Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[McG]

Where @KevinB and I are completely in sync is that if you have a mission like Latvia, where you feel you may have to deploy very rapidly then prepositioned equipment and war stocks are the best answer. The easiest deployment (as REFORGER proved over and over again) is taking a given number of soldiers with nothing but their personal kit and the odd battle-box on a fleet of military and contracted civilian aircraft and land them on a completely equipped brigade, division or corps. You can probably do that in 48 hours if the proper plans and processes in place.

If REFORGER had ever needed to be fought instead of exercised, would getting troops to Lahr have required flying through & landing within the Russian A/AD bubble?

That will be the reality if we try deploying troops to prepositioned kit in Riga during a war.

 

[FJAG]

If REFORGER had ever needed to be fought instead of exercised, would getting troops to Lahr have required flying through & landing within the Russian A/AD bubble?

That will be the reality if we try deploying troops to prepositioned kit in Riga during a war.

There are two time frames during which a REFORLAT would take place.

Prior to hostilities have started, where any attempt by the forces in Kaliningrad firing on a NATO aircraft would immediately start the war with catastrophic consequences for Kaliningrad.

After hostilities have started where the defences in Kaliningrad will have been neutralized or annihilated.

Kaliningrad is a factor. It is not a decisive factor nor is it the only way to get to Latvia. Plans would include sequencing aircraft so that no more than one would be lost if a hostile act were to take place and escorting aircraft with appropriate SEAD capabilities.

Alternate plans could include landing in Estonia (yup - same issue with St Petersburg) or Finland or Sweden and taking sea transport across.

My guessing is that any serious Russian attempt to actually invade the Baltics would come by way of covert infiltration and/or a massing on the borders a la Ukraine giving warning and triggering deployment in order to provide an enhanced deterrence over and above that of a standing force.

There are only two alternatives: 1) a return to a larger permanent forward deployed force than what we have currently committed (something which we are probably no longer able to sustain the way 4 CMBG was); or 2) holding to the inadequate status quo, assuming it can't be reinforced or sustained, and writing the Baltics off to the whim of Russia when it feel ready to try to gather some more low hanging fruit. Neither of those two options appeal to me.

 

[daftandbarmy]

There are only two alternatives: 1) a return to a larger permanent forward deployed force than what we have currently committed (something which we are probably no longer able to sustain the way 4 CMBG was); or 2) holding to the inadequate status quo, assuming it can't be reinforced or sustained, and writing the Baltics off to the whim of Russia when it feel ready to try to gather some more low hanging fruit. Neither of those two options appeal to me.

You forgot Option 3:

Defang the CAF by re-roling it into a 'Climate Emergency Response Force'

 

[Edward Campbell]

Oh, yes, and see Andrew Leslie's comments: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brit...y-needs-new-disaster-response-force-1.6955373

 

[McG]

Kaliningrad is a factor. It is not a decisive factor nor is it the only way to get to Latvia. Plans would include sequencing aircraft so that no more than one would be lost if a hostile act were to take place and escorting aircraft with appropriate SEAD capabilities.

Kaliningrad is not the only relevant node in Russian AAD. There is no uncontested path to Latvia.

Clearing Kaliningrad definitely opens some options, but it would be naive to assume the city can easily be neutralized. So Latvia needs all the resources to counter a Russian invasion for the duration of a long Kaliningrad siege. Flyover kit in Latvia is kit that will be unavailable but potentially useful as part of that siege.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Oh, yes, and see Andrew Leslie's comments: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brit...y-needs-new-disaster-response-force-1.6955373

'Lives at risk'...

I'm sure the firefighting community across Canada will appreciate that.

 

[KevinB]

Kaliningrad is not the only relevant node in Russian AAD. There is no uncontested path to Latvia.
View attachment 79855
Clearing Kaliningrad definitely opens some options, but it would be naive to assume the city can easily be neutralized. So Latvia needs all the resources to counter a Russian invasion for the duration of a long Kaliningrad siege. Flyover kit in Latvia is kit that will be unavailable but potentially useful as part of that siege.

So you use POMCUS depots in Germany and Poland.
Troops can fly into secure areas of Western Europe, and ground move (trains, bus etc) to the storage sites, and then road move in their equipment to required locations.

 

[McG]

So you use POMCUS depots in Germany and Poland.
Troops can fly into secure areas of Western Europe, and ground move (trains, bus etc) to the storage sites, and then road move in their equipment to required locations.

That works if the prepositioned kit is not required for the battles to retain Latvia. The Suwałki Gap is unlikely to provide a viable GLOC before Kaliningrad is resolved.

 

[Kirkhill]

Your figures presuppose 100% aircraft/crew availability which will not happen and the force being landed is too large for people and too small for cargo. It begs the whole question though: what is the force you wish to land and where. Distance is a critical factor as is the capability at the far end for receiving and deploying the force. @GR66 brings up some factors that come into play. Math isn't the problem. Its reality that's the bitch.

Let's for a second assume we're going to Europe. If so there is very clearly a seaborne option. A RORO/Ocean ferry operates at roughly 30-40 kph cruising speed. The 5,000 km journey can be covered in 5-7 days sea travel. Like airborne shipping there is a very major logistics effort involved in staging and loading the cargo. The people are the easiest component. Vehicles and especially palletized or containerized cargo not so much.

If anyone here thinks that we can move a light battalion in anything under 96 hours they are pretty much mistaken. In addition, before we deploy there is a very long decision cycle that needs to be gone through before the force is launched. A lot of activity can be accomplished to prepare during this decision phase including positioning force for sea-lift.

What I'm really trying to get to is that air isn't the only option. If it takes a week to fly a given force over then you can ship it by sea in a week so long that there is a viable, frequently rehearsed staging and loading plan in place to make it happen. This could even be true for our big bugbear of stopping the Russian horde at the Latvian border. Like Ukraine there will be a build up period which creates a political decision game of: will we/won't we deploy?

Where @KevinB and I are completely in sync is that if you have a mission like Latvia, where you feel you may have to deploy very rapidly then prepositioned equipment and war stocks are the best answer. The easiest deployment (as REFORGER proved over and over again) is taking a given number of soldiers with nothing but their personal kit and the odd battle-box on a fleet of military and contracted civilian aircraft and land them on a completely equipped brigade, division or corps. You can probably do that in 48 hours if the proper plans and processes in place.

Unfortunately, I think Canadians are dilettantes when it comes to strategic, rapid-rection moves. We saw that with the CAST combat group decades ago when we had many months to prepare for moving a brigade group. We look at these things as ad hoc administrative problems. It's been a very long time since I saw the plans for moving ACE and CAST but my guess is the plans for whatever contingency plans exist these days aren't even as well developed as those were and the joint exercising of them probably does not take place outside of computer simulations (if that). We may have some available planes to load but we do not set up to utilize them at scale.

The problem is complicated exponentially if we are considering a deployment into any other theatre other than Latvia where we do not already have a base presence to build on. Anything greater than deploying a light battalion with some enablers into a low-intensity situation would be challenging for Canada.

This is what happens when I don't show my work. Thank you for providing the opportunity to revisit my calculations. I found that I had underestimated the maximum effort by 50%.

To wit:

The aircraft and their capacities

Aircraft	Fleet	Range	Speed	Payload	80% Payload	Volume
	#	km	km/h	kg	kg 80%	m3
C330-200	9	13450	860	45,000	36,000	132
C130J	17	3890	643	19,958	15,966	129
C17	5	4480	830	71,214	56,971	592

Aircraft	Typical Cargoes
	463L Pallets	MRZRs	JLTV	Stryker	Abrams	Bradley	BvS10	Troops
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
*C330-200	8	?	?	0	0	0	?	291
C130J	8	6	2	1	0	0	1	128
C17	18	21	8	3	1	2	6	134

*C330-200

can carry both 291 troops and 8 463L pallets at the same time and still has lower deck capacity for additional cargo

Scenario Development

Vancouver to Tokyo Distance	7522	km
Goose Bay to Prestwick Distance	3518	km

Prestwick Scenario selected as it fits within the range of the shortest ranged aircraft, the C130J

Allow 1 week of surge	7	days/wk
	168	hrs / wk

Aircraft Utilization (Commercial norms)	12	hrs/24 hr day
Flying hours available per aircraft	84	hrs / wk

Fleet Availability

Aircraft	Fleet	Flying Hours
	#	hrs/wk
C330-200	9	756
C130J	17	1428
C17	5	420

Time Requirements for the Goose Bay to Prestwick Scenario

Aircraft	Speed	Distance	Flight Time	Return Time	Time Available	Flights Allowable Per Aircraft
	km/h	km	hrs	hrs	hrs	#
C330-200	860	3518	4.1	8.2	84	10.3
C130J	643	3518	5.5	10.9	84	7.7
C17	830	3518	4.2	8.5	84	9.9

Flight Availability

Aircraft	Fleet	Flights Available
	#
C330-200	9	92.4
C130J	17	130.5
C17	5	49.5

Lift Availability

Aircraft	Flights Available	Payload	80% Payload	Volume	Troops
	#	kg	kg 80%	m3	#
C330-200	92.4	4,158,215	3,326,572	12,197	26,890
C130J	130.5	2,604,536	2,083,629	16,835	16,704
C17	49.5	3,528,312	2,822,649	29,331	6,639
Max Lift	272.5	10,291,063	8,232,850	58,363	50,233

Some Limited Cargo Options (drawn from USAF OSInt and others)

Aircraft	Flights Available	463L Pallets	MRZRs	JLTV	Stryker	Abrams	Bradley	BvS10
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
C330-200	92.4	739	?	?	0	0	0	?
C130J	130.5	1044	783	261	131	0	0	131
C17	49.5	892	1040	396	149	50	99	297
Max Lift	272.5	2675	1823	657	279	50	99	428

My underlying point is that Canada is not without capabilities. That Canada has within its grasp the ability, right now, to move a force of 2000 to 5000 bodies across the Atlantic to a staging area within 7 days (168 hours) from a standing start.

That force has access to 8 to 10,000 tonnes of support cargo being delivered concurrently or about 50,000 m3 of volume.

That cargo can comprise whatever can be carried on 2500 463L pallets.
It could, instead, include 1000 light vehicles or a couple of hundred medium vehicles or even 50 tanks. It could even include as squadron of Griffons. The Chinooks can get themselves to Prestwick.

Not all options are possible simultaneously. You can't lift 50,233 troops AND 2675 463Ls AND 50 MBTs at the same time.

It does seem likely to me though that you could deliver

4000 troops
mounted on MRZRs and JLTVs with
a composite squadron of CH146s and CH147s backed with
a regiment of artillery with M777s and a battery of SPHs or HIMARs and a GBAD battery as well as
a squadron of tanks and
a battalion set of LAVs.

And, after the 168 hour surge, return to something resembling routine operations while maintain air communications with the deployed brigade group.


....


If you really want to have a full Heavy Brigade Group on standby in Canada then you need to buy a couple of Rick Hillier's Big Honking Ships and park them in Bedford Basin with another couple parked in Esquimalt. In which case you are also going to need to hire crews, maintenance staff and ensure that you have escort ships available for a couple of high value targets for a month or so. Or for the duration if you intend to use the BHS for routine resupply.

.....

The RCAF supplies a sound base for exploitation. If you want more transport capacity then the cheaper solution, in my opinion, is to buy them more of what they already have. More C130s. More of the A330s if necessary. And perhaps large volume freighters to complement the very small fleet of C17s.

And under routine conditions all of those aircraft will get exercised daily at a lower utilization rate which will extend their life expectancy.

...

The CAF has its troubles. Without doubt. But do we really need to keep emphasizing what is wrong?

If the politicians pulled the pin and released the CAF tomorrow - what is in the realm of the possible?

Personally I think that a lot of Canadians would be surprised. Just as the CAF surprised a lot of folks with their Afghanistan efforts. And just as an earlier generation were surprised to find Canadian paratroopers deployed to Cyprus on short notice (with even less airlift capacity than today).

 

[GR66]

The

That works if the prepositioned kit is not required for the battles to retain Latvia. The Suwałki Gap is unlikely to provide a viable GLOC before Kaliningrad is resolved.

One of the primary purposes of pre-positioning troops and equipment in the Baltics (and other frontline NATO nations) is to deter the Russians from attacking in the first place.

Personally I count myself in the camp of those that think that the chances of a direct Russian military attack on NATO is exceedingly small. I however will grant that it is non-zero. I also think that there are significant political reasons for NATO to show its resolve and unity on the Russian frontier that extend beyond the actual direct military threat posed by Russia. For that reason I support the deployment of deterrent forces but personally don't believe that the cost of a fully manned, forward deployed Brigade is justified by the current (or near future) threat.

That being said, any forces that we do deploy have to be credible in order to have the desired deterrent effect. Plopping a Battle Group HQ and Infantry Company with minimal artillery support, no air defence capability and minimal anti-tank capability does not show serious resolve. The deterrent effect of such a force is really limited to the fact that the Russians would have to take into consideration the political effect that killing Canadian troops would have should they decide to attack Latvia.

A real military (not just political) deterrent requires credible military forces and for a pre-positioned force a credible plan to man the equipment in case of invasion. Assuming that Canada does go forward with establishing a full Brigade (either mulit-national or fully Canadian) in Europe then we need to have all the enablers required for the Brigade to be militarily effective deployed. And if the force isn't going to be fully manned then we need to practice moving the required troops into theatre in order to show the Russians that we have both the capability and resolve to do so when required.

I'd argue that a serious reinforcement plan would include both REFORLAT exercises as well as REFORGEN exercises where Canadian troops marry up with pre-positioned US equipment in Germany to cover scenarios where direct reinforcement of Latvia is not possible. This would be another argument for working toward commonality of equipment with the US Army.

In theory, if our deterrent forces are strong and credible enough then a) Russia will not risk attacking in the first place or b) they will require a significant build up of forces in order to hope for victory which will be harder to hide and therefore will make it more likely that we can send our troops from Canada before hostilities begin.

 

[KevinB]

That works if the prepositioned kit is not required for the battles to retain Latvia. The Suwałki Gap is unlikely to provide a viable GLOC before Kaliningrad is resolved.

IMHO the sensible thing to do is to have additional equipment.
As @GR66 pointed out a credible deterrent means that the RuAF isn’t going to be able to invade quickly.
So either there is a build up of tensions - and troops can be deployed on equipment in Latvia, or it is a rapid RuAF move that doesn’t require a large contingent there, and troops can fall in on equipment in Germany.
The ability to use US kit would be a major advantage for the CA in that situation, as realistically the US Army has more equipment in Germany and Poland than V Corps can use immediately.

@Kirkhill

This is what happens when I don't show my work. Thank you for providing the opportunity to revisit my calculations. I found that I had underestimated the maximum effort by 50%.

To wit:

The aircraft and their capacities

Aircraft	Fleet	Range	Speed	Payload	80% Payload	Volume
	#	km	km/h	kg	kg 80%	m3
C330-200	9	13450	860	45,000	36,000	132
C130J	17	3890	643	19,958	15,966	129
C17	5	4480	830	71,214	56,971	592

Aircraft	Typical Cargoes
	463L Pallets	MRZRs	JLTV	Stryker	Abrams	Bradley	BvS10	Troops
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
*C330-200	8	?	?	0	0	0	?	291
C130J	8	6	2	1	0	0	1	128
C17	18	21	8	3	1	2	6	134

*C330-200

can carry both 291 troops and 8 463L pallets at the same time and still has lower deck capacity for additional cargo

Scenario Development

Vancouver to Tokyo Distance	7522	km
Goose Bay to Prestwick Distance	3518	km

Prestwick Scenario selected as it fits within the range of the shortest ranged aircraft, the C130J

Allow 1 week of surge	7	days/wk
	168	hrs / wk

Aircraft Utilization (Commercial norms)	12	hrs/24 hr day
Flying hours available per aircraft	84	hrs / wk

Fleet Availability

Aircraft	Fleet	Flying Hours
	#	hrs/wk
C330-200	9	756
C130J	17	1428
C17	5	420

Time Requirements for the Goose Bay to Prestwick Scenario

Aircraft	Speed	Distance	Flight Time	Return Time	Time Available	Flights Allowable Per Aircraft
	km/h	km	hrs	hrs	hrs	#
C330-200	860	3518	4.1	8.2	84	10.3
C130J	643	3518	5.5	10.9	84	7.7
C17	830	3518	4.2	8.5	84	9.9

Flight Availability

Aircraft	Fleet	Flights Available
	#
C330-200	9	92.4
C130J	17	130.5
C17	5	49.5

Lift Availability

Aircraft	Flights Available	Payload	80% Payload	Volume	Troops
	#	kg	kg 80%	m3	#
C330-200	92.4	4,158,215	3,326,572	12,197	26,890
C130J	130.5	2,604,536	2,083,629	16,835	16,704
C17	49.5	3,528,312	2,822,649	29,331	6,639
Max Lift	272.5	10,291,063	8,232,850	58,363	50,233

Some Limited Cargo Options (drawn from USAF OSInt and others)

Aircraft	Flights Available	463L Pallets	MRZRs	JLTV	Stryker	Abrams	Bradley	BvS10
	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
C330-200	92.4	739	?	?	0	0	0	?
C130J	130.5	1044	783	261	131	0	0	131
C17	49.5	892	1040	396	149	50	99	297
Max Lift	272.5	2675	1823	657	279	50	99	428

My underlying point is that Canada is not without capabilities. That Canada has within its grasp the ability, right now, to move a force of 2000 to 5000 bodies across the Atlantic to a staging area within 7 days (168 hours) from a standing start.

You are not really being realistic in terms of aircraft availability for the RCAF at 50% and 100% space utilization.

The MRTT are going to need to support RCAF operations so you may want to use 33% for Army support. Furthermore they don’t have a large cargo door, or ramp, so pallets/or people is what you get, no JLTV type vehicles , you could palletize some smaller MRZR by removing the roll bars etc

The C-17 and Herc are you only rough field capable craft, and the C-17 the only real strategic airlift system available for vehicles larger than a JTLV - the Herc can’t take the LAV’s.

That force has access to 8 to 10,000 tonnes of support cargo being delivered concurrently or about 50,000 m3 of volume.

That cargo can comprise whatever can be carried on 2500 463L pallets.
It could, instead, include 1000 light vehicles or a couple of hundred medium vehicles or even 50 tanks. It could even include as squadron of Griffons. The Chinooks can get themselves to Prestwick.

Getting to Preswick doesn’t mean anything.
Because you have used all your lift to get them there.
Not sure the Hook ride would be fun either, bouncing from Labrador to Greenland to Iceland and into the UK.

Not all options are possible simultaneously. You can't lift 50,233 troops AND 2675 463Ls AND 50 MBTs at the same time.

It does seem likely to me though that you could deliver

4000 troops
mounted on MRZRs and JLTVs with
a composite squadron of CH146s and CH147s backed with
a regiment of artillery with M777s and a battery of SPHs or HIMARs and a GBAD battery as well as
a squadron of tanks and
a battalion set of LAVs.

And, after the 168 hour surge, return to something resembling routine operations while maintain air communications with the deployed brigade group.

I think you have woefully underestimated the needs of a force, and overestimated what you can move.

Your tables have 50 Abrams and 99 Bradley’s, but for those 49.5 C17 trips, it’s really just 49 which then means really 49 Abrams or 98 Bradley, or 147 Strykers (or 98 LAV 6.0)

....


If you really want to have a full Heavy Brigade Group on standby in Canada then you need to buy a couple of Rick Hillier's Big Honking Ships and park them in Bedford Basin with another couple parked in Esquimalt. In which case you are also going to need to hire crews, maintenance staff and ensure that you have escort ships available for a couple of high value targets for a month or so. Or for the duration if you intend to use the BHS for routine resupply.

Realistically pre deployment of heavy systems is the only viable method for Canada.

.....

The RCAF supplies a sound base for exploitation. If you want more transport capacity then the cheaper solution, in my opinion, is to buy them more of what they already have. More C130s. More of the A330s if necessary. And perhaps large volume freighters to complement the very small fleet of C17s.

And under routine conditions all of those aircraft will get exercised daily at a lower utilization rate which will extend their life expectancy.

Herc’s need to be view as an in theatre sustainment airframe.
They can’t move large equipment and the flight times for cross Atlantic just suck.

Short of finding C-17’s or 747 Cargo’s in the used market, there isn’t a lot out there.

...

The CAF has its troubles. Without doubt. But do we really need to keep emphasizing what is wrong?

If the politicians pulled the pin and released the CAF tomorrow - what is in the realm of the possible?

Personally I think that a lot of Canadians would be surprised. Just as the CAF surprised a lot of folks with their Afghanistan efforts. And just as an earlier generation were surprised to find Canadian paratroopers deployed to Cyprus on short notice (with even less airlift capacity than today).

Canada is arguably in a worse spot than either of those situations before.

Moving the CAR wasn’t a major issue in 1970.
Moving 3 LIB’s isn’t a major issue for the CAF now, however they are woefully equipped compared to the needs of today.

 

[Kirkhill]

IMHO the sensible thing to do is to have additional equipment.
As @GR66 pointed out a credible deterrent means that the RuAF isn’t going to be able to invade quickly.
So either there is a build up of tensions - and troops can be deployed on equipment in Latvia, or it is a rapid RuAF move that doesn’t require a large contingent there, and troops can fall in on equipment in Germany.
The ability to use US kit would be a major advantage for the CA in that situation, as realistically the US Army has more equipment in Germany and Poland than V Corps can use immediately.

@Kirkhill

You are not really being realistic in terms of aircraft availability for the RCAF at 50% and 100% space utilization.

The MRTT are going to need to support RCAF operations so you may want to use 33% for Army support. Furthermore they don’t have a large cargo door, or ramp, so pallets/or people is what you get, no JLTV type vehicles , you could palletize some smaller MRZR by removing the roll bars etc

The C-17 and Herc are you only rough field capable craft, and the C-17 the only real strategic airlift system available for vehicles larger than a JTLV - the Herc can’t take the LAV’s.


Getting to Preswick doesn’t mean anything.
Because you have used all your lift to get them there.
Not sure the Hook ride would be fun either, bouncing from Labrador to Greenland to Iceland and into the UK.



I think you have woefully underestimated the needs of a force, and overestimated what you can move.

Your tables have 50 Abrams and 99 Bradley’s, but for those 49.5 C17 trips, it’s really just 49 which then means really 49 Abrams or 98 Bradley, or 147 Strykers (or 98 LAV 6.0)






Realistically pre deployment of heavy systems is the only viable method for Canada.

Herc’s need to be view as an in theatre sustainment airframe.
They can’t move large equipment and the flight times for cross Atlantic just suck.

Short of finding C-17’s or 747 Cargo’s in the used market, there isn’t a lot out there.



Canada is arguably in a worse spot than either of those situations before.

Moving the CAR wasn’t a major issue in 1970.
Moving 3 LIB’s isn’t a major issue for the CAF now, however they are woefully equipped compared to the needs of today.

You're reaching if you are starting to pick out rounding errors from 49.5 to 50. Especially when the move I am asking for is 14 MBTs and 45 LAVs.

I have already derated the fleet by 50% to allow for actual flight hours. Additionally I have derated the lift by 20% of its max load.

I do not propose to fully utilize all the fleet. My purpose is to describe what full utilization looks like and suggest that the requirements of a battlegroup or a brigade group are well within the capabilities of the RCAF because I believe that wrt to the people and vehicles we would be well within the available lift (4000/50000 = 8% of the passenger lift, 14/50 = 28% of the MBT lift, 45/279 = 16% of the LAV lift, etc ....)

Decisions have to be made. No Doubt. I believe that is called planning. My expectation is that if a 7 day surge window were opened the RCAF would be able to redirect their existing flight programme long before the Army got its act together and figured out what they wanted to ship. Hell it took them three years to organize the CAST brigade exercise.

As to the advantage of Prestwick?

It was a point on a map to create a scalable reference for the purpose of the exercise.

Having said that - once in Prestwick it is a one hour drive to Leith and you can hop a Danish RoRo to any port on the Baltic. A couple of C17s and a half dozen of the C130s could be staged out of Prestwick on an ongoing basis circulating back to Trenton. And you have the resources of the Brits to work with as well.

But the point to be made is that we could deploy a useful force of size with existing resources. That might be to Prestwick. It might be to Resolute. It might, via Anchorage or Cold Bay, be to Seoul or Taipei and take 10 days instead of 7 days, or perhaps we have to borrow some of Air Canada's freighters....


....

TBH Kevin I am just getting tired of your constant beating up on the CAF and beating the drum for Lock-Mart. Your current President is doing your sales effort no favours with his feet dragging. That doesn't give me a lot of comfort that the US is going to be backing anybody in the foreseeable future. You talk about the Germans and the Swiss not allowing their weapons to be used. How, exactly, is that any different to you building special 80% Abrams from scratch rather than supplying immediately from the thousands you have in stock?


Cheers man.

 

[FJAG]

So you use POMCUS depots in Germany and Poland.
Troops can fly into secure areas of Western Europe, and ground move (trains, bus etc) to the storage sites, and then road move in their equipment to required locations.

My thinking is that if we're at the stage that airliner REFORLAT flights are at risk from Kaliningrad, then the land route through the Suwalki Gap will be equally at risk. Let's be honest, the Baltics are not a risk-free endeavour regardless.

Personally I count myself in the camp of those that think that the chances of a direct Russian military attack on NATO is exceedingly small. I however will grant that it is non-zero. I also think that there are significant political reasons for NATO to show its resolve and unity on the Russian frontier that extend beyond the actual direct military threat posed by Russia. For that reason I support the deployment of deterrent forces ...

Up to this point 100% agreement.

... but personally don't believe that the cost of a fully manned, forward deployed Brigade is justified by the current (or near future) threat.

This really is the million (maybe billion) dollar question, isn't it? What level of force is a proper deterrent and (if push comes to shove) a proper survivable fighting force. Deep down Canada still has a bit of the Hong Kong complex in its DNA.

I must admit I tilt to the brigade side. Amongst other things I could see a forward deployed brigade with an appropriate level of HQ and maintenance and full-time personnel replace the need for a CMTC for practical brigade exercises and to replace that with a facility in Latvia (or other European location). Leave live fire complex battle group level training close to units in Canada and have large scale flyover and manoeuvre exercises take place in Europe for each brigade annually to get the muscle memory for all three skills (battalion live-fire; deployment; large-scale manoeuvre) deeply engrained across the joint force.

 

[quadrapiper]

I must admit I tilt to the brigade side. Amongst other things I could see a forward deployed brigade with an appropriate level of HQ and maintenance and full-time personnel replace the need for a CMTC for practical brigade exercises and to replace that with a facility in Latvia (or other European location). Leave live fire complex battle group level training close to units in Canada and have large scale flyover and manoeuvre exercises take place in Europe for each brigade annually to get the muscle memory for all three skills (battalion live-fire; deployment; large-scale manoeuvre) deeply engrained across the joint force.

Imagine there would be additional, positive, ripple effects as far as personnel, equipment, and other supporting processes across the CA, assuming there was a desire to see it fully equipped and at full strength.

 

[KevinB]

You're reaching if you are starting to pick out rounding errors from 49.5 to 50. Especially when the move I am asking for is 14 MBTs and 45 LAVs.

I have already derated the fleet by 50% to allow for actual flight hours. Additionally I have derated the lift by 20% of its max load.

I do not propose to fully utilize all the fleet. My purpose is to describe what full utilization looks like and suggest that the requirements of a battlegroup or a brigade group are well within the capabilities of the RCAF because I believe that wrt to the people and vehicles we would be well within the available lift (4000/50000 = 8% of the passenger lift, 14/50 = 28% of the MBT lift, 45/279 = 16% of the LAV lift, etc ....)

Decisions have to be made. No Doubt. I believe that is called planning. My expectation is that if a 7 day surge window were opened the RCAF would be able to redirect their existing flight programme long before the Army got its act together and figured out what they wanted to ship. Hell it took them three years to organize the CAST brigade exercise.

Oh I agree with the CA. I doubt you would get 15 Leo’s and 45 LAV into theatre in 7 days without major preparations prior to that 7 day surge.
Due to that I suspect the RCAF would be focused on other things and not even have 30% of the fleet availability for CA usage.

As to the advantage of Prestwick?

It was a point on a map to create a scalable reference for the purpose of the exercise.

I think that is about 1/2 the distance you need to plan for. Which was my main sticking point.

Having said that - once in Prestwick it is a one hour drive to Leith and you can hop a Danish RoRo to any port on the Baltic. A couple of C17s and a half dozen of the C130s could be staged out of Prestwick on an ongoing basis circulating back to Trenton. And you have the resources of the Brits to work with as well.

TBFH I don’t think you can count on anyone to support the CAF into theatre in an emergency.
Everyone is going to have their own needs, and outside of the US DoD no one has a robust support system.

But the point to be made is that we could deploy a useful force of size with existing resources. That might be to Prestwick. It might be to Resolute. It might, via Anchorage or Cold Bay, be to Seoul or Taipei and take 10 days instead of 7 days, or perhaps we have to borrow some of Air Canada's freighters....

A nationally supported air transport system would be a good step IMHO.

....

TBH Kevin I am just getting tired of your constant beating up on the CAF and beating the drum for Lock-Mart. Your current President is doing your sales effort no favours with his feet dragging. That doesn't give me a lot of comfort that the US is going to be backing anybody in the foreseeable future. You talk about the Germans and the Swiss not allowing their weapons to be used. How, exactly, is that any different to you building special 80% Abrams from scratch rather than supplying immediately from the thousands you have in stock?


Cheers man.

Our Abrams have DU armor. We are loathe to send these to anyone due to a congressional mandate not to.
The only countries that we have ever even considered it have been 5E.

They aren’t being scratch built, they are M1A1 SA’s that have been withdrawn from service and are being refurbished to remove the DU armor. They are still capable tanks, just with standard composite armor as opposed to the DU sheets imbedded into the front glacis as well.

Do I agree with it in this case, absolutely not. If I was POTUS, we’d have given the Ukrainians access to POMCUS depots for at least 2 Div worth of forces — but I’d have also parked V Corps units in Ukraine in Mid Feb too.

 

[Kirkhill]

Oh I agree with the CA. I doubt you would get 15 Leo’s and 45 LAV into theatre in 7 days without major preparations prior to that 7 day surge.
Due to that I suspect the RCAF would be focused on other things and not even have 30% of the fleet availability for CA usage.


I think that is about 1/2 the distance you need to plan for. Which was my main sticking point.



TBFH I don’t think you can count on anyone to support the CAF into theatre in an emergency.
Everyone is going to have their own needs, and outside of the US DoD no one has a robust support system.


A nationally supported air transport system would be a good step IMHO.



Our Abrams have DU armor. We are loathe to send these to anyone due to a congressional mandate not to.
The only countries that we have ever even considered it have been 5E.

They aren’t being scratch built, they are M1A1 SA’s that have been withdrawn from service and are being refurbished to remove the DU armor. They are still capable tanks, just with standard composite armor as opposed to the DU sheets imbedded into the front glacis as well.

Do I agree with it in this case, absolutely not. If I was POTUS, we’d have given the Ukrainians access to POMCUS depots for at least 2 Div worth of forces — but I’d have also parked V Corps units in Ukraine in Mid Feb too.

Let's just say I will meet you half-way. That would be somewhere round about Prestwick. Is that maximum effort? Is that over optimistic? Is that a useful hub? What more needs to be done given that? Those are the things we can, and have spent, hours debating. But, IMHO, all those debates turn around two things: the realities of the situation at the moment and arithmetic.

With respect to Prestwick I would note that the RCAF appears to have joined the USAF at Prestwick in employing it as an operational support hub of sorts which returns that aerodrome back to its WW2 roots when it was the eastern terminus of the Atlantic Air Bridge. As to the business about Prestwick only getting you halfway there: Yup.

Harper and MacKay, recognizing that the CAF's short legs didn't match their global aspirations decided to adopt the hub and spoke system used by virtually every company in the world with global aspirations. Hubs are. The Canadian hubs, if I remember right, were to be Kingston-Jamaica, Bonn-Germany, Dakar-W Africa, Mombasa-E Africa, Kuwait (?), Singapore, Busan-Korea plus, of course, the Canadian support hubs of Trenton, Shearwater and Esquimalt. There was and is a need for an Arctic operational support hub, or hubs, or FOLs.

And you keep nattering about these POMCUS warehouses. What are they but operational support hubs? They, and the prepositioning fleet are recognition that even the US needs to come down to earth occasionally. Not everything can be available all the time by means of air to air refuelling.

Prepositioning (PM3)

Hitler's army was mechanized except when it wasn't and mostly it wasn't. It was light infantry supported by horses.

Horses in World War II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Horses & The Mechanized Myth of the Eastern Front

Nazi Germany’s reliance on horses on the Eastern Front is downplayed in modern accounts, but the animals played an essential role during World War II.

warfarehistorynetwork.com

The globally deployable US is the modern version of the mechanized German army. It exists. It is good. It is effective. But it is not the centre of mass.

Canada can't begin to match the US resources, even if it matched the US effort and invested 3.5% of GDP in defence, so Canada can do one of two things: stretch its dollars as far as it can or give up. And there is support for both positions in Canada.

By the way - on the 3.5% vs 2% - how much of that 3.5% is spent double hatting the Emergency Management National Guard for military purposes?

 

[Kirkhill]

This really is the million (maybe billion) dollar question, isn't it? What level of force is a proper deterrent and (if push comes to shove) a proper survivable fighting force. Deep down Canada still has a bit of the Hong Kong complex in its DNA.

Sam Hughes, Arthur Currie, Robert Borden and Mackenzie-King wouldn't have agreed on much but one thing they did agree on was that Canadian forces would be commanded by Canadians, both Canadian generals and Canadian politicians. The Aussies and Kiwis were of much the same mindset. Thus the ANZACs and the Canadian Corps and, in WW2 the 1st Canadian Army. They were national efforts that, if the politicians chose, could be withdrawn from the line and the hole would be noticed. Canada's allied generals did not think much of the arrangement and would much sooner that they had been good lads and just supplied bodies to fill in the blanks. Canada acquiesced on two occasions - Hong Kong and Dieppe - three if you include the Newfoundlanders at Gallipoli.

Canada's Air Division in Europe made such a hole. Canada's mechanized brigade group?

And how big a hole does a Latvian battalion minus leave? Or even a Latvian brigade group?

Canada's army will not win wars because the only war that really matters is a war of national survival. That is the only war that any nation must win at all costs. Everything else is negotiable. Canada's army is not prepared to fight a war of national survival because neither the army nor the population sees that as a realistic possibility. Most people don't see it as a possibility of any sort. That means that any deployment of the Canadian Army is negotiable. One might even say transactional. Canada is not going to risk everything to save another country. There is no country that rises to the level of the emotional connection that existed with Britain in WW1 when a good chunk of the Canucks, Aussies and Kiwis that signed up were actually born in Britain or, at least, had relatives in Britain. Those associations are long gone in today's Canada and nothing has replaced them.

In the Deeply Fractured US thread I am going to post a review about book called "The Fourth Turning". It basically says that history is described by the lives of people and events and every now and then an event comes along that influences the lives of an entire cohort of people and that that single cohort carries that event with them throughout their lives. It binds the cohort and influences their thinking and there actions throughout their lives. But their influence dies with them and a new cohort waits to be influenced by the next traumatic event.

Canada has turned a couple of times since the days of John A.

 

[KevinB]

@Kirkhill my sole point on the air fleet is that realistically to get to Europe or Asia, the trip is IVO of 9,000km (even more to Asia - but the 9k number is a decent start for discussion).
So getting to a staging ground is only part of the equation.
The US Army does POMCUS Depots because we know we cannot move everything into theatre, it is one of the major reasons I am a big proponent of the CAF having predeployed elements, and predeployed equipment reserves.

Joint Forceable Entry doctrine is reliant on Paratroops to seize airheads for things like NEO or Non Near Peer conflict entrance.
Even our Aviation assets require pre-staged equipment close to theatre to make it viable to move heavier equipment.

So strategic airlift gets X to a staging point - and tactical airlift brings X from there to theatre (or as close as it can).

 

[Kirkhill]

@Kirkhill my sole point on the air fleet is that realistically to get to Europe or Asia, the trip is IVO of 9,000km (even more to Asia - but the 9k number is a decent start for discussion).
So getting to a staging ground is only part of the equation.
The US Army does POMCUS Depots because we know we cannot move everything into theatre, it is one of the major reasons I am a big proponent of the CAF having predeployed elements, and predeployed equipment reserves.

Joint Forceable Entry doctrine is reliant on Paratroops to seize airheads for things like NEO or Non Near Peer conflict entrance.
Even our Aviation assets require pre-staged equipment close to theatre to make it viable to move heavier equipment.

So strategic airlift gets X to a staging point - and tactical airlift brings X from there to theatre (or as close as it can).

My problem with prepositioned kit is that we can't afford to build enough staging areas to provide timely response to everywhere. We can't afford to supply one battalion set of NVGs apparently let alone 3 or 4 warehoused battalion sets of LAVs. Sure we might be able to convince the politicians to buy an extra set for northern Europe but what if the next flare up is in the Middle East, or India, or Central America or, obviously, Taiwan.

My sense is that we are not going to get there on day one with a heavy force. Even a light force is going to have to be staged. Better yet if Global Affairs Canada did its job identifying locations where a Company Team can be brought in to demonstrate intent while the threat level is low. The 2014 Ukrainian training programme seems to be one to emulate. But that implies keeping the weight on the back foot and jabbing. Canada can't deliver a decisive thrust.

If we want to have Global influence it is not going to be delivering a Heavy Division once in a generation or two. It is going to be in a steady supply of Combat Teams to hot spots before they become conflagrations (pace @foresterab and Emergency Management).

 

[KevinB]

My problem with prepositioned kit is that we can't afford to build enough staging areas to provide timely response to everywhere. We can't afford to supply one battalion set of NVGs apparently let alone 3 or 4 warehoused battalion sets of LAVs. Sure we might be able to convince the politicians to buy an extra set for northern Europe but what if the next flare up is in the Middle East, or India, or Central America or, obviously, Taiwan.

My sense is that we are not going to get there on day one with a heavy force. Even a light force is going to have to be staged. Better yet if Global Affairs Canada did its job identifying locations where a Company Team can be brought in to demonstrate intent while the threat level is low. The 2014 Ukrainian training programme seems to be one to emulate. But that implies keeping the weight on the back foot and jabbing. Canada can't deliver a decisive thrust.

If we want to have Global influence it is not going to be delivering a Heavy Division once in a generation or two. It is going to be in a steady supply of Combat Teams to hot spots before they become conflagrations (pace @foresterab and Emergency Management).

I'd argue that you only really need a Heavy Force in Europe.
Light Forces are the only realistic Global Response Canada has inside 30 days.
Medium Forces can come later.

Arriving and showing the Flag with a Light Bde is 100x more practical than not arriving with a Heavy or Medium Force until well after it was needed...