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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

When looking at other countries' reserve force models, the ones that were designed decades ago for mass mobilization at the outset of a major European conflict aren't particularly relevant now and haven't been recently tested/proven. Look at the countries that are occasionally successfully employing large numbers of reservists on contemporary missions, and particularly the ones that can generate functioning sub-units. Those are the proven models. Pick one.
 
With or without promotions? What do they do? Represent their org at discussions?
There is no promotion because of the appointment. They have primary duties that they discharge such as Division Commander or COS Ops etc etc and they occupy those primary positions based on their rank. They are also assigned these secondary duties. They provide some oversight over their Branches/Regiments/ Corps, giving the Army Commander someone to turn to do for issues regarding specific branches, and to provide a focal point to bring Branch issues to light. They are involved in personnel management as well, particularly the Branch Directors.
 
Swiss like, not their exact system itself.

Your assuming the training done on parade nights and weekends is inherently valuable. Most of it is not. Your going to end up with more capable soldiers doing a 1 month a year of actual field work than the hodgepodge of training which is currently done. I have been on a few really good weekend exs, I have been on substantially more which I strongly question why we even bothered showing up.

Establishing relationships has an inherent value in it, we do that best face to face. I don’t disagree that often weekly parade nights are a waste of time, you’ll see me argue against them in the previous page. I think two days a month, with a coherent plan, is probably good though.

“Your going to end up with more capable soldiers doing a 1 month a year”

Are you? Why ? Because I’ve taught a BMOQ-A where the candidates had downed tools for a year due to Covid, I can assure you the skills fade was real, and we had to take a lot more time than you’d think retraining on basic weapons handling. What’s your solution to 11 months of skill fade?

Many parade nights are wasted going over the same material constantly due to the requirements to get everyone done their IBTS.

Probably because influxes of people mean you have to hit that training again yes.

Not to mention with the current commitment requirements you only have to show up approximately 8 half days a year which really isn’t much, especially when you consider many of those can be things like the Christmas dinner or remembrance day. So how much actual training is really done under the current system?

That’s a good point and a fair question. I don’t know where we capture that but we should be. NES is built for the volunteering to serve nature of the reserves. If you have troops that can’t make their 1 month training block are they immediately kicked out or how does that work?


In comparison there would be 1 month of training and field time, on a full scale exercise. Doing more than section/platoon sized, but actual regiment and brigade work.

No you won’t. You spend a minimum 1 week refreshing basic skills, then you’ll hopefully get in a range, at best you’ll validate at platoon. When we do Bde Exercises they’re the summery of full training years with multiple 3-6 week exercises building to them.


I am not saying it would completely get rid of planning requirements but I feel they would be substantially reduced. When you actually think about the amount of admin a Reserve unit generates currently just to barely function reducing things to a 1 month planning span should substantially reduce the burden.

I agree fullly the the reserve system is a self licking lollipop administratively. It generates admin for COs because the CO position exists ect. Fully agree. That said having 1 WO plan the flights, arrivals, and training goals of what ever size, let’s say platoon, with no established chain of command to help sounds horrific.


Another thing to consider is the amount of admin which is spent on things which bring dubious value to the military but still needs to be done currently such as NPF and building maintenance.

I’d argue building maintenance is of critical value to the military - we need those places to keep our equipment and provide training venues / places to run admin

No more concerns about NES troops. No more concerns about trying to get people to show up.

What if they don’t show up?

There would have to be several regional depots, basically one per division which the equipment can be maintained and stored at.

So the nearest rifle for someone in Price George is Edmonton ? What if they break some kit, how does that happen without some kind of regular check in / local stores ?

There still would be more than one Ops warrant and some level of leadership above them, but how many is really needed when we get rid of the generic class A work which goes with maintaining a unit year round? How many would be needed when we have full strength units? Right now there is tons of duplication of purpose with small units each needing to have ‘xyz’ to function but if they were larger in number would still have the same amount of people doing those jobs.

Yes I agree about duplication of work. But you were the one talking about not having units beyond regional WOs running the admin. So now what it sounds like we’re talking about is coming around to regimental amalgamations into usable Bn hubs with dispersed sub and sub sub units. Right ?

I see it as listing the taskings available with it being up to the individual soldiers to volunteer for taskings when emailed for them, or to email the Ops warrant with their potential availability for courses/taskings. If the CAF was smart they could possibly even do it with a website which members update their status and availability on.

Or on a soft wear program called CFTPO ? Isn’t this kind of already what happens ? Chain of command finds a tasking, ask for volunteers via a talk or group chat? Then does the CFTPO filling online ? Give members the option to bid ? Sure I guess.
This whole system would be much more individual focused in terms of soldiers planning their careers. It also would create some actual full strength units and allow us to get away from the costly and inefficient system we currently run on.

The problem is now we have 47 UOI qualified MCpls in the Toronto Militia district but no driver examiners and no one has vault access. Individual training goals are great but need to be subordinate to the institutions needs.

There would still be units, and you still would be serving with the same people, just those units would now be able to take people from a wider spread area and not be tied down to localized manning limitations.

So we’re really just talking about amalgamating units, which everyone here is for. In fact I think everyone in the CAF more or less agrees. The 1 month a year thing I think would be fraught with problems and end up being a month of refreshing drills with some ranges at best.
 
Perhaps if Unit COs want to be LCols, they need to invest in retention and recruitment. If not, well if you parade at a Coy minus strength; that leads one to believe that's a Major or Senior Captain level of responsibility, and that can be folded into a larger TBG CoC headed by a LCol.
As much as some PRes units imagine that recruiting is the only barrier preventing their being a full battalion, the CAF establishes the number of positions in a unit and that provides a hard ceiling. I listened through many reservist blustering about the CA Army not allowing them to recruit enough people to fill their second rifle company, and then pulled up the unit establishment to see there was no authority for such a company to exist. The vast majority of reserve units are only authorized one company even in many units that believe they are entitled to two.

Establishing a reward structure with the incentive on the far side of an uncrossable barrier? That’s probably not the best CoA.
 
As much as some PRes units imagine that recruiting is the only barrier preventing their being a full battalion, the CAF establishes the number of positions in a unit and that provides a hard ceiling. I listened through many reservist blustering about the CA Army not allowing them to recruit enough people to fill their second rifle company, and then pulled up the unit establishment to see there was no authority for such a company to exist. The vast majority of reserve units are only authorized one company even in many units that believe they are entitled to two.

Establishing a reward structure with the incentive on the far side of an uncrossable barrier? That’s probably not the best CoA.
In the 80’s to early 90’s a lot of units had a second Company or Battery, that was theoretically their training entity, but often seemed to suffer mission creep.

Frankly given the units where only authorized 1 Company, one would ask why they had a LtCol as a CO…
Or a Col as a District Commander (or whatever they are called now).
 
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As much as some PRes units imagine that recruiting is the only barrier preventing their being a full battalion, the CAF establishes the number of positions in a unit and that provides a hard ceiling. I listened through many reservist blustering about the CA Army not allowing them to recruit enough people to fill their second rifle company, and then pulled up the unit establishment to see there was no authority for such a company to exist. The vast majority of reserve units are only authorized one company even in many units that believe they are entitled to two.

Establishing a reward structure with the incentive on the far side of an uncrossable barrier? That’s probably not the best CoA.
I suspect there’s a few unit COs who are distraught to find out their regiments are in fact not their personal militias
 
As much as some PRes units imagine that recruiting is the only barrier preventing their being a full battalion, the CAF establishes the number of positions in a unit and that provides a hard ceiling. I listened through many reservist blustering about the CA Army not allowing them to recruit enough people to fill their second rifle company, and then pulled up the unit establishment to see there was no authority for such a company to exist. The vast majority of reserve units are only authorized one company even in many units that believe they are entitled to two.

Establishing a reward structure with the incentive on the far side of an uncrossable barrier? That’s probably not the best CoA.
Our B Company was our Training Platoon/Section with a full Coy HQ and a Platoon with trained Section Commanders, 2iC and a trained Platoon Leader but there was also an untrained Platoon Leader learning his trade. The trainee was responsible for all the duties of the Platoon Leader. The trained Platoon Leader, along with the OC, CSM, Sr PL, Pl WO, Coy Clk, Storesman, Section Leaders all did their bit in training the untrained subby as well as the troops in training. The trainees also taught the Officer in Training many things as well.

This employed many authorized supernumeraries without putting much of a strain on anybody.

As I recall it.
 
When looking at other countries' reserve force models, the ones that were designed decades ago for mass mobilization at the outset of a major European conflict aren't particularly relevant now and haven't been recently tested/proven. Look at the countries that are occasionally successfully employing large numbers of reservists on contemporary missions, and particularly the ones that can generate functioning sub-units. Those are the proven models. Pick one.
I disagree with that Brad. You're looking at a mass mobilization army in many ways with the Ukrainians and I wouldn't call their mobilization ineffective.

Going backwards to the war on terror over the last thirty years, the Americans have been mobilizing battalions and brigades of ARNG and USAR. I think even the odd ARNG div HQ was mobilized for Iraq.

The Canadian reserve system has been crippled over many decades so that formation and unit mobilization is an impossibility. We can't move towards reestablishing that capability without massive changes. I think that with the scale within which Canada operates, we can go towards a system of creating viable ResF sub-units within RegF units without a massive change; but it would require a significant change in culture for both elements.

The obvious fallacy with that is that the Canadian Army sets low objectives and expectations for the reserves and itself and then continuously fails to meet them. The Army needs to aim higher and plan for the long game. The economics of maintaining a full-time v a part-time (or mixed) force makes that obvious.

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I disagree with that Brad. You're looking at a mass mobilization army in many ways with the Ukrainians and I wouldn't call their mobilization ineffective.
To what extent did they mobilize existing reserve units and formations as units and formations? Can we replicate that? Would we choose to replicate it if we were facing anything less than direct invasion?
 
To what extent did they mobilize existing reserve units and formations as units and formations? Can we replicate that? Would we choose to replicate it if we were facing anything less than direct invasion?

There's an article here that gives a broad overview of the brigades (regular and reserve) that Ukraine had prior to Russia's latest indecency.


Their system is, of course, highly dependent on released conscripts/contract soldiers but how they are formed doesn't really matter.

Can we replicate it? You answer your own question. Why would we want to?

That begs the question though since we already have a reserve that we're paying for. The question isn't: do we want to replicate Ukraine? The question is: do we want to optimize the army we have with a better trained and more efficient reserve force?

All that I'm saying is that reserve units and formations are not out of the question except in our own small minds where we see everything novel as impossible. At the turn of the century we saw peer conflict as impossible and designed ourselves for failed states scenarios. How'd that work out for us?

Let's truck out an old adage that applies today as well as it did two millennia ago: "Si vis pacem, para bellum". These days we prepare for war by forming defence alliances. That means carrying your weight. The only way we can carry our weight and still try to be cheap is through a less expensive but capable reserves. The first step in that is preparing deployable sub-units functioning under RegF command. If we get that accomplished then the next step is building deployable units and formations similar to US ARNG ones. Now that's a long range goal that will take a generation.

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In the ideal world I would see the CA PRes be much like the ARNG down here.
However without equipment, and mandated training (supported by legislation) it’s not really possible at this point.
 
Establishing relationships has an inherent value in it, we do that best face to face. I don’t disagree that often weekly parade nights are a waste of time, you’ll see me argue against them in the previous page. I think two days a month, with a coherent plan, is probably good though.
There is some inherent value to establishing relationships, that being said due to the fickle nature of the reserves attendance system it can be months before you see some people due to how everyones schedules match up.

2 days a month is easily said, it is much harder to get everyone to match up especially with society moving towards working less traditional hours and more shift work.

The advantage of one month a year guaranteed by law is you can get people from all over the country who normally wouldn’t be able to attend your standard parade nights/weekends due to location and or schedule to participate. Its a lot easier for employers to accommodate 1 month off a year than constantly asking for a weekend here or there, and that doesn’t even include asking for time off for training.
Are you? Why ? Because I’ve taught a BMOQ-A where the candidates had downed tools for a year due to Covid, I can assure you the skills fade was real, and we had to take a lot more time than you’d think retraining on basic weapons handling. What’s your solution to 11 months of skill fade?
If the skill fade is that bad after 11 months, I would argue we didn’t spend enough time on it in the first place. For example a couple years ago I hadn’t handled a MG in a few years. Despite that I could still strip the weapons faster than the soldiers who had just finished the then shortened BMQ-L. They were less confident with the weapons than I was and it had been years since I was trained on them.

We like to pretend that we are constantly utilizing skills we have learned on a regular basis in the CAF, yet the reality is many things we get trained on we don’t refresh on a regular basis as is, we go back to trying to remember our training from years ago.

This is also why I think its important for the Reserves to have a hard cap on your rank unless you have a exceptional amount of time doing the job at the lower levels.

That’s a good point and a fair question. I don’t know where we capture that but we should be. NES is built for the volunteering to serve nature of the reserves. If you have troops that can’t make their 1 month training block are they immediately kicked out or how does that work?
I would set it up that troops can ask for a exemption to the one month for various reasons (medical, parental/family, etc.) up to the CoC to approve. If the CoC refuses the reason due to the legal requirement to attend you will attend or you will be charged with AWOL.

Treat them like the Regs for that one month span, what does the Reg Force do if someone fails to show up when ordered?
No you won’t. You spend a minimum 1 week refreshing basic skills, then you’ll hopefully get in a range, at best you’ll validate at platoon. When we do Bde Exercises they’re the summery of full training years with multiple 3-6 week exercises building to them.
Either way it will still have your soldiers much more trained at their levels than the current system. When we have Regiments with maybe a company on paper, that only have a platoon to a section show up on ex currently, what is really being validated?

If everyone is legally required to show up you have everyone there to train. We can’t demand people always show up to everything on the current system, its too much to demand as a part time gig. Getting a month off to do it is much more attainable.
I agree fullly the the reserve system is a self licking lollipop administratively. It generates admin for COs because the CO position exists ect. Fully agree. That said having 1 WO plan the flights, arrivals, and training goals of what ever size, let’s say platoon, with no established chain of command to help sounds horrific.
Its not necessarily one WO doing the work, just that if we know this is happening every year we can plan it every year. I imagine the structure would look something like all the WOs and above and Majors and above would be Reg force (with some exemptions for retired Reg force members transferring into the Reserves, or Reservists with tons of full time experience wishing to advance).

Since those units would be stood down each year, we can use that leadership as training staff for the CAF (run both courses for the Regs and Reserves the rest of the year), or filling in elsewhere as required. Then pull them back to manage the Reserves for the one month exercise/standing up of the unit.

Some members will have to be full time managing the Reserves but with the reduced admin of having the units stood down most the year, a lot of the current manning needs would be gone. If we properly utilized technology we wouldn’t need nearly as many people to administer the system.

For example, we create a lot of admin just by sending stuff down the CoC constantly.

There is so many exercises and taskings I have had sent to me that by time it hits the troops it is now urgent (or even past due) for a response, when in reality they asked for the manning a few weeks prior it just took that long for it to be emailed down the CoC.

Why couldn’t that initial email simply have been sent to the troops directly? Or if we were smart we would generate a website which lists the taskings available and allows the troops to apply for them as they come up. That would allow the soldiers to apply for work if they desire to, well substantially reducing the admin on the collective CoCs.

It also allows for a decentralized approach which doesn’t require the people arranging the taskings/courses to be anywhere near the people attending them. You could have someone in Moose Factory in the Reserves and take taskings/courses if they wished. In many ways this could open the doors for many rural communities with not much good job prospects to have people join and earn great money for the area without having to commit to moving away for long periods.

I’d argue building maintenance is of critical value to the military - we need those places to keep our equipment and provide training venues / places to run admin
Building maintenance is of critical value, what I am questioning is why we need armouries in every city when we could centralize all those resources in a few bases across the country and allow the full time staff there to deal with that.
What if they don’t show up?
Treat them the same as the Regs, its a legal requirement, you face AWOL if you don’t.
So the nearest rifle for someone in Price George is Edmonton ? What if they break some kit, how does that happen without some kind of regular check in / local stores ?
Where ever the training bases happen to be is where the equipment would be. Why would we need the equipment to be elsewhere?

Set up a online equipment shop/depot for ordering replacement equipment/returning equipment. Make it so the box the new equipment is sent in has a return label on it and you pack the old broken/damaged/now under/oversized equipment in and mail back to the depot.

Equipment really doesn’t break that much, certainly not enough to justify the amount of money we spend to keep stores going at each armouries. I think I have used clothing stores for equipment maybe half a dozen times in the last 8 years, certainly not enough to justify a full time pers managing a micro stores.
Yes I agree about duplication of work. But you were the one talking about not having units beyond regional WOs running the admin. So now what it sounds like we’re talking about is coming around to regimental amalgamations into usable Bn hubs with dispersed sub and sub sub units. Right ?
There is always going to need to be more than just one person, but the admin side will be substantially reduced. Exactly how many is needed would have to be sorted out, but it wouldn’t be anywhere near the current manning demand.
Or on a soft wear program called CFTPO ? Isn’t this kind of already what happens ? Chain of command finds a tasking, ask for volunteers via a talk or group chat? Then does the CFTPO filling online ? Give members the option to bid ? Sure I guess.
We can make the current system more efficient than it currently is. There is a lot of inefficient processes in how we currently do it, see my example above for taskings.
The problem is now we have 47 UOI qualified MCpls in the Toronto Militia district but no driver examiners and no one has vault access. Individual training goals are great but need to be subordinate to the institutions needs.
100%. The main goal is to create OFP soldiers, beyond that courses become optional. What OFP means can be adjusted as needed. The Reserves as I see it mainly exist as a force multiplier on the cheap for the lower levels (the levels which are easier to maintain the skills at). To me the training should primarily be run by Reg Force staff, just as the courses the Reservists should mainly be taking be oriented towards their specific positions.

Why have Reservists with driver examiner, when the training is done mainly by the Regs? Why would a Reservist need vault access when the weapons are managed in the centralized bases? We create a lot of the demand for these types of courses currently due to our spread out nature. By centralizing it reduces/removes the burden of these types of courses.

Some will argue the Regs cannot possibly provide all that training, I simply need to point to how many troops we have helped train for Ukraine. Its not a matter of we cannot, its a matter of we choose not to.
So we’re really just talking about amalgamating units, which everyone here is for. In fact I think everyone in the CAF more or less agrees. The 1 month a year thing I think would be fraught with problems and end up being a month of refreshing drills with some ranges at best.
Even if it turns into a month of refreshing drills/range time/field time isn’t that all it really needs to be? Isn’t that basically all we do year round with the Reserves anyways, just spread out in a inefficient manner?

At least with this one month system we would kill a lot of needless admin, expensive building costs, full time positions that don’t need to exist, and actually force the troops to attend/get the training.
 
One argument that is trotted out is that reserves are cheaper than regulars — but how much cheaper? I’d like to see the math on that — certainly maintaining heritage buildings as glorified platoon houses to host 40 odd effectives has to be expensive, but I wonder what the actual numbers are.
 
One argument that is trotted out is that reserves are cheaper than regulars — but how much cheaper? I’d like to see the math on that — certainly maintaining heritage buildings as glorified platoon houses to host 40 odd effectives has to be expensive, but I wonder what the actual numbers are.

The value of those buildings can be increased. Not just from the real estate point of view either.

In addition to being gathering points they could also be better storage points. The logistics equipment necessary for conducting training and operations is also exactly the same equipment that is so valuable in emergencies - vehicles, water purifying straws, first aid kits, ration packs, blankets and sleeping bags and tents, radios, charged batteries. And when I am talking about vehicles I am thinking more along the lines of Milverados than LAVs, maybe, perhaps Bandvagons and Inflatable boats with outboard motors....

With that gear on hand then not only would the community be better served but the training and exercises of those 40 bodies could become that much more interesting, as well as relevant.

Add in a proper permanent, live, command and control centre in the BOR that can be manned in an emergency or during exercises and you are really increasing the value of that property.

And, of course, a secure location to store dangerous government property while keeping it ready to hand.
 

Brits having many of the same debates as we are about the role of an expeditionary Army and the Reserves.
 
In the ideal world I would see the CA PRes be much like the ARNG down here.
However without equipment, and mandated training (supported by legislation) it’s not really possible at this point.
There is no question that equipment is essential. It takes time to acquire that. There's no reason, however, that you can't start the rebuilding process with what we have and then add the equipment as it goes along.
One argument that is trotted out is that reserves are cheaper than regulars — but how much cheaper? I’d like to see the math on that — certainly maintaining heritage buildings as glorified platoon houses to host 40 odd effectives has to be expensive, but I wonder what the actual numbers are.
The US Congressional Budget Office has a website that lets you see how much the direct and indirect costs of a given military element is. These are in annual operating costs and do not include capital equipment purchases. Note the figures are large because they also include the proportional overhead costs.

Read in three columns: Type of BCT; Active Army BCT cost; ARNG BCT cost

ABCT $3.5 billion $1.0 billion

SBCT $3.4 billion $0.9 billion

IBCT $3.2 billion $0.9 billion

In short, it cost a bit less than one third to maintain an equipped ARNG BCT than an active one.

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I think we can all agree, fundamentally, on a few things when it comes to reshaping the army reserve:

1. Its structure is at best not optimized for organizational efficiency, and at worst directly detracts from the reserves mission (see below). It needs to be rebuilt into usable units that hold enough mass (read people) to make Bn sized groupings sensible.

2. 3 hour parade nights are not a good use of time and money. A full weekend is a) better time for money b) allows for far more actual time for training and c) is less administrative work.

3. The idea of “the regs” and “the reserves” as separate organizations vs simply as administrative statuses of personnel creates a deeply unproductive culture of distrust and disinterest. Any more forward should better integrate the two to make good use of all soldiers and to start breaking apart this culture.

* note: the mission of the reserves needs to be addressed. A coherent, directive, mission task to each unit and then build a structure that is made to meet that task.
 
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