Infantry Vehicles

[KevinB]

Well obviously the status quo is bad, and treating a new trade managed by its own branch, with its own school and courses will solve our problems.

Actually I do think the status quo isn’t working. I see proof of that based on the current make up of the CA.

Further derailing the Infanty vehicle thread - but here goes, and I will see if I can tie it back to vehicles by the end.

There are several skills that are more specific to Light Forces and need constant work if one if going to do it to a high standard safely.
Climbing/Mountaineering
Airborne Operations
Amphibious/Maritime/Water Operations.
High Arctic Operations

In the same vein, as there are only so many training hours in a day, week, month, year. You cannot expect Armored Fighting Vehicle crews to be at the top of their game if they are not out training for that task. GIB's however need to be able to conduct dismounted infantry work, and provide backup crews for the AFV's - needless to say you aren't going to be able to get everything under the sun done that needs to be done.

One method of doing that is having the Infantry solely be Infantry - Light, and then let other drive and crew the vehicles -- but that doesn't really work for the integration of fighting the vehicle with the dismounted section/squad.

I think there are 4 main classes of Infantry Vehicles
1) Transport Integral
2) Transport External
3) Protected Mobility
4) Fighting Vehicle

For theTransport Integral, these are generally soft skin vehicles that are used for admin mobility, and don't require a dedicated crew. So vehicles like the ISV, GMV, Hummer, SnowMobiles, ATV's etc. They are not designed to be involved in the fight, but simply logistics and admin support functions - that the Section/Squad can use as required, but are not wedded to the vehicle.

Transport External was just my catchall for stuff like Aircraft, Helicopters, Ships/Boats, Wheeled Logistics Transports used for TCV etc. They aren't a Sub Unit holding and likely not a unit holding - but used for mobility as required, and the sub units are not wedded to the vehicle at all.

Protected Mobility, this is the column where I wonder if a Armoured/Armored Transport Corps is worthwhile - it is an armored vehicle with a crew, so the crew cannot detach (easily) from the vehicle. They are primarily used for movement under a threat - but not really as a direct fighting vehicle -- the Stryker, Bison, M113, AMPV, TAPV, MRAP's, and even the Armored Hummers are all examples of this (some good, some bad, and some down right awful). Since the crew isn't expected to fight the vehicle with the dismounts, there isn't the direct need to have the crew/GIBs be an organic unit.

Fighting Vehicle, this is the area where I have a tough time with the LAV. As generally the goal of the IFV was to fight the vehicle along with tanks up onto the objective - and then dismount the GIB's. The Germans with the Marder II were really the pioneers in the West - followed up by Bradley and Warrior. It isn't quite a tank as far as armor goes (albeit the latest Bradley M2A4 is getting pretty close) and the Israeli Namer is a tank without a gun turret, but they are intended to fight up with tanks, sometimes slightly trailing other times abreast and intermixed with the MBT's.



Now down here we eliminated the 11M Mechanized Infantry MOS, with the concept that it would streamline the Infantry trade - and with the adoption of the Stryker there was no appetite to make a third specific MOS for that, as well as the removal of the 11H Anti-Armor Infantryman. The only separate Infantry MOS down here is 11C Mortarman (technical Indirect Fire Infantryman). The 11H was dropped as the 11M had most of it already due to the TOW in the Bradley, and the 11B's using the TOW in the M1121 Hummer, and the M901 TUA had been withdrawn in the 1994/5 time frame due to being redundant with the Bradleys.
It briefed well - however now you have 11B MOS spanning folks from Ranger Batts, to Bradley units in CAB's, all theoretically interchangeable (a Ranger E-7 can go from Batt to a CAB to be a Platoon Sgt, which is quite a culture shock, and has a massive difference in required knowledge). The 11C was retained as it was viewed as agnostic, but very few folks in Armored Div's want to go to the 82nd to walk around with 81's on their back. I personally think the 11B and 11M are separate enough that they should be reinstated - but drop the 11C and folks them into either the B or M trades.


Thank you for ignoring my Ted talk.

 

[markppcli]

Actually I do think the status quo isn’t working. I see proof of that based on the current make up of the CA.

Further derailing the Infanty vehicle thread - but here goes, and I will see if I can tie it back to vehicles by the end.

There are several skills that are more specific to Light Forces and need constant work if one if going to do it to a high standard safely.
Climbing/Mountaineering
Airborne Operations
Amphibious/Maritime/Water Operations.
High Arctic Operations

In the same vein, as there are only so many training hours in a day, week, month, year. You cannot expect Armored Fighting Vehicle crews to be at the top of their game if they are not out training for that task. GIB's however need to be able to conduct dismounted infantry work, and provide backup crews for the AFV's - needless to say you aren't going to be able to get everything under the sun done that needs to be done.

One method of doing that is having the Infantry solely be Infantry - Light, and then let other drive and crew the vehicles -- but that doesn't really work for the integration of fighting the vehicle with the dismounted section/squad.

I think there are 4 main classes of Infantry Vehicles
1) Transport Integral
2) Transport External
3) Protected Mobility
4) Fighting Vehicle

For theTransport Integral, these are generally soft skin vehicles that are used for admin mobility, and don't require a dedicated crew. So vehicles like the ISV, GMV, Hummer, SnowMobiles, ATV's etc. They are not designed to be involved in the fight, but simply logistics and admin support functions - that the Section/Squad can use as required, but are not wedded to the vehicle.

Transport External was just my catchall for stuff like Aircraft, Helicopters, Ships/Boats, Wheeled Logistics Transports used for TCV etc. They aren't a Sub Unit holding and likely not a unit holding - but used for mobility as required, and the sub units are not wedded to the vehicle at all.

Protected Mobility, this is the column where I wonder if a Armoured/Armored Transport Corps is worthwhile - it is an armored vehicle with a crew, so the crew cannot detach (easily) from the vehicle. They are primarily used for movement under a threat - but not really as a direct fighting vehicle -- the Stryker, Bison, M113, AMPV, TAPV, MRAP's, and even the Armored Hummers are all examples of this (some good, some bad, and some down right awful). Since the crew isn't expected to fight the vehicle with the dismounts, there isn't the direct need to have the crew/GIBs be an organic unit.

Fighting Vehicle, this is the area where I have a tough time with the LAV. As generally the goal of the IFV was to fight the vehicle along with tanks up onto the objective - and then dismount the GIB's. The Germans with the Marder II were really the pioneers in the West - followed up by Bradley and Warrior. It isn't quite a tank as far as armor goes (albeit the latest Bradley M2A4 is getting pretty close) and the Israeli Namer is a tank without a gun turret, but they are intended to fight up with tanks, sometimes slightly trailing other times abreast and intermixed with the MBT's.



Now down here we eliminated the 11M Mechanized Infantry MOS, with the concept that it would streamline the Infantry trade - and with the adoption of the Stryker there was no appetite to make a third specific MOS for that, as well as the removal of the 11H Anti-Armor Infantryman. The only separate Infantry MOS down here is 11C Mortarman (technical Indirect Fire Infantryman). The 11H was dropped as the 11M had most of it already due to the TOW in the Bradley, and the 11B's using the TOW in the M1121 Hummer, and the M901 TUA had been withdrawn in the 1994/5 time frame due to being redundant with the Bradleys.
It briefed well - however now you have 11B MOS spanning folks from Ranger Batts, to Bradley units in CAB's, all theoretically interchangeable (a Ranger E-7 can go from Batt to a CAB to be a Platoon Sgt, which is quite a culture shock, and has a massive difference in required knowledge). The 11C was retained as it was viewed as agnostic, but very few folks in Armored Div's want to go to the 82nd to walk around with 81's on their back. I personally think the 11B and 11M are separate enough that they should be reinstated - but drop the 11C and folks them into either the B or M trades.


Thank you for ignoring my Ted talk.

Oh I read it, I just don’t find it terribly compelling in our case. I have issues with how the CAF is structured but I don’t think that problem gets solved by adding another trade to the mix.

 

[KevinB]

Oh I read it, I just don’t find it terribly compelling in our case. I have issues with how the CAF is structured but I don’t think that problem gets solved by adding another trade to the mix.

Ack, I do think that if you end up with some sort of Tracked IFV family eventually that you may change your tune though.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Ack, I do think that if you end up with some sort of Tracked IFV family eventually that you may change your tune though.

We used to managed a tracked fleet quite successfully without a 'Cavalry' trade....

Armour in Canada: M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)

Harold writes articles on Canadian military history, including Military Parachuting, Warplanes, Armour and Artillery, Castles, Fortifications, Sieges and Battles, Warships, The Cold War, Women in the Canadian Forces, First Nations and Black Canadian Military Service. Each article is supported by...

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[markppcli]

Ack, I do think that if you end up with some sort of Tracked IFV family eventually that you may change your tune though.

Honestly I think the argument is largely a mute one. Realistically we don’t have that much movement between light and mechanized Bns, people tend to stay in one or the other. If the Army goes Asymetric that will likely increase vs decrease. I think the US system has its advantages but it’s also built on the attitude of getting the most out of people in four years and as we are increasingly shortening time in the training establishment in favour of at unit training… I don’t think we’d have the same return with our much smaller critical mass and longer expected careers. I often wonder how much benefit the Germans get out of the panzergrenadiers being seperate when all their “light” infantry are now in Boxer. I don’t think that much changes with wheels or tracks tbh.

 

[KevinB]

We used to managed a tracked fleet quite successfully without a 'Cavalry' trade....

View attachment 88636

Armour in Canada: M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)

Harold writes articles on Canadian military history, including Military Parachuting, Warplanes, Armour and Artillery, Castles, Fortifications, Sieges and Battles, Warships, The Cold War, Women in the Canadian Forces, First Nations and Black Canadian Military Service. Each article is supported by...

www.silverhawkauthor.com

I must have missed when the M113 had a fairly sophisticated cannon, ATGM and advanced EO/IO secondary targeting system.

 

[FJAG]

I often wonder how much benefit the Germans get out of the panzergrenadiers being seperate when all their “light” infantry are now in Boxer. I don’t think that much changes with wheels or tracks tbh.

I agree that there is little to choose in the armour protection of the Puma and Boxer. Puma comes in at 31 to 43 tons depending on armour and the Boxer around 38 with variations depending on tactical variant.

Like @KevinB I think that tracks are essential for an IFV intended to accompany tanks which puts Puma into the Panzergrenadier category.

The big issue is weapon systems. Puma IFVs come with a 30mm and Eurospike which, again, provide it with the weapon capabilities to accompany and fight with tanks. Boxer, OTOH, comes primarily with a 7.62 RWS (or a .50 or 40mm grenade launcher). While stronger armament is available, the German concept for its Jaeger battalions is that Boxers are "armoured personnel carriers" and not IFVs.

The German army generally defines jaegers as follows:

Die Jäger sind vor allem für den Kampf in bebautem, stark bewaldetem Gelände oder auch für den Jagdkampf ausgebildet.

Jägers are trained primarily for fighting in built-up, heavily forested terrain or for raids and operations behind enemy lines.

While panzergrenadiers:

Gemeinsam mit der Panzertruppe bilden sie einen Verbund. Ihr Hauptwaffensystem ist der Schützenpanzer. Das besondere Merkmal der Grenadiere ist der schnelle Wechsel der Kampfweise. In ihrem Schützenpanzer sitzend sind die Grenadiere sehr beweglich. Verlassen sie den Panzer, kämpfen sie zu Fuß in unübersichtlichem und sehr engem Gelände.

They form a unit with the tank troops (effectively combined arms units). Their main weapon system is the (Puma or Marder IFV). The special feature of the grenadiers is their ability to quickly change their fighting style. Sitting in their IFVs, the grenadiers are very mobile. When they leave the tank, they fight on foot in (difficult or confusing) and very confined terrain.

The key here is Panzergrenadiers, like American combined arms battalions are trained to fight intimately with tanks in tactics appropriate for that fight. German Jaegers come in various types - similar to Stryker battalions, or paratroopers they specialize in the dismounted fight without intimate tank support.

German Jaeger battalions with Boxers are contained in the misnamed 1st Panzer Div's Panzer Brigade 21 (which notwithstanding its name has zero tanks) and the 10th Panzer Div's Franco-German Brigade which has two Boxer bns and a French bn with VAB and Griffon but moving to Scorpion wheeled APCs and, again, zero tanks.

I'm kind of with @KevinB here. I think dropping the 11M MOS was a mistake. There is clearly a common to both 11B and 11M training but then there is a clear division. The Americans believe that teaching the common to all rifleman skills at the AIT and then leaving the specialized elements to be covered at the units. It simplifies the AIT but puts a burden on the units to teach the light v combined arms elements. One would think that could be better handled at AIT with any given serial being split based on the posting assignment or by alternating serials. The removal of 11M also simplifies career management in that an inf sergeant is an inf sergeant etc.

There's a lot of that going on in the army though. Arty has to deal with FSCC/FOO and gunline and STA and soon AD all in one MOC.

I must have missed when the M113 had a fairly sophisticated cannon, ATGM and advanced EO/IO secondary targeting system.

M109 enters the chat. 90% of the maint issues with the equipment was automotive with electronics, weapons, and optics being a distant 2nd, 3rd, and 4th. Yup. Systems have gotten more complex but its the running gear and motor that still gets the biggest stress from day to day usage. The crew maintenance mostly addressed the automotives. Everything else were specialist techs who mostly did component replacement as a repair.

From what I've seen of the LAV, it's already a far more complex beast than what we had with the M113 fleet and the infantry is handling that alright when given the parts. Adding track maintenance isn't rocket science, just heavy grunt work.

 

[Kirkhill]

With respect to the 40 tonne Boxer.

The Germans have the same situation as the Israelis. They intend to fight on their home turf.
The Israelis can manage an all heavy force because they don't need to run far. Merkavas and Narmers make sense.

The Germans have a bigger country but they also have a well developed highway system to run over. They can motor from Nantes to Chernobyl and from Nordkapp to Taranto at 60 mph. The Boxer makes a useful transport to relocate reserves rapidly. They don't need airlift.

If we are going to use airlift we need something else. If you are going to go with German kit then the Dingo might could work for the "light" reserve.

8.8 - 11.9 t

5.45 m (short) 6.08 m (long)[2]

2.3 m

2.5 m

2 crew (Driver and remote weapons system Officer) 8 passengers

Kind of like a Senator though.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I must have missed when the M113 had a fairly sophisticated cannon, ATGM and advanced EO/IO secondary targeting system.

Infantry can do just about anything given the right leadership and support.

Canadian Infantry? Even more...

 

[KevinB]

From what I've seen of the LAV, it's already a far more complex beast than what we had with the M113 fleet and the infantry is handling that alright when given the parts. Adding track maintenance isn't rocket science, just heavy grunt work.

My point isn’t the track maintenance, it’s the different mentality that comes with the CAB style fighting, and then the time sink that is modern training.

Infantry can do just about anything given the right leadership and support.

Canadian Infantry? Even more...



View attachment 88639

There is only X hours in a day.

The demands on soldiers time to learn and maintain a wider and deeper knowledge base is significantly higher today than yesterday and getting more and more daily.

The days of Jack of All Trades are pretty much gone, it’s more like a 4 of all Trades.

 

[GR66]

Well since I don't expect us to get a tracked IFV any time soon and we don't (won't) have enough tanks to really support and sustain (in wartime) any more than the single Squadron(-) deployed to Latvia I think creating a separate Mechanized Infantry trade is a bit premature.

 

[IKnowNothing]

Well since I don't expect us to get a tracked IFV any time soon and we don't (won't) have enough tanks to really support and sustain (in wartime) any more than the single Squadron(-) deployed to Latvia I think creating a separate Mechanized Infantry trade is a bit premature.

Given

• The current government's clear decision to do the bare minimum to get by
• The likely future governments hesitance to commit to change that policy
• The CA to organizing and equipping a rotational force that reflects the above
• The current "non heavy" make up of most of Multi National divison North dictating how the defense will be planned
• The Canadian mech contribution amounts to a combat team + HQ and support

Good idea fairy says: Why not UOR to lease the appropriate mix of Bradley's/ tracked support vehicles? The eFP battlegroup becomes a fully tracked combined arms force with 3 maneuver units
Square combat team 1: 15 Canadian Leo's + 6 Spanish Leo's and 15 Pizarro
Square combat team 2: Polish Twardy Coy + Canadian Inf Coy in Brads
Reserve Italian Inf heavy Combat team: Ariete+ Dardo (tell them to leave the Frescia's at home)

 

[Kirkhill]

Infantry can do just about anything given the right leadership and support.

Canadian Infantry? Even more...



View attachment 88639

The right support?

You mean like adequate numbers of EO/IR Techs, Mechanics, Wreckers, MSE Ops, Signallers, QMs, Clerks, Transporters, Medics and such?
They might even like a few gunners and cavalry types on hand. A bit of air support?

....

One of my longstanding points of consternation with the Canadian infantry, going back to the 1980s, was the manner in which the infantry battalion of its day was configured for independent action.

Start with the 4 large companies retained from the 1914 British Army. When our allies adopted the triangular battalion Canada persisted with the 4 company battalion. To my way of understanding, as it was explained to me as a youngster, the notion was three companies permitted a single battalion to maintain an all round defence with three arcs (10-2, 2-6, 6-10) around a hollow core. The 4th company was held in the centre in reserve as a QRF.

Meanwhile the infantry had its own "cavalry" in the form of the Recce and TOW platoons (gathering info, screening and supplying mobile Direct Fire Support), its own "artillery" in the form of the Mortar platoon complete with its own FSCC (with the arty conforming to the FSCC), and its own "engineers" in the form of the Pioneers (doing defenses, counter-mobility and mobility work).

And then there was the Support Company and Battalion HQ - Clerks, Sigs, MPs, Medics, Sanitation, Rats, Water, Fuel, Mechanics, Electricians, Truck Drivers...

...

The Battalion of the 1980s was essentially a Battle Group in its own right. They were, when fully constituted, ready to go out the door as an independent force.

The obvious disadvantage to this plan was that it reduced/eliminated the need for the other trades and arms unless a brigade or division were deployed. I suggest that resulted in a very insular, inward-looking infantry, a loss of liaison skills with the other arms, a failure to appreciate the benefits they provided and a lot of skill fade in the support arms. Not to mention the loss of budget allocation to the support trades as the infantry-centric army protected its own.

When the infantry lost its own cavalry, artillery and engineers, and its fourth QRF company I kind of understood the call. I understood it as the revenge of the nerds, an attempt to force the infantry army to pay attention to the other trades. Policy forced the deployment of the All-Arms Battle Group rather than the All-Singing, All-Dancing Infantry Battalion. Unfortunately a lot got lost in the translation. Infanteers resented the loss of skills and opportunities while gunners didn't want to play with mortars, engineers didn't want to be pioneers and cavalry types wanted their own units to command rather than being relegated to being attachments to the infantry. And no champions emerged to ensure the necessary changes in procedures, skills and budgets.

...

Since the loss of the ASAD Bn we seem to have been spending an inordinate amount of time discussing how to make lego blocks and how to stick them together. The ASAD Bn was ready(ish) to go out the door. The modern Battle Group needs to be designed and built from scratch to meet the needs of the moment, and the moment keeps changing on us.

Maybe the Army should have been promoting the deployment of Brigade Groups (double minus) rather than Battle Groups (plus). The ASAD Bn had, and has much to recommend it. But only if constructed within, and trained within, and deployed within, the framework of the Brigade Group.

...

Take Latvia as an example. Rather than creating the Ad Hoc Battle Group why not task the job to one of the Brigades for a 5 year period and have them deploy as a Brigade (double minus) with most of their resources held in Canada and rotating through the task as a family group.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The right support?

You mean like adequate numbers of EO/IR Techs, Mechanics, Wreckers, MSE Ops, Signallers, QMs, Clerks, Transporters, Medics and such?
They might even like a few gunners and cavalry types on hand. A bit of air support?

All of the above, and then some, of course

 

[Infanteer]

I find it goofy that we would consider two different occupations based on the drivetrain of a vehicle that may or may relevant to the tactical task.

 

[Infanteer]

One of my longstanding points of consternation with the Canadian infantry, going back to the 1980s, was the manner in which the infantry battalion of its day was configured for independent action.

Start with the 4 large companies retained from the 1914 British Army. When our allies adopted the triangular battalion Canada persisted with the 4 company battalion. To my way of understanding, as it was explained to me as a youngster, the notion was three companies permitted a single battalion to maintain an all round defence with three arcs (10-2, 2-6, 6-10) around a hollow core. The 4th company was held in the centre in reserve as a QRF.

Meanwhile the infantry had its own "cavalry" in the form of the Recce and TOW platoons (gathering info, screening and supplying mobile Direct Fire Support), its own "artillery" in the form of the Mortar platoon complete with its own FSCC (with the arty conforming to the FSCC), and its own "engineers" in the form of the Pioneers (doing defenses, counter-mobility and mobility work).

And then there was the Support Company and Battalion HQ - Clerks, Sigs, MPs, Medics, Sanitation, Rats, Water, Fuel, Mechanics, Electricians, Truck Drivers...

...

The Battalion of the 1980s was essentially a Battle Group in its own right. They were, when fully constituted, ready to go out the door as an independent force.

The obvious disadvantage to this plan was that it reduced/eliminated the need for the other trades and arms unless a brigade or division were deployed. I suggest that resulted in a very insular, inward-looking infantry, a loss of liaison skills with the other arms, a failure to appreciate the benefits they provided and a lot of skill fade in the support arms. Not to mention the loss of budget allocation to the support trades as the infantry-centric army protected its own.

When the infantry lost its own cavalry, artillery and engineers, and its fourth QRF company I kind of understood the call. I understood it as the revenge of the nerds, an attempt to force the infantry army to pay attention to the other trades. Policy forced the deployment of the All-Arms Battle Group rather than the All-Singing, All-Dancing Infantry Battalion. Unfortunately a lot got lost in the translation. Infanteers resented the loss of skills and opportunities while gunners didn't want to play with mortars, engineers didn't want to be pioneers and cavalry types wanted their own units to command rather than being relegated to being attachments to the infantry. And no champions emerged to ensure the necessary changes in procedures, skills and budgets.

...

Since the loss of the ASAD Bn we seem to have been spending an inordinate amount of time discussing how to make lego blocks and how to stick them together. The ASAD Bn was ready(ish) to go out the door. The modern Battle Group needs to be designed and built from scratch to meet the needs of the moment, and the moment keeps changing on us.

Maybe the Army should have been promoting the deployment of Brigade Groups (double minus) rather than Battle Groups (plus). The ASAD Bn had, and has much to recommend it. But only if constructed within, and trained within, and deployed within, the framework of the Brigade Group.

...

Take Latvia as an example. Rather than creating the Ad Hoc Battle Group why not task the job to one of the Brigades for a 5 year period and have them deploy as a Brigade (double minus) with most of their resources held in Canada and rotating through the task as a family group.

That's an interesting take on things, but makes a lot of assertions that are incorrect.

• An infantry battalion in the 1980s was not configured for "independent action." It was, like today, designed to fight a unit-level engagement as part of a brigade fight.
• Battalion combat support elements provide combined arms capabilities that enable a battalion CO to weight his main effort. If the Bn had a task on a Bde's supporting effort, he or she may not receive bde or higher support. Ensuring a battalion has organic combined arms capability is just prudent force design (as evident by all of our major allied armies who maintained these capabilities in the inf bn).
• Whomever told you Canada retained four companies to fight encircled with a reserve in the middle was making stuff up because you won't find that in any reference out there.
• Do you have any proof that organic combat support in an inf bn led to insular organizations that failed to appreciate other arms? What are you basing this assertion on? Is there anything to suggest that it is better now?

 

[Kirkhill]

That's an interesting take on things, but makes a lot of assertions that are incorrect.

• An infantry battalion in the 1980s was not configured for "independent action." It was, like today, designed to fight a unit-level engagement as part of a brigade fight.
• Battalion combat support elements provide combined arms capabilities that enable a battalion CO to weight his main effort. If the Bn had a task on a Bde's supporting effort, he or she may not receive bde or higher support. Ensuring a battalion has organic combined arms capability is just prudent force design (as evident by all of our major allied armies who maintained these capabilities in the inf bn).
• Whomever told you Canada retained four companies to fight encircled with a reserve in the middle was making stuff up because you won't find that in any reference out there.
• Do you have any proof that organic combat support in an inf bn led to insular organizations that failed to appreciate other arms? What are you basing this assertion on? Is there anything to suggest that it is better now?

40 years of observations and conversations equals an opinion.

 

[KevinB]

I find it goofy that we would consider two different occupations based on the drivetrain of a vehicle that may or may relevant to the tactical task.

Which I would argue is both why the CA ended up with the whole Symmetrical Bde fiasco, and a by product of the same viewpoint.

 

[Infanteer]

How so?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

40 years of observations and conversations equals an opinion.

Can I ask as to the nature and context of these observations and conversations? What were you observing and with whom were you conversing?

I joined in 1989 and so I was part of about 15 years of the army that had the full combat support companies. Combined arms training could always be improved, but I noticed no systemic problem linked to the infantry thinking they could go alone because they had combat support platoons. There was a great article from the 80s called "The Marriage of Two Solitudes" by an Infantry and Armour major about combat team quick attacks, but I don't think there was any systemic problem.

As a tank troop leader and BC we were often training with the infantry battalions in the CMBG, and they had TUA. The engineers were out there as well and the infantry had their pioneers. Recce Squadron worked for the Brigade, but the infantry battalions had their recce platoons.

The changes in 2004/05 were linked to falling manpower levels. Cut units or cut combat support/combat service support elements. There was also a somewhat mistaken understanding about changes to modern warfare, but it was really about manpower and units.