- Reaction score
- 6,140
- Points
- 1,260
I am afraid we are about to reap what we sowed about 30 years ago.
It really doesn't matter, at all, not even in the slightest, what the US leadership said circa 1990, nor does it matter what they now say was really meant, what the Russians heard, what most of the world heard, was that the Warsaw Pact would be dissolved, the former Soviet client states would be free, they could, likely would, join the European Union, BUT they would NOT join NATO, they would remain neutral and would be a buffer between the US led NATO alliance and the new Russian federation.
That didn't happen; they were invited into NATO. Ronald Reagan said, "trust but verify." The Russians now say that they have verified American actions and the US-led West cannot be trusted.
That's problem 1: the Russians actually have an internally consistent "case" which makes very good sense in Russia, to Russians.
Problem 2 is that a large minority of Americans and, indeed, a lot of Europeans do not believe that Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia actually belong in NATO and are "allies" in the same way that Canada, Iceland, the Baltic States or even Turkey "belong" in the alliance.
But, see, also, this, in Foreign Affairs: "The Kremlin is keeping the world guessing about its intentions and pursuing a policy of strategic ambiguity. This makes it difficult for the United States and Europe to know how to respond, inhibiting Western action. The Biden administration could follow suit, preparing a range of options with its European allies—including ramping up trade and financial sanctions and enhancing military cooperation with Ukraine—but doing so out of the public eye, ensuring that the Kremlin is uncertain about what Washington’s response might be in the event of a military escalation. Previous U.S. administrations have telegraphed their Ukraine policy. Back in 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama explained to The Atlantic why the United States had not responded more assertively to the Russian annexation of Crimea two years earlier. He said that Ukraine was more important to Russia than it was to the United States, that Washington had no treaty obligation toward Kyiv, and that Ukraine was Russia’s neighbor but was far from the United States. These realities invariably limited the options available to Washington. The Kremlin assumes that this remains the U.S. view and that the use of Russian military force would not be met with concomitant Western force."
Maybe it is time for some US "strategic ambiguity:" warn the Russians that military aggressions will be met with massive, absolutely overwhelming counterforce but, at the same time, offer to renegotiate the entire shape of Europe ... including he dissolution of NATO, itself.
It really doesn't matter, at all, not even in the slightest, what the US leadership said circa 1990, nor does it matter what they now say was really meant, what the Russians heard, what most of the world heard, was that the Warsaw Pact would be dissolved, the former Soviet client states would be free, they could, likely would, join the European Union, BUT they would NOT join NATO, they would remain neutral and would be a buffer between the US led NATO alliance and the new Russian federation.
That didn't happen; they were invited into NATO. Ronald Reagan said, "trust but verify." The Russians now say that they have verified American actions and the US-led West cannot be trusted.
That's problem 1: the Russians actually have an internally consistent "case" which makes very good sense in Russia, to Russians.
Problem 2 is that a large minority of Americans and, indeed, a lot of Europeans do not believe that Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia actually belong in NATO and are "allies" in the same way that Canada, Iceland, the Baltic States or even Turkey "belong" in the alliance.
But, see, also, this, in Foreign Affairs: "The Kremlin is keeping the world guessing about its intentions and pursuing a policy of strategic ambiguity. This makes it difficult for the United States and Europe to know how to respond, inhibiting Western action. The Biden administration could follow suit, preparing a range of options with its European allies—including ramping up trade and financial sanctions and enhancing military cooperation with Ukraine—but doing so out of the public eye, ensuring that the Kremlin is uncertain about what Washington’s response might be in the event of a military escalation. Previous U.S. administrations have telegraphed their Ukraine policy. Back in 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama explained to The Atlantic why the United States had not responded more assertively to the Russian annexation of Crimea two years earlier. He said that Ukraine was more important to Russia than it was to the United States, that Washington had no treaty obligation toward Kyiv, and that Ukraine was Russia’s neighbor but was far from the United States. These realities invariably limited the options available to Washington. The Kremlin assumes that this remains the U.S. view and that the use of Russian military force would not be met with concomitant Western force."
Maybe it is time for some US "strategic ambiguity:" warn the Russians that military aggressions will be met with massive, absolutely overwhelming counterforce but, at the same time, offer to renegotiate the entire shape of Europe ... including he dissolution of NATO, itself.