Princess Patricia's warriors battle alongside Fighting 13th Marines at TRUEX, MA

[paracowboy]

Paracowboy, you've piqued my curiosity. I'm trying to guess who you are but I can't put my finger on the answer. Formerly 3 RCR, tour in Afganistan, "fat ol' redneck" and a Mcpl. Hmmm... I'll have to work on this.

shouldn't be too hard for ya, troop. I was on loan to C Coy for the Ex, and am now back to being a desk-jockey over in Admin CQ. The troops of 9 Pl call me "Iceman" when they're making fun of my long hair. Got it, now?

Now we're back in Edmonton preparing for three weeks of training in Wainwright, based on 60-year old doctrine, next month. After our time in California, any other kind of training seems that much more irrelevant.

Not irrelevant, troop. Not as nifty-keen as MOUT, and probably not as high-speed as the MAGTF, but still important. Why does Canada have a military? To defend the nation, above all else. That means preparing to fight off foreign hordes. That means diggin' in. That means patrolling out of a Defensive position. Whether that will ever happen, or not, we have to train for it. That is why we run around wearing relish-coloured pajamas in the first place.

Further, sittin' in a patrol base in a swamp, or trying to sleep in a trench at -1,000,000 degrees Celsius, pushes you to overcome self-imposed limitations. No training is irrelevant unless you choose to make it so. You can always get something out of it, if you want to. If nothing else, come find me, and I'll teach you new and interesting ways to snivel and whine, I'm really good at it!

And, it's going to be geared towards potential up-coming missions, anyway. If you'll recall, we had a visitor from 1VP come down for the express purpose of seeing what the Marines were doing in order to try and make the Wainwright Ex into something similar. And, the Q is going to be there as well, doing his best to make the training as cool as he can.

 

[eyre]

Well said paracowboy.  While I firmly believe that force-on-force with MILES / SIMUNITION in an urban environment is some of the best training we can do, there is a place for the basics â “ pairs, sect and platoon attacks.  One thing that this training with the Marines showed us is that we are relatively very good at the interior fight, but our exterior fight, which in many cases resembles a more traditional fire and movement advance, requires improvement.  We still have to be able to conduct a combat estimate, issue clear, workable orders, and fight through. 

Now we're back in Edmonton preparing for three weeks of training in Wainwright, based on 60-year old doctrine, next month. After our time in California, any other kind of training seems that much more irrelevant.

Force-on-force with simulators must be balanced with live fire.  I think we can all agree that once live rounds are chambered the pucker factor goes up.  We must understand live weapons effects, be comfortable with firing live rounds in fire and movement, and moreover have confidence in the other troops around us.  The unfortunate part of live fire is the lack of a dynamic, thinking enemy.  Important training nonetheless and far from 'irrelevant.'  It may stem from '60 year old' doctrine, but one of the bugbears I have with 'transformation,' in whatever form it takes, is a proclivity to disregard the hard won lessons of history.  Wainwright will be an exercise we need.

They weren't terribly impressed with our apparent timidity, lack of â Å“Hearts and Mindsâ ?, or failure to employ the various assets we had available to level targets (yeah, sounds contradictory, but it makes perfect sense if you think about it). Too much Bosnia. But, then, I don't know what was discussed at those levels, and have nothing to go on except what those Gunnies said to me. The story may be entirely different if you spoke with someone else, at higher levels than mine.

Ouch.  My understanding (from the DCO and the Q) is our guys were somewhat more deliberate than the Marines.  Instead of going straight up the middle, there was a tendency to take an indirect approach.  A big lesson was not to make too wide a flanking.  Shallow is better in an urban fight as the next block is generally unknown.  More great training was exposure to the other assets out there.  One thing I've noticed is that the Marines are superb at is integration of fires.  Based on their force structure, it is built into their culture. 

I am only asking out of interest to see if anyone has noticed any real dramatic change in working with the Marines as opposed to, say, pre 9/11 or pre Iraq.

I was down in the US undergoing training with the Marines on 9/11 and for about a year and half afterwards.  One great takeaway was their lessons learned feedback loop.  They send 'assessment teams' over to theatre who report on emerging TTPs (both enemy and friendly) and feed that right back into their training system.  It makes for incredible currency.  This was also in evidence during this training in California with the staff of the Special Operations Training Group (the organization that conducted the exercise), some of who had just returned.

Bottom line â “ this training was excellent, our guys learned lots, and we must do all we can to get invited to similar activities.

 

[GO!!!]

To all, but especially the one known as eyre...

The trg in CA was great, no one will dispute that, but one thing still irks me;

After we did all of the stands, and progressed to the final ex, there was not one OPFOR for us in our Coy trace. We advanced with the MEU, then they pushed us forward for the final push - to 31 empty bldgs.

There was a distinct feeling during the entire ex that we were not really welcome, being a burden on USMC logistics and trg resources, and an all around inconvenience.

Could also have something to do with an internationalist foreign policy which virtually precludes our use in active cbt ops...

Were we there as an exchange unit, or was this something fed to the MEU from higher, whether they wanted it or not?

Any thoughts on this?

 

[paracowboy]

After we did all of the stands, and progressed to the final ex, there was not one OPFOR for us in our Coy trace.

actually, there were two enemy. TWO. For the company. Lotta kickin' in doors to empty houses. Lotta movin' and coverin' only to face - nobody. Good trainin' there. You can shadow-box for years, but until you get in a ring with an opponent, you still can't fight.

I still haven't found out whether this was because the MEU didn't want to waste their enemy force resources on soldiers who weren't going to war (which I could have understood) or some other reason, but either way, it was a serious kick in the groin. Funny thing, too. A lot of the houses I entered seemed to have been cleared already. Makes me wonder if the MEU hadn't already cleared through our sector for their own training, then we decided to beat ourselves stupid attacking cleared houses.

There was a distinct feeling during the entire ex that we were not really welcome, being a burden on USMC logistics and trg resources, and an all around inconvenience.

Yeah, I felt that, too. But I don't hold it against the Yanks. After all, they're going to go do what soldiers are supposed to, and we were just strap-hanging to try and get another free ride off America. And we at least provided some real-time training for their HQ and ANGLICO in attempting to work with coalition forces. It may help save the live of Marines.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Interesting points brought up by all.

Did the concept of 'Satelllite Patrolling' get brought up at all?
As I posted earlier in the training area, the 'exterior' fight is undergoing alot of conceptual/doctrinal change as a result of operations in Iraq in regard to things such as stacking, covering fires, makeup of assault, support and security elements, breaching techniques, etc.

I'm sorry to hear that the Patricia's felt like the bastard step-children of the MEU.  I wasn't there so I can't comment on what the atmosphere was like.  With that said, while it's been quite some time that I worked with anyone from the VPs, I'd always found that they were extremely professional and mission-oriented troops.  Sometimes us Marines tend to think that our sh*t doesn't stink and we get a bit snobby around other forces.  I remember talking to a Marine Sgt. from one of the Pendleton based units back in 2001 about the US/Australian Ex. Tandem Thrust.  He had nothing good to say about the Australians and only commented that they were 'fat and nasty'.  : Having worked with Aussies myself, I found them extremely competent and wouldn't hesitate to have them on my flank anyday. 

And while the ex. may have been extremely 'high-speed' for those participating north of the border, it also must be realized that the Marines still spend alot of time in the conventional battlspace training mentality.  The Combined-Arms-Exercise/CAX program at Twentynine Palms still continues with infantry battalions combined with LAR, Tank, Artillery and air assets to operate in the conventional sense and unless a unit is working up for an OIF rotation, they'll continue to focus on conventional tactics that would be much akin to those conducted at CMTC.

 

[eyre]

For GO!!! and paracowboy, it's my understanding that the lack of OPFOR was a flaw in the ex design.  The CO of SOTG explained to me that the free-play enemy was too 'free' and were drawn away by other contacts before you guys launched.  Not the high-point to end an ex on, especially after all the great lane training.  Lesson learned for them and he phoned not only to apologize for that, but to extend his thanks for your participation and note his high regard for your soldier skills. 

There was a distinct feeling during the entire ex that we were not really welcome, being a burden on USMC logistics and trg resources, and an all around inconvenience.

We were actually invited by the Marines to participate in order to give their HQ some training in integrating a coalition force into the MEU.  Given their tight pre-deployment timelines, some would feel this extra training to be a burden.  Too bad, coalition warfare is reality.  More importantly for this question, every military, including ours, has individuals whose personalities are difficult to work with (to put it nicely), especially when foreigners are involved.  We can talk specifics offline if you wish.  That being said, there were many of them (including the CO of 3/1 who observed some of your training) who stated they would love to have us on their flank. 

As for this being an exchange, we are now looking for a suitable opportunity to reciprocate and bring some of SOTG up here.

 

[pbi]

To offer eyre some flanking fire, I was priveliged to hear the CO of 3/1 speak recently in Edmonton, and from the attitude and genuine professional respect and camaraderie he and the team of leaders accompanying him expressed, I would have to say that we did not leave all that bad an impression on TRUEX.

Cheers.

 

[paracowboy]

Did the concept of 'Satelllite Patrolling' get brought up at all?

Yes, I heard the term, but never did get the definition. Could you elaborate on it, please?

I'm sorry to hear that the Patricia's felt like the ******* step-children of the MEU. I wasn't there so I can't comment on what the atmosphere was like...  Sometimes us Marines tend to think that our **** doesn't stink and we get a bit snobby around other forces.

This wasn't at the troop level, by any means. Every Marine I spoke with (And I spoke with Marines fresh from Boot Camp, Gunnies who'd been everywhere, and Officers up to the MEU CO â “ who was one funny mofo) was very positive towards us, and simply wanted to talk about the same things troops talk about everywhere â “ guns, girls, booze, chicks, Leave/Liberty, women, money, broads, Iraq/Afghanistan, dames, etc. I met a lot of good fellers. In fact, I spent about $50 of my own money when I found out that they'd deployed from an Exercise in the field, to the SASO, and hadn't had time to buy smokes/dip. Amazing how much goodwill can be generated by simply supplying fellow drug addicts with their fix. Got a lot of Int that way.
I can't speak for GO!!, but, for me, it was a feeling I picked up in the general layout of the training. It seemed that we were simply 'tacked on' wherever possible, and were more of an inconvenience than an asset. I don't believe this was intended, but it was something that we felt (rightly or wrongly). It may have been an unintended result of the SOTG's having to prepare 2000 Marines to go to a real shooting war, more than anything. Or simply a carryover of our feeling like we were letting our allies down. It's disheartening to train with boys, and then watch as they leave to go to a fight, and all you can do is wave at them and hope they all come back. It would have been far better to be able to go with them, and do my best, personally, to ensure that they came back. 

The CO of SOTG explained to me that the free-play enemy was too 'free' and were drawn away by other contacts before you guys launched.

That does make sense. I know from talking with the OPFOR that they had a lot of free-play. In fact, there were defections from the â Å“Iraqi Nat'l Guardâ ? to the â Å“Insurgentsâ ?, the various â Å“Insurgentâ ? cells frequently acted against each other, it was true chaos at times, and that just added to the realism.

We were actually invited by the Marines to participate in order to give their HQ some training in integrating a coalition force into the MEU.

On this point, I know first-hand that the ANGLICO team assigned to us were genuinely happy that we were there, as it gave them an opportunity to actually practice their liaison skills, something they rarely get to do out of theatre. I know this is fact, because I had a good working and personal relationship with the Sergeant of the team (Geow-ja boy).

Maybe the feeling is just a carry-over of the sort of 'inferiority complex' that Canadians seem to feel when dealing with our elephant to the South. I've noticed that Canuck soldiers, especially, seem to experience this a great deal when working alongside Yanks in their backyard. We get caught up in their hype, get distracted by the sheer amount and shinyness of their toys, and start to feel like second-hand citizens.

All in all, I enjoyed the hell out of the training, and would like to see all of our infantry rotate through it. If possible, eyre, maybe we could look into getting our boys through the Afghanistan stand that we saw on the SOTG 'promotional video'?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Satellite patrolling is a concept that the Brits developed for urban patrolling during operations in Northern Ireland during the 70's and 80's.  It is just now coming into wide acceptance and practice within the Marine Corps (we tend to be more influenced by Brit experiences than the US Army is...probably due to our close relationship with the Royal Marines).

Satellite Patrolling was developed to allow a force to operate along multiple axes in the urban space so that contact with the enemy could be dealt with in a more fluid manner.  Typically most urban patrol/assault formations used have been the column, where your troops would be spread in a linear formation down a single street.  The column is great for command and control and allows for good speed, however it restricts reaction time, maneuveur and the ability to bring fire onto an enemy position.

Satellite patrolling employs a command element on a primary axis, with elements moving as entities or 'satellites', in front of, behind and parallel to the command element.  Imagine that you've got a platoon moving down a street.  On the parallel streets to your right and left you've got a section moving in tandem.  You may also have a fireteam operating a block ahead of the command element.  Situation and terrain will really dictate the composition and flow of the patrol.  What is key is that your patrol has communications between the the command element and satellite patrols.  When contact is gained, the patrol commander has great flexibility to react.  He can easily flank the enemy, come up on his rear, counterambush, etc. due to the disposition of his forces.  If the main body is engaged by sniper fire from a building to the immediate left, the 'Left' satellite patrol can gain entry into the building and engage the sniper.

Another beautiful thing about satellite patrolling is that it is scalable.  You can use it at section level by breaking into 3 or 4 man fireteam groups, or you can use it up to platoon or company level just scaling up the size of forces involved.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab has this AAR that touches upon the concept of satellite patrolling:
http://www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/Experiment/AARs/platoonlevelaar.pdf

Also, the Marine Corps Gazette published an article further detailing the concept of Satellite Patrolling:
Patrolling in the urban environment
Colin J Beadon. Marine Corps Gazette. Quantico: May 2002.Vol. 86, Iss. 5;  pg. 49
You can purchase a copy of the article online for $4US at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/mca-marines/

 

[Scoobie Newbie]

Other then a reduced command and control what are the drawbacks to this system?  Also does anyone know if the Canadians are looking at adopting this system?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

The drawbacks of Satellite Patrolling is that it takes awhile to become proficient in, but what skillset doesn't? 

As mentioned the main areas of concern are within the realm of command and control.  The patrol should have a decent knowledge of the terrain they're operating in.  What has made satellite patrolling successful for Marine units in Iraq is familarity of the terrain being covered, access at section and fireteam level to high-resolution aerial photomaps (to show individual buildings, alleys, courtyards, etc.) of the terrain and a GPS unit for each of the patrol elements so they can report their positions accurately.

 

[paracowboy]

Satellite patrolling employs a command element on a primary axis, with elements moving as entities or 'satellites', in front of, behind and parallel to the command element.   Imagine that you've got a platoon moving down a street.   On the parallel streets to your right and left you've got a section moving in tandem.   You may also have a fireteam operating a block ahead of the command element.  

Okay, the use of 'Bricks'. Yeah, I'm very familiar with this. We employed it (unofficially) a lot in Kabul while with 3 RCR (or at least, a few of us did, at the Section level.) I like it a lot, really, but you have to have trust in your 2IC, and in the individual soldiers in your section. You have to train a lot at the section level, so that everyone is always on the same net. But, it's very fluid, very fast, and very hard for the enemy to predict/interdict. Further, since they don't know exactly where your soldiers are, they have to be quite circumspect in their actions against you, as they have no idea whether or not they have white hats to their rear or sides.

Other then a reduced command and control what are the drawbacks to this system?

  with the new PRR radios, and if your troops are trained up enough, and familiar enough with each other, C&C isn't much of an issue anymore. It carries on up to the Platoon level very easily, as we used it to some extent in the MAGTF Ex. The PL Comd had a grip on the reins, and we Sect Comds worked together, letting our 2ICs have their bricks. With a few directions from him, a few on to our 2ICs, and a good idea of the Aim, OBUA/MOUT is FAST. Real fast. Fun, too!


(I just realized, I'm taking a break from doing Army work on the computer by taling about Army stuff on the computer. Man, I'm a LOSER!) ;D

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Exactly...The Brits use the term "Brick" whereas in the Marines we use the term "Fireteam" to denote the basic unit of action.

I don't know if you've read any of these in the area of of small, semi-independent units (Brick/Fireteam) level, but I'd highly recommend:

Stormtroop Tactics : Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918
Bruce I. Gudmundsson

and some of the works of H. John Poole:
The Last Hundred Years - The NCO's Contribution to Warfare
One More Bridge to Cross - Lowering the Cost of War
The Tiger's Way - A U.S. Private's Best Chance For Survival

 

[ImanIdiot]

Ahh, sunny Victorville. I slept in their hospital parking lot on a road trip last year. woo nostaligia

Anyways, call me slow, however, I'm having a tough time picturing this whole satellite patrolling concept. Is it laid out almost like a fighting patrol on the move, only with larger flank security elements? Or am I way off here?

 

[Matt_Fisher]

MasterPrivate,

that's essentially what it is...a fighting patrol with your flankers operating semi-independently.

Check out the links I provided as they explain it in alot better detail.

Cheers!

 

[baboon6]

Don't know if this is the right place to ask, but I've wondered for a while, looking at photos taken in Iraq, Afghanistan etc. , why do some forces (British/Canadian, others) issue the PRR (or equivalent) to every soldier in a rifle platoon, while others (US Army/USMC) only give it to officers and NCOs?

 

[GO!!!]

It's more a matter of supply and demand, and what you are doing.

IE if you are mounted as a 031, you dont need individual radio, as you may only dismount for a limited time (depending on the situation).

If you are dismounted or light infantry, then you may have a Pl spread out over several hundred metres in all directions. This problem is even more difficult in FIBUA, where command and control can collapse quickly without good comms to all friendly participants.

Plus, we are the CF, why would we have enough of the kit we need?

 

[HItorMiss]

Actually GO every man in every platoon from the 3RCR battle group Op Athena Roto 0 had a PRR so in that case we had everything we needed and then some...so lets not slam the CF on that one, often on tour you have more kit then you have ever seen or will see again till your back on tour. The problem is that once your back in Canada you don't have the kit you need to train properly to use the kit you have overseas to it's fullest extent.

 

[291er_sigdev]

Personally I've never been impressed with the US Forces.. what they lack in quality they have in quantity.. This has always been a problem with the US Military. Loved being the OPFOR against any US unit.. Was not impressed when excersises had to be restarted after they had lost in less than 1/4 of the exercise lenght.

Forces that impressed me, were the Germans and the Isralies (sp) and a particular UK regiment.

i.e. in one area that I worked we had 1 person doing the same job as 10 of theirs.. in NAS Pensacola on my HFDF course we Canadians aced the course even though we were always terribly hung-over.. (we know how to soar with the eagles in the morning after flying with the owls at night).. the Marines I encountered there were the dumbest people I've ever met.. they were SO slow that sometimes the computer forgot what they were typing they were so slow.

Their radio discipline is the worst of ANY unit in the field (was with 1CBT GRP EW when in Germany)..

The problem that we have is lack of transport.. We knew at 2Sqdn 1CSR that by the time we got to the action it'd be all over.. why bother about moving Regiments when you are airlifting Divisions..

 

[Infanteer]

Personally I've never been impressed with the US Forces.. what they lack in quality they have in quantity.. This has always been a problem with the US Military. Loved being the OPFOR against any US unit.. Was not impressed when excersises had to be restarted after they had lost in less than 1/4 of the exercise lenght.

I'm unsure of the timeframe you are recollecting, but you'd be best to remember that this is a military that has been fighting a war for the last 4 years.  As PBI has stated before, cozy Canadian feelings of superiority are about to be popped.