accomodate the expectation.

In the meantime there's George Macdonald Fraser and Slim's army with rifle, bayonet, 50 rounds, two grenades, shovel, water and poncho.  Burma 1944.

Either method of fighting a campaign successfully seems possible.
 
I certainly feel much better on those days I do not carry 100lbs/50 kg!

Modern Pentathalon was a sort of example I pulled out of my hat, but in fact, most of the exercises of that discipline were military in nature around the time of the founding of the modern Olympic movement. see: http://www.modern-pentathlon.com/history.html The wide and rather diverse nature of the disciplines develop many different abilities in the athlete/soldier, and as an interesting aside, George S Patton Jr was a competitor in the 1912 Olympics (finishing 5th in the Pentathalon).

I suspect soldiers who are athletically trained under this or a similarly demanding regime will be able to operate either like Gaius Marius' "Mules" or as Field Marshal Slim's light infantry with a very high degree of success.

 
Kirkhill said:
Doesn't this one keep going round in circles?

Its done because it is possible.

Therefore training needs to accomodate the expectation.

In the meantime there's George Macdonald Fraser and Slim's army with rifle, bayonet, 50 rounds, two grenades, shovel, water and poncho.   Burma 1944.

Either method of fighting a campaign successfully seems possible.

It's done because most poeple don't understand load carrying and don't understand how infantry best operate. Until we loose the 1944 'Bayonets are best' approach to infantry operations, we'll always be stuck in the past.

There are better ways, but they mean radicle change and changing the mind set of the infanteer. A lot of scared cows need killing, to STOP infantry carrying all the crap they don't need.

 
Joint Service Guy said:
There are better ways, but they mean radicle change and changing the mind set of the infanteer. A lot of scared cows need killing, to STOP infantry carrying all the crap they don't need.
Which cows are those?
 
MCG said:
Which cows are those?

Well there's a whole herd of very well fed ones...., but let me cite just a few.

1. Infantry have gotto be self-sufficent as concerns fire support and re-supply.

2. Infantry have got to be able to achieve their mission, not matter what.

3. Infantry must be able to cope with any situation. - march anywhere and do anything

4. Infantry must able to operate in isolation from other arms - and light infantry don't use vehicles, or ARMOUR.

Infantry are merely that part of the combined arms force that fight dismounted. If we actually got it into our heads that an Infantry Coy needs the same level of log support as a light gun artillery battery (not the exact same level. Just compartive effort) then 75% of load carrying problems go away.

Load carrying is very little to do with what crap you carry. It's far more about psycology, expectation and training. Get those things right and all else follows.

 
Infanteer said:
Funny, me and a couple of fellow soldiers, wasting time away in the guard shack, figured the 3x3 section was the way to go as well.

It seems that a 9-man section with 3-man teams has a distinct advantage over the current format - more agile and less command and control from


what is the current format?
 
Quote from: Kirkhill on August 01, 2005, 18:38:25

Light Infantry - lightly equipped, well supported, well supplied, well informed.



You mean like that JSG?  Perhaps I should have added well led.  Surely it is the command that makes the decisions as to whether the soldier has to carry his gear, has to beg for resupply or has it shoved into his hand when he needs it?

I'm guessing that one of the reasons that CO's require their troops to haul 100lbs plus of kit is that they have no guarantee of timely resupply with the right gear to meet the ever changing threat in the field. Net result is like my wife on holiday - three bags carried, most outfits never see the light of day.

Cheers.
 
Kirkhill said:
Quote from: Kirkhill on August 01, 2005, 18:38:25

I'm guessing that one of the reasons that CO's require their troops to haul 100lbs plus of kit is that they have no guarantee of timely resupply with the right gear to meet the ever changing threat in the field. Net result is like my wife on holiday - three bags carried, most outfits never see the light of day.

Cheers.

That's the symptoms. Not the problem. The problem is lack of understanding. No infantry unit exists in isolation. Your wife is merley seeking freedom of choice in preference to carried load. Make her carry all the shit and she'll make better choices, - and get you to carry it!! :)

Joking aside, the problem is mostly unit organisation and tactical doctrine. Yes there are actual equipment issues, but those are easy to solve, given the resources to do so. The biggest gap in the pie is education and understanding.

 
Joint Service Guy said:
Well there's a whole herd of very well fed ones...., but let me cite just a few.

1. Infantry have gotto be self-sufficent as concerns fire support and re-supply.

2. Infantry have got to be able to achieve their mission, not matter what.

3. Infantry must be able to cope with any situation. - march anywhere and do anything

4. Infantry must able to operate in isolation from other arms - and light infantry don't use vehicles, or ARMOUR.

That's prime, grain fed beef there, and all these points were front and centre for the Rakkisans and 3 PPCLI troops up in the Sha-e-kot valley and the "Whale's Back" in Afghanistan 2002. If the Infantry troops cannot meet these expectations, then they will be somewhat less than effective. Another good place to look is LCol Banks recent article in the CAJ "Three Block Warriors" http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_08/iss_1/CAJ_vol8.1_05_e.pdf, which has troops operating in insanely inhospitable terrain and dispersed to a degree that troops even ten years ago would find unbelievable. The fact that these individual sections (squads) might have to transition between all "three blocks" at any time certainly puts meaning to the phrase "be prepared".

A related thread on Light Infantry concentrates on doing more with (a lot) less, here we are looking at more basic changes to things like equipment, organization and individual training.
 
Now I haven't been following this post and admittedly I haven't read all entries to this point but I have been skimming (basically excuse me if I am repeating something already posted).

This post started off about infantry of tommorrow and discussing tactics and doctrine changes that could possibly be made and has gone into talking about pers loads and equipment.  I think fundamentally this whole post is repeating the errors of command due to the fact that posters seem to be basing their ideas on the assumption that we are still fighting WW2 tactics.

I believe that before we re-write infantry tactics and doctrine we have to seriously look at what  type of war we are likely to be fighting.  Is the section/platoon/company/battalion attack (or advance to contact) even keeping with what we are seeing on the battlefields of the world?  I don't think so.  Are the Chinese or Russians (or insert bad guy here) going to invade us tomorrow - no, I would hazard a guess they won't.

Are we as Canadians likely to ever fight a war against another mass, trained army?  I doubt it.  We should be studying terrorist tactics and the 'doctrine' of insurgents in Iraq.  I have believed now for a while that in Vietnam the Americans attempted to fight a guerrilla army using tactics from WW2 and Korea that failed.  Now in Iraq they seem to be making the same mistakes again.  I think to seriously talk about what should be happening to form the infantry of tomorrow we first have to decide what it is they will most likely be doing.

I think the 'war' we would most likely find ourselves involved with would be against terrorists and/or a guerrilla style army.  To fight a war against an opponent that does not;t have a definite country and or location would be next to impossible given current CF layout.

Look at the Americans in Iraq - they are now holed up in secure Vietnam style 'fire-bases' and scared to drive 20km down the road for a re-supply.  Why? - they went in ready to fight an identifiable enemy force and what they got was guerrilla warfare where no one knows anything.

Making the assumption that we probably won't be doing an advance to contact into Moscow anytime soon but could credibly be fighting a guerrilla 'terrorist army' on our own or foreign soil means that infantry tactics and usage should be seriously re-thought.

So now I have thrown a bunch of crap out into the fan and and I want to see what blows back. ;)

But here are some of my thoughts:

The likelyhood of infantry soldiers being involved in pitched battles against an opposing traditional army is slim (although I believe that if possible, we should be ready for any eventuality).  More likely the capability will be needed to be able to move quickly on little notice to attack a discovered target of opprotunity before they have the chance to move.  How would the infantry be best suited to deal with that?
What would make the most suitable force size and how would it be laid out?  What equipment would be most useful?

Bottom line is I think the most likely scenarios for future conflict have to be examined and then the tactics and organization for the "infantry of tommorrow" could be better disccussed and implemented.

Whoops - did I ever write a load of crap!

Anyhooo - Thoughts on my rant?
 
Nah, you should have read the thread (and this one as well), we discussed that in detail.
 
Thanks - new to this site and I am a bit overwhelmed with all the points ( a lot well thought out - some not) that I am reading.

I guess I will read some more and see who stands where.

By the by - did you read about the joint Chinese/Russian ex going on right now?  Now that's scary (especially if you live in a country on the Asian rim).

Andy
 
Andy365 said:
Look at the Americans in Iraq - they are now holed up in secure Vietnam style 'fire-bases' and scared to drive 20km down the road for a re-supply.   Why? - they went in ready to fight an identifiable enemy force and what they got was guerrilla warfare where no one knows anything.

Erm, either you've been getting all your news from the CBC and Al-Jazeera, or you've seriously misinterpreted what's going on in Iraq.  Either way, I'd love to see you try and substantiate that claim.
 
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