Infantry Vehicles

[FJAG]

I'd love to see the SOR on those things.

 

[dapaterson]

I'd love to see the SOR on those things.

Ironically, it started out as an information management system for lawyers ...

 

[FJAG]

Ironically, it started out as an information management system for lawyers ...

That would explain why the cannons keep missing and the things move so ponderously slow.

 

[KevinB]

Hmm

Estonian-made combat robots in Ukraine now come with Starlink

The new satellite connectivity feature allows the vehicles to be operated from thousands of miles away, according to the manufacturer.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Fabius]

Further to...

Canadian Context -

LAV 6.0 with turreted weapons - RCAC with Dragoons on board.
LAV 6.0 ACSC, or BvS10, or Senator, or ISV, or helicopter or boat - Infantry with back-packable weapons.

In the Canadian context we are focused on grouping combat MOSIDs together. An Infantry Battalion will only have Infantry combat MOSIDs and Armoured Regiment only armoured.

It’s virtually impossible culturally to see the CA with a ABCT Bn with two infantry Coys and two armoured Coys, with both MOSIDs under one CO.
Nor would an armoured MOSID NCO shrug and say why not after he tells you that his Abrams driver is actually Infantry but since the guy was a Bradley driver in the same Bn why couldn’t he fill in since they were undermanned.

The CA view for many reasons some legitimate is that one cannot mix MOSIDs. That culture precludes to a degree the professionalism of the AFV crews in the Army overall.

A not insignificant reason for refusing to mix MOSIDs is the Infantry Corp would lose PYs even if the Bns would not lose strengths.

 

[markppcli]

In the Canadian context we are focused on grouping combat MOSIDs together. An Infantry Battalion will only have Infantry combat MOSIDs and Armoured Regiment only armoured.

It’s virtually impossible culturally to see the CA with a ABCT Bn with two infantry Coys and two armoured Coys, with both MOSIDs under one CO.
Nor would an armoured MOSID NCO shrug and say why not after he tells you that his Abrams driver is actually Infantry but since the guy was a Bradley driver in the same Bn why couldn’t he fill in since they were undermanned.

The CA view for many reasons some legitimate is that one cannot mix MOSIDs. That culture precludes to a degree the professionalism of the AFV crews in the Army overall.

A not insignificant reason for refusing to mix MOSIDs is the Infantry Corp would lose PYs even if the Bns would not lose strengths.

I think there are strong strong reasons to have crews be the same trade as their dismounts. The number one reason, beyond culture and mosid and PYs, is simply that your can reliable have back up crewmen across the Bn. In the end the important question is “is it effective” and the answer is yes. So why fuck with it to just change the window dressing of calling them infantry or dragoons?*


* Dragoons is a very silly term to bring up. Realistically the mounted rifleman task of Dragoons was dead by the mid 1700s. The only reason the British Army even has them is because they chose to designate most of their Cavalry regiments as Dragoons in the 1750s, because dragoons got paid less.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think there are strong strong reasons to have crews be the same trade as their dismounts. The number one reason, beyond culture and mosid and PYs, is simply that your can reliable have back up crewmen across the Bn. In the end the important question is “is it effective” and the answer is yes. So why fuck with it to just change the window dressing of calling them infantry or dragoons?*


* Dragoons is a very silly term to bring up. Realistically the mounted rifleman task of Dragoons was dead by the mid 1700s. The only reason the British Army even has them is because they chose to designate most of their Cavalry regiments as Dragoons in the 1750s, because dragoons got paid less.

'Labourers on horseback'... I like that

In the context of the seventeenth century, there was extensive difference in equipment and costs between dragoons and cavalry. Now, this was also the period where most cavalry became the type known as harquebusiers, where the distinctions between cuirassiers, reitters, and other forms of cavalry disappeared or merged into an all purpose cavalryman.

If we take the British Civil Wars for an example of the differences between the mounted soldiers of the middle of the seventeenth century - cavalryman and dragoon.

The cavalryman of the period needed a steel helmet, usually with a three-bar or single-bar face guard, and either a 'corslet' (back and breastplate) or a strong 'buff' coat of leather armour. A well-equipped trooper might have armour over a buff coat, and strong leather boots and gloves.1 His weapons would include a good quality sword, as well as flintlock carbine, and usually two flintlock pistols (although older wheellocks might have been used in a shortage of the new flintlocks). The flintlock was more complex and more expensive than the matchlock firing mechanism carried by the infantry. A flintlock in 1643 would cost £1 2s, whereas a matchlock only 12s 6d.2 The dragoon on the other hand, would be equipped almost identically to a conscripted foot soldier - minimal uniform, shoes, a cheap short sword, and a light matchlock musket and associated equipment. As the wars continued, dragoons often re-equipped with flintlock muskets but otherwise remained equipped as Poor Bloody Infantry.

The dragoon's horse was only as a means of transport - less attention was given to quality of the horse, or requirement of speed, strength, and agility. In comparison the cavalryman's horse needed to be 'serviceable', of a certain size and strength to carry the cavalry man, at the charge, into battle and on his myriad other duties. It therefore needed to be around 15 hands high, strong, but nimble. The difference can be seen in the prices paid for the different mounts with the New Model Army paying £7 10s for a cavalry horse, and only £4 for a dragoon horse.3 Even cavalry saddles cost more, as the saddle of a trooper needed to be higher, reinforced, and more substantial because the cavalryman relied on it for much of his movements and strength when riding into battle, whereas dragoon saddles only needed to be riding saddles. According to Peter Edwards in his review of Civil War Equipment, dragoon saddles cost half of what a cavalry saddle cost.4

Dragoons were, for the initial century or more of their inception considered inferior as a mounted arm to cavalry. Even one of their earlier adopters, Gustav Adolphus of Sweden referred to them as "labourers on horseback."5 As the 18th century advanced, however, armies began turning the dragoon more toward a cavalryman that could also fight dismounted in addition to mounted rather than simply a mounted infantryman who only fought on foot. Their equipment became more in line with cavalry - longer sword, boots, better quality horses, etc.6 By the time of the Napoleonic wars, the dragoon of old, originally simply mounted infantry, had become a subset of the cavalry itself, the name applied to particular type of cavalry regiments as the cavalry arms diversified once more into various regiment/equipment-specific roles of Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, Dragoons, and Lancers.7

1. See descriptions in both Firth, C., Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldiers During the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate (Methuen, 1902) and Young, P., & Holmes, R., The English Civil War (Wordsworth Editions, 2000)
2. UK National Archives, State Papers, 28/11, i, f.9, receipts to the New Model Army 1645
3. Edwards, P, 'Supply of Horses to the Parliamentarian and ROyalist Armies in the English Civil War', Historical Research, 68 (1995)
4. Edwards, P., Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-1652 (Sutton, 2000), p. 12
5. Brzezinski, R., The Army of Gustavus Adolphus (2): Cavalry: Pt. 2. Men-at-Arms (Osprey Publishing, 1993), p. 38
6. Barthorp, M. British Cavalry Uniforms Since 1660 (Littlehampton Books, 1984)
7. Rothenburg, G., The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana University Press, 1978)

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/t9a359/why_were_dragoons_so_much_less_expensive_than

 

[Brad Sallows]

And then, a little later, ultimately all cavalry became - essentially - mounted infantry.

 

[markppcli]

'Labourers on horseback'... I like that

In the context of the seventeenth century, there was extensive difference in equipment and costs between dragoons and cavalry. Now, this was also the period where most cavalry became the type known as harquebusiers, where the distinctions between cuirassiers, reitters, and other forms of cavalry disappeared or merged into an all purpose cavalryman.

If we take the British Civil Wars for an example of the differences between the mounted soldiers of the middle of the seventeenth century - cavalryman and dragoon.

The cavalryman of the period needed a steel helmet, usually with a three-bar or single-bar face guard, and either a 'corslet' (back and breastplate) or a strong 'buff' coat of leather armour. A well-equipped trooper might have armour over a buff coat, and strong leather boots and gloves.1 His weapons would include a good quality sword, as well as flintlock carbine, and usually two flintlock pistols (although older wheellocks might have been used in a shortage of the new flintlocks). The flintlock was more complex and more expensive than the matchlock firing mechanism carried by the infantry. A flintlock in 1643 would cost £1 2s, whereas a matchlock only 12s 6d.2 The dragoon on the other hand, would be equipped almost identically to a conscripted foot soldier - minimal uniform, shoes, a cheap short sword, and a light matchlock musket and associated equipment. As the wars continued, dragoons often re-equipped with flintlock muskets but otherwise remained equipped as Poor Bloody Infantry.

The dragoon's horse was only as a means of transport - less attention was given to quality of the horse, or requirement of speed, strength, and agility. In comparison the cavalryman's horse needed to be 'serviceable', of a certain size and strength to carry the cavalry man, at the charge, into battle and on his myriad other duties. It therefore needed to be around 15 hands high, strong, but nimble. The difference can be seen in the prices paid for the different mounts with the New Model Army paying £7 10s for a cavalry horse, and only £4 for a dragoon horse.3 Even cavalry saddles cost more, as the saddle of a trooper needed to be higher, reinforced, and more substantial because the cavalryman relied on it for much of his movements and strength when riding into battle, whereas dragoon saddles only needed to be riding saddles. According to Peter Edwards in his review of Civil War Equipment, dragoon saddles cost half of what a cavalry saddle cost.4

Dragoons were, for the initial century or more of their inception considered inferior as a mounted arm to cavalry. Even one of their earlier adopters, Gustav Adolphus of Sweden referred to them as "labourers on horseback."5 As the 18th century advanced, however, armies began turning the dragoon more toward a cavalryman that could also fight dismounted in addition to mounted rather than simply a mounted infantryman who only fought on foot. Their equipment became more in line with cavalry - longer sword, boots, better quality horses, etc.6 By the time of the Napoleonic wars, the dragoon of old, originally simply mounted infantry, had become a subset of the cavalry itself, the name applied to particular type of cavalry regiments as the cavalry arms diversified once more into various regiment/equipment-specific roles of Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, Dragoons, and Lancers.7

1. See descriptions in both Firth, C., Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldiers During the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate (Methuen, 1902) and Young, P., & Holmes, R., The English Civil War (Wordsworth Editions, 2000)
2. UK National Archives, State Papers, 28/11, i, f.9, receipts to the New Model Army 1645
3. Edwards, P, 'Supply of Horses to the Parliamentarian and ROyalist Armies in the English Civil War', Historical Research, 68 (1995)
4. Edwards, P., Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-1652 (Sutton, 2000), p. 12
5. Brzezinski, R., The Army of Gustavus Adolphus (2): Cavalry: Pt. 2. Men-at-Arms (Osprey Publishing, 1993), p. 38
6. Barthorp, M. British Cavalry Uniforms Since 1660 (Littlehampton Books, 1984)
7. Rothenburg, G., The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana University Press, 1978)

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/t9a359/why_were_dragoons_so_much_less_expensive_than

Which is precisely why I mentioned the 1750s, not the 1650s . From 1756 the British gradual reorganized their Cavalry to be nearly all “dragoons” with little to no distinction. That’s in Barthop by the way

The point is that we’ve had regiment of dragoons for oh… 370 odd years and it’s made a practical difference for maybe 25 percent of that time so it’s a silly distinction to bring up.

 

[Fabius]

I think there are strong strong reasons to have crews be the same trade as their dismounts. The number one reason, beyond culture and mosid and PYs, is simply that your can reliable have back up crewmen across the Bn. In the end the important question is “is it effective” and the answer is yes. So why fuck with it to just change the window dressing of calling them infantry or dragoons?*

Admittedly going to combined MOSIDs in a unit is a more drastic change to increase the professionalism of the AFV crews. There are other options.
I would suggest though that the whole concept of backup crewman is an infantry corps culture. It’s not as much a thing in an armoured regiment from what I have seen.

I think it’s becoming a problematic part of the culture for the Mech Bns and it’s not a strength it once might have been. Look at where turrets and AFVs are going equipment and technology wise. The ability to train multiple people in a section to operate a M2 A4E1 turret comes at what cost in time and resources? How proficient while one be if out of the turret for months - years?

Those turret crews likely will share more in common with MBT crews than in dismounted riflemen.

If those crews can’t be armoured we might need a sub occupation in the infantry for IFV crewmen, so those skills and expertise can be built on and developed.

We currently make do but the Bns LAV crews are not as capable or professional as they could be due to the Corps personnel policies. Is the Army okay with that? Seems it is, so hey.

 

[FJAG]

If those crews can’t be armoured we might need a sub occupation in the infantry for IFV crewmen, so those skills and expertise can be built on and developed.

The Americans had that and decided to streamline the system to training one class of infantryman (and one of indirect fire infantryman) and leave the specialization of the turret (Bradley v Stryker v HMMWV) to the units. Both the MOS 11M (mechanized infantry) and MOS 11H (anti-armour infantry) merged into the general 11B (Infantryman) specialty.

Before one advocates creating a specialty one should look closely at why they decided the way that they did. Effectively it was to ensure standardization of NCO development across the force and to facilitate cross unit assignments. There are obviously different opinions. Here are some.

https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2000/MAY-AUG/pdfs/MAY-AUG2000.pdf - see page 1

https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2019/Summer/pdf/6_PF_VanWie_txt.pdf

 

[KevinB]

The Americans had that and decided to streamline the system to training one class of infantryman (and one of indirect fire infantryman) and leave the specialization of the turret (Bradley v Stryker v HMMWV) to the units. Both the MOS 11M (mechanized infantry) and MOS 11H (anti-armour infantry) merged into the general 11B (Infantryman) specialty.

Before one advocates creating a specialty one should look closely at why they decided the way that they did. Effectively it was to ensure standardization of NCO development across the force and to facilitate cross unit assignments. There are obviously different opinions. Here are some.

And guess what we are discussing doing now?

IMHO the 11M and 11B merger was a mistake, it was a GWOT’ism that got traction and didn’t get course corrected in time.

There is a major difference between Light and Mech Inf - and the training time to be good at both doesn’t exist.

One will suffer - and it’s a pretty brutal transition for one to the other.

 

[KevinB]

Edit - before the belief comes in that I’m slagging track toads, the demands on a fighting vehicle crew to be proficient are incredible. Driver, CC and Gunner need to be in harmony, as well as the need to work in concert with other vehicles - buttoned up and still retain SA is a significant task.

A dismounted squad/section doesn’t have the same type of demands on it - they are very different trades when one looks at the core competencies in detail.

 

[daftandbarmy]

And guess what we are discussing doing now?

IMHO the 11M and 11B merger was a mistake, it was a GWOT’ism that got traction and didn’t get course corrected in time.

There is a major difference between Light and Mech Inf - and the training time to be good at both doesn’t exist.

One will suffer - and it’s a pretty brutal transition for one to the other.

The British Army's Infantry used to do the transition from 'tracks to boots and back' all the time, from Type A to Type B Infantry and back, as I recall.

If high school dropouts from inner city London can handle the complexity ...

 

[KevinB]

The British Army's Infantry used to do the transition from 'tracks to boots and back' all the time, from Type A to Type B Infantry and back, as I recall.

If high school dropouts from inner city London can handle the complexity ...

Used to. Big difference in a FV432 and a M2A4 Bradley turret.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Used to. Big difference in a FV432 and a M2A4 Bradley turret.

... adn about a million other things....

All things are possible with the right planning and leadership.

I mean, I even saw paratroopers effectively operate a troop of Scimitar

 

[KevinB]

... adn about a million other things....

All things are possible with the right planning and leadership.

I mean, I even saw paratroopers effectively operate a troop of Scimitar

It’s all about available training time. Everything is more complex than 5 let alone 20 years ago.

 

[Kirkhill]

It’s all about available training time. Everything is more complex than 5 let alone 20 years ago.

Peace time army has all the time in the world for training. How long do Russia and Ukraine have to train replacement crews and rifle sections?

Edit: I don't know about the complexity issue. I am not sure that it really matters.

 

[Fabius]

If training time is short and compressed that’s an argument for specialization as you don’t have time to get generalists to an acceptable level of expertise.

 

[FJAG]

And guess what we are discussing doing now?

IMHO the 11M and 11B merger was a mistake, it was a GWOT’ism that got traction and didn’t get course corrected in time.

There is a major difference between Light and Mech Inf - and the training time to be good at both doesn’t exist.

One will suffer - and it’s a pretty brutal transition for one to the other.

It's an interesting issue for debate especially for an army as small as ours. When you think back to when we had the Arty 022 Air defender and related officer trade, we had over 500 RegF and 500 ResF folks in AD and it was just enough organization with enough leadership positions to have appropriate career paths for officers and NCOs. Right now the whole arty stands at around 2,000 RegF positions and you have some specialties with STA, gunline, OP/FSCC, and soon AD again and maybe rockets. Conceivably you can have a BSM of a gun battery whose entire career before that was STA. There's a risk that people won't be as proficient in a given job as they ought to be or not capable of being cross posted when required by the branch or their career progression. The risk mitigation for that is more or longer courses that try to teach everything to everyone at every stage of their career.

I'm long past faulting anyone for making some hard choices when there isn't one clear win-win option available.

When I think of Canada's infantry I see light and LAV (and not armoured). To me that means the dismounted fight is the key core component. What the LAV adds is mobility and, in some circumstances, the way that fire support is provided to the dismounted fight. To me that means the core central competency that the infantry has to master across the board (up to the ranks of MWO and major) is the dismounted fight within a company context. After that there are the specialties that need to be mastered within the respective light and LAV units. To me that means the Infantry school concentrates on teaching the core competencies while units deal with the specialties. But I fully acknowledge that this is only one solution. Others with way more experience than me may have other views.