Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[Infanteer]

It's easier to build down with task tailored groupings than it is to build up with a critical mass for core skill development.

 

[GR66]

All right. I've threatened to add another Force 2025 napkin orbat into the system and here it is. I call it Force 2027 V2.0.

It still works on the basis that every headquarters and company designated RFL 1 or 1.1 is a fully equipped and rapidly deployable entity with 100% to 70% RegF staffing. (RFL 1.1 is a slight modification which indicates the headquarters or company is fully equipped and deployable in peace or war with minimal augmentation from either it's organic reserve personnel or from another RegF or ResF organization.)

RFL 2 and 3 headquarters and companies form augmentation pools and are designed to be mobilizational with varying levels of equipment but designed with an expectation to be equipped at some point in the future.

Changes include the following:

a) artillery close support regiments lose their observation and STA batteries. FSCCs and observers return to the close support batteries to simplify training and career progression. STA batteries are reduced to STA troops contained within the Regt'l headquarters. Each brigade has two loitering AUAV batteries, one permanently assigned to the cavalry regiment as close support, the other to the artillery regiment as general support.

b) tank squadrons are three platoons of four tanks to permit equipping of two full regiments from current stocks

c) all infantry battalions have a weapons company for mortars, recce, anti-armour and pioneers.

d) transport companies and supply companies in the brigade service battalions have been amalgamated back into S&T companies.

e) while not apparent from the diagram, all Regt'l and Bn service support companies within a manoeuvre brigade are under command of the service battalion but attached in direct support of the units that they are assigned to. The purpose is to allow one central agency to control both staffing and career management for CSS personnel within the brigade while retaining the response relationship with the supported unit.

f) while not an army resource, HSvc and MP elements have been included for information purposes. The sole MP regiment assigns MP platoons to brigade HQs as required and maintains additional resources for above brigade tasks such as PW handling etc. Medical resources assigned to brigades as Fd Ambs will be attached for administration to the Svc Bn. A Medical battalion is located within 1 CSustB with a Fd Hosp and three Evac platoons.

g) a Canadian Army Support Group has been added to contain all base support functions. It is divided into three regional regiments of four battalions each.

View attachment 68735

Two questions:

1. What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct? It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy. I'd think you'd be better off making sure that you have enough RFL1 sub-units to handle your expected (SSE mandated) deployments and count on your RFL2 and RFL3 units for the exceptional deployment requirements. It may mean an overall reduction in the total number of units/sub-units in the org chart, but may be a more efficient use of Reg Force PYs in peacetime and ultimately doesn't change the total number of troops available.
2. In your chart you show various Reserve Regiments contributing sub-units to the ORBAT. From everything I've read on these forums that is a huge stretch for any of the AR units and would likely require full national mobilization to achieve. Would you be better off treating the Reserve units as Company/Squadron/Battery sized force generators for the required Plantoon/Troop/Gun Detachment sized units required to augment the Reg Force units. For example, if 1PPCLI has 2 x RFL1 Companies and 1 x RFL2 Company (Reg force HQ and a single Platoon) then the King's Own Calgary Rifles and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could each be tasked to supply a single Rifle Platoon to round out the RFL2 Company. This would reduce the training burden on the Reserve units (only need to train up to the Platoon leadership level rather than Company leadership) and also potentially provides for improved sustainment for longer Reserve deployments. If a Reserve Regiment has to fully mobilize in order to provide a Company then it is a one-shot deal. However, if they only need to be able to deploy a Platoon, then they can maintain their home armoury training structure, take in new recruits and begin training a replacement Platoon/individual augmentees in order to prolong the deployment.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Two questions:

1. What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct? It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy.

The main advantage, IMHO, is that everyone (not just the Cpl/Ptes) gets the training they need - up to date and properly resourced training - that is well planned and led in a consistent, reliable, repeatable fashion.

To best achieve this, I would suggest not relying on any current reserve unit to sponsor/ lead/ house this capability as it would be in danger of falling under the spell/adverse influence of the existing Bde/Regimental mess. We don't need the power of this tool to be frittered away helping any particular CO lead a Regimental Family Day, Freedom of the City Parade, or something like that.

I would, for example, locate a Reg F/ Class B training team in a centralized location (with a training area and a range) that all units would send troops to on a regular basis for training, probably centred on the weekend periods. Concurrently, units can run the preparation and continuation training required to be successful at these collective weekend training events.

In the lower mainland of BC, for example, the training team (call it the OMLT? ) could be located in Chilliwack. Units in the lower mainland could then send their troops there for the weekend training periods. As a result, the OMLT would need to consist of a cross section of skills e.g., Inf, Engr, Sigs, Log, Arty etc.

It would also be a pretty fun job, I would think, for an up and coming Maj/MWO team

 

[Kirkhill]

I generally like it.

The modifiers I would add would be:

Every Company has a transport section under command of its CQ and a separate Weapons Platoon for MG, AT and Indirect Fires (pick your poison wrt weapons)

Every Squadron has a separate Support Troop with dismounted personnel, MGs and AT.

Every Battery has a separate AD Troop with an MRAD Section in every Reserve Battery. I would put the AD troops at a higher RFL than the Field troops.

These are all in addition to unit, brigade and army assets.

I figure the RCAC and RRCA don't need more trucks.


The other thing I would like to see a lot more of is Reserve S&T Coys, Fd Ambulance and Fd Hospitals at RFL 3.

 

[FJAG]

Two questions:
1. What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct? It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy. I'd think you'd be better off making sure that you have enough RFL1 sub-units to handle your expected (SSE mandated) deployments and count on your RFL2 and RFL3 units for the exceptional deployment requirements. It may mean an overall reduction in the total number of units/sub-units in the org chart, but may be a more efficient use of Reg Force PYs in peacetime and ultimately doesn't change the total number of troops available.

The RFL 1.1 isn't meant to be immediately deployable like an IRU but is designed, as D&B alludes, to be able to train in the key areas as a full unit and, with minor augmentation, take their place as a roto on a deployment - for example a 1.1 battalion could take a scheduled Latvia roto. Each RFL 1.1 Bn HQ has at least one RFL 1 company so that much of the training and career progression needed by a bn could go on day-to-day. The RegF pers in each of the RFL2 and RFL 3 companies within that battalion would provide not only the core of the leadership of the ResF members in the company but also be the TEWT element of that company on battalion exercises whether computer assisted or in the field.

I thik the expected SSE mandated deployments are met even better than now. Now we have 12 Regt/bn HQs the proposal gives us 12 RFL 1 and 10 RFL1.1. Currently we have 27 rifle companies. Under this proposal you have 23 RFL 1 rifle companies and another 23 RFL3 rifle companies with a leadership cadre that could be brough up to strength with augmentees for planned rotations.

Your right that it doesn't change the total number of troops available. The intent was to see what could be built out of the existing number of people. The main difference is that the full-time leadership personnel from 4 divisional headquarters, 6 ResF brigade headquarters and all the RSS staff are reassigned to leadership roles in battalions and companies.

2. In your chart you show various Reserve Regiments contributing sub-units to the ORBAT. From everything I've read on these forums that is a huge stretch for any of the AR units and would likely require full national mobilization to achieve. Would you be better off treating the Reserve units as Company/Squadron/Battery sized force generators for the required Plantoon/Troop/Gun Detachment sized units required to augment the Reg Force units. For example, if 1PPCLI has 2 x RFL1 Companies and 1 x RFL2 Company (Reg force HQ and a single Platoon) then the King's Own Calgary Rifles and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could each be tasked to supply a single Rifle Platoon to round out the RFL2 Company. This would reduce the training burden on the Reserve units (only need to train up to the Platoon leadership level rather than Company leadership) and also potentially provides for improved sustainment for longer Reserve deployments. If a Reserve Regiment has to fully mobilize in order to provide a Company then it is a one-shot deal. However, if they only need to be able to deploy a Platoon, then they can maintain their home armoury training structure, take in new recruits and begin training a replacement Platoon/individual augmentees in order to prolong the deployment.

I understand your point. My aim is that there are no RegF nor ResF units anymore; rather all units are hybrid units with varying ratios of RegF to ResF personnel based on the likelihood the unit will need to be employed in peacetime. The higher the peacetime role (eg infantry, SFCB) the more RegF, the lower the peacetime role (eg artillery) the lower the RegF ratio. (legally one still has RegF and ResF units albeit units can be transferred from one component to the other just like personnel)

I prefer to think in companies. But, since there is a strong Reg F leadership element within even RFL3 companies, the leadership will be capable of operating as a company while the platoons in such a unit will train mostly as platoons with just enough training as a company to understand the concept. The point is that most of the annual training cycle for the ResF members is at the platoon level while their RegF leadership trains above that level year round.

I frankly do not see much mobilization of RFL 3 companies as part of day-to-day operations. I see a continuing process of augmentation by individuals. The change is that those individual augmentees will have been better trained and led and have the capability of being mobilized in an extreme situation.

To best achieve this, I would suggest not relying on any current reserve unit to sponsor/ lead/ house this capability as it would be in danger of falling under the spell/adverse influence of the existing Bde/Regimental mess. We don't need the power of this tool to be frittered away helping any particular CO lead a Regimental Family Day, Freedom of the City Parade, or something like that.

Absolutely. The vast majority of the proposed units have a battalion HQ that is either 100% or 70% RegF so the leadership is full time. I would see very few ResF COs but don't completely dismiss that for a ResF individual who has the training and experience and is prepared to do a full time command cycle. I do see some higher ResF staff officers (LCol to Maj) in certain brigade and even bn roles.

As it is many ResF units would go to the Supp order of battle. I see nothing wrong with retaining a ResF units name and geographical affiliation, but you are right the power focus has to shift if this is to be successful. That means attitude adjustments to a total force concept by both sides. Commanding an RFL 1.1 unit or brigade carries the same capability and responsibility as commanding an RFL 1 one because both of them may be required to deploy on an operational roto.

I tend to think that we should be able to keep some affiliation to ResF unit genealogy at the company level (e.g the BC battle group having a company linked to the Seaforths, the Westies the BCR ... whatever) to keep the ties to both history and the local community. That's going to take a gentle touch to get both buy-in while moving the yardsticks forward. There are choices for this, and I don't profess to know what the best one is but I do know it can't stay the way it is.

The modifiers I would add would be:

I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization principally because I'm starting equipment neutral - using what we have. For example 1 RCHA's RFL 1 bty has 6 x M777 while the two RFL 3 batteries have 6 x C3. The AUAV battery will only have Skylarks for the time being. Eventually that should change.

The same for transport and support weapons. Each brigade/bn has transport. Each inf bn has mortars, recce, ATGM and pioneers which can be allocated downward as required for exercise and operations is required and desired.

I definitely want to see roughly our current distribution throughout the local communities across Canada. What might be a battalion now would end up becoming a company but using the same armoury. That said, some rationalization for modern shifts in population centres which have taken place since the 1880s and the needs of modernizing armouries needs to be planned for.

The other thing I would like to see a lot more of is Reserve S&T Coys, Fd Ambulance and Fd Hospitals at RFL 3.

I've been thinking about those as well. My very rough calculation puts this field force at roughly 30-35,000 folks which I think the current PY and ResF establishment could manage. I must admit if there were more people available they would go to CS and CSS before any further manoeuvre elements. More RFL 3 S&T, medical, maintainers and vertical and horizontal engineers would be high on my wish list - most of them you could generate through a partnership with community colleges and a decent incentive system through paid education.

 

[Kirkhill]

I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization principally because I'm starting equipment neutral - using what we have. For example 1 RCHA's RFL 1 bty has 6 x M777 while the two RFL 3 batteries have 6 x C3. The AUAV battery will only have Skylarks for the time being. Eventually that should change.

The same for transport and support weapons. Each brigade/bn has transport. Each inf bn has mortars, recce, ATGM and pioneers which can be allocated downward as required for exercise and operations is required and desired.

I definitely want to see roughly our current distribution throughout the local communities across Canada. What might be a battalion now would end up becoming a company but using the same armoury. That said, some rationalization for modern shifts in population centres which have taken place since the 1880s and the needs of modernizing armouries needs to be planned for.


I've been thinking about those as well. My very rough calculation puts this field force at roughly 30-35,000 folks which I think the current PY and ResF establishment could manage. I must admit if there were more people available they would go to CS and CSS before any further manoeuvre elements. More RFL 3 S&T, medical, maintainers and vertical and horizontal engineers would be high on my wish list - most of them you could generate through a partnership with community colleges and a decent incentive system through paid education.

I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization

Lego blocks. The key to the their rigidity is all those integral little knobs that project into the next block.

I think we need little knobs. Useful ones.

The best example I think is the Infantry Battalion Mortar Platoon, in particular the Platoon HQ acting as the knob to which the Fire Support Coordination Centre attaches. The fact that there is a real battery at the other end of the phone is gravy.

With a company having a key to the DFS plan, the AT plan and the Fires plan then I think the integration to the Battalion and the Brigade would be smoother. Similarly if the Cavalry had its own dismounts. And the Artillery - (Field, Garrison, Siege, Air Defence, EW-Directed Energy) well, I think the Royal Regiment needs the opportunity to spread the wealth, and a bit more wealth to spread.

 

[FJAG]

It's kind of funny actually. I haven't really been concerning myself with organizational and tactical issues for many decades now. When I left the combat arms (and in those days artillery and engineers were combat arms) in the mid '80s I left that thinking behind. It's since I retired and started writing and joining this forum and particulalry this last year with the Afghanistan book that I have started pondering this stuff again in detail.

In a lot of ways its really helpful that I learned cold war stuff way back then and am now looking at how things are being done today. It let's me analyze critically in both directions. I see things we did quite wrong back then and I see how the 1990's influenced the Army to go the way they did before and during Afghanistan without actually having had to go through the trauma of the decade of darkness.

The FSCC and the mortar platoon is a perfect example. What worked perfectly well for us back then - a mortar platoon FSCC that stayed with the battalion and two battery commanders that had to rove back and forth between four battle groups to work with the ones having the highest priority worked okay but wasn't optimum by any stretch of the imagination. Our FACing was primitive and airspace coordination worked basically on the principle of "big sky; little bullet".

We've upped the BCs to three and the FOO/JTAC parties per brigade to nine which is an improvement but still not optimum. At the same time the complexity of managing indirect fire support and all that means with FSCCs and ASCCs and STACCs and gods know what else is something that doesn't work too well anymore either. In Afghanistan we made most of that a battlegroup asset - well it can't stay that way - but at the same time since we still deploy standalone battlegroups it must. I think folks are struggling right now with what is the proper organizational structure to work throughout the full spectrum of ops. I can tell you there were numerous structural screw-ups in Afghanistan - not my words but the words of folks who were there. Our doctrine, IMHO, is not coherent and in the absence of that people tend to fall back on their past experiences which, if I'm understanding people correctly varies extensively.

There are some folks on this forum who have a very good grasp on things and can synthesize very well between the way things are and the way things ought to be. In my experience most folks can't. They tend to follow dogma - call it drills or SOPs or what have you. They need stability and certain fixed points to work off of.

That's one reason I tend to lean more towards a standard hierarchical structure that is based on the high end of conflict. Its my belief that if you organize and train for high end conflict then you can handle the stuff below that easily. The same isn't true in the opposite direction. That also means that the more diverse entities that any given commander has to handle (particulalry at the company and even battalion level) the more likely it is some of those will not be used to their optimum effect. In many cases it is better to have specialist cells working outside the battalion or company but whose effects are superimposed on it to allow solid coverage. EW, indirect fire support, ASCC, etc are some of those. Effectively the battalion shouldn't have to concern itself about it, it's effects should just be there. The TTPs of how that should happen obviously vary.

So when it comes to those Lego blocks there are several areas where I'm not so sure where we need to be anymore.

For Recce squadrons, I see a role for organic drones and anti armour weapons. In my days recce squadrons had support platoons (which were a form of dismounts) but I never really saw them doing anything that couldn't be done by a Lynx crew. I'm not sure what dismounts would do now beyond handling drones and anti armour weapons. I certainly believe that recce should participate more in the deep battle than they did in my day but a lot of that is equipment dependent; equipment we do not have. I think the recce (or better yet cavalry) regiment is due for a redesign from the ground up.

I'm still a 100% fan of battalion mortars but am leaning away from them being the knob to hang indirect fire support onto. Mainly that's because of fire supports growing complexity what with air and long range strike and UAV/AUAVs etc etc. It's more specialty now than a temporary assignment in an infantry officer's career. That said, I think there needs to be a stronger link between a battalion and its fire support coordination elements than we have now. A tad more towards the US system with an FSO and team at battalion/regiment HQ and at each company/squadron with links to all the resources that can be mustered in the theatre, both STA and fires. Empire building? Maybe, but it needs to be a big and coordinated network in order to deliver the necessary effects. (That's a lesson we lost during Afghanistan where a little fire support went a long way - it won't at the high end of the spectrum)

My general view when it comes to those Legos is that you have to start with a moderate sized structure made up of sections of different colours and functions that comes preassembled but that you use h=just as it is or that you can take apart and build smaller multicoloured structures from if required.

 

[Kirkhill]

I remember noting back in the Cold War days that some armies formed brigade mortar companies rather than battalion mortar platoons.

The other difference I noted was between the British tendency to either/or resources vs the US tendency to replicate all resources at all levels. Now some of that relates to budget and some relates to proficiency.

To be fair though, I would sooner an imperfectly handled mortar at my side than a perfectly handled one a thousand miles away.

The one at my side can be improved.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?

 

[KevinB]

Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?

Got sold that Bridge once before...

 

[Kirkhill]

Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?

Shhh! Next thing you will be wanting Infantry Drivers to wear Black Hats.

 

[FJAG]

Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?

Got sold that Bridge once before...

The artillery didn't sell that bridge. They got roped into the deal - like the engineers got roped into being ersatz pioneers.

The US army does it a bit differently. The infantry has an 11B MOS for infantryman while 11C is called indirect fire infantryman. Its a separate MOS and not just a subclassification. Training for each of the two MOSs is different and now consists of 22 weeks (up from 14 weeks) of One station training which includes both the basic training and the advanced individual training for the MOS.

To answer your question directly, Brad; there is no reason why it couldn't be an artillery trade and in some armies it is. My personal opinion is that mortars are more intimately and permanently involved with their battalion and the skill levels of the infantryman are the more important. The mortars are just another tool like a machine gun or an ATGM or a sniper rifle that needs basic infantry skills and then an add-on skill. It provides better cohesion and career flow to be part of the Inf classification. But that's just me - like I said, other countries differ and even we did for a while.

 

[FJAG]

Shhh! Next thing you will be wanting Infantry Drivers to wear Black Hats.

Australian M113 APC drivers and crew commanders during Vietnam used to be armoured corps. I don't think they do anymore.

 

[Kirkhill]

The artillery didn't sell that bridge. They got roped into the deal - like the engineers got roped into being ersatz pioneers.

The US army does it a bit differently. The infantry has an 11B MOS for infantryman while 11C is called indirect fire infantryman. Its a separate MOS and not just a subclassification. Training for each of the two MOSs is different and now consists of 22 weeks (up from 14 weeks) of One station training which includes both the basic training and the advanced individual training for the MOS.

To answer your question directly, Brad; there is no reason why it couldn't be an artillery trade and in some armies it is. My personal opinion is that mortars are more intimately and permanently involved with their battalion and the skill levels of the infantryman are the more important. The mortars are just another tool like a machine gun or an ATGM or a sniper rifle that needs basic infantry skills and then an add-on skill. It provides better cohesion and career flow to be part of the Inf classification. But that's just me - like I said, other countries differ and even we did for a while.

I don't see why a rifleman can't progress to MG/Gdr in the Section, MG/CG in the Platoon and MG/AT/Mor( LOS) in the Coy then be sent on an arty course for Spotting and Indirect Fires. Also, I note that some armies, especially in Europe, consider the 81 to be a company weapon.




To me that looks like a perfectly good baseline solution. 3 ATVs, Two Trailers, Two Tube and 6 soldiers. Only two soldiers per tube.

You can't hang around for long in any case so I'm assuming one man beds in the tube while the other preps the bombs, the bombs get dropped and everybody buggers off to prep the next stonk.

 

[FJAG]

I don't see why a rifleman can't progress to MG/Gdr in the Section, MG/CG in the Platoon and MG/AT/Mor( LOS) in the Coy then be sent on an arty course for Spotting and Indirect Fires. Also, I note that some armies, especially in Europe, consider the 81 to be a company weapon.


View attachment 68751

To me that looks like a perfectly good baseline solution. 3 ATVs, Two Trailers, Two Tube and 6 soldiers. Only two soldiers per tube.

You can't hang around for long in any case so I'm assuming one man beds in the tube while the other preps the bombs, the bombs get dropped and everybody buggers off to prep the next stonk.

It's been a long time since I looked at this and in the interval there was all the crap with taking the mortars away from the infantry but I seem to vaguely recall a three stage training - a basic course of roughly three weeks for basic mortarman, another three to four week intermediate course that taught basic mortar line leadership and firing data production and an advanced course that taught fire controller and FSCC duties. I might be wrong about MFC and that might have been on the intermediate.

You really need three people on a tube, a layer, a loader and an ammo number to prep the rounds for the loader to ensure a rapid rate of fire. Generally the group is deployed and prepared before the mission is received. Whether the group moves after the mission is dependent on the circumstances. In Afghanistan they generally didn't because CB was pretty much non-existent most of the time. Some missions would be done from within FOBs. Where there is active CB you would definitely pull-pole for an alternate position after "rounds complete". That's where group deployments are handy in keeping one foot on the ground wile the other is moving.

Back in my days while you could deploy two tubes the usual way was to deploy a four-tube group or a full eight-tube platoon. One thing most people seem to forget about indirect fire is the effectiveness of indirect fire is based on what arrives on the target rapidly. The more rounds you can put down in the first volley, the more effective the fire becomes. The lethal burst diameter for an 81mm round is roughly 35 metres so four tubes gives you a rough line of around 150m by 40m for planning purposes which would barely suppress a platoon. To cover a 150m by 100m area you need a whole mortar platoon. Similarly to neutralize a target of that size you would need a six gun 105mm battery or slightly larger for 155mm. Remember we're talking lethality here - splinters obviously fly further than that and you can always get lucky but the first rounds within the lethal area do the most damage which is why we mass fires and try to reach first round surprise. M777s are fairly easy to mass from multiple positions. Mortars are much harder to mass accurately from distributed positions - not impossible - but harder. (as an aside I've asked various gunners in Afghanistan how often they massed the fire from more than one troop and the answer so far is - not. They usually fired single or two-gun missions on very small targets - like your stereotypical grape hut. They rarely saw what one could call a platoon or company position - Medusa was a bit different as none of the targets were what one would call identified and defined targets)

Also, neutralization doesn't mean the target is dead. It means it can't do anything while under fire. If you create enough casualties so much the better, the target might become combat ineffective but don't count on that. Usually after the fire stops, the target gets on with business.

 

[Kirkhill]

With respect FJAG, you may really need three people on a tube but

Indirect fire weapon

The 81mm Mortar is an indirect fire weapon which is operated by 2 commandos and has a range of 5,650 metres. The mortar can fire a number of different types of round, including fire smoke, illuminating and high explosive rounds.

Royal Navy - Royal Marines Equipment Weaponry

Discover what is in the kit-bag of a Royal Marine, including machine guns, assault rifles, pistols and grenades. Plus the support weaponry, including sniper rifles, mortars, Javelin and NLAW anti-tank rockets.

www.royalnavy.mod.uk

Royal Marines Trial Can-Am 6x6 ATV For Mortars | Joint Forces News

Royal Marines from 45 Commando have been trialling Can-Am OUTLANDER MAX 6x6 all-terrain vehicles in the mortar transport role.

www.joint-forces.com

It may work better with three but, needs must, apparently it can work with two.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Got sold that Bridge once before...

I don't mean that way, any more than I would have chosen to pull the admin companies out and hand them to the service battalions. I mean the units keep the equipment and the platoons, but the platoons are staffed the same way the admin companies are staffed. Could also do black hats in the recce and anti-armour platoons, and, yes, engineers in the pioneer platoons. Also, gunners and engineers in the armoured units.

I'd be inclined to view those as career-enhancing positions for promising soldiers and officers - people who would benefit from working closely with or across manoeuvre units early on, because they are good prospects for key positions further down the road.

 

[FJAG]

With respect FJAG, you may really need three people on a tube but

Royal Navy - Royal Marines Equipment Weaponry

Discover what is in the kit-bag of a Royal Marine, including machine guns, assault rifles, pistols and grenades. Plus the support weaponry, including sniper rifles, mortars, Javelin and NLAW anti-tank rockets.

www.royalnavy.mod.uk

Royal Marines Trial Can-Am 6x6 ATV For Mortars | Joint Forces News

Royal Marines from 45 Commando have been trialling Can-Am OUTLANDER MAX 6x6 all-terrain vehicles in the mortar transport role.

www.joint-forces.com

View attachment 68752

It may work better with three but, needs must, apparently it can work with two.

And in the US Army the crew for an 81mm mortar is 4. When the airborne battery deployed with mortars rather than L5s, each seven man detachment manned 2 tubes. I don't doubt that during manpower starvation times platoons went out short mortars and people and my guess is they probably do so now. I can go on. You can operate a mortar with one man if you want, and if the Marines are so manpower poor that they give those things two two blokes, then the trade-off is that the weight of fire that the tube can deliver is either slow getting off the mark because rounds need to be unpacked, charges selected and possibly a fuze set and fire is delayed until that happens or alternatively the rate of fire is slowed from what it could be while the loader is busy doing that.

You can squeeze any detachment, section, platoon etc down to the bare minimum to make the weapon function but that usually means it operates below optional capability, can't work 24/7 and can't absorb casualties.

I'll let D&B explain why Marines put two guys on a mortar - maybe they are supermen but my guess is they are PY starved.

 

[Kirkhill]

And in the US Army the crew for an 81mm mortar is 4. When the airborne battery deployed with mortars rather than L5s, each seven man detachment manned 2 tubes. I don't doubt that during manpower starvation times platoons went out short mortars and people and my guess is they probably do so now. I can go on. You can operate a mortar with one man if you want, and if the Marines are so manpower poor that they give those things two two blokes, then the trade-off is that the weight of fire that the tube can deliver is either slow getting off the mark because rounds need to be unpacked, charges selected and possibly a fuze set and fire is delayed until that happens or alternatively the rate of fire is slowed from what it could be while the loader is busy doing that.

You can squeeze any detachment, section, platoon etc down to the bare minimum to make the weapon function but that usually means it operates below optional capability, can't work 24/7 and can't absorb casualties.

I'll let D&B explain why Marines put two guys on a mortar - maybe they are supermen but my guess is they are PY starved.

My guess is that you are correct on being PY starved. My second guess is that they are replacing muscles with motors where they can and have decided that they are either going to work from the back of a BV or else from an ATV and trailer. And try and make up some of the difference that way.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I don't mean that way, any more than I would have chosen to pull the admin companies out and hand them to the service battalions. I mean the units keep the equipment and the platoons, but the platoons are staffed the same way the admin companies are staffed. Could also do black hats in the recce and anti-armour platoons, and, yes, engineers in the pioneer platoons. Also, gunners and engineers in the armoured units.

I'd be inclined to view those as career-enhancing positions for promising soldiers and officers - people who would benefit from working closely with or across manoeuvre units early on, because they are good prospects for key positions further down the road.

That would work....

Right up until the point where you need to walk from A to B with all your stuff and, by the time you get to B, you only have Infantry types ...