Mech infantry or all light infantry with some Armd APC units?

[AIC_2K5]

Nyala is a crap vehicle for fighting....hard to dismount from, light weapons(relativly speaking in comparison to a tank/LAV).  Nyala shouldn't be used as and isn't an intimate support vehicle.  Great convoy vehicle especially in high IED areas but not a good battle field taxi at all.

But should we not maintain APV-equipped light forces that can revert back to their original role if required? If Nyala isn't working, what about other alternatives?

British employ their Saxons in a few of their mechanized infantry battalions:
http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/av/av_sxn.htm

Aussies have the Bushmaster:
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/bushmaster/

Saxons first came into service in '83 and were originally intended to transport reinforcements from the UK to the British Army of the Rhine; probably not a very suitable candidate.

It's interesting to note that the Busmaster is being produced into 6 different variants including a dedicated infantry carrier. The site also says that the U.S. and Iraq are showing interest in the vehicle.

 

[a_majoor]

Moist modern COIN operations that scored success did not rely on heavy firepower and protection. Ramon Magasassy vs the Huk; the Marine "County Fairs" and Civic Action Programs in Viet Nam and the British in Malaysia and Kenya used soldiers to interact with the population, provide limited, local protection and generally fought as dismounted light infantry.

That being said, the soldiers in these operations did need mobility and would have apprieciated firepower and protection from time to time. LAV III's would have been seen as a bonus in all these situations, and also allowed the soldiers to transition upwards if and when the enemy showed themselves in strength.

In this theater of operations, the enemy has showed themselves in strenght in the past and may continue to do so as long as they have secure areas where they can reconstitute themselves and believe there is advantage (against our CoG; the Canadian public) in doing so. For the most part, we are doing things right, if any refinement needs to be made it might lie in considerring the LAV battalions more like "motor infantry" for day to day operations, and keeping the big sticks just out of sight.

 

[AIC_2K5]

That being said, the soldiers in these operations did need mobility and would have apprieciated firepower and protection from time to time. LAV III's would have been seen as a bonus in all these situations, and also allowed the soldiers to transition upwards if and when the enemy showed themselves in strength.

Point seen, a few proposals to counter:

Mobility - New chinooks are on the way, and, along with existing griffins, these can be used to increase mobility of light forces. From what I hear this is actually the ideal method of mobility in this fight since troops and supplies can fly over IEDs instead of driving through them.

Firepower - Some weapons currently in the project phase would greatly increase firepower of light infantry forces, one such example being the Company Area Suppression Weapon. General Leslie has expressed his desire for attack helicopters to support ground troops so maybe this is something that should be looked at as well.

Protection - Just to reinforce what I mentioned in an earlier post maybe we could look at the possible purchase of a new APV, like the Bushmaster or maybe something else, to equip our light forces. These could be used interchangably with other vehicles and equipment on any given operation to equip light infantry forces. On some ops these APVs may be needed but on others the leadership might find the mission to be suitable for footborne and soft-skin vehicle ops.

These and many other points are things that our allies have considered and revised into their doctrine and maybe its time that we look at incorporating some of these ideas into a new light infantry doctrine.

 

[McG]

Mobility - New chinooks are on the way, and, along with existing griffins, these can be used to increase mobility of light forces. From what I hear this is actually the ideal method of mobility in this fight since troops and supplies can fly over IEDs instead of driving through them.

Once the troops dismount, they have lost the mobility.  Helicopters work to move troops over one big hop.  However, the area is so dispersed that mobility is still required to conduct missions on the other end.

I’d also like to point out that, while still light infantry, you are specifically recommending airmobile infantry.  We will not get enough helicopters in all the CF to make this work.

Firepower - Some weapons currently in the project phase would greatly increase firepower of light infantry forces, one such example being the Company Area Suppression Weapon.

An automatic grenade launcher will not turn a Nyala into a fighting vehicle.  In fact, if mounted on the vehicle it would make things worse.  The LAV can choose the best option between cannon & machine gun.  RWS mounts machinegun or CASW.  If a CASW RWS vehicle finds itself in a fight in downtown Kandahar (where HE would be bad) then it can’t shoot back.

General Leslie has expressed his desire for attack helicopters to support ground troops so maybe this is something that should be looked at as well.

Great for some situations, but these will not always be with the soldiers & they will be very dependant on weather.  The fighting vehicle moves with the soldiers & is there when it is needed (including surprise encounters & ambushes).  Besides, once you’ve assigned escortes to all the Chinook flights there will not be as many attack helicopters available to follow the ground forces.

Protection - Just to reinforce what I mentioned in an earlier post maybe we could look at the possible purchase of a new APV, like the Bushmaster or maybe something else, to equip our light forces. These could be used interchangably with other vehicles and equipment on any given operation to equip light infantry forces. On some ops these APVs may be needed but on others the leadership might find the mission to be suitable for footborne and soft-skin vehicle ops.

The armoured mini-van concept is still not a fighting vehicle.  You also proposes that the light force have a different fleet of vehicles for every conceivable mission.  Now, not only do the light guys have to worry about doing the mission, they also have 2 – 3 times the vehicles of the mech guys for maint. 

 

[a_majoor]

I suspect that "we" will be needing to upgrade notionally Light Infantry to at least Motor Infantry status for the next generation at least. Wide ranging theaters of operations and the need to be widely dispersed to patrol and find the enemy speak to that need, and unless there is some handy mobility aid, there is no ability to concentrate light forces when the enemy is finally identified.

The Bushmaster is an attempt to creat a sort of wheeled M-113; a protected and versatile base vehicle which can be adapted for many roles. In many respects it seems better than the RG-31 in terms of layout, although it is still not a fighting vehicle, more of a battle taxi.

The Royal Marines use the "Viking", which is an armoured vehicle similar to the BV-206. The layout needs getting used to (it dosn't resemble anything else), but as a battle taxi, it can go places you wouldn't expect a vehicle to go. A similar vehicle is made by Charter Arms in Singapore, I think it is called the Bronco.

For real lightweight fighting vehicles, the British Scimitar/Stormer series of vehicles provides limited protection, with mobility and firepower similar to the LAV. Being smaller and carrying less kit/ammmunition etc. is one of the trade offs a light force equipped with this class of vehicle would have to make (more maintainence is the other).

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

To correct what you are saying though ('cause I'm OK with flame wars  ), the Ops, as our leadership has chosen to conduct them ...require LAVs, Leo2, etc.

The enemy has a say as well, and perhaps they didn't get the memo.  Infantry lacking armoured fighting vehicles have been penned up inside their bases by a determined enemy who can sense a vulnerabilty and exploit it.  Sometimes it comes to a fight whether you want to or not.  When the enemy is dug-in across that river, it can suddenly get very 1944 and some 1944 tactical solutions come to the fore.  Terrain and the size of the operating area also have a say.  A force needs operational mobility and helicopters do not give that guarantee. 

I see COIN as an infantry game supported by other arms as the situations sees fit.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is interesting to go back and review the early comments on the LAV and its applicability to this type of fight.

Before the enemy was engaged the questions were about:

-  the LAV's ability to get into the theater in significant numbers due to available transport - now moot on two grounds - time was available to move in the vehicles, and new transport is coming on line for future operations

- the LAV's abiilty to negotiate the terrain encountered - now moot as it is covering the terrain it is encountering

- the LAV's ability to supply adequate protection - now moot as it seems to be meeting the protection expectations of the troops employing it

- the LAV's inability to engage heavy armour - now moot as there seems to be a lack of opposing heavy armour

- the LAV's limited troop carrying capacity vs the ideal size of the infantry section - now moot as operations are being conducted effectively at the section level with numbers that can be carried by the LAV

- the LAV's ability to patrol in congested urban environments - still an open question (or maybe not)

- the psychological impact of operating from a massive vehicle like the LAV.


Of these 7 concerns it seems that we are down to 2.  All the rest have been set aside by the reality of operations conducted.

The G-Wagen/Landrover solution was (in my fevered mind) a means of supplying an early entry, light force, with adequate tactical mobility with the available strategic transport.  An operation that is now in its 6th year (counting from 2001) can hardly be considered as an early entry operation.  This is an ongoing - not to say permanent - operation.  It is possible to get the necessary assets into the theater in a timely fashion (helicopters excluded). 

Alternatively something like the Pinzgauer was suitable for domestic operations as a section carrying all terrain vehicle in a low threat/training environment.  Demonstrably this is not a low threat environment.

At the other end of the spectrum, concern was expressed about the need for a Bradley/Marder type vehicle - but while there may be some need for those vehicles in the assault the LAV seems to be an outstanding patrol vehicle that is also capable of conducting assaults.

That leaves us only with the questions of urban applicability - but you seem to be operating primarily in a rural environment - and psychological impact.........and anything psychological is always a matter of great debate.

The force generated seems to be adequate to the task at hand (now comes the sustainment issue).

You have created the same type of force used to pacify the Anglo-Scots borders, the Highlands, Ireland, Normandie and Brittany, the American Plains, the Canadian West and South Africa.  Call them moss-troopers, dragoons, dragons, cavalry, mounted rifles, mounted police, mounted infantry or constabulary*.  The dominant feature of them all was mobile, heavily armed soldiers conducting patrols and assaults. 

My only further observation is that that mobile force was only part of the solution.  A further part of the solution was a static force guarding settlements, choke points and lines of communication, as well as manning barriers and Observation Posts to hinder illegal movement.  How do you hold that which the "Dragoons" have gained?

And how do you deal with the next "early entry" or "rapid response" operation, or the next operation in complex or urban terrain?

* You could even call them Cossacks because that is what they did on the Steppes.

 

[ArmyRick]

Some points to throw in from my perspective.
(1) Helicopters can be brought down. It has happened in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. However choppers certainly do have their use. Lifting troops into very adverse terrain or limited re-supply (Chinooks).

(2) From what i have been hearing, the LAVIII seems to be a very good COIN vehicle. It has intermediate fire power, decent protection and can travel fast (Since we need to cover large AORs). True the Bradley has more fire power but it also is limited by fuel consumption and speed and it has only 6 dismounts (7 if they are ghurka sized people). The US Stryker IMO would be a great compliment (The carrier version not the MGS) because of its 9 man dismounts. I would also add a commanders cuploa with GPMG and gun shield (like the ones they put on the g-wagon) and a rear mounted GPMG as well. Keep in mind this vehicle also has RWS (same as on RG-31). I would aim for keeping the RWS with .50 cal (Better use when colateral damage is a concern).

(3) Interesting if you look up royal marines in afghanistan on youtube.com, they are using land rovers with .50 and GPMG and all kinds of other weaponry strapped on. I wouldn't mind hearing from them what they think of this concept. It was the complete opposite of what we have tried to achieve with our nyala. As you can see in the videos they got into lots of fire fights as well.

Just some thoughts....

 

[Old Sweat]

You have created the same type of force used to pacify the Anglo-Scots borders, the Highlands, Ireland, Normandie and Brittany, the American Plains, the Canadian West and South Africa.  Call them moss-troopers, dragoons, dragons, cavalry, mounted rifles, mounted police, mounted infantry or constabulary*.  The dominant feature of them all was mobile, heavily armed soldiers conducting patrols and assaults. 

My only further observation is that that mobile force was only part of the solution.  A further part of the solution was a static force guarding settlements, choke points and lines of communication, as well as manning barriers and Observation Posts to hinder illegal movement.  How do you hold that which the "Dragoons" have gained?

* You could even call them Cossacks because that is what they did on the Steppes.

Kirkhill has once again covered a lot of ground, figuratively and literally.

It may be a blinding flash of the obvious to note that the most effective of these mobile forces were able to fight both mounted and dismounted and that they relied on their own resources to move around the battlefield. Are we seeing the same?

To be successful, these forces also had to rely on intelligence, much of which was gathered by scouting. An example, and I apologize for being unable to refer to my files for specific details but I am typing this in our RV 50 metres from the sea on the coast of the Florida panhandle, is the 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade in the advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria in roughly late-April to early-June 1900. Each of the units had a small scout section that operated to the front and flanks while the brigade scouts (a troop-sized unit commanded, in this case, by ex-NWMP member Charlie Ross) worked well in front - perhaps between one and two hours hard ride for a good horseman. 

 

[Journeyman]

the Ops, as our leadership has chosen to conduct them ...require LAVs, Leo2, etc.

The enemy has a say as well, and perhaps they didn't get the memo.  Infantry lacking armoured fighting vehicles have been penned up inside their bases by a determined enemy who can sense a vulnerabilty and exploit it.  Sometimes it comes to a fight whether you want to or not.  When the enemy is dug-in across that river, it can suddenly get very 1944 and some 1944 tactical solutions come to the fore.  Terrain and the size of the operating area also have a say. 

Quite correct. The leadership does an appreciation, which includes the enemy and the environment (yes, both terrain AND the size of the AO), from which they determine how they wish to prosecute the campaign. Your sarcasm and the utility of your insight are equally valid.

Infantry lacking armoured fighting vehicles have been penned up inside their bases...

Thank you for providing a wonderful example to illustrate the difference between how we are currently engaging the enemy versus what I stated several pages ago.

Does your hypothetical COIN situation represent:

A) the primary emphasis being on increased protection and technology, relying on increasingly heavier weights of fire (think Dien Bien Phu), or

B) a Light Infantry force, living out amongst the population to assist them in their struggle, while interdicting insurgents in their supposed safe-havens (think Selous Scouts).

If your priority is force protection, then by all means, "A" is fine. Just be aware that over the past 3000 years, "A" only defeats an insurgency when you are capable of going in with overwhelming force (for chuckles, Google "3rd Punic War" and see what the Romans did to Carthage). Canada is incapable of adopting such a strategy, even if we wanted to. Therefore the tactics our military leadership has chosen to employ, whether conducted from a LAV or a Nyala, WILL NOT support our strategic objective of defeating the Taliban insurgency.



------------------
If you can snag a copy, have a read of Col. JH Vance's "Tactics Without Strategy, or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign" - - he does a much better job of explaining the required linkage between tactics and strategy, which is absent in our current operations.

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm sorry to keep harping at this point but I think it keeps getting lost in the shuffle.

Maintaining the type of security force that Journeyman alludes to is NOT a zero technology option.  Manpower requirements for the security role can be greatly reduced by augmenting "light troops" with permanently emplaced security systems augmented by equally permanently placed Remote Controlled Weapons Systems.

What would the effect on the defence of Sangin have been if the Paras had been equipped with a Coyote mast, four LAV turrets, and three or four preloaded, 16 barrel 60mm mortars.  All of which could be slaved to a central control to which could also be tied an RF detonated Claymore field at the base of the walls.  Metalstorm 60mm mortars are preloaded with multiple rounds in the same barrel.  Rounds available include the usual HE/Smk/Ill but also include parachute deployed cameras.

All of this stuff is available -
http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/cs/aad_mst.htm  (MSTAR Radar)
http://www.army.mod.uk/equipment/cs/pw_spy.htm  (Brit equivalents of CCTV and TI)
http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/8/628.pdf  (30mm RCWS with 7.62 mm Coax and ATGMs) - make it cheaper by getting rid of the stabilisation, the folding bracket and the ATGMs
http://www.metalstorm.com/clientuploads/news/1presentations/LWC_2002_Presentation.pdf?PHPSESSID=72ba6a5e77cfe275d3115f6bc332b462

Tie this stuff in with any civilian perimeter security system - here's one company

http://www.magal-ssl.com/

Or go the whole hog and opt for the Oerlikon-Rheinmetal

http://www.rheinmetall-defence.com/index.php?fid=3670&lang=3&pdb=1

The point is - that holding that which has been gained no longer requires the same manpower commitment as it did even as late as Vietnam.  A dozen men - equipped with the equivalent of 4 LAVs, a Coyote, and a pair of 60mm mortars, as well as sound and motion detectors and claymores - all operated by 2-4 duty personnel and still leave 8-10 personnel for sleeping, local interactions and patrols, and to handle additional weapons like ATGMs. 12 soldiers, a cost lower than the cost of a troop of LAVs and a permanent local presence, standing WITH the local populace AGAINST "the unknown".

If that is an augmented light infantry force fine.... it could also be seen as a garrison artillery force, or a defence and duties force, or a fixed cavalry force..... above all else it is a security force.  One that gives comfort to the locals that they are not abandoned to the creatures of the night when the Dragoons move on.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I wasn't being hypothetical, although I might have been a little sarcastic regarding the memo.  

You have presented a dichotomy, but I don't believe that risk acceptance has to be that stark.  Being able to operate in the face of the threat can mean that you need firepower and protection.  Being able to get out with the population can mean going out in armoured vehicles backed up by artillery and other arms.  Some light forces that had every intention of getting out in the population found themselves under seige in their platoon houses.

I believe that countering an insurgency short of a Genghis Khan approach requires a political solution, and that military strategy and tactics are only a part (obvious, I suppose).  The military can buy time for that solution to be found and applied, although I recognize that military actions can have effects on that political process (positive or negative).  Putting troops out living with the population may not mean a thing if the reason there is an insurgency is not addressed.

 

[KevinB]

I would suggest that Red Five is looking at this issue from his background.
 
  I believe that this is a CF (and worldwide issue) -- that Mech Inf anf Armoured Forces and those in them, look a the issue entirley differently from Light Infantry and "Special" Forces.

  I dont beleive that one can win the populace without being an integral part of it -- thus living with the villagers in some of the more remote villages.  The FOB's and KAF reienforce an "us and them" strategy. 
  Yes will will lose a lot of soldiers at the beginning -- but in the long term it is a win.

I do agree that large concentrations of enemy outside of urban centers can be best currently dealt with combined arms forces.  However these forces should also be integrated -- so its an ANA arty unit - not a coalition one that takes the grief...


Once again -- its a different mindset issue, and as we have seen elsewhere - one experiences and branch tend to color the glasses one looks at things.

 

[McG]

Does your hypothetical COIN situation represent:

A) the primary emphasis being on increased protection and technology, relying on increasingly heavier weights of fire (think Dien Bien Phu), or

B) a Light Infantry force, living out amongst the population to assist them in their struggle, while interdicting insurgents in their supposed safe-havens (think Selous Scouts).

You’ve presented a logical fallacy hidden in your question; you’ve presented forces as either being overly focused on protection or being light infantry, and you continue to allude that only light infantry are capable of engaging the population.  The fact is that light infantry can be just as over-focused on protection as a mechanized force.  Additionally, a mechanized force is just as capable of engaging the population.  The reality on the ground is that we are employing mech forces in the capacity which you’ve presented as exlusive to light infantry.

While you don’t mention it, I would suggest it is also possible to be sufficiently lacking in combat power so as to be irrelevant.

You can put enough into a Pl House to make it defensible.  Go smaller & the Taliban will destroy our piecemeal presence one outpost at a time.  We had good results from the Gumbad Pl house.  However, in order to exert their presence over the prescribed area, vehicles were required; the Pl House required a mech platoon to do its job.  A truly light platoon would not have had a large enough sphere of influence.

 

[Old Sweat]

Apologies for straying off the track into the weeds, but ulimately this war is Afghanistan's to win or to lose. I am not one that subscribes to the notion that a negotiated settlement with as intractable a foe as the Taliban does anythng but postpone the inevitable. It is up to the host government with its arms - the ANA and the ANP - to establish the rule of law, justice and capable administration in something approaching an honest and efficient manner. If part of their grand strategy to pacify the hostile parts of the country is to ask us to help garrison outlying settlements, that is something we would have to at least consider carefully. As JM just posted that does not automatically mean light infantry.

Part of the pacification process, however, involves reducing the ration strength of the enemy by the most effective manner, without killing or wounding the friendly, neutral or mildly hostile elements of the population. If reports are to be believed, some of those our troops meet in the field are in fact as un-native as are we. If guerrillas are fish that swim in the sea of people, the outsiders along with the more violent of their local comrades may soon find themselves flopping on the beach if the Afghan government can assert its authority. To exploit that requires us to locate, fix and destroy the enemy. Until that is accomplished, much of the fighting will be violent and nasty. That requires us to win the firefight first, and that means the mechanized all arms team supported by air power.  

It is crude, but sometimes to bring the hearts and minds onside in a tribal society, we have to get their attention by grabbing them somewhat farther down on the body. That is not to say we need lower ourselves to the like of Glencoe or My Lai, but we cannot afford to lose too many skirmishes, let alone battles, lest we and our hosts ultimately lose the war.

 

[hat]

Some thoughts,

As background, for the last three years I have been in a (mech) infantry battalion.  I deployed on Op ARCHER Roto 1.  During Roto 1 we conducted 2 months of airmobile (QRF) ops using Chinooks, Blackhawks, Apaches and fast air as support.  We conducted approx 1 month of tasks as IRF (ground-based QRF).  We had opportunity to work with American, British and Afghan forces.

Our ops were widely dispersed.  For 4 out of 6 months I rarely saw my Coy HQ (at its furthest, I was 230 km from it).  Ops typically lasted from 1 day to 2 week's duration.

While conducting airmobile operations we sometimes had difficulty getting inserted.  We always had difficulty getting re-suplied or extracted.  Why?  Because there are only so many resources and you compete with everything else that's going on.  On airmobile ops we could only carry limited water, ammunition etc...  The enemy possessed vehicles.  They were lighter and were capable of moving rapidly, even in rugged terrain.  Essentially, unless the terrain favored dismounted ops, we were the equivalent of "fixed" as soon as we inserted.  I watched other nations that had their own helicopter assets struggle with the same issues.  Light forces were either pent up in FOBs or suffered regular, serious casualties trying to patrol and dominate their battle space.  The largest op we participated in (MAR CHICHEL) was to extricate a light force out of a precarious situation.

While conducting mechanized operations, we relied on our own vehicles to move to objectives.  Sometimes, we dismounted to complete our ingress or actions on the objective.  Sometimes we conducted dismounted patrolling.  It was up to the leadership to decide based on the task.  When we moved in dismounted, zulu vehicles were available to reinforce or conduct other tasks.  Reserves of ammunition and water were always at hand.  We were not tied to FOBs.  We operated primarily out of leaguers and were as mobile as tasks required.  Frequently we would move over 100 Km just to get to the area of operations.  When we did operate out of FOBs, the majority of our attention was focused on conducting ops outside the FOB instead of securing the immediate area.  Many of our operations involved engaging the population through shuras or simply stopping to talk to locals.  If we were in LAVs, we would simply stop, dismount, approach the locals with respect and talk to them.

I don't think that light and mech forces, of necessity, think differently.  To me it all comes down to leadership having the mindset that they will get to the objective by any means necessary and conduct their tasks.

 

[KevinB]

hat - perhaps your proving my point in the different method of thinking -- but for a COIN operation --

To me it all comes down to leadership having the mindset that they will get to the objective by any means necessary and conduct their tasks.

I consider the task to be the securing of the local area.

I beleive you are looking at this thru the glasses of manuver warfare.

The British Para's where poorly equipped for the role they where given in that area - and that to me shows a complete disconnect of the leadership (UK in this instance) with the charateristics of their troops.

Several units have sucessfully run light operations in the area - so it is possible.
  the trick is to ensure they know how to operate and have a chain of command that can support that type of activity.

 

[McG]

Several units have sucessfully run light operations in the area - so it is possible.

Which units and what type of operations?

 

[Kirkhill]

Before delving too much more into the predicaments of the Paras I recall that when they were initially inserted the game plan changed virtually on the day the deployed - whoever's fault that was.

AFAIK  they were intended to be a heliborne reaction force in a brigade that was supposed to be a battalion stronger.  The extra battalion didn't show and the AFGHAN GOVERNMENT set the strategic requirement that the district centres be reoccupied/occupied with a government presence.  The Paras got the job.  They did what they were told with what they had.  They established a presence.

I wonder if they would have tackled the job the same way if circumstances were different.

 

[McG]

Before delving too much more into the predicaments of the Paras I recall that when they were initially inserted the game plan changed virtually on the day the deployed - whoever's fault that was.

I was there well before they deployed & we always understood that they were going to Hellmund.