http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun05/odom.pdf
Interesting article; I think they are basing their move for small-unit reorganization on a good premise, chiefly that:
In transforming itself, the Army has not looked below the brigade level and has considered only minor changes at the battalion level.
...Battalions operate more like brigades,and the cascade of increasing complexity flows all the way down to the squad. But in looking at C2 issues and leader-to-led ratios, current Army experiments regard company, platoon, and squad structures as inviolate, although both OEF and OIF show that small-unit leaders face increased challenges
This would certainly be what
LtCol Banks observed during his work with the American's deployed to OEF. Anyways, the authors of the article based their recommendations off of special reports from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) that focused on squad, platoon and company level operations across the spectrum of conflict. Some highlights:
The study also looked at strengthening the collective experience in maneuver elements by shifting grades down one echelon to allow captains to command platoons and majors to command companies.
This is somewhat similar to how we do things. Canada's ways of doing things seem to be validated by much of the American experience; such as shifting older, more experienced NCO's down to lower levels. As well, a recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette by CWO3 Eby praised the "buddy system" within a four-man team - what is standard practice in the Canadian Army as the fire-team.
The article makes an interesting proposal of having a platoon of 4x14 man squads commanded by 2 sections - these are larger platoons, but this seems to me to be cramming to many "chiefs" down too low (3 officers in a Platoon). I'd rather see more leadership pushed down to the junior ranks.
The article uses a principle of function to build small-units at the squad, platoon and company level:
As currently organized, the squad has one leader and two four-man fire teams. As troop-to-task ratios and countless rotations at the JRTC suggest, specialized missions in that nine-man organization often must be organized and rehearsed by special teams, placing additional strains on communications, soldier and team discipline, and soldier alertness.
....Most often, those specialized teams fall into the categories of assault, breach,and support.
Thus, squads are built around 3 teams (assault, breach, support - unfortunately the squad level diagrams are really blurry and hard to make out). As if to vindicate what KevinB has been saying the whole time:
Command and control is better served with four-man teams acting as a natural building block for squad combat power.
Platoon's recieve an equal treatment, with an assault section of two assault squads and a support section with a breach squad and a support squad. The breach squad is listed as having "breaching capabilities", which imply some sort of pioneer skills pushed down to the platoon level. This is pretty similar to our current platoon layout, although the numbers proposed mean a much bigger and more robust platoon (65 soldiers):
Commanded and led by more senior leaders; organized to train to standard missions; and equipped to provide its own direct and indirect fire support; the two-section infantry platoon would become a pocket company for the Army in the COE.
Like the platoon, the company recieves robust organization:
Figure 4 shows a company organized in this way with two standard infantry platoons (assault), a heavy direct-fire platoon (support and breach), a heavy indirect-fire platoon (support), and a logistics platoon.
The "Heavy Direct-Fire Platoon" is interesting; it is essentially two sections (each with an AT and an MG squad) and an engineer squad; again, more engineering assets are pushed down (the diagrams for these platoons are messed up). The "Heavy Indirect-Fire Platoon" has 4 mortar squads (2 of which have 120mm!). Essentially, a mortar platoon (which is traditionally at battalion level) at the company level. The company also has its own maintenance platoon (with maint., supply, and med sections). This leads to a very robust company structure (at my count, over 250 troops). The reasoning of the authors for strengthing the small-units of the Infantry?:
Today's brigades and squads have greater responsibilities, larger areas to cover, and more complex missions to deal with than the linear brigades and squads of the Cold War. In its transformation, the Army has not looked below the battalion and continues to believe small-unit leaders should be junior leaders.
The challenges to junior leaders at squad, platoon,and company levels are well known. If the Army's approach remains unchanged, subordinate small units with unchanged structures will face an even greater challenge when their higher headquarters realign.The ultimate bill-payers in this top-heavy, modular BCT metamorphosis will be the rifle squads, platoons, and companies that actually execute the missions.
Interesting article altogether; although I think the proposal of ballooning up small units to the point where they are no longer small and adding many more officers to the mix is not a good plan, there are some interesting points made that are probably worth examining in more detail in the Canadian context:
- Is the organization of the section, platoon and company inviolate in transformation? Are there better ways to do things at the small-unit level than using what are essentially WWII structures?
- Can the level of combined arms be increased at company level and below (engineers, mortars, tactical HQs, int cells)? The Americans are trying this in a few ways with the Stryker battalions, but will it work in the Light Infantry context as well?
- Can sections/platoons be organized along more functional lines (assault/breach/support - my initial thoughts are that this tasking doesn't need to neccesarily need to drive organization)?
Let's hear your thoughts.
