Our North - SSE Policy Update Megathread

[PrairieFella]

World War Two would beg to differ…

A chopper can't take and hold ground. Nor can a frigate. Everything the CAF does in war is in support of the infantry.

 

[daftandbarmy]

A chopper can't take and hold ground. Nor can a frigate. Everything the CAF does in war is in support of the infantry.

And we like to remind everyone of that fact as often, and as loudly, as possible

 

[SeaKingTacco]

A chopper can't take and hold ground. Nor can a frigate. Everything the CAF does in war is in support of the infantry.

Okay, thanks, for that insightful bit of military wisdom…

I assume that you plan on swimming to Europe?

 

[McG]

If the Army's deployable force is a BG, the Army's commander can be a BGen...

Do you mean a BG or a Bde Gp?
… or are you saying CCA can be a BGen if our largest deployable capability is just a BG?

 

[PrairieFella]

Okay, thanks, for that insightful bit of military wisdom…

I assume that you plan on swimming to Europe?

Probably hitching a ride with the RCAF doing their job, supporting the fighting troops.

That said, it's almost guaranteed to be Americans providing sealift so maybe hitching a ride with them.

 

[PrairieFella]

And we like to remind everyone of that fact as often, and as loudly, as possible

People seem to forget that tidbit. My job as a crewman is to zoom around and make big things dead for the infantry so they can kill the little things and take ground. Simple as.

 

[McG]

Assuming the Americans will carry out water is not planning.

 

[PrairieFella]

Assuming the Americans will carry out water is not planning.

Well that's our only option atm so what else can we expect? It's not planning but it's reality. A merchant marine with major troop transport capability would be cool but isn't a thing and would take years upon years to get started. I'm all for starting now though.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Probably hitching a ride with the RCAF doing their job, supporting the fighting troops.

That said, it's almost guaranteed to be Americans providing sealift so maybe hitching a ride with them.

No- you just said the RCAF and RCN need to give up budget to the Army for the next five years (which, is not how it works, but since we are already well into pretend land…).

So- infantry first and always. How are the Infantry getting themselves to Europe?

 

[PrairieFella]

No- you just said the RCAF and RCN need to give up budget to the Army for the next five years (which, is not how it works, but since we are already well into pretend land…).

So- infantry first and always. How are the Infantry getting themselves to Europe?

I said "new" penny. Ie every new dollar needs to go to the Army. Not every dollar, they still need their budgets. Big difference.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I said "new" penny. Ie every new dollar needs to go to the Army. Not every dollar, they still need their budgets. Big difference.

Based on what strategic rationale. Be specific.

 

[KevinB]

I said "new" penny. Ie every new dollar needs to go to the Army. Not every dollar, they still need their budgets. Big difference.

Frankly I wouldn't give the Army one red cent until it can come up with an actually viable plan for itself.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I don't think you'll find any disagreement here that we need hundreds. The government has forgotten since the peace dividend who will actually win a war if the flag goes up, and it looking like it might. It's time for the RCAF and RCN to be good corporate citizens and recognize the Army needs every new penny for the next 5 years to properly be prepared, Navies and Air Forces don't win wars in Europe or continental Asia.

A chopper can't take and hold ground. Nor can a frigate. Everything the CAF does in war is in support of the infantry.

You're trolling right ?

 

[FJAG]

That is the question. But you're on Army.ca so chances are the hive decision has already been made. Everyone wants to get them into theatre, but no one has a plan to sustain/replace them once they get knocked out or break down. They are basically one and done toys.

Put them all, except what is required for training, in Latvia.

The issue brought up was the "deployment of tanks" not the sustainment once there. Sustainment is a question of prepositioned (and protected) war stocks in theatre and a system of bringing in more when the situation demands it. IMHO, if your prepositioned war stocks and immediate spares is large enough then you can commit a combination of air and sea resources to keep those up to strength. Our problem isn't so much an inadequate air or sea lift but an inadequate manufacturing base.

I don't minimize the fact that our logistics system doesn't recognize a proper industrial base and the big picture sustainment of a force like a brigade. It didn't while we were in Germany either and that was a much bigger force.

What I oppose is the notion that we can't deploy a heavy force because we do not have the air or sea lift. The difference being discussed is the issue of deploying the force and sustaining it. IMHO we have the resources to "predeploy" a brigade's equipment in peacetime; to deploy the personnel to man it during a pre war heightened tensions phase and to sustain it with our current resources to the extent that we have material available in Canada. The fact of the matter is we are not even deploying a brigade. At best we are providing a half of a brigade. IMHO the bigger and more valid question is how do we sustain this multinational polyglot in combat when its elements come from all over Europe? I'll make the assumption that someone is planning that as we debate. Whether the solution is adequate beyond the short term is a different question than that originally posed.

Its not a deflection at all. And this attitude speaks to the general apathy that the CAF has towards sustainment. Its a very fair question. If we don't have a plan for after the first time we get punched in the nose then the whole thing is for not and we've just wasted lives and equipment for peacetime politics.

I don't think that's the issue he was raising nor the one I answered. The issue raised is the quick deployment of a heavy armoured force which IMHO is only an issue if you think that quick deployment is the only method available.

The low intensity of that conflict and complete inability of the enemy to deny our over seas supply lines is skewing your view on this. Russia will have surface, sub surface and air defence which will be hunting for our sustaining forces.

As did the Germans in WW2 - some gets lost others make it through. Don't forget the industrial base in Europe itself. I don't disagree that there are challenges and that sustainment is an issue that needs better planning and commitment. However, by not deploying a force, even if sustainment must be sourced elsewhere is effectively not providing a visible deterrence.

This is the only way it works, just put them all there now, with the exception of what is required at the armor school; and hope they last long enough if the environment heats up. Because it will be years before Canada sees replacement tanks should we need them in a conventional WW3 scenario.

That's my view too.

It is when you have neither the ability to support that strategic lift in the air or at sea assets to move your equipment and people that make this a difficult logistics issue to solve. Throw into the mix that enemy gets a say in how many of our toys actually make it to theatre and its now a more complicated and difficult issue to solve.

I'll reiterate that the logistics lift is a much smaller problem than the lack of an industrial base and the lack of any mobilization plan. You can augment logistics by seizing civilian ships and aircraft to augment the existing lift. But if the materiel isn't there and the plan isn't there, all the lift in the world won't help you.

To once again quote Granatstein and Belzile from 2005, "...no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis if very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. The Canadian Forces needs a plan." Making plans is relatively inexpensive.

Where I'm critical of @SupersonicMax's position is that he suggests that since we can't "quick" deploy a heavy force, because we lack the lift resources to do that, so we shouldn't deploy. It's actually that type of thinking which has left the CAF without a viable plan. The lack of a full war plan makes it dubious that we can even begin to calculate the lift needed to support a prepositioned heavy force and how we go about generating it. As I said before, the lift component is the simple part once we've dealt with the industrial base and started making valid plans. I use the term "valid" here because I'm quite sure that there are, at least, some plans but they are bound with the existing materiel and financial constraints that we have.

My gut tells me that we can generate enough lift to sustain Canada's element of the brigade. The real problem is getting the materiel to lift.

 

[Rudburg]

So- infantry first and always. How are the Infantry getting themselves to Europe?

"Hail Mary, full of grace...Hail Mary, full of grace..."

 

[FJAG]

Very much this, unfortunately I don’t see any evidence in the Canadian Army that there is any realization of this.
The Army is effectively doubling down on peace time rotations and everything is geared to that.
The UORs coming on line very clearly demonstrate that in their fielding plans.

The rotation mindset and similarly the belief that the Army is only capable of fighting one BG with a tank SQN and an Arty Bty at a time is well established.

Trying to break that mindset will need sustained commitment to culture change by the Army.

On reflection I think the sentence should have read, "Canada's army needs to wean itself off the roto and UOR system. UORs very much are reactive to the operational situation we face. We've slowly become used to having it provide major gear which should have been thought about and life-cycle programmed years ago. Financial constraints play a large role in this, however, I agree with you that the culture mindset within the army as to how it plans, allocates priorities and fights for them within DND and the government has a lot to do with this as well. There are far too few GOFOs resigning in disgust and voicing their criticism out loud.

 

[KevinB]

The issue brought up was the "deployment of tanks" not the sustainment once there. Sustainment is a question of prepositioned (and protected) war stocks in theatre and a system of bringing in more when the situation demands it. IMHO, if your prepositioned war stocks and immediate spares is large enough then you can commit a combination of air and sea resources to keep those up to strength. Our problem isn't so much an inadequate air or sea lift but an inadequate manufacturing base.

Inadequate vision...

I don't minimize the fact that our logistics system doesn't recognize a proper industrial base and the big picture sustainment of a force like a brigade. It didn't while we were in Germany either and that was a much bigger force.

What I oppose is the notion that we can't deploy a heavy force because we do not have the air or sea lift. The difference being discussed is the issue of deploying the force and sustaining it.

Canada cannot deploy a Heavy Force unless it has a year to get ready, or borrow/buys/steals air and sea lift, and even then, you don't have a heavy force.

IMHO we have the resources to "predeploy" a brigade's equipment in peacetime; to deploy the personnel to man it during a pre war heightened tensions phase and to sustain it with our current resources to the extent that we have material available in Canada.

Agreed

The fact of the matter is we are not even deploying a brigade. At best we are providing a half of a brigade. IMHO the bigger and more valid question is how do we sustain this multinational polyglot in combat when its elements come from all over Europe? I'll make the assumption that someone is planning that as we debate. Whether the solution is adequate beyond the short term is a different question than that originally posed.

Which is why I come back to fitting into a US Division, and having like equipment...

I don't think that's the issue he was raising nor the one I answered. The issue raised is the quick deployment of a heavy armoured force which IMHO is only an issue if you think that quick deployment is the only method available.

It's also an issue that you don't have a heavy armored force - so deploying it is an exercise in theory at this point.

I'll reiterate that the logistics lift is a much smaller problem than the lack of an industrial base and the lack of any mobilization plan. You can augment logistics by seizing civilian ships and aircraft to augment the existing lift. But if the materiel isn't there and the plan isn't there, all the lift in the world won't help you.

I'd argue that a comprehensive Logistical plan would have the creation of material and training of personnel included.

To once again quote Granatstein and Belzile from 2005, "...no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis if very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. The Canadian Forces needs a plan." Making plans is relatively inexpensive.

Plans only work if they are adopted.

Where I'm critical of @SupersonicMax's position is that he suggests that since we can't "quick" deploy a heavy force, because we lack the lift resources to do that, so we shouldn't deploy. It's actually that type of thinking which has left the CAF without a viable plan. The lack of a full war plan makes it dubious that we can even begin to calculate the lift needed to support a prepositioned heavy force and how we go about generating it. As I said before, the lift component is the simple part once we've dealt with the industrial base and started making valid plans. I use the term "valid" here because I'm quite sure that there are, at least, some plans but they are bound with the existing materiel and financial constraints that we have.

My gut tells me that we can generate enough lift to sustain Canada's element of the brigade. The real problem is getting the materiel to lift.

Ack.

 

[dimsum]

You're trolling right ?

I don’t want to sound condescending (apologies to @PrairieFella if I come out that way) but they may be speaking from their experience as a crewman, which would (probably, I could be wrong) be viewing it from a unit/tactical level. That ground-level view is important but as we know from experience, rank, and postings, there is more to that. If I was about 10 years earlier in my career, I’d probably agree with them.

However … yes, only Infantry takes and holds ground. Even the RCAF and RCN folks know this - we can see it in Afghanistan and Ukraine. So yes, @SeaKingTacco is also correct in that the RCAF and RCN are the folks that have a hand in getting them to the point of taking/holding ground.

Stepping back, and bringing @SupersonicMax’s earlier comments that kicked this off, the question is whether Canada objectively should be an Army-centric force, or a “quicker reaction” Air/Sea-centric force. This would need to be a clean-sheet re-think, which would be tough because we all have inherent unconscious biases based on our experiences and careers - perfect example being “we should divest armour”.

There is precedent - do we become Australia and try to do everything, or New Zealand and focus on a few things? Yes, NZ divested their fighter force but anecdotally, I wouldn’t want to mess with the SOF or Infantry folks.

If we become NZ, what things do we focus on?

Note: This in itself could (and should) be a thread split.

 

[Halifax Tar]

The issue brought up was the "deployment of tanks" not the sustainment once there. Sustainment is a question of prepositioned (and protected) war stocks in theatre and a system of bringing in more when the situation demands it. IMHO, if your prepositioned war stocks and immediate spares is large enough then you can commit a combination of air and sea resources to keep those up to strength. Our problem isn't so much an inadequate air or sea lift but an inadequate manufacturing base.

Deployment - Sustainment - Industry are all linked. Sure, we can push forward XX tanks; but tanks need to be fed, maintained and replaced. So that XX becomes an X and then becomes a 0 very fast, without the sustainment and industry behind them.

The only way I see your plan working is if we adopt American war material, which I think we should, and utilize their sustainment and industry. That would also depend on them having the space in their own sustainment and industry sectors to take on Canadian demands.

I don't minimize the fact that our logistics system doesn't recognize a proper industrial base and the big picture sustainment of a force like a brigade. It didn't while we were in Germany either and that was a much bigger force.

Sustainment (Logistics) is in the middle of the links. If we don't have an industry to fill sustainment needs the deployment fails. Buy American.

What I oppose is the notion that we can't deploy a heavy force because we do not have the air or sea lift. The difference being discussed is the issue of deploying the force and sustaining it. IMHO we have the resources to "predeploy" a brigade's equipment in peacetime; to deploy the personnel to man it during a pre war heightened tensions phase and to sustain it with our current resources to the extent that we have material available in Canada. The fact of the matter is we are not even deploying a brigade. At best we are providing a half of a brigade. IMHO the bigger and more valid question is how do we sustain this multinational polyglot in combat when its elements come from all over Europe? I'll make the assumption that someone is planning that as we debate. Whether the solution is adequate beyond the short term is a different question than that originally posed.

Its not so much that we cant, its more of a what's the point ?

Our 40 (ish?) tanks will put a major draw on already strained supply chains and probably be quickly removed from the fighting equation with no reasonable time line to being replaced. Saying this I would propose we either use American kit which opens this up; or we let others be the tanks.

I don't think that's the issue he was raising nor the one I answered. The issue raised is the quick deployment of a heavy armoured force which IMHO is only an issue if you think that quick deployment is the only method available.

Quick deployment and armor don't go together. Armor is either in place before the ball drops or you ship it by sea, in this scenario. Our C17s will be prime targets. And sea routes are the fastest way to ship heavy equipment and lots of people, and its not terribly fast.

As did the Germans in WW2 - some gets lost others make it through. Don't forget the industrial base in Europe itself. I don't disagree that there are challenges and that sustainment is an issue that needs better planning and commitment. However, by not deploying a force, even if sustainment must be sourced elsewhere is effectively not providing a visible deterrence.

That's my view too.

I think if we are going to do this and use Leos we put them all their now, with their spares and let them do what damage they can before they cant.

European industry cant support their own demands, let alone ours. Depending on them is no a go IMHO. Build the industry in Canada and invest in shipping and air lift, or buy American.

I'll reiterate that the logistics lift is a much smaller problem than the lack of an industrial base and the lack of any mobilization plan. You can augment logistics by seizing civilian ships and aircraft to augment the existing lift. But if the materiel isn't there and the plan isn't there, all the lift in the world won't help you.

Too many ifs for me. What civilian shipping will you seize ? Who will crew them ?

To once again quote Granatstein and Belzile from 2005, "...no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis if very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. The Canadian Forces needs a plan." Making plans is relatively inexpensive.

This we can clink our glasses too.

Where I'm critical of @SupersonicMax's position is that he suggests that since we can't "quick" deploy a heavy force, because we lack the lift resources to do that, so we shouldn't deploy. It's actually that type of thinking which has left the CAF without a viable plan. The lack of a full war plan makes it dubious that we can even begin to calculate the lift needed to support a prepositioned heavy force and how we go about generating it. As I said before, the lift component is the simple part once we've dealt with the industrial base and started making valid plans. I use the term "valid" here because I'm quite sure that there are, at least, some plans but they are bound with the existing materiel and financial constraints that we have.

My gut tells me that we can generate enough lift to sustain Canada's element of the brigade. The real problem is getting the materiel to lift.

We have no GoC owned sea lift and below minimal Air Lift capability. If you are comfortable with this you're a more hopeful person than I.

Either way, lets just both hope that all this is for naught and never needed.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I don’t want to sound condescending (apologies to @PrairieFella if I come out that way) but they may be speaking from their experience as a crewman, which would (probably, I could be wrong) be viewing it from a unit/tactical level. That ground-level view is important but as we know from experience, rank, and postings, there is more to that. If I was about 10 years earlier in my career, I’d probably agree with them.

However … yes, only Infantry takes and holds ground. Even the RCAF and RCN folks know this - we can see it in Afghanistan and Ukraine. So yes, @SeaKingTacco is also correct in that the RCAF and RCN are the folks that have a hand in getting them to the point of taking/holding ground.

Stepping back, and bringing @SupersonicMax’s earlier comments that kicked this off, the question is whether Canada objectively should be an Army-centric force, or a “quicker reaction” Air/Sea-centric force. This would need to be a clean-sheet re-think, which would be tough because we all have inherent unconscious biases based on our experiences and careers - perfect example being “we should divest armour”.

There is precedent - do we become Australia and try to do everything, or New Zealand and focus on a few things? Yes, NZ divested their fighter force but anecdotally, I wouldn’t want to mess with the SOF or Infantry folks.

If we become NZ, what things do we focus on?

Note: This in itself could (and should) be a thread split.

You can only take that ground if you can get to that ground and you can only hold that ground if you can be sustained.

Agreeing with your post.